{ "id": 3614547, "name": "In re R.G. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Estella Daniels, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Daniels", "decision_date": "1988-01-11", "docket_number": "No. 2-86-1136", "first_page": "112", "last_page": "135", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 112" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5455316 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469559 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" }, { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3572408 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5661339 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 1273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5812888 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3571076 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469093 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3576435 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 Ill. App. 3d 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2684463, 2684423 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/14/0553-01", "/ill-app-3d/14/0553-02" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ill. App. 3d 946", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5583295 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/72/0946-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3336041 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 3d 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3349931 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/61/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3073635 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 902", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8500105 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "906" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0902-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3644427 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 877", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3650013 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0877-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3139219 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3267916 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 1007", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3576046 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/1007-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 1075", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3459032 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1077-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/1075-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687-95" }, { "page": "2064-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 N.W.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10688358 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/271/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 A.2d 939", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Conn. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 1950162 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/179/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 N.W.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Mich. App. 785", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 2279381 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/155/0785-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 U.S. 45", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 369864 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/287/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 1005", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3072594 ], "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1011" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/1005-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11333627 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/387/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3559683 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" }, { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3460336 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. App. 3d 1055", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3581199 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/164/1055-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1755, "char_count": 55631, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.125669006190667e-07, "percentile": 0.8609430511199687 }, "sha256": "ba3df5a66730608151f3791107a4f615b56ea0a38aeba8429502e95ecbece9f8", "simhash": "1:35c984a4e201e443", "word_count": 9581 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:33.943810+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re R.G. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Estella Daniels, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe respondent, Estella Daniels, mother of R.G. and B.D., a male and female minor, respectively, appeals from the orders of the circuit court of Winnebago County finding each minor to be abused, finding her to be an unfit person, terminating her parental rights, and appointing the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as the children\u2019s legal guardian with the power to consent to adoption. Neither Vernon Daniels, B.D.\u2019s father and R.G.\u2019s stepfather, nor Bobby Powers, R.G.\u2019s alleged natural father, are parties to this appeal. We note the respondent\u2019s contemporaneous appeal from her criminal conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault against R.G., which involved some of the same conduct alleged in the instant cause, has been affirmed by this court. People v. Daniels (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 1055.\nRespondent contends: (1) she received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the court erred by conducting a combined adjudicatory, dispositional, and termination hearing; (3) the court erred in not allowing her to be present during the testimony of her children; and (4) the court\u2019s finding of parental unfitness was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.\nWe sua sponte find respondent\u2019s statement of facts is argumentative with regard to the issue of whether she received the effective assistance of counsel and is otherwise insufficient to convey an understanding of the case as required by Supreme Court Rule 341. (107 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(6).) As stated in Midland Hotel Corp. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 53, 57, \u201cattorneys can properly present evidence that is favorable to their clients but not at the cost of this court\u2019s understanding of the case.\u201d The respondent\u2019s statement of facts will not be stricken, however, and, as in Midland, these comments are intended both as chastisement and warning.\nOver objection of counsel for Vernon Daniels and counsel for respondent, the court granted the State\u2019s request to have its petitions for adjudication, the dispositional hearing, and its request for termination of parental rights heard at the same time. The hearing began on November 3, 1986, and was continued once to November 24. After examining R.G. in chambers in the presence of the children\u2019s appointed guardian ad litem (GAL), the court granted the State\u2019s motion, over respondent\u2019s and Vernon\u2019s objections, to receive R.G.\u2019s testimony in chambers out of respondent\u2019s presence.\nOn direct examination, R.G. defined \u201cfamily touching\u201d as he, his sister, his mother and stepfather, Vernon Daniels, touching each other\u2019s genitals. R.G. would have sex with his mother and B.D. by putting his penis in their vaginas; he would have sex with Vernon by Vernon putting his penis in R.G.\u2019s \u201cbutt.\u201d \u201cFamily touching\u201d happened about every week, and it began when he was eight years old. Vernon would also place R.G.\u2019s hand over Vernon\u2019s penis in a circle around his penis and then move R.G.\u2019s hand back and forth; if R.G. did this for a long time \u201cwhite stuff\u201d would come out, but if for a short time it did not.\nIn R.G.\u2019s presence, B.D. would move her hand back and forth on Vernon\u2019s penis. Over respondent\u2019s objection, R.G. testified B.D. told him she and the respondent played with a penis-like thing which R.G. had seen under his mother\u2019s pillow. He said his mother and Vernon took five or six movies of him. In the last one, R.G., B.D., the respondent, Vernon and Duker, their dog, were present. Vernon was doing the filming; R.G. masturbated the dog\u2019s penis, the dog licked R.G.\u2019s penis, and R.G. put his penis in the dog\u2019s \u201cbutt.\u201d Vernon and the respondent were directing R.G.\u2019s actions with the dog.\nThe other movies were just like \u201cfamily touching.\u201d R.G. stated his mother did filming when Vernon and B.D. were having intercourse. In one movie, Vernon had a bull whip and whipped it at him and B.D.; once in a while the whip would hit them, but usually it missed. Sometimes in the movies he and B.D. got slapped or punched by Vernon and their mother. He didn\u2019t remember if anything sexual happened in the movies in which he was slapped and whipped. R.G. testified that once or twice his maternal grandparents, Clara and Dave Ginger, would be present at the filming and would hold the camera. His grandparents never did anything sexual to him, but they would punch and kick B.D. and him.\nR.G. testified Tim B. lived a couple houses away from R.G.\u2019s grandparents. He did not know how old Tim was. R.G. testified Tim B. sexually abused him in Tim\u2019s backyard shed; R.G. told his grandparents about this, but they would not listen. R.G. testified that when his uncle died and B.D. and his mother went to Peoria on July 28, 1985, he was alone with Vernon. R.G. testified Vernon had anal intercourse with him on that day; it was a Sunday, and it happened in Vernon\u2019s bedroom.\nOn cross-examination by counsel for Vernon, R.G. admitted he did not tell anyone in authority right away about Vernon\u2019s having intercourse with him. He also admitted he had stated to the authorities that various neighbors had sexually abused him, but that it was not true. R.G. stated it also was not true that his mother'or his parents had killed someone. The camera used made films that were shown on. a projector; he admitted it was untrue that Vernon transferred film so it could be played on their \u201cRCS\u201d movie player. R.G. stated he first said nothing happened when he came into foster care because his parents told him that if he told, they would come after him and hurt him. He remembered the statement he made to police on October 11, 1985; the incident related therein in which Vernon was in the kitchen and made R.G. have anal intercourse with him occurred on July 28, 1985; the other incident of anal intercourse in the bedroom was on another date.\nR.G. stated that sometimes he and boys named Chris and Justin would go out in a cornfield and look at magazines depicting nude people doing sexual things. R.G. stated that he and a boy named Louie had sex with B.D. in the cornfield on one occasion in 1985. He got the magazines from under his parents\u2019 bed. His parents did not know that he took them until a neighbor, Mrs. Long, found out, and that same day he and B.D. were taken into foster care.\nOn cross-examination by counsel for respondent, R.G. stated he had sex with Tim B. possibly four times. On those occasions, Tim, who was \u201ca lot older\u201d than R.G., \u201calmost 20,\u201d would put his penis in R.G.\u2019s \u201cbutt\u201d and then R.G. would put his penis in Tim\u2019s \u201cbutt.\u201d When Tim\u2019s sister, Brandy, was not at home, B.D. played with Tim and R.G. one time. His relationship with Tim started about the same time the \u201cfamily touching\u201d did.\nR.G. never saw any of the movies that were made. He did not know if the movies were ever taken to be developed. R.G. stated Vernon has two bull whips; they were hung on the deer head that they have in their home. Their dog, Duker, was part German shepherd and part collie and was about 10 years old. The movie R.G. made with the dog was made when R.G. was 11 years old. R.G. stated his grandparents filmed them on one occasion; they didn\u2019t kick or punch them at that time, but on a few other occasions they would do so.\nR.G. stated he changed his mind about telling about what had happened because he began to know he was safe and began to understand that the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys and the other attorneys don\u2019t punch kids. He admitted he told some lies along with the truths. R.G. stated when he had contact with his mother while he was in foster care, she would tell him that he had better not tell anything. He was mad at his mother only because of the things that she did to him; otherwise, he always liked his mom.\nOn cross-examination by the GAL, R.G. stated the things that happened to him happened in Rockford, and that nothing in his testimony that day was a lie; he knew the difference between a lie and the truth. He lied about things in the past because he was confused and trying to cover up for his mother. His parents told him he would go to jail if he told about it because he had gone along with it. R.G. stated he does not feel now that any of it was his fault, but that he did feel that way before and he felt guilty about it.\nR.G. stated his parents showed him about one-half of an X-rated movie showing people that just got married and about how to have sex. He stated his parents would not be there when his grandparents hit and kicked him, but that he thought they knew about it because his parents and grandparents talked a lot. R.G. stated the penis-like object vibrated when it was plugged into the wall. His mother never told him what she did with the movies after she and Vernon took them. R.G. stated his parents showed him Playboy, Chic and Hustler Magazines; his father told him he should read about these things because they were going to have some fun things like in the magazines. R.G. stated that when his parents wanted to do those things, they would tell him and his sister to remember about the magazines. When R.G. saw a movie with his mother in which a boy was licking a dog\u2019s penis and playing with the dog, R.G. stated he did not believe that could happen, and his mother sat their dog on the bed and told R.G. to take down his pants and the dog would lick his penis.\nR.G. stated there was a light mounted on the camera they used to take movies. R.G.\u2019s parents had a projector, and R.G. thought the movies they took fit that projector. He had not seen and did not know if his parents could develop the film. R.G. stated he never told his parents about B.D. having sex with Tim B. or Louie. He did not know if the movies had been given names, and he never heard his relatives talk about the movies.\nOn redirect examination, R.G. said the last time he saw the projector was in court the Wednesday before. On re-cross-examination by respondent\u2019s attorney, R.G. stated he did not see the movies or bull whip at the trial, but he did see the penis-like vibrator.\nUpon inquiry by the court, R.G. stated Tim B. put his penis in B.D.\u2019s vagina. R.G. did not do anything to make his grandparents angry, which would have caused them to kick or punch him. In one movie, there was no sex, but just pictures of Vernon and the respondent hitting R.G. and his sister. He first started seeing the magazines when he was about 10 or 11, after the \u201cfamily touching\u201d began. Examination of R.G. then concluded. After recess, and based on his interview with B.D. in chambers in the presence of the GAL, the court granted the State\u2019s motion over Vernon\u2019s and respondent\u2019s objections to examine B.D. out of the presence of her parents.\nB.D. testified that \u201cfamily touching\u201d meant when people have sex with their kids and have them touch with their hands you and your mom\u2019s and your dad\u2019s private parts. B.D. said the touching took place at her house with her mother, father, brother and herself present. She said she would touch her mother\u2019s vagina with her hand for a long time. Her parents told her to touch R.G.\u2019s penis, and R.G. would touch her vagina with his hand. B.D. said her father would put his penis in her \u201cbutt\u201d and touch her vagina. \u201cFamily touching\u201d happened a lot until August 22, when she left and was placed in foster care. During each \u201cfamily touching\u201d session, her father would put his penis in her \u201cbutt.\u201d B.D. said it started at home when she was six or seven years old.\nB.D. stated her parents made movies, and some were made at her grandmother's house. The one with the dog and the one with mother and daughter were made at B.D.\u2019s house. In the mother-daughter movie, she was directed to touch her mom and kiss her vagina, and her mother kissed B.D.\u2019s vagina. In the movie with Duker, the dog, B.D. stated her parents made R.G. put his penis up next to the dog where the dog would lick it, and put his penis up to the dog\u2019s \u201cbutt.\u201d\nFive or six movies were made. In one of the movies, her dad had a whip, and he hit her and her brother. She got hit in the head, but it really did not hurt. R.G. had a lot of white lumps, mostly on his back. In one movie, B.D. stated her grandfather put his penis in her \u201cbutt,\u201d and R.G. put his penis in her grandmother. B.D.\u2019s mom and dad were taking the pictures. B.D. said her grandparents lived in Sterling.\nB.D. testified her mother used \u201cthis white thing\u201d with a cord for her vagina. It did not make a sound, but when she took it out it had blood on it, and her mother had B.D. clean it. Her mother used \u201cthe white thing\u201d a lot of times. Sometimes in the bathroom and sometimes in the bedroom. She would use it in her bedroom when B.D. was watching television in there. B.D. testified her parents showed a movie once which showed how to do sex; they told her and her brother that it would teach them something.\nOn cross-examination by Vernon\u2019s attorney, B.D. stated when she said \u201cfamily touching\u201d happened \u201clots of times\u201d she meant about once or twice a month. She stated her parents never showed her the movies they took of her. The movies were made on a camera that had film on a spool that went through a projector. B.D. stated she thought it was an accident that her father hit her with the whip handle; he was trying to hit R.G.\nOn cross-examination by respondent\u2019s counsel, B.D. stated \u201cfamily touching\u201d and \u201csex touching\u201d were mostly both the same thing. The movies lasted longer than one-half hour but less than one hour. The first movie made was sex touching with herself, her mother, father, and brother. The one with her grandparents was second to the last. The one with R.G. and the dog was made after the first one when she was about five or six years old.\nB.D. stated she knew Tim B. and one time when his sister Brandy was out shopping, B.D. said Tim put his penis in her \u201cbutt.\u201d They were in a shed by the house. Tim also had R.G. get on him and Tim put his penis in R.G.\u2019s \u201cbutt.\u201d B.D. stated she did not know how many times this happened with Tim. She did not tell her parents about it because they didn\u2019t really care what happened because they did it too. The incident with Tim B. happened after her parents started making the movies. Tim lived behind her grandparents\u2019 house. Her father had more than one whip, and he kept them by the deer head. Her mother kept \u201cthe white thing\u201d in her dresser. The movie camera was kept at her grandparents\u2019 house. Just the dog and mother and daughter movies were made at B.D.\u2019s house; the rest were made at her grandparents\u2019 house.\nB.D. stated she didn\u2019t want to testify in front of her parents because she was too scared. Her grandmother and her parents told her not to tell the truth, but to lie. She was mad at them for telling her to lie. She said when her parents visited her in foster care they said they would have a \u201cWelcome Back Home\u201d party. B.D. said she took that to mean coming back and having sex and everything, and she did not want that. She learned the various words she used in her testimony from her parents.\nOn cross-examination by the GAL, B.D. defined three of the words she used during her testimony, and stated that all the things that were talked about happened in Rockford. The boys and girls in the sex movies she saw were older than she. In the \u201cfamily touching\u201d movie, her grandparents were running the camera. She never heard what happened to the movies. B.D. stated her mother often used \u201cthe white thing\u201d on her by having B.D. put it in her vagina.\nUpon examination by the court, B.D. stated the camera was one where you could show pictures and take them with the same instrument. She saw the one on learning how to do sex with that camera; she recognized the people in the movie from their pictures on the box. Every time her mother used \u201cthe white thing\u201d it came out bloody, and B.D. had to clean it. B.D. stated her mother tried to put \u201cthe white thing\u201d in B.D.\u2019s vagina, and B.D. put it where she (B.D.) wanted it to go. The cord was in then. It tickled her, but didn\u2019t make any noise. B.D. did not have to clean it afterward because there was nothing on it.\nLou Gadow, executive director of Family Advocate, was then called as a witness for the State. Family Advocate operates several programs for qualified rehabilitation of families in which physical and sexual abuse of children is involved. With no objection, Gadow was qualified as an expert in the field of sexually abused children.\nHer contact with R.G. and B.D. began in August 1985; she continues to work with B.D., but contact with R.G. has been interrupted by his placement in two different specialized treatment facilities. She averaged three sessions per week with the children during the period August 1985 to June 1986; she no longer sees R.G. that regularly, and, on a decreasing basis since January 1986, she now sees B.D. weekly.\nWhen she interviewed R.G. on August 23, 1985, statements he made caused her to suspect he had been sexually abused, but the circumstances were unclear. R.G. initially described how wonderful his home life was and how his family had no problems, but he then began describing his stepfather in negative terms and alluding to marital fights. He also explained that he was in foster care due to a neighbor\u2019s claim that he and his sister were being sexually abused; he denied that, and he indicated reasons why the neighbor would say such a thing, such as his stepfather getting mad and talking too loudly. Further, R.G. spontaneously denied having had sex with his mother and stepfather.\nWhen she interviewed B.D. on August 26, Gadow was questioning her about ways in which B.D.\u2019s mother showed she loved her. During the interview, B.D. did not use the word \u201cmasturbate,\u201d but she described what her mother did with what B.D. called \u201cthe white thing.\u201d B.D. described that her mother put it in her own vagina, sometimes while B.D. watched cartoons on TV in the bedroom. B.D. stated she had tried to use \u201cthe white thing,\u201d too. During another interview, B.D. stated her mother used \u201cthe white thing\u201d on days when her mother was bleeding, and it was B.D.\u2019s job to clean the white thing intermittently during those sessions.\nDuring the month of September, B.D. made reference to pictures, both as to film and stills and made reference to her mother\u2019s sale of pictures. B.D. said her mother\u2019s pictures were of ladies or adult people \u201cdoing it\u201d (meaning sexual activity) with various animals, such as a cow, dog and pig.\nIn an interview on April 9, 1986, B.D. was listing \u201cyucky\u201d things that had happened, and she listed when her father put his penis part of the way into what she called her \u201cbutt.\u201d That act was one of the ones performed in \u201cfamily touching.\u201d B.D. said \u201cfamily touching\u201d took place \u201clots of times since \u2018[she] was little.\u2019 \u201d B.D. had difficulty expressing frequency.\nIn September 1985, B.D. described some activities to Gadow being \u201clike in the movies,\u201d and, in October 1985, B.D. disclosed the making of movies by her family. In the September interview, B.D. said she wanted to show Gadow what it was like at home. B.D. designated Gadow in the role of her mother, the respondent. B.D. then devised several props out of paper, one being \u201cthe white thing\u201d and one a pretend-penis. B.D. then directed a scenario in which the mother had the daughter touch and lick the mother\u2019s genitalia and vice versa. The mother then told the daughter to \u201c[g]et the penis,\u201d which the mother was then to thrust in and out of herself. B.D. tried to crawl onto Gadow\u2019s lap, but Gadow would not permit actual contact during this scene being acted out. Because Gadow was not pretending to push the penis in and out, B.D. said she would be the mother. B.D. then performed an up-and-down hip motion, accompanied by moaning noises and a simulated orgasm.\nLater, after a break in this session, B.D. stated that R.G. was in a movie about a boy having sexual contact with a dog, Duker, which included oral contact between R.G. and the dog and vice versa, and simulated anal intercourse between R.G. and the dog.\nGadow testified B.D.\u2019s behavior and statements were consistent with those of a sexually abused child. Gadow stated B.D. also demonstrated behaviors that were indicative of physical abuse and threats by her family. Gadow stated B.D. had changed significantly for the better since being removed from her parents in terms of increased performance, increased I.Q., verbal skills and expression of herself. Gadow stated B.D. is more self-sufficient and able to go to school without fear of peer problems.\nOn continued direct examination, Gadow testified that on April 9, 1986, B.D. reaffirmed what she told her about her father\u2019s attempted anal intercourse with her, which occurred on more than one occasion. Beginning in October 1985, B.D. told Gadow about \u201cdirty movies\u201d she had been in where they did \u201cfamily touching\u201d including manipulation of her by her father. Her father had a whip in one movie, and her parents had wanted her to have sexual contact with Duker, but only R.G. did.\nOn July 18, 1986, Gadow discussed with B.D. her having visits with her relatives and her grandparents. Gadow stated B.D.\u2019s maternal grandmother had requested visitation and wished to be considered as a placement resource. B.D. stated she did not want visits with her grandmother because what R.G. said about her being the boss of the movies was true. B.D. stated her grandmother decided who was going to be in the movies and who was going to do what in the movies. Gadow stated B.D. had not had any unsupervised visits with her grandmother since her placement in foster care.\nGadow stated that R.G. clearly indicated to her that Vernon had hit him with a board and slapped him several times. R.G. was not interested in reuniting with his stepfather, and he had mixed feelings about his mother. R.G. stated he felt he (R.G.) should be put in jail, too, if they were putting his mother there because he did these things also. R.G. told Gadow he felt he was a sex offender, and he told her he had sexually abused B.D. and two of his cousins before being taken into foster care. As to why he did this, R.G. stated, \u201cI wanted to do it to somebody else instead of having it done to me.\u201d He was afraid he was \u201cgoing to be like [his] family.\u201d\nGadow testified the children denied any abuse only on the first day she met with them. After that, they gradually spoke about contact with each other and with Tim B. Neither child retracted his or her statement with regard to the sexual abuse by their mother and Vernon, but after his visit with his mother before she left for the Department of Corrections, R.G. stated he wished he had not told about it.\nBased on the children\u2019s behavior, statements, and their ability to visually, psychologically and physiologically relate various sexual acts, it was Gadow\u2019s opinion that they had been sexually abused.\nOn cross-examination by counsel for Vernon Daniels, Gadow acknowledged that she observed and R.G. demonstrated much rage at home and in school not only toward his parents but toward his foster parents, older adults, and other and younger children. R.G. many times made statements that were untrue which he later retracted.\nGadow stated the children had been medically examined, but she did not believe the exam was to determine whether they had been sexually abused. The report she saw showed neither child had a venereal disease. She stated that prior to disclosure of sexual abuse, the children\u2019s stories were inconsistent; after full disclosure in October, they were consistent regarding sexual contact with their mother and Vernon. R.G. first told her the magazines came from a garbage can, but later each child said the other had taken the magazines from the parents\u2019 bedroom. In September 1985 R.G. told Gadow he did not care if his stepfather went to jail, but he felt he could not tell the truth because his mother would go to jail. Gadow stated R.G. admitted to having sexually abused B.D. and two of his cousins before he was taken into foster care. R.G. did not abuse his foster parents\u2019 two-year-old nephew, however, although he said he did because he was angry with his foster parents.\nGadow was then cross-examined by counsel for respondent. The only reference she heard the police make with regard to using truth serum or a polygraph with R.G. was in connection with the alleged murder of a person by his mother. B.D. called the place where the movies were taken \u201cthe studio,\u201d and R.G. directed the police to a place where he said the studio was, but then he stated that was not the place where he said it was. R.G. ran away from the foster home once after discussion of his possibly being placed in a residential treatment program. Gadow stated B.D. had begun to adjust, but was still in need of treatments; R.G. continues to be severely disturbed and is in a specialized residence facility; he has done very poorly and is continually anxious. Gadow stated she believed R.G. was capable of lying about someone if he did not like him, but she was not sure he could stay with it once he was interrogated. Because of the doubt about what R.G. was saying with regard to the extreme level of sexual abuse he kept reporting, Gadow questioned him herself, and the truth of what R.G. was alleging was confronted frequently.\nGadow was then cross-examined by the children\u2019s GAL. The anger R.G. exhibited was typical of a victim of a male sexual abuser and also because his mother was one of the perpetrators. She knew that the police had found further magazines, a projector, a floodlight, a dildo, a vibrator and a sexually explicit film.\nIt was Gadow\u2019s opinion that the children had disclosed the full truth in October, because prior to that time, in September, R.G. had been upset and he said he was afraid he could not keep B.D. from telling the truth, and that it would be all his fault if the truth came out. In October, R.G. said he was having nightmares and wanted the truth to come out, but he was afraid to tell it. Gadow said they could not help unless they knew what the problem was. R.G. then talked with Mark Morrison, of Family Advocate, and remarked about his fear that his mother would go to jail and about what would happen to him if he told. Later that evening, R.G. told his foster parents he could not keep the secret any longer, and Gadow and Morrison were called. When the children began talking about the movies, Gadow felt the interview was moving away from counselling into investigation, and DCFS and the police were contacted to pick up the investigation.\nGadow believed B.D. had lied at times under the influence of her brother, but had been fairly truthful and honest. R.G. has also been fairly truthful about the sexual assault, but Gadow could not say he has been genuinely honest. The children\u2019s stories were consistent with each other after the disclosure on October 10 except that B.D. for a long time denied any sexual contact with the dog. Gadow stated the children both wished to be adopted and did not wish contact with their mother, Vernon, their grandparents, or their aunts and uncles.\nOn redirect examination, Gadow said the children were shown the movie by their parents to learn ways to have sexual contact; B.D. told the police that she had seen the movie which showed people of different sizes having sexual contact. Gadow said R.G. told her two stories about the murder which he had not actively retracted; R.G. just says he lied and will not say why he lied. Gadow stated she did not know whether to think it was a lie or not.\nOn re-cross-examination by counsel for Vernon Daniels, Gadow stated the children were together in the various foster homes where they were placed until R.G. was placed in residential treatment, and that they were very, very closely supervised in the foster homes. She observed B.D. lie under the influence of her brother in that when Gadow was with them, R.G. would make a statement and say to B.D.,\u201cB.D., tell them that is right,\u201d and B.D. would say \u201cThat is right.\u201d\nAlthough he retracted it on one occasion, R.G. continued to tell the story of the murder until April 1986, and he would add or change details. In the story of the murder, R.G. was the person who committed the shooting.\nOn re-cross-examination by counsel for respondent, Gadow stated on several occasions R.G. stated it was his mother who did the shooting. The police showed the children the box of the film which was recovered by the police from their home, and the children described what the movie inside the box was about. It was a commercially made movie. As far as she knew, the movies taken of the children were not recovered.\nOver the objections of counsel for Vernon Daniels and counsel for the respondent, the State tendered to the court certified copies of the convictions of Vernon Daniels for indecent liberties with a child and aggravated criminal sexual assault, and of E Stella Daniels for aggravated criminal sexual assault. In order to establish the relevance of the exhibits to the State\u2019s petition, the State called Virginia Steele to testify concerning the trial of Vernon Daniels for aggravated criminal sexual assault. A recess was declared in order to obtain the court file pertaining to that cause.\nThe State called Lou Gadow with regard to count X of its petition, naming Bobby Powers, and count XII, addressed to \u201cAll Whom It May Concern.\u201d Gadow testified R.G. and the respondent identified Bobby Powers as R.G.\u2019s natural father. R.G. told Gadow he had had no contact with Powers. The State represented that its efforts to locate Powers were unsuccessful and an order of default was entered against Powers on August 25,1986.\nThe court then took judicial notice of Vernon Daniels\u2019 conviction after a bench trial of aggravated criminal sexual assault against R.G. based on a three-page statement signed by R.G. which detailed much of the same evidence received by the court in the instant cause. The court also took judicial notice of Vernon Daniels\u2019 conviction in 1980 for indecent liberties with a child, T.D., another daughter of his, to which charge he pleaded guilty.\nThe court then took judicial notice of respondent\u2019s conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault against R.G. based on much of the same evidence heard by the court in the instant cause. At the request of counsel for the respondent, the court also took judicial notice that respondent was appealing that conviction. As noted previously, respondent\u2019s conviction for that offense has been affirmed by this court. The State then rested.\nVernon Daniels then testified, denying any sexual contact between himself and the children. He also denied he had any pornographic magazines, had shown the children a sexually explicit movie, hit R.G. with a board, or caused the children to commit any acts of intercourse or masturbation with a dog. He admitted he slapped R.G. when they were \u201cplaying around\u201d and stated all he ever used was a small ruler. When his wife and B.D. went to Peoria for a funeral, he and R.G. stayed home.\nOn cross-examination by counsel for respondent, Daniels acknowledged that the children played with their grandparents\u2019 neighbor, Tim B., who was 17 or 18. Daniels stated he took movies once at the grandparents\u2019 house; he had the floodlight with him. Daniels stated the police took a one-step camera from his house that was his. On cross-examination by the State, Daniels stated he did not receive any counselling after he pleaded guilty to indecent liberties. He did not feel he needed counselling. On cross-examination by the children\u2019s GAL, Daniels stated nothing happened with his daughter, T.D., and he pleaded guilty to indecent liberties because he was threatened that something would happen to him if he didn\u2019t. He does not have a VCR (video cassette recorder), but he has an \u201cRSA\u201d which uses records and plays them on the TV screen. He keeps whips on top of a deer head in his bedroom.\nCounsel for Vernon Daniels then rested, and respondent\u2019s counsel presented no evidence. Following arguments, the court rendered its judgment finding R.G. and B.D. abused minors. Its order irrevocably terminated the parental rights of Estella Daniels, Vernon Daniels, Bobby Powers and All Whom It May Concern, and named the Guardianship Administrator for the DCFS as the children\u2019s legal guardian and custodian with the power to consent to the adoption of the minors.\nRespondent first contends she was denied the effective assistance of counsel in that counsel inadequately, prepared for the hearing and thereby failed to present the \u201csubstantial defense\u201d she asserts was available to her as evidenced by reference to her criminal trial.\nAlthough the proceeding at bar was civil in nature, certain due process safeguards have been extended for the protection of juveniles (In re M.D.B. (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 77, 84), among them the right to counsel as found in the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. (In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 87 S. Ct. 1428; U.S. Const., amend. XIV.) This right to counsel has been codified and extended to the parents \u00f3f a minor who are parties respondent in a proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act (Act). (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 701\u201420(1).) Due to the instant respondent\u2019s indigency, counsel was appointed for her under that statute.\nContrary to the State\u2019s unsupported suggestion that counsel so appointed in a termination of parental rights proceeding should possibly be judged by a different standard of effectiveness than counsel representing a defendant in a criminal matter, it has been stated that implicit within the right to counsel is that such representation be effective. (In re M.D.B., 121 Ill. App. at 84;, In re Johnson (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1011, citing Powell v. Alabama (1932), 287 U.S. 45, 77 L. Ed. 158, 53 S. Ct. 55.) Although the specific issue in Johnson was whether counsel had labored under a conflict of interest, the cause nevertheless involved the termination of the appellant\u2019s parental rights, and we reject the illusory distinction drawn by the State. It would seem a useless gesture on the one hand to recognize the importance of counsel in proceedings to terminate parental rights \u2014 as evidenced by our statutory right for sam\u00e9 \u2014 and, on the other hand, not require that counsel perforin effectively. Moreover, as respondent points out in reply, other jurisdictions have applied to termination of parental rights proceedings the same standard of effectiveness of counsel as that applied in criminal cases. E.g., In re Trowbridge (1986), 155 Mich. App. 785, 401 N.W.2d 65; State v. Anonymous (1979), 179 Conn. 155, 425 A.2d 939; In re Voeltz (Iowa 1978), 271 N.W.2d 719.\nAccordingly, our determination of whether respondent shall prevail on her claim that she was deprived of her right to the effective assistance of counsel is guided by the standards set out in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed: 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052, and adopted by our supreme court in People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504. That is, respondent must show that her counsel\u2019s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different had there not been ineffective assistance of counsel. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-95, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693-98, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-69.) In determining whether there is such a reasonable probability, we must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge. (People v. Wilson (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 1077-78.) Errors in trial strategy or judgment alone do not establish that the representation was incompetent. People v. Bell (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 1007.\nRespondent contends counsel\u2019s failure to adequately prepare prior to the hearing prejudiced her in that no defense or denial was made on her behalf even though \u201csubstantial defenses were available.\u201d\nCounsel\u2019s fee petition in the record reflects that in October he spent one hour reviewing the file, one hour preparing a. writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum and conferring with the assistant State\u2019s Attorney. On November 3, the first day of the hearing, he had a one-hour conference with respondent. On November 24,' the date of the continued hearing, he had a two-hour conference with her. The remaining IOV2 hours expended was time spent in the hearing itself. It does not appear counsel reviewed the report of proceedings of the respondent\u2019s criminal trial, which was transcribed SVb months previously, or that he consulted with counsel for respondent at that trial.\nRespondent finds this amount of preparation to be analogous to his having been appointed on the day of the hearing, as was the case in Powell v. Alabama (1932), 287 U.S. 45, 77 L. Ed. 158, 53 S. Ct. 55), and claims the failure of counsel to investigate and prepare falls below accepted norms of performance. She cites in support People v. Bell (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 1007, and People v. Howard (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 138.\nIn Bell, counsel\u2019s failure to interview potential witnesses whose testimony may have supported the defendant\u2019s theory of self-defense was found, inter alia, to have caused a prejudicial denial of adequate representation. Similarly, in Howard, counsel\u2019s failure to discover a discharge summary from a mental hospital which supported the defendant\u2019s pretrial defense of incompetency and her trial defense of insanity was found to be ineffective assistance of counsel, in that it resulted in his inability to use it effectively at both of the defendant\u2019s competency hearings and at her trial.\nWe find distinguishable, however, respondent\u2019s claim of ineffectiveness here which is based on counsel\u2019s failure to call Dr. Charles DeHaan as a witness. Dr. DeHaan was the emergency room physician who examined the children in August 1985 after they were removed from their home and placed in foster care. Dr. DeHaan testified at respondent\u2019s criminal trial that he found no evidence of genital or rectal trauma to either child and testified that B.D.\u2019s hymen was intact. Dr. DeHaan testified that if an object larger than the hymenal ring had passed through it, the ring would tear and heal irregularly, leaving scar tissue, and that he did not observe any scar tissue. He also testified that an adult erect male penis should damage the hymenal ring, but he did not measure B.D.\u2019s hymenal opening, and he stated that an object that was too small or too soft would not have tom the hymen.\nRespondent asserts that this evidence was a substantial defense to the State\u2019s petition in light of the instances of sexual intercourse testified to at the hearing by R.G. and B.D., and that it was prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel not to have presented it.\nWe do not view this evidence as the type of \u201csubstantial defense\u201d evident in Bell and Howard, however. Those were legal defenses, defenses \u201ccomplete and adequate in point of law.\u201d (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 378 (5th ed. 1979).) Dr. DeHaan\u2019s testimony reveals no such complete and adequate defense. At most, it discredits the minor\u2019s understanding of what vaginal intercourse is and whether it occurred. It does not wholly negate the possibility of sexual intercourse,' however, considering the unknown sexual maturity and physical characteristics of the males involved, notwithstanding that tjhere was evidence of their approximate ages. Further, Dr. DeHaan did not testify whether, based on the minors\u2019 testimony concerning rectal intercourse, any evidence of trauma would have been expected to be found. Moreover, inasmuch as the State\u2019s petition alleged, inter alia, that the minors were sexually abused in that respondent caused them to be engaged in various deviate sexual acts, including cunnilingus and sexual contact with a dog, contrary to sections 12\u201413 and 12\u201415 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 12\u201413, 12\u201415), and as defined in section 12\u201412 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 12\u201412(e), (f)), it is unlikely that any diminishment in the minors\u2019 credibility created by Dr. DeHaan\u2019s testimony would have affected the outcome of the proceeding.\nRespondent next contends counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and utilize certain. testimony given by B.D. at respondent\u2019s criminal trial which was in contradiction to her testimony at the hearing, including several admissions made by B.D. at the criminal trial that she had lied about a number of things. She also contends counsel failed to investigate and utilize the possible motive R.G. had for lying about his mother (i.e., his recent discovery that Vernon was his stepfather and his anger at his mother because she would not divorce Vernon), and his \u00e1dmissions at trial that he had told numerous lies. She contends that failure to utilize available prior inconsistent statements and admissions to impeach testimony against an attorney\u2019s client can serve as a basis for determining ineffective assistance of counsel, citing in support People v. Bell (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 1007, People v. Howard (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 138, and People v. Wilson (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 1075.\nAs is evident from our discussion of the Bell and Howard cases above, neither one involved prior inconsistent statements but, rather, a failure to discover and utilize substantive evidence that would have materially advanced the defend\u00e1nt\u2019s legal defense. Further, although Wilson does involve a prior inconsistent statement, counsel\u2019s failure was in neglecting to apply a recently enacted section of the Code which makes prior inconsistent statements by a witness admissible as substantive evidence in a criminal trial. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 115\u201410.1.) Without the use of the statement as substantive evidence, the court in Wilson denied an instruction on a lesser offense, and the jury was instructed that prior inconsistent statements could be used only for the purpose of deciding the weight to be given the testimony.\nThe proceeding at bar, however, was civil in nature and section 115\u201410.1 of the Code is inapplicable. Accordingly, evidence of B.D.\u2019s prior inconsistent statements, R.G.\u2019s admitted lies, and possible motive to lie about his mother would only have affected the weight afforded their testimony by the court. Given other evidence heard by the court, which indicated reasons suggesting why both children initially lied about having had any sexual contact with their parents (fear of what would happen to them and to themselves) and also why they would continue to lie about some things (R.G.\u2019s guilt feelings, B.D.\u2019s list of \u201cyucky\u201d things she did not want to acknowledge), we find no reasonable probability that counsel\u2019s failure to discover and utilize this evidence would have affected the outcome of the proceeding.\nRespondent also contends she did not receive the effective assistance of counsel due to his failure to object to the \u201cpatently inadequate foundation\u201d for Gadow\u2019s qualification as an expert witness and to call respondent as a witness so that she could deny the charges.\nAs the State points out, Gadow\u2019s testimony concerning the statements of the children was not admitted as expert testimony, and counsel may have had personal knowledge of Gadow\u2019s qualifications which, as a matter of trial tactics, he did not wish to have emphasized to the court. Moreover, counsel\u2019s decision whether to object to Gadow\u2019s qualifications, and his decision whether to call the respondent as a witness, are clearly matters of trial tactics which are not subject to appellate review and which will not support claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Madej (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 201; People v. Clark (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 877; People v. Chitwood (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 730.\nAccordingly, we find defendant was not denied her right to the effective assistance of counsel.\nRespondent next contends it was error for the court, over her objection, to conduct a single hearing to adjudicate R.G. and B.D. wards of the court and to terminate her parental rights. She argues she was prejudiced by the procedure due to the varying standards of evidentiary proof.\nThe standard of proof and rules of evidence required in an adjudication of wardship are the same as in civil proceedings, a preponderance of the evidence. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 704\u20146(1).) In a dispositional hearing, the court may consider \u201call evidence helpful\u201d in determining the proper disposition, including oral and written reports, \u201ceven though not competent for the purposes of the adjudicatory hearing\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 705\u20141(1)), whereas any termination of parental rights must be based upon \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d that a parent is an unfit person as defined in section 1 of \u201cAn Act in relation to the adoption of persons ***\u201d (Adoption Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 1501(D)). (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 705\u20149(2).) Therefore, respondent argues, \u201cthe court would consider in the dispositional \u00e1spect, for purposes of termination of parental rights, which requires a stricter burden of proof, evidence which is \u2018not competent\u2019 for the adjudicatory hearing which has the lesser standard of proof.\u201d Specifically, respondent complains of the testimony of Lou Gadow concerning B.D.\u2019s favorable adjustment after being removed from her home and the feelings of the children about their parents and grandparents. Accordingly, she asserts, where the Act contemplates the holding of separate adjudicatory and dispositional hearings (In re Dalton (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 902, and In re L.H. (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 169), and where prejudice from a combined hearing results, such hearing cannot be considered proper. In re Prough (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 227.\nAccording to the record, the basis for respondent\u2019s objection to the procedure at bar was that' the different standards would be an \u201cundue onus\u201d on her, and that the State\u2019s petition was an attempt to thwart the spirit of the Act in that the State would not be carrying out its statutory obligatioh to provide remedial services for the purposes of reunification of the family. That is, a minor adjudged a ward of the court may be placed as: provided in section 5 \u2014 7 of the Act if the court finds that the minor\u2019s parents are unfit, that it is in the minor\u2019s best interest, and that \u201cappropriate services aimed at family preservation and family reunification have been unsuccessful in rectifying the conditions which have led to such a finding of unfitness.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 705\u20147(1).) The court determined that so long as the State wished to take on the burden of proving sufficient of their counts I through IX alleging the children to be abused minors by clear and convincing evidence \u2014 the burden in a termination proceeding \u2014 rather than by a preponderance of the evidence, as is the usual standard, it would allow the State to proceed on the petition as amended to include the allegations of unfitness set forth in counts X, XI and XII. The court also found by its reading of the cases submitted by the parties prior to argument, which were not included in the record here, that there is no absolute right to remedial services.\nIt is axiomatic that an objection must specify grounds for same and that no grounds other than those stated will be considered on appeal. Respondent\u2019s assertion here of prejudice presents a new ground for the objection which was not considered below and need not be considered here. On the merits, however, the evidence respondent complains of being admitted here ostensibly for disposition purposes was, in fact, specifically admissible in the context of the adjudicatory hearing. Section 4 \u2014 6 of the Act provides for the admission in evidence of:\n\u201cProof of the impairment of emotional health or impairment of mental or emotional condition as a result of the failure of the respondent to exercise a minimum degree of care toward a minor may include competent opinion or expert testimony, and may include proof that such impairment lessened during a period when the minor was in the care, custody or supervision of a person or agency other than the respondent.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 704\u20146(4)(f).\nAlthough we subscribe to the \u201cbetter practice\u201d of a bifurcated hearing as noted in In re Dalton and In re Prough (Dalton, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 906; Prough, 61 Ill. App. 3d at 231), we conclude respondent was not prejudiced by the combined hearing conducted here.\nWe find no merit in respondent\u2019s next contention that the court erred in not allowing her to be present during the testimony of R.G. and B.D. because it violated her right to be present as provided in section 1\u201420 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 701\u201420(1)). She argues that had she been present during the children\u2019s testimony, she could have assisted counsel in providing some defense to the allegations presented, particularly where she has contended that counsel was ill-prepared for the hearing. She distinguishes In re Brooks (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 328, on the basis it did not involve a termination of parental rights, which, she argues, \u201cis as drastic and permanent an action as can be taken\u201d (Blakey v. Blakey (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 946) and requires strict compliance with the applicable statutes. In reMoriarity (1973), 14 Ill. App. 3d 553.\nRespondent\u2019s right to be present at the hearing was only one of the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Act; she also had the right \u201cto be heard, to present evidence material to the proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, to examine pertinent court files and records and also, although proceedings under this Act are not intended to be adversary in character, the right to be represented by counsel.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 701\u201420(1).) We have determined above that respondent received the effective assistance of counsel at the hearing, and it is clear he reviewed the court file and discussed the matter both with the assistant State\u2019s Attorney and with respondent. Although he did not present evidence, he was under no obligation to manufacture a defense for respondent (In re M.D.B. (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 77, 80), and he cross-examined both children at the hearing.\n\u201cDue process is not a technical concept unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; rather, it is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as a particular1 situation demands. [Citation.] Procedural aspects of due process require that a person be given notice and an opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the case. [Citation.]\u201d In re E.L. (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 25, 33.\nThis flexible nature of due process is recognized in the Act wherein it provides that the court \u201cmay allow the minor to testify in chambers with only the court, the court reporter and attorneys for the parties present.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 704\u20146(4)(d).) Thus, the court here had discretion to exclude the respondent during the children\u2019s testimony. We find no abuse of that discretion where the court interviewed R.G. and B.D. prior to their testimony and determined that such exclusion would be in the minors\u2019 best interest.\nRespondent\u2019s final contention, is that the court\u2019s finding of unfitness was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. She argues the children\u2019s testimony was uncorroborated, save for the opinion testimony of Lou Gadow, which she asserts was based upon Gadow\u2019s selective belief arid disbelief of the children. She also discredits R.G.\u2019s testimony due to his preoccupation with things of a sexual nature and his far-reaching lies. :\nIt is well established that a finding of unfitness must be supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the finding will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (In re Brown (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 147; In re Harpman (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 504.) \u201cClear and convincing evidence is stated to be something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 544, 367 N.E.2d 1273.)\u201d (In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 214, 218.) The findings of the trial court must be given great deference since it has the opportunity to view and evaluate the testimony of the parties and witnesses. In re R.M.B. (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 523, 527-28.\nThe court here found the respondent was unfit as to each of the minors in that she had substantially neglected them, been extremely and repeatedly cruel to them, was a depraved individual, and had failed to protect them from conditions within the environment which were injurious to their welfare. Section 1 of the Adoption Act lists the grounds whereby a person may be found to be unfit. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 1501(D).) \u201cDepravity\u201d is one such ground and has been defined as \u201can inherent deficiency of moral sense and rectitude.\u201d (See In re Abdullah (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 300, 305.) A person may be found to be unfit on one or more of the grounds listed!\nBased on our review of the record, we find respondent\u2019s unfitness was proved by \u201cclear and convincing\u201d evidence and that no reversal is warranted. People v. Morgan (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 200, 206, relied on by respondent, was a prosecution for indecent liberties which, of course, required proof beyond a reasonable' doubt. The complainant\u2019s account there was not corroborated; she told a teacher a different version of an attempted sexual assault during the same month by another individual, and she had a history of fabricating stories. Based on that record, the supreme court affirmed reversal of the defendant\u2019s conviction based on insufficiency of the evidence.\nHere, although R.G. admitted he had lied in the past and B.D. was subject to his influence at times, their credibility was a matter for the court to determine, and, based on the record, we see no basis not to defer to its evaluation. Each of the minors testified separately and in detail concerning the litany of sexual \u201cfamily touching\u201d practices which occurred at the instigation of the respondent and her husband. There was expert testimony that the children had been sexually abused and that they were still either undergoing treatment or had been placed in a treatment facility as a result of the sexual abuse. Although the certified copy of respondent\u2019s conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault against R.G., by itself, would not support a finding of unfitness based on depravity (In re Abdullah, 85 Ill. 2d at 306), nevertheless, it must be viewed as corroborative of R.G.\u2019s testimony since he also testified in that cause as to \u201cfamily touching.\u201d Moreover, proof of respondent\u2019s abuse of R.G. was also specifically admissible as to her abuse of B.D. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 704-6(3).\nIn sum, we conclude the court\u2019s finding of respondent\u2019s unfitness was not against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nLINDBERG, P.J., and INGLIS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Bernard H. Shapiro, of Prairie State Legal Services, Inc., of Rockford (David H. Taylor, of counsel), for appellant.", "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and John X. Breslin and Rita Kennedy Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re R.G. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Estella Daniels, Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201486\u20141136\nOpinion filed January 11, 1988.\nBernard H. Shapiro, of Prairie State Legal Services, Inc., of Rockford (David H. Taylor, of counsel), for appellant.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and John X. Breslin and Rita Kennedy Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0112-01", "first_page_order": 134, "last_page_order": 157 }