{
  "id": 3614077,
  "name": "WINDOLYN J. HULL, Adm'r of the Estate of Ernest Hull, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hull v. City of Chicago",
  "decision_date": "1987-12-24",
  "docket_number": "No. 87-0938",
  "first_page": "732",
  "last_page": "734",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 732"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "369 N.E.2d 188",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "53 Ill. App. 3d 1019",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3392398
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "1021"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/53/1019-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "390 N.E.2d 1270",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "72 Ill. App. 3d 622",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        5585120
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "625"
        },
        {
          "page": "624-25"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/72/0622-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "496 N.E.2d 1034",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 124",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3572545
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "126"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/146/0124-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 303,
    "char_count": 4031,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.774,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 2.813582839640897e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8377918944309108
    },
    "sha256": "d0b484378168ec65da5f720cb02ac7301fe254e0eacbc611af9dcf859ebdfd6f",
    "simhash": "1:3173181549e2b401",
    "word_count": 657
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:33.943810+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "WINDOLYN J. HULL, Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Ernest Hull, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Windolyn J. Hull, administrator of the estate of Ernest Hull, appeals from an order dismissing 11 of 12 subparagraphs of her complaint charging defendant, the City of Chicago (the City), with negligence. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order.\nPlaintiff\u2019s decedent, Ernest Hull, was killed as a result of an accident which occurred in the 4900 block of South Lake Shore Drive on September 28, 1979, when a southbound vehicle driven by Robert Drain crossed the median and collided with Hull\u2019s northbound vehicle. Plaintiff\u2019s second amended complaint contained two counts: count I alleged that the City was negligent in maintaining and repairing the roadway where the accident occurred. Paragraph 7 of count I described the negligent acts or omissions in 12 separate subparagraphs. Count II alleged that the action survived by virtue of the survivorship statute. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110\u00bd, par. 27\u20146.\nOn defendant\u2019s motion, the circuit court, on January 20, 1987, dismissed subparagraphs (b) through (1) of paragraph 7 of each count. Subparagraph (a), which alleged that defendant was negligent in permitting a chunk or block of concrete to remain on the southbound lanes of the roadway, was not dismissed. Plaintiff\u2019s motions for reconsideration and rehearing were denied on February 18, 1987, and March 19, 1987. On March 26, 1987, the court made an express finding that the order entered on March 19, 1987, denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for a rehearing on her motion to reconsider, was \u201cfinal and appealable\u201d and that \u201cthere is no just cause to delay enforcement or appeal.\u201d This appeal followed.\nAn order is final and thus appealable if it either terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits or disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or a separate branch thereof. (Village of Burnham v. Cook (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 124, 126, 496 N.E.2d 1034.) Thus, the question in this appeal is whether the order of January 20, 1987, disposed of the rights of the parties on any branch of the action. In our judgment, it did not.\nPlaintiff\u2019s action involves a single claim of negligence against one defendant. Although paragraph 7 of plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged various negligent acts or omissions, only one theory of recovery was advanced \u2014 negligence. The statement of a single claim in several ways, by multiple subparagraphs, does not warrant a separate appeal upon dismissal of less than all of those subparagraphs. (Prado v. Evanston Hospital (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 622, 625, 390 N.E.2d 1270.) Thus, the dismissal of subparagraphs (b) through (1), which left sub-paragraph (a) standing, did not determine the merits of a separate cause of action or terminate any litigation between the parties. The order of dismissal merely determined which allegations of negligence would be allowed to remain. The order was not final and appealable. 72 Ill. App. 3d at 624-25.\nThe Rule 304(a) (107 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) finding of March 26, 1987, did not make the order of dismissal final and appealable because the rule is intended to apply only where multiple claims or parties are involved. It is not designed to permit appeals from orders that dispose of less than all of the issues in an action involving a single party and a single claim. Coble v. Chicago Health Club, Inc. (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 1021, 369 N.E.2d 188.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we dismiss plaintiffs appeal.\nAppeal dismissed.\nLORENZ and MURRAY, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Philip F. Maher, of Chicago (Michael W. Rathsack, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Judson H. Miner, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Ruth M. Moscovitch and Joseph A. Moore, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "WINDOLYN J. HULL, Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Ernest Hull, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 87\u20140938\nOpinion filed December 24, 1987.\nPhilip F. Maher, of Chicago (Michael W. Rathsack, of counsel), for appellant.\nJudson H. Miner, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Ruth M. Moscovitch and Joseph A. Moore, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0732-01",
  "first_page_order": 754,
  "last_page_order": 756
}