{
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  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD BERTELLE, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bertelle",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD BERTELLE, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE CAMPBELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Donald Bertelle, an assistant public defender, appeals from an order entered by the circuit court of Cook County which found him guilty of direct criminal contempt and imposed a $200 fine. On appeal, defendant contends'that because his comments were not calculated to embarrass or to obstruct the court or to derogate from the court\u2019s authority and dignity, they did not constitute contempt of court. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.\nThe record indicates that the alleged contempt arose during the murder trial of Dennis Fox, who was represented by Bertelle, Clyde Lemmons and Judith Stewart, all assistant public defenders. During cross-examination of a defense witness, the State asked the witness if she recalled being interviewed by an investigator from the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office on an earlier date. Defense attorney Stewart immediately objected to the question. However, the witness replied before the court could rule on the objection. Stewart then repeated the objection and requested a sidebar. Ignoring Stewart\u2019s request, the court asked the State to tender a copy of the interview to the defense. The following colloquy ensued:\n\u201cBERTELLE: Judge-\nTHE COURT: Be quiet.\nBERTELLE: It is very unfair.\nTHE COURT: So are you being unfair.\nBERTELLE: I am not hiding anything.\n\u2022THE COURT: If you say anything once again like that, Mr. Bertelle, we are really going to have it. You have been badly trained. Judges have let you get away with things, and you had better not step out of line one more time in this case.\u201d\nSubsequently, during surrebuttal, defendant Fox testified that he had pled guilty with respect to his three prior convictions and, thus, had never gone to trial. During cross-examination of Fox, the following occurred:\n\u201cTHE STATE: Mr. Fox, if you learned anything from your court experiences in those other three cases that you were convicted of\u2014\nLEMMONS: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Let him finish his question.\nTHE STATE: You learned there is no profit or advantage to pleading guilty, didn\u2019t you?\nTHE COURT: Sustained.\nTHE STATE: .You go to jail when you plead guilty, don\u2019t you?\nFOX: Yes.\nBERTELLE: He is going along the same lines.\nTHE COURT: Sit down Mr. Bertelle. Sit down, Mr. Lem-mons.\nLEMMONS: Objection.\nBERTELLE: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nBERTELLE: Unfair.\nTHE COURT: Mr. Bertelle, I fine you $100. Put it up on the clerk\u2019s table and don\u2019t flash it because I w,ill \u00a1empty that pocket.\nBERTELLE: It is unfair, judge.\nTHE COURT: Put down.another hundred.\nBERTELLE: I do not have another hundred.\nTHE COURT: Then you will go in custody at the end of the day. Sit down. Send for a deputy sheriff, Mr. Sheriff.\nSHERIFF: Yes, your Honor.\nTHE STATE: You know, Mr. Fox when you plead not guilty that there is a chance that you might not be convicted?\nTHE COURT: Sustained. Redirect.\nLEMMONS: I have nothing further.\u201d\nPursuant to the record, an order was entered on December 5, 1985, holding Bertelle in direct contempt and fining him $200. Ber-telle\u2019s timely appeal followed.\nIt is well established that to sustain a finding of direct \u25a0 criminal contempt, it must be proven that the acts which allegedly form the basis for the contempt order were calculated to embarrass, hinder or obstruct a court in its administration of justice or to derogate from its authority or dignity or to bring the administration of law into disrepute. (People v. Siegel (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 167, 445 N.E.2d 762; People v. Miller (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 76, 281 N.E.2d 292.) Criminal contempt consists of an intent and an act, both of which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (City of Chicago v. Hart Building Corp. (1969), 116 Ill. App. 2d 39, 253 N.E.2d 496.) The necessary intent has been defined as a voluntary act by one who knows or who should reasonably be aware that his conduct is' wrongful. (United States v. Seale (7th Cir. 1972), 461 F.2d 345.) Under Illinois law, wrongful conduct is that which embarrasses, hinders, or obstructs the court in the administration of justice. (People v. Siegel (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 167, 445 N.E.2d 762.) In reaching its determination as to whether direct criminal contempt has occurred, the reviewing court may also consider provocation by the trial court and erroneous trial court rulings which may have triggered the attorney\u2019s comments. (People v. Pearson (1968), 98 Ill. App. 2d 203, 240 N.E.2d 337.) If it can be shown that the underlying cpnduct constituted a good-faith attempt by the attorney to represent his client without hindering the court\u2019s functions or dignity, a finding of direct contempt will be reversed upon review. People v. Miller (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 76, 281 N.E.2d 292.\nIn the present case, Bertelle argues that his remarks were not offensive, were not shouted in a boisterous tone and did not disrupt the court proceeding. Instead, they were merely part of a \u201cgood faith effort\u201d to represent his client. As evidence of his good-faith effort and his lack of intent to hinder, embarrass or obstruct the court, Bertelle points out that the trial court ultimately sustained the objection he had made which had given rise to the contempt order.\nIn response, the State contends that Bertelle\u2019s statements before the jury impugned the integrity of an officer of the court, which would lead the jury to question the fairness of the entire judicial proceeding. In support of its position, the State relies on People v. Siegel (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 167, 445 N.E.2d 762, and People v. Halprin (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 922, 457 N.E.2d 1010. In Siegel, defendant acted as \u201clegal adviser\u201d to Marie Rodriguez, a- self-proclaimed soldier fighting for Puerto Rican freedom who claimed that she was a prisoner of war and, thus, not amenable to the court\u2019s jurisdiction. Although defendant had been instructed by the court that she could not argue on behalf of Rodriguez until she filed an appearance, defendant refused to do so and during Rodriguez\u2019 trial, approached the bench from the spectator\u2019s section of the courtroom and proceeded to argue on Rodriguez\u2019 behalf. The court cited defendant for contempt and fined her $1,000. The appellate court reversed the judgment and the supreme court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the trial court. In reaching its decision, the supreme court noted that defendant\u2019s actions gave rise to a reasonable inference that her conduct was calculated to embarrass, hinder or obstruct the court in the administration of justice. The supreme court further noted that if defendant had wished to object to jurisdiction, she could have filed a limited appearance. Instead, she chose to behave in a highly disruptive manner.\nHighly disruptive conduct also served as the basis for the affirmance of a contempt judgment in People v. Halprin (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 922, 457 N.E.2d 1010. In reaching its decision, the reviewing court noted that defendant repeatedly ignored the rulings of the trial court, and that \u201c[djefendant\u2019s actions were not only contemptuous of the court\u2019s rulings, but hindered the court in its attempt to conduct voir dire examination.\u201d (119 Ill. App. 3d at 929-30.) In Halprin, defendant claimed in front of the prospective jurors that, unless she was allowed to conduct the venire in her own way, she would not be able to select a jury. After the court informed defendant that she would have to submit all additional questions, other than those for clarification, to the court in writing, defendant continued to argue about her statutory right to question the venire, in the presence of prospective jurors. In addition, defendant repeated several times in the venire\u2019s presence that the court\u2019s questions were inadequate and, as a result, she could not make a rational determination. In fact, defendant made this statement immediately following a warning by the court that if she did not make a decision as to whether she was going to select a panel, she would be held in contempt. When defendant finally accepted a panel, she stated that she was doing so with \u201ctotally inadequate information.\u201d Defendant continued to make similar comments in the presence of the prospective jurors, despite warnings by the court not to do so on the grounds that she had already made an adequate record for an appeal on the matter regarding voir dire examination.\nWe find Siegel and Halprin readily distinguishable from the case at bar on the grounds that the conduct in these cases is unquestionably more egregious and acted to blatantly disrupt the court proceeding by consciously disregarding court orders. By contrast, in the present case, Bertelle merely stated twice that the court\u2019s response to his objection was \u201cunfair.\u201d Further, there is no indication in the record that these isolated comments created a significant disruption of the court proceedings. While we do not condone such comments, we do not find that they provide an adequate basis for a contempt conviction, especially in light of the fact that, after Bertelle\u2019s second comment, the trial court reversed itself on the ruling which had prompted the contempt order. In our view, Bertelle\u2019s comments were no more than vigorous, good-faith attempts to represent his client\u2019s interests and were not made with the requisite intent to embarrass, hinder or obstruct the court in its administration of justice.\nIn reaching our decision, we find People v. Pearson (1968), 98 Ill. App. 2d 203, 240 N.E.2d 337, factually similar to the present case and persuasive in its analysis. In Pearson, during trial, defendant commented to the judge, \u201cI think' your, bias is showing,\u201d and was found to be in contempt. On appeal, the reviewing court recognized that defendant\u2019s comment was improper, but held that it did not constitute contempt. The Pearson court further noted that defendant may have been provoked by the trial court\u2019s prior erroneous rulings during trial and concluded that the defendant\u2019s conduct was no more than strenuous representation of his client\u2019s interests. Similarly, in our case, the trial court\u2019s initial ruling on defendant\u2019s objection to the State\u2019s continued line of improper questioning clearly provoked Ber-telle\u2019s comment. Although provocation does not provide a defense to contempt, the circumstances of the trial proceeding and the egregious nature of the comments are properly weighed in the determination of whether the requisite intent had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. (See United States ex rel. Robson v. Oliver (7th Cir. 1972), 470 F.2d 10.) We conclude that this burden of proof was not satisfied in the present case.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.\nReversed.\nQUINLAN, P.J., and MANNING, J., concur,",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE CAMPBELL"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Ronald' P. Alwin, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Kathleen A. Bom, and Aaron Iverson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD BERTELLE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 85\u20143739\nOpinion filed December 14, 1987.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Ronald' P. Alwin, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Kathleen A. Bom, and Aaron Iverson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0831-01",
  "first_page_order": 853,
  "last_page_order": 858
}
