{ "id": 3581252, "name": "CHARLES E. PRATT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RONDELL J. ANDREWS et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Pratt v. Andrews", "decision_date": "1987-11-05", "docket_number": "No. 85\u20143596", "first_page": "606", "last_page": "610", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "164 Ill. App. 3d 606" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "208 N.E.2d 12", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. App. 2d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2601895 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/58/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5533128 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 4", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5659937 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 F. Supp. 557", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4018294 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" }, { "page": "568" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/660/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 U.S.C. \u00a7 11107", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(3)" }, { "page": "(a)(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 C.F.R. \u00a71043.1", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 U.S.C. \u00a710927", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a71057.11", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 C.F.R. \u00a71057.12", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(k)" }, { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 C.F.R. \u00a7 1057.2", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 492, "char_count": 10212, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.336086283408427e-08, "percentile": 0.44022798240360733 }, "sha256": "7e87d7fc4bd04f3a782bf6ba5526b454c0ad32fb4cd0c6108fb27b4de0d95200", "simhash": "1:fca63ff4bcff31aa", "word_count": 1598 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:25.181183+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHARLES E. PRATT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RONDELL J. ANDREWS et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Charles Pratt (Pratt) appeals from the order of the circuit court of Cook County that dismissed the second count of his amended complaint. The dismissed count sought damages from defendant Express Freight Lines, Inc. (Express Freight), on the theory that Pratt was a third-party beneficiary to Express Freight\u2019s lease agreement with Rondell Andrews (Andrews) regarding Andrews\u2019 operation of a tractor and semitrailer. Andrews had driven the semi in an allegedly negligent manner, causing Pratt to sustain personal injuries. We affirm.\nBackground\nAccording to the well-pleaded allegations in Pratt\u2019s complaint as ultimately amended, Pratt sustained personal injuries on March 19, 1980, when the tractor and semitrailer he was operating on a highway in Hammond, Indiana, was struck by a semi being driven by Andrews. Andrews was operating the vehicle under a lease agreement with Express Freight and under the authority of Express Freight\u2019s Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) permit. At the time, Express Freight was an authorized carrier pursuant to Federal regulations. See 49 C.F.R. \u00a7 1057.2(a) (1986).\nAfter any tort liability that could be asserted against Express Freight or Andrews had been barred by the two-year statute of limitations, Pratt filed his complaint, in which he maintained that because of ICC regulations, Express Freight was required to clearly specify in its lease with Andrews that Express Freight had a legal obligation to maintain insurance coverage for the protection of the public. (49 C.F.R. \u00a71057.12(k) (1986).) Pratt also claimed that Express Freight\u2019s lease was required to state Express Freight\u2019s obligation \u201cto be completely responsible for the operation and proper maintenance\u201d of the semi which Andrews had been operating.\nPratt asserted that he was a third-party beneficiary of the lease between Andrews and Express Freight. He argued that if Andrews were not covered by Express Freight\u2019s insurance, then Express Freight breached the lease agreement by failing to obtain insurance. He also argued that Express Freight breached the lease by \u201cfailing to assume complete responsibility and control of the vehicle being operated by Andrews\u201d and by \u201cfailing to properly maintain the equipment.\u201d\nExpress Freight filed a motion to dismiss the count of the complaint directed to it, relying upon section 2 \u2014 615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615.) In this motion, Express Freight asserted that at the time of the accident, Andrews was the owner and driver of the semitrailer vehicle. According to Express Freight, Andrews had leased the vehicle to Express Freight for a trip to deliver various goods. Express Freight was therefore the lessee of the vehicle, and Andrews was the driver. Thus, under pertinent Federal regulations, Andrews was the owner/trip lessor and Express Freight was the trip lessee. Express Freight argued that under Federal regulations, it was obligated, as trip lessee, to maintain insurance coverage for its benefit and the benefit of the public, but not for the benefit of Andrews, the owner/trip lessor. See 49 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a71057.11, 1057.12 (1986).\nExpress Freight also maintained that Pratt was attempting to circumvent his own error. It claimed that Pratt could have filed a tort action for bodily injuries against Express Freight, or Andrews as employee of Express Freight, within two years after the accident occurred. In fact, Express Freight argued, Express Freight had insurance coverage to defend and be indemnified for any judgment resulting from such a lawsuit. Express Freight further argued that even if the lease agreement required that it be generally liable for any operation of the semi, Pratt was not an intended beneficiary of the lease. Finally, Express Freight asserted that Pratt\u2019s action against Express Freight was premature because Express Freight had filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the extent of its insurance coverage and that the declaratory judgment action was still pending and unresolved. Express Freight also argues that Pratt\u2019s action was premature because judgment had not been entered in the personal injury suit Pratt filed against Andrews.\nFollowing briefing and argument, the trial court allowed the motion and dismissed the count with prejudice, finding no just reason to delay enforcement of or appeal from the order. The trial court\u2019s order did not specify the basis for its allowance of Express Freight\u2019s motion to dismiss. Pratt\u2019s timely appeal followed.\nOpinion\nOn appeal, Pratt contends that count II of his amended complaint stated a claim that Express Freight breached its lease agreement with Andrews, and that Pratt, as a third-party beneficiary, is entitled to damages for injuries he sustained as a result of Express Freight\u2019s breach. Specifically, Pratt asserts that the lease agreement obligated Express Freight to obtain liability insurance covering Andrews as an insured. Pratt claims that Express Freight\u2019s duty to obtain such insurance arises by virtue of ICC regulations.\nExpress Freight responds that it was not required to obtain liability insurance in which Andrews would be specified as an insured. We agree. ICC regulations do not require Express Freight to procure such insurance. Instead, an ICC-certified carrier must obtain an insurance policy which is \u201csufficient to pay *** for each final judgment against the carrier for bodily injury to, or death of, an individual resulting from the negligent operation, maintenance, or use of motor vehicles\u201d under the carrier\u2019s permit. (Emphasis added.) (49 U.S.C. \u00a710927(a)(1) (1986); see also 49 C.F.R. \u00a71043.1(a) (1986).) Also, a \u201cmotor carrier *** that uses motor vehicles not owned by it to transport property under an arrangement with another party [must] *** obtain liability and cargo insurance on [the vehicles].\u201d (49 U.S.C. \u00a7 11107(a)(3) (1986).) A motor carrier/lessee is also required to \u201chave control of and be responsible for operating those [leased] motor vehicles.\u201d (49 U.S.C. \u00a7 11107(a)(4) (1986).) Consequently, a lease between a carrier and a driver must provide that the carrier has \u201cexclusive possession, control and use of the equipment for the duration of the lease\u201d and that the carrier \u201cassume[s] complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment\u201d during the lease. 49 C.F.R. \u00a71057.12(c) (1986).\nThese ICC regulations do not requite that the carrier obtain liability insurance in which a driver is specified as a named insured. As the court observed in American General Fire & Casualty Co. v. Truck Insurance Exchange (D. Kan. 1987), 660 F. Supp. 557, 568, \u201c[A]ll the relevant federal statutes and regulations speak in terms of insurance covering final judgments obtained against the carriers. Since Congress has decided to impose liability on motor carriers for any negligent operation, maintenance or use of vehicles under the carriers\u2019 permits, it is not improper for the insurer to require that the carrier be made a party to the action in order to protect their interests.\u201d 660 F. Supp. at 568.\nThe court further reasoned that although \u201c[t]he effect of federal law is to make [the driver] a \u2018statutory\u2019 employee of [the carrier] [citation], [the driver\u2019s] employee status does not mean that he was or should have been an insured under the [carrier\u2019s] policy. *** Since the carrier has \u2018complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment\u2019 during the lease, 49 U.S.C. sec. 11107(a)(4), 49 C.F.R. sec. 1057.12(c), an injured party always has recourse against the carrier for negligent maintenance and/or operation of the carrier\u2019s vehicles\u201d (660 F. Supp. at 567), and the motor carrier/lessee fulfills its statutory obligation when it \u201cobtainfs] an insurance policy to cover \u2018each final judgment against the carrier\u2019 \u201d in accordance with 49 U.S.C. section 10927 and 49 C.F.R. section 1043.1(a). (660 F. Supp. at 567.) Thus, the court concluded, \u201cThe public is protected without requiring that the carrier also insure all its.drivers.\u201d 660 F. Supp. at 567.\nBased upon this analysis, we determine that ICC regulations do not obligate Express Freight to obtain liability insurance in which Andrews would be specified as a named insured. We also hold that Pratt has no standing to litigate the insurance coverage extended to Andrews or Express Freight. (See Batteast v. Argonaut Insurance Co. (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 4, 454 N.E.2d 706.) Consequently, count II of Pratt\u2019s amended complaint' was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.\nPratt argues that Reagor v. Travelers Insurance Co. (1980), 92 Ill. App. 3d 99, 415 N.E.2d 512, and Gothberg v. Nemerovski (1965), 58 Ill. App. 2d 372, 208 N.E.2d 12, support his theory that he is an intended beneficiary of Express Freight\u2019s lease agreement with Andrews. Both decisions are distinguishable from the case at bar, however.\nIn Reagor, the court held that an injured person is deemed to have an interest in the adjudication of insurance coverage disputes and is a necessary party to a declaratory judgment action regarding the coverage provided by the policy. Pratt does not seek a declaratory judgment regarding the scope of coverage provided by Express Freight\u2019s insurance policy; Reagor'is~therefore inapposite.\nGothberg is also distinguishable, since its holding is premised on distinct public policy considerations regarding automobile liability insurance policies. The policy at issue here is not for automobile liability insurance, and Gothberg is not controlling or persuasive authority with respect to Pratt\u2019s contention.\nBased upon these considerations, we find count II was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. As a result, the order of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLINN and JOHNSON, JJ.\u2019, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McMORROW" } ], "attorneys": [ "Craig M. Armstrong, of Armstrong, Surin & Engels, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHARLES E. PRATT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RONDELL J. ANDREWS et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 85\u20143596\nOpinion filed November 5, 1987.\nRehearing denied January 6,1988.\nCraig M. Armstrong, of Armstrong, Surin & Engels, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nPretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0606-01", "first_page_order": 628, "last_page_order": 632 }