{ "id": 3613622, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GROVER SARGEANT, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sargeant", "decision_date": "1987-12-31", "docket_number": "No. 4-87-0383", "first_page": "10", "last_page": "14", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 10" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 614", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 918", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3505645 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0918-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3578178 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 1132", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3648533 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 N.E.2d 1186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1188" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 1088", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465843 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1091" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/1088-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. App. 3d 1164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 462, "char_count": 9500, "ocr_confidence": 0.8, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.719567370958748e-08, "percentile": 0.2961705489393397 }, "sha256": "2a0485f6e0b77c06d4729f29a1bafbc6c922a463dfad36535463450bc31fe2d4", "simhash": "1:31260bb362439521", "word_count": 1604 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:33.943810+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GROVER SARGEANT, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Grover Sargeant was charged April 15, 1987, with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 11\u2014501(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014501(a)(2)). Pursuant to section 11\u2014 501.l(f\u20141) of the Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014501.1(f\u20141)), the arresting officer served notice of statutory summary suspension on defendant when defendant refused to submit to chemical testing. On defendant\u2019s petition, the trial court rescinded the statutory summary suspension. The State appeals. We reverse.\nAt 4:56 p.m. on April 15, 1987, defendant was cited for driving under the influence of alcohol (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014501(a)(2)). At 5:21 p.m. the arresting officer issued a \u201cWarning to Motorist\u201d form notifying defendant of the effects of refusal or failure to complete or pass chemical tests. Defendant refused to submit to testing. The officer served immediate notice of statutory summary suspension, issuing a \u201cLaw Enforcement Sworn Report\u201d (report) which contained the following paragraph:\n\u201cUnder penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1\u2014 109 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct.\u201d\nThe officer signed the report on the line provided. The form did not contain a space for the officer to swear under oath before an official authorized to administer oaths. The suspension was effective 46 days following issuance.\nOn April 30, 1987, defendant filed a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. A confirmation form filed April 30, 1987, showed the suspension would run from May 31, 1987, to November 30, 1987.\nAt the rescission hearing June 1, 1987, the judge found the report, although certified pursuant to section 1\u2014109 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 1\u2014109), did not constitute a sworn report under section 11\u2014501.1(d) of the Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014501.1(d)). The trial judge based his decision on People v. Sullivan (1987), 151 Ill. App. 3d 1164 (unpublished Rule 23 order). As a Rule 23 order, the decision is not precedential. (107 Ill. 2d R. 23.) Therefore, we need not consider it. The court rescinded the statutory summary suspension, and this appeal followed.\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether certification under section 1\u201409 of the Code constitutes a sworn report under the requirements of section 11\u2014501.1(d) of the Vehicle Code. We conclude it does.\nSection 1 \u2014 109 of the Code states in pertinent part:\n\u201cUnless otherwise expressly provided by rule of the Supreme Court, whenever in this Code any *** pleading filed in any court of this State is required or permitted to be verified, or made, sworn to or verified under oath, such requirement or permission is hereby defined to include a certification of such pleading, affidavit or other document under penalty of perjury as provided in this Section.\n*** The person or persons having knowledge of the matters stated in a pleading, affidavit or other document certified in accordance with this Section shall subscribe to a certification in substantially the following form: Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to such matters the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he verily believes the same to be true.\nAny pleading, affidavit or other document certified in accordance with this Section may be used in the same manner and with the same force and effect as though subscribed and sworn to under oath.\nAny person who makes a false statement, material to the issue or point in question, which he does not believe to be true, in any pleading, affidavit or other document certified by such person in accordance with this Section shall be guilty of a Class 3 felony.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 1\u2014109.\nPeople v. Morrison (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 508 N.E.2d 1186, and People v. Angelino (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 632, 513 N.E.2d 1132, control the disposition of this case. In Morrison, the court ruled the Vehicle Code was satisfied where the arresting officer signed and filed an attached document entitled \u201cVerification and Certification\u201d which was certified in accordance with section 1\u2014109 of the Code. Since summary suspension proceedings are civil in nature, the court stated the \u201csworn report\u201d was equivalent to a pleading. The panel noted that since perjury was the penalty for filing a false certification, the document qualified as a pleading under the Code. Morrison, 155 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1091, 508 N.E.2d 1186, 1188.\nMorrison was relied upon in Angelino, in which the court initially examined the purpose of the sworn report under the Vehicle Code. It concluded that under the former act relating to suspensions, the purpose of the sworn report was to notify the circuit clerk, not the Secretary of State. Therefore, the definition of \u201csworn\u201d depended upon what would be a sworn report for purposes of filing a document with the circuit clerk. Since documents required to be sworn to may be certified under penalty of perjury under the Code, the implied consent hearings are civil in nature, and section 2\u2014118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 2\u2014118.1(b)) provides that hearings relating to summary suspensions shall proceed in the same manner as other civil proceedings, section 1\u2014109 was held to apply.\nIn People v. Farrell (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 690, 511 N.E.2d 265, we rejected on due process grounds the State\u2019s attempt to amend the language of the report (\u201cI further solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm ***\u201d) by adding a section 1\u2014109 certification as late as the time of the hearing. We affirmed the rescission of the statutory summary suspension in Farrell based on a report form which did not contain a place for a notary\u2019s affirmation or a statement that the information was written subject to penalty for perjury. Here, section 1\u2014109 of the Code makes the giving of a false statement in a certified document a Class 3 felony.\nUnder the rationales in Morrison and Angelino, since the certification paragraph in the case at bar complied with section 1\u2014109 of the Code, the report was sworn as required by section 11\u2014501.1(d) of the Vehicle Code. We note the Vehicle Code does not define \u201csworn report.\u201d The Vehicle Code also does not expressly adopt the Code of Civil Procedure. We invite the legislature to address this matter.\nAn additional concern involves the further disposition of this case in the circuit court. Section 2\u2014118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code specifies that when notice is served under section 11\u2014501.1, the person may request a hearing. The circuit court shall conduct the hearing within 30 days after the receipt of the written request. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 2\u2014118.1(b).) The petition to rescind filed April 30, 1987, specified the grounds on which defendant sought rescission. A paragraph at the bottom of the form petition stated, \u201cThe hearing will be held within 30 days after receipt of the petition to rescind statutory summary suspension.\u201d The petition to rescind, therefore, constituted a request for hearing.\nSection 11\u2014501.1(g) provides the statutory summary suspension takes effect on the 46th day following the date the notice was served. It is apparent that defendant is now precluded from contesting the suspension of his license since more than 45 days have passed since notice was served April 15, 1987. We do not believe the legislature intended this result. At the hearing held June 1, 1987, the court did not reach the issues of reasonable grounds and improper arrest, as it rescinded the statutory summary suspension at the outset for lack of a sworn report.\nIn In re Summary Suspension of Driver\u2019s License of Trainor (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 918, 510 N.E.2d 614, the hearing on defendant\u2019s statutory summary suspension did not occur within the 30 days required by section 2\u2014118.1(b), in part because defendant requested a change of judge. We held that in such cases, the 30 days within which the implied consent hearing must be held begins to run when the new judge is furnished with a copy of the hearing request. (156 Ill. App. 3d at 923, 510 N.E.2d at 617.) Here, due process requires that defendant have a hearing on his petition to rescind. The 45-day period in section 11\u2014501.1(g) shall begin anew from the date of the mandate issued by this court. The circuit court shall hold the hearing on the petition to rescind within 30 days from the date of the mandate. Defendant need not file another hearing request.\nWe reverse the decision of the circuit court of Sangamon County.\nReversed.\nMcCULLOUGH and LUND, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Donald M. Cadagin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Gwendolyn W. Klingler, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Robert J. Eggers, of Holley, Keith & Huntly, and John S. Narmont, both of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GROVER SARGEANT, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201487\u20140383\nOpinion filed December 31, 1987.\nDonald M. Cadagin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Gwendolyn W. Klingler, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nRobert J. Eggers, of Holley, Keith & Huntly, and John S. Narmont, both of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0010-01", "first_page_order": 32, "last_page_order": 36 }