{ "id": 3613092, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARY KAEDING, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Kaeding", "decision_date": "1988-01-25", "docket_number": "No. 2-86-1069", "first_page": "188", "last_page": "199", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 188" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5414169 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 1017", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2519890 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/16/1017-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5441203 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 891", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3591726 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0891-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3448082 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3464522 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3520297 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 784", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3562211 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0784-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3167414 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3415763 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. App. 3d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3226141 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/82/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3649177 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3125562 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. App. 3d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3538705 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/151/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156739 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3483104 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Ill. App. 3d 760", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2667895 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/7/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3603578 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 2d 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2553063 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/85/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 Ill. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5304913 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/385/0392-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 891, "char_count": 20667, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.10349831206375353 }, "sha256": "f8ce093381dc3a495f0ccd2a256d250af80f58468032cdad341bd8604d427a36", "simhash": "1:b13932d7f87e5237", "word_count": 3474 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:33.943810+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARY KAEDING, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of Winnebago County on September 8 and 9, 1986, the defendant, Gary Kaeding, appearing pro se, was found guilty of speeding and driving with only one headlight. In this pro se appeal, he raises 13 issues.\nAccording to the record, the defendant was issued two uniform traffic citations and complaints on October 17, 1985, at 8:10 p.m. by Trooper Craig Allen of the Illinois State Police. Defendant was traveling 63 miles per hour in a 55 mile-per-hour zone and had only one headlight illuminated. He appeared in court on November 13, 1985, as directed on the citations, and, according to the docket sheet, pleaded \u201cNG.\u201d Amongst numerous motions filed thereafter, the defendant demanded that a court reporter be present at all proceedings and that the cause be dismissed for jurisdictional defects.\nThe next hearing on December 20 was called for the purpose of plea negotiations; however, no negotiations occurred, and defendant\u2019s conduct in refusing to step aside and get the notice of the jury trial date caused the court to place him in a holding cell for 40 minutes. Thereafter, the defendant refused to sign the notice of hearing for January 17, 1986. Defendant filed a demand for trial by jury, and more motions to dismiss. The motions to dismiss were heard and denied on January 10. The docket sheet entries do not reflect a court appearance by the defendant on January 17, 1986. Defendant\u2019s \u201cAffidavit of Record\u201d contained in the common law record purports to detail the events on that date, and his brief is appended with a report of proceedings for that date under case number 86\u2014CM\u2014311 and case name \u201cPeople v. John Doe a/k/a Steve (no last name).\u201d Defendant\u2019s affidavit is not properly part of the common law record and may not be considered by this court. (People v. Berkowski (1944), 385 Ill. 392; People v. McGrath (1967), 85 Ill. App. 2d 388.) Similarly, the report of proceedings from the unrelated cause, People v. John Doe, is not properly before this court.\nThe docket sheet reflects the defendant failed to appear on February 3, but he filed a number of \u201cdemands\u201d and motions arising out of the events which purportedly occurred at the January 17 hearing. The two uniform citations were dismissed when the defendant failed to appear, leave was given to file verified complaints, and a warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest was issued. He was arrested and released on bond on February 4, and agreed to appear on February 7. The record does not reflect what action, if any, was taken on that date. In July, defendant filed another motion to dismiss the charges for lack of jurisdiction in that the 55 mile-per-hour speed limit was fraudulently enacted under threat of withheld Federal highway funds. The cause proceeded to jury trial on September 8 and 9, 1986. The defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss on the basis of lack of jurisdiction and for violation of his right to speedy trial were heard and denied. As noted, the defendant was found guilty as to both counts. On October 14, the court entered judgments of conviction and fined the defendant a total of $300.\nInitially we note defendant\u2019s brief fails to conform to the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341 in that it has an improper and inadequate appendix, no meaningful statement of facts, and\u2014 save for nondispositive references to sections of the criminal and traffic codes, the constitution and the supreme court rules \u2014 cites no pertinent authority in support of his arguments. (107 Ill. 2d Rules 341(e)(6), (e)(7), 342(a).) As frequently stated, this court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined and supported by pertinent authorities (Boeger v. Boeger (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 629; In re Estate of Kunz (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 760), and a reviewing court will not apply a more lenient procedural standard to pro se litigants than is generally allowed attorneys. (Harvey v. Carponelli (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 448.) In addition to the inadequacy of defendant\u2019s brief, defendant\u2019s post-trial \u201cMotion to Vacate Judgment\u201d specifies as error only one of the issues he now presents. It is clear that in criminal, cases tried to a jury, a written motion for a new trial specifying the grounds therefore must be filed by the defendant within 30 days of the jury\u2019s verdict. (People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 23; People v. Miles (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 485; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 116\u20141.) Moreover, application of the plain-error doctrine is not warranted in order to save the remaining issues. The doctrine of plain error \u2014 that is, an error or defect affecting substantial rights (107 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) \u2014 may be applied where an issue not properly preserved for review serves to deprive a criminal defendant of a fair and impartial trial or where the evidence is closely balanced. (People v. Friesland (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 369; People v. Bosworth (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 714.) Such is not the case here.\nIn our own discretion, however, and notwithstanding the fact defendant\u2019s argument is unsupported by citation of authority, we proceed to consider the issue defendant has attempted to preserve for review by including it in his post-trial motion: whether the court had jurisdiction of the cause. Defendant argues that it did not, since no plea was ever entered, nor was he either informed of the criminal nature of the offense or rearraigned after the two uniform traffic citations and complaints were dismissed and criminal complaints filed.\nContrary to the defendant\u2019s assertion, the common law docket sheet entry for November 13, 1985, shows the defendant pleaded \u201cNG\u201d to both charges. Moreover, his own \u201cAffidavit of Record,\u201d which is not properly part of the common law record, shows he appeared in court on that date as directed on the citations and that he did not respond to the court\u2019s thrice-asked question: \u201cHow do you plead?\u201d Section 113\u20144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Code) provides that, \u201c[i]f the defendant stands mute a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him and the trial shall proceed on such plea.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 113\u20144(b).) Thus, there was no error in the defendant\u2019s arraignment.\nAs to the criminal complaints filed after the uniform traffic citations were dismissed, the coitiplaints which were substituted charged the defendant with violations of the same sections of the Illinois Vehicle Code as did the uniform traffic citations. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 11\u2014601(b), 12\u2014211(a).) After the complaints were filed, defendant made no further objection to the court\u2019s jurisdiction on the basis he had not been arraigned, and he appeared and proceeded to trial pro se on the date set by the court. Under these circumstances, defendant has waived any claim of error with regard to arraignment. People v. Hahn (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 173; see also People v. Jones (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 600; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 113\u20146.\nWe comment briefly on the defendant\u2019s remaining contentions which, as noted above, have not been preserved for review and are not adequately presented.\nDefendant\u2019s contentions that he was not informed of the criminal nature of the charges and that the court erred in giving the jury the actual traffic tickets are refuted by the record. Each ticket clearly informed the defendant of the name of the offense and the statute violated, and, according to a docket sheet entry, the court explained the charges to the defendant, as well as his rights. Moreover, the report of proceedings shows the defendant specifically stated that he had no objection to the jury seeing the actual traffic tickets.\nDefendant next contends he was deprived of due process when the court incarcerated him at the December 20 hearing after he refused to comply with the court\u2019s order to sign a notice of hearing. Defendant further contends the court lacked authority to imprison him because no court reporter was present. The record shows the court remanded the defendant to a holding cell for approximately 40 minutes after he interrupted the court with \u201call sorts of comments\u201d when the court was trying to dispose of its call. Sixty-plus persons were in the courtroom at the time. Defendant\u2019s conduct constituted, in effect, direct criminal contempt, and in such instances, it is clear that the usual safeguards of procedural due process are not required. (People v. L.A.S. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 539, 543.) Moreover, the court\u2019s jurisdiction of the cause was not dependent upon the presence of a court reporter; the source of the court\u2019s jurisdiction is the constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. 6, \u00a79; see also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 16\u2014102.\nDefendant next contends he was deprived of his right to counsel. He asserts the court refused to allow him to have counsel despite his demand therefor and that the court erred in charging his \u201ccounsel\u201d with contempt for sittihg'in court with the defendant.\nAccording to the docket sheet entry for November 13, 1985, the defendant was advised of his rights, which includes the right to counsel (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 113\u20143.) No report of proceedings, however, has been submitted for that date. According to defendant\u2019s \u201cAffidavit of Record\u201d contained in the common law record, the court denied his request for counsel. As noted previously, defendant\u2019s affidavit is not properly part of the record, and the defendant has failed to provide a proper bystander\u2019s report. (107 Ill. 2d R. 323(c).) Inasmuch as the responsibility for presenting a sufficiently complete record is the defendant\u2019s, any doubts occasioned by the incompleteness of the record are resolved against him. People v. Turner (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 784.\nThe report of proceedings of defendant\u2019s next appearance in court, on December 20 shows he appeared \u201cwithout counsel.\u201d There is no indication therein that he had attempted to engage counsel or wished to do so, or that he was indigent and desired appointed counsel. The right to counsel of the defendant\u2019s own choosing may not be employed as a weapon \u201cto indefinitely\u2019 thwart the administration of justice or to otherwise embarrass the effective prosecution of crime.\u201d (People v. Vaughn (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 193, 197.) It does not appear from this record that defendant was deprived of the right to counsel, but rather that he used that right to further obfuscate the proceedings. Defendant\u2019s appearance in court on January 17, 1986, is not reflected in the docket sheet entries. Clearly, however, defendant had no right to be represented at that time by his friend, Steve, a nonlawyer. (People v. Schwarz (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 41.) Whether the court erred in finding Steve in contempt is a matter not properly before this court.\nThe defendant next contends the court erred by not dismissing the cause on the ground his right to a speedy trial was violated. Defendant filed a written demand for jury trial on January 7, 1986. Supreme Court Rule 505 specifically provides that a jury demand triggers the speedy trial requirements of section 103\u20145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 103-5). (107 Ill. 2d R. 505; People v. Lorah (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 163.) The defendant here did not actually post bail, however, until his arrest pursuant to warrant on February 4, 1986, after his failure to appear in court on February 3. Until defendant actually was on bond or recognizance, the 160-day speedy trial statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 103\u20145(b)) did not apply to him. (People v. Eblin (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 891.) Moreover, the record fails to show defendant demanded either a jury or speedy trial after he was released on bail on February 4. Thus, neither the speedy trial provisions of Supreme Court Rule 505 nor of section 103\u20145(b) of the Code were triggered, and the court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss.\nViewing defendant\u2019s next argument in light of his motion to dismiss and attachments thereto, we believe defendant is contending the court should have granted his motion to dismiss the speeding violation of section 11\u2014601(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014601(b)) because the Federal law which served to modify the stated 65 mile-per-hour maximum speed to 55 miles per hour had expired. As the State points out, this court upheld the validity of the 65 mile-per-hour speed limit in Illinois, stating that congressional placement of terms and conditions on States receiving Federal funds is constitutional, inasmuch as each individual State sets its own limit. (People v. Austin (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 213.) Moreover, assuming arguendo the Federal law had expired, defendant was permitted to travel 65 miles per hour \u201cunless some other speed restriction [was] established under this Chapter.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014601.) It is not clear from the record whether 55 mile-per-hour speed limit signs were posted in the area of defendant\u2019s travel. If they were, clearly the defendant was obligated to abide by them.\nDefendant\u2019s next contention is based on his misunderstanding of the unofficial paragraph title of section 11 \u2014 610 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, to wit: \u201cCharging violations and rule in civil actions.\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014610.) Based on this reference to \u201ccivil actions,\u201d defendant believes his speeding violation must have been civil rather than criminal and, consequently, he asserts the court exceeded \u201cconstitutional provisions.\u201d Defendant\u2019s contention is patently without merit. Section 11\u2014610(b) simply provides that the maximum speed provisions of the article do not relieve the plaintiff in any civil action of the burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant as a proximate cause of an accident.\nDefendant\u2019s next contentions are also patently without merit. He contends the trooper had no authority to issue him a citation, and that the court had no jurisdiction over him because he did not sign the citations and, thus, he made no promise to comply.\nState policemen clearly have statutory authority to enforce the motor vehicle laws (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 16\u2014102; ch. 121, par. 307.16), by issuing a uniform traffic ticket which constitutes a complaint to which a defendant may plead (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 111\u20143(5)(b)). The record shows defendant did not execute a promise to comply. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6\u2014306.2(a); 107 Ill. 2d R. 501(g).) We point out that section 6\u2014306.2 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, which provided the option of executing a promise to comply, has now been repealed by Public Act 84\u20141231, \u00a72, effective July 28, 1986. Further, the definition of \u201cpromise to comply\u201d provided in Supreme Court Rule 501(g) was amended June 26, 1987, effective August 1, 1987, to delete the option as being available to Illinois residents. That aside, Trooper Allen testified at defendant\u2019s trial that he issued the defendant a notice to appear (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 107\u201412) and defendant did, in fact, appear on November 13, 1985. Despite his refusal to sign subsequent hearing notices, defendant does not assert he did not have actual notice of the hearing dates. Moreover, the traffic citations were dismissed and verified complaints filed in their stead. Accordingly, we find no deficiency in the court\u2019s jurisdiction.\nDefendant next contends the size of the \u201coriginal process\u201d (the uniform traffic citations) should not have been accepted for filing since they are smaller than 8\u00bd inches by 11 inches as required by Supreme Court Rule 10. (107 Ill. 2d R. 10.) The common law record does not include the original process, however; rather, it includes copies of two uniform citations and complaints on S^a-inch by 11-inch paper as specified in Supreme Court Rule 10. Moreover, as the State points out, no sanctions for failure to abide by this rule have been set forth, and a reasonable sanction clearly would not include reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction.\nAs we understand the thrust of defendant\u2019s next argument, he contends that because he filed a written \u201cappearance\u201d on February 3, 1986, the court erred in issuing a warrant for his arrest when he failed to appear personally on that date. Clearly, only a personal appearance would suffice where the cause was continued to that hearing date. Further, the record shows the traffic tickets were dismissed and complaints issued that day. Accordingly, the court had authority to issue a warrant for his arrest. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 107\u20149.\nIn the next related issue, defendant contends his brief incarceration following execution of the warrant for his arrest violated the provision that the penalty for his traffic offense shall be no greater than a fine. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 1\u2014300, 16\u2014104; ch. 38, par. 1005\u20141\u201417.) The arrest and brief incarceration occurred after the criminal complaints were filed against him, however, and the incarceration was not in the nature of punishment for the offenses. He was fined $300 for those offenses in accordance with statute.\nDefendant\u2019s further contention that, upon his failure to appear, the court should have continued the cause for 30 days as provided by Supreme Court Rule 556 (107 Ill. 2d R. 556) is without merit in light of the fact of the filing of the criminal complaints against him thus warranting his arrest. Defendant did appear in court at the initial hearing in November and at subsequent hearings in December and January. Consequently, defendant did not \u201cfail to appear\u201d as contemplated in Supreme Court Rule 556. 107 Ill. 2d R. 556.\nDefendant\u2019s next contentions are that the court erred by not keeping an accurate record of the proceedings on December 20, 1985, that it erred when it \u201clost\u201d his affidavit purporting to recount the early events of that date when no court reporter was present, and that it was error for the docket sheet not to reflect the filing of various motions by him.\nDefendant fails to show how any of these asserted errors prejudiced him, and we perceive no prejudice. It has been stated that a verbatim transcript is not required of all criminal proceedings (People v. Kline (1974), 16 Ill. App. 3d 1017, aff\u2019d (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 246), particularly where the defendant, upon conviction, is subject only to a fine, not imprisonment. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, pars. 661, 663.) Moreover, although the cause was up for pretrial, no plea negotiations occurred, and the matter was simply continued to a February date. The error, if any, in the \u201closing\u201d of defendant\u2019s affidavit, which was file-date stamped, but not included in the common law record, was harmless. As noted previously, defendant\u2019s affidavit is no substitute for a proper bystander\u2019s report and is not properly part of the common law record. (107 Ill. 2d R. 323(c).) Also harmless was the error, if any, in the failure of the hand-written docket sheet to reflect with specificity the filing of several of defendant\u2019s numerous motions where all the motions were included in the common law record.\nDefendant\u2019s final contention is that the court erred in refusing his tendered jury instructions. He argues that without the \u201clegal definitions\u201d of the words \u201coperating,\u201d \u201cvehicle,\u201d \u201cdriving,\u201d and \u201cof-fence [sic],\u201d the jury could not determine if he had violated the statutes. Defendant\u2019s proposed instructions, in addition to being non-Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, did not purport to define those terms. The term \u201cvehicle\u201d is the only one of the four which is defined in the statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 1\u2014217); the others have commonly understood meanings. The car Trooper Allen testified defendant was driving easily falls within that legal definition of \u201cvehicle,\u201d and the defendant has not argued he was not \u201coperating\u201d or \u201cdriving\u201d a vehicle. Further, the jury was clearly instructed as to the elements of each offense against the defendant. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing defendant\u2019s tendered instructions.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed, and the State\u2019s request that costs be taxed is granted.\nJudgment affirmed.\nNASH and INGLIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary Kaeding, of Rockton, appellant pro se.", "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARY KAEDING, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201486\u20141069\nOpinion filed January 25, 1988.\nGary Kaeding, of Rockton, appellant pro se.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0188-01", "first_page_order": 210, "last_page_order": 221 }