{
  "id": 3615482,
  "name": "DANIEL DISARIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ENESCO IMPORTS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Disario v. Enesco Imports Corp.",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "DANIEL DISARIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ENESCO IMPORTS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE PINCHAM\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Daniel Disario, appeals from the order which dismissed his complaint against his former employer, defendant Enesco Imports Corporation. The issue on appeal is whether there is a cause of action for tortious breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment contract.\nThe allegations of Disario\u2019s complaint follow: Disario was employed by Enesco as a warehouse supervisor under an oral employment contract. In February 1984, after three years of employment with Enesco and without prior warning, Disario was terminated. Disario was told that as a result of the recent sale and reorganization of Enesco, his position of warehouse supervisor had been eliminated. Two days after his termination, however, Disario discovered that Enesco had placed an advertisement in the local newspaper to fill the position of warehouse supervisor. As a direct result of Enesco\u2019s discharging him, Disario experienced extreme stress and anxiety and three days after discovering Enesco\u2019s newspaper advertisement for a warehouse supervisor, Disario was stricken with a heart attack which left him physically disabled, virtually unemployable and destitute.\nDisario initiated the instant lawsuit in November 1984. Count II of Disario\u2019s complaint, with which we are here concerned, alleged that Enesco\u2019s conduct in terminating Disario constituted a tortious breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in his employment contract. Upon motion of Enesco and the authority of Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Co. (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998, the trial court dismissed count II for failure to state a cause of action.\nOn this appeal, Disario contends that Enesco\u2019s conduct in terminating him was so outrageous and morally reprehensible that it offends the public conscience and renders the compensation of traditional contract remedies wholly inadequate.\nDisario alleged that Enesco repeatedly assured him that his job was not in jeopardy and that Disario would be given adequate notice in the event that his position was ever threatened with termination. These assurances, Disario maintains, in addition to Enesco\u2019s fictitious ground for discharging him, constitute circumstances which justify the expansion of the theory of breach of the covenant of good faith. It is Disario\u2019s contention that, unlike the circumstances in Martin, the extent of bad faith exercised by Enesco necessitates an exception to the general rule that wrongfully discharged employees may not proceed against the terminating employer on a theory of tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, except in very limited cases.\nThe circumstances of this case are far less compelling than those in Martin, wherein we refused to make such an exception. Martin had been employed with Federal Life Insurance Company for 12 years when Federal\u2019s competitor offered Martin an attractive position. Martin rejected the competitor\u2019s offer after Federal agreed to give him lifetime employment. Ten years later, however, Martin was terminated from Federal without cause. By contrast, Disario\u2019s tenure with Enesco was only three years and Disario did not reject a more lucrative employment offer from a competitor while remaining in Enesco\u2019s employment. The gravity and the unfortunate consequences of Disario\u2019s reaction to his termination cannot be denied, but an employee\u2019s physical or mental reaction to his employment termination is not basis for a cause of action by the terminated employee against his former employer.\nIn Martin we stated:\n\u201cWhile we agree that the same conduct may give rise to both tort and contract theories of recovery in some cases, we do not believe that Illinois law recognizes a tort remedy based on an employer\u2019s \u2018bad faith\u2019 breach of an implied contract covenant of fair dealing. As previously discussed, in limited circumstances a terminable at will employee has an action for wrongful discharge despite the general maxim that such an employee may be discharged for any or no reason. [Citations.] In such cases there is no actionable breach of employment contract but the law nonetheless implies a duty in tort based on public policy. In contrast, employees, such as plaintiff, who have expressly bargained for permanent employment, have a right of action based on the contract itself, and do not need tort principles. In extreme eases, an employer\u2019s breach of the contract may also give rise to an independent tort, such as intentional infliction of mental distress, but we believe plaintiff\u2019s allegations of count II fall far short of stating an independent tort action. ***\nCare must be taken to prevent the transmutation of every breach of contract into an independent tort action through the bootstrapping of the general contract principle of good faith and fair dealing. *** A general \u2018bad faith\u2019 tort based on breach of contract would undoubtedly be difficult to apply in most cases and superfluous in cases such as the present one, which primarily sounds in contract. *** [T]he court properly dismissed count II for failure to state a cause of action.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Co. (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 606-07, 440 N.E.2d 998.\nDisario argues that the alleged facts of the instant case present the extreme case contemplated by the court in the foregoing language of Martin and in the language in Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540. Ledingham held that the insured and insurer in a life and health insurance relationship have a duty to deal fairly with each other and in good faith and that failure to do so constitutes a tort as well as a breach of contract. Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 351, 330 N.E.2d 540.\nOur response to Disario\u2019s reliance on Ledingham in the case at bar is the same as our response to Martin: \u201cWe express no opinion as to the soundness of the Ledingham rationale but decline to expand the tort theories advanced there into the employment context by analogy.\u201d Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Co. (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 606 n.2,440 N.E.2d 998.\nThe trial court properly dismissed count II of Disario\u2019s complaint for failure to state a cause of action. We affirm. .\nAffirmed.\nLORENZ and MURRAY, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE PINCHAM"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Laura S. Addelson and Carson H. Wernick, both of Wernick & Addelson, P.C., of Evanston, for appellant.",
      "Sidley & Austin, of Chicago (Chester J. Maciorowski, Lisa A. Hausten, and Holly A. Harrison, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "DANIEL DISARIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ENESCO IMPORTS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 85\u20142432\nOpinion filed December 31, 1987.\nLaura S. Addelson and Carson H. Wernick, both of Wernick & Addelson, P.C., of Evanston, for appellant.\nSidley & Austin, of Chicago (Chester J. Maciorowski, Lisa A. Hausten, and Holly A. Harrison, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0901-01",
  "first_page_order": 923,
  "last_page_order": 926
}