{ "id": 5070246, "name": "In re APPLICATION OF THE COUNTY TREASURER AND ex officio COUNTY COLLECTOR OF COOK COUNTY (County Collector of Cook County, Applicant-Appellant, v. Ford Motor Company, Objector-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "County Collector v. Ford Motor Co.", "decision_date": "1988-02-03", "docket_number": "No. 86-1931", "first_page": "373", "last_page": "380", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 373" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "57 N.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "388 Ill. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2501629 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/388/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 922", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 1016", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3592890 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/1016-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 N.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5377860 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/36/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 N.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 887", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3558739 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0887-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 N.E.2d 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3568991 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 N.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2877738 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.E.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2787969 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 N.E.2d 27", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2895532 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 N.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5403894 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3137814 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3594459 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0369-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 662, "char_count": 14981, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.763331425558182e-08, "percentile": 0.40925571336398375 }, "sha256": "5e1dc902c6947f235d5ff7ff97f0bcee0e2f8a902f14d7474a56c1d3e19ba193", "simhash": "1:198d7a9e4b3e0f91", "word_count": 2416 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:55:23.036295+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re APPLICATION OF THE COUNTY TREASURER AND ex officio COUNTY COLLECTOR OF COOK COUNTY (County Collector of Cook County, Applicant-Appellant, v. Ford Motor Company, Objector-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nApplicant-appellant, the county collector of Cook County (Collector), appeals the trial court\u2019s finding that its assessment of real property owned by objector-appellee, Ford Motor Company (Ford), was constructively fraudulent as being excessive. The Collector asserts that Ford failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that its assessment was constructively fraudulent. The Collector further asserts that the trial court committed reversible error by considering as evidence prior settlements and a subsequent assessment which were outside the record.\nFor the reasons stated below, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court which found the original assessment fraudulent.\nThe evidence at trial indicated the following. Ford paid real estate taxes for 1981 under protest for its real estate located at 1000 East Lincoln Highway, Chicago Heights, Illinois. The real estate covers approximately 133 acres and is improved with an automobile stamping plant. The assessor of Cook County (Assessor) assessed the subject property as of January 1, 1981, in the sum of $13,626,634. The assessment corresponds to a market value of the property of $34,066,585. The Ford property is a class V parcel under the Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance and is assessed at 40% of fair market value. Ford paid under protest $1,783,381.49 in real estate taxes on the stamping plant for 1981, claiming that the assessment was excessive and void. Ford asserted at trial that the correct market value of the stamping plant was $19.5 million.\nJohn Shanahan, a certified real estate appraiser, testified at trial as Ford\u2019s expert witness. Shanahan made a formal inspection of the Ford property on November 17, 1980. Shanahan gave his opinion of the value of the plant based on his utilization of the three standard appraisal approaches to value \u2014 cost, income, and market data. The cost analysis resulted in a valuation of $20,730,000. This value was the result of estimating the reproduction cost of the building as of the date of appraisal, deducting therefrom accrued depreciation, and adding the value of the land. The income approach resulted in a valuation of $17,870,000. This approach involves an estimate of rental income from the property, which estimate is utilized to develop an opinion of value regarding an income stream over the foreseeable future. Shanahan stated that he placed the least reliance on this approach to value since most properties the size of the Ford plant are owner-occupied and therefore do not produce rental income.\nThe market data approach resulted in a valuation of $19.5 million. The market data approach seeks to find sales of properties that are as similar to the subject property as possible and adjust the sales for variances in time of sale, location and physical characteristics of the property, and financial conditions of the sales. Then the data is reduced to a unit of comparison, such as price per square foot of building area. Shanahan gave the most weight to this approach in arriving at his valuation of the property.\nShanahan stated that while his appraisal is dated November 17, 1980, each of the three valuation amounts he arrived at regarding the property was effective both as of November 17, 1980, and as of January 1, 1981, the date pertinent to the instant case. After considering all three approaches to valuation, Shanahan opined that the value of the Ford property as of January 1,1981, was $19.5 million.\nAfter Ford rested its case, the Collector moved for a directed verdict, asserting that Ford failed to meet its burden of proving that the assessment was constructively fraudulent. The trial court denied the motion.\nThe Collector then called Bruce Brenner, a professional real estate appraiser, as its expert. Brenner was called upon in late 1984 to render a preliminary opinion of value of the subject property. In late 1984, Brenner made exterior inspections of the Ford plant and reviewed the Shanahan appraisal and market data. Brenner performed a complete inspection of the property on May 1,1985.\nBrenner utilized the three accepted approaches to value \u2014 cost, income, and market data-in valuating the property. He relied most heavily on the market data approach in reaching a final opinion of value. The cost approach analysis resulted in a value of $30 million. The income approach analysis resulted in a value of $24,569,986. Brenner stated that he gave the least weight to the income method since properties the size of the Ford plant are typically owner-occupied rather than rented. The market data approach resulted in a value of $28 million. After considering all three methods of valuation, Brenner determined that the value of the plant as of January 1, 1981, was $28 million. This sum did not include the value of cranes worth between $1.5 million and $2 million.\nThe Collector then called Arthur Goepp, who was employed by Ford as a property assessment evaluator. Goepp testified that he had prepared a memorandum of value of the Ford stamping plant as of January 1980. Goepp described the document as providing an \u201cadvisory in-house suggestion of value for our local tax representative in this area to use in talking to the assessor.\u201d Goepp indicated in his report that while he considered all three approaches to value, he utilized only the cost approach to value, \u201cin order to obtain a value by using the same appraisal technique which was used by assessing authorities.\u201d Goepp\u2019s report indicates a value of the Ford plant as of January 1980 of $34,150,000.\nFord moved to strike the testimony of Goepp, asserting that since Goepp\u2019s memorandum of value pertained to 1980, it was irrelevant to a valuation for 1981, the year pertinent to the instant case. The Collector responded that Goepp\u2019s memorandum had been submitted to the Assessor\u2019s office in Ford\u2019s 1979 objection concerning the same property. The court denied Ford\u2019s motion to strike the testimony. After Goepp testified, the Collector moved to admit Goepp\u2019s report into evidence. Ford objected to its admissibility and relevancy. The court admitted the Goepp report into evidence over Ford\u2019s objection.\nAfter hearing argument of counsel, the trial court took the case under advisement and subsequently issued a written order of findings. The order indicates that the court considered the expert appraisal witness testimony that the premises had a fair market value of $19.5 million (Ford\u2019s expert) and $28 million (the Collector\u2019s expert). The court also considered a finding by the Assessor of the market value for the property of $25 million in a tax year subsequent to 1981. Additionally, the court took judicial notice of the settlement of objections from previous tax years, which indicated a market value of $25 million for 1980 and $25,853,160 for 1979.\nBased on the evidence, the court found that the presumption that an assessment based upon a market value of $34,065,582 was correct was overcome and that the Assessor presented no evidence to justify the assessment. The trial court found that the fair market value of the property as of January 1, 1981, was $22.8 million. The court relied primarily on the market and cost approaches in determining the value. Further, the court found that the market value as indicated by the assessment was so excessive with respect to the market value found by the court as to constitute constructive fraud, and that Ford proved by clear and convincing evidence that the assessment was constructively fraudulent. The court ordered a tax refund of $589,804.34 to Ford based upon an assessment reflecting the fair market value as determined by the court.\nThe Collector initially asserts on appeal that Ford failed to prove constructive fraud in the assessment by clear and convincing evidence. We note that Illinois law requires that all real property shall be valued at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale. (In re Application of Rosewell (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 369, 458 N.E.2d 121.) The county ordinance provides the same definition for \u201cmarket value.\u201d (Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance, \u00a7 1(b)(2).) In reviewing a case of specific objection to an assessment, courts will presume that the assessing authority competently and honestly performed its function. (In re Application of Rosewell (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 311, 478 N.E.2d 343.) In order to obtain relief, the objector must show by clear and convincing evidence that the Assessor\u2019s opinion of fair market value is constructively fraudulent. (Clarendon Associates v. Korzen (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 101, 105, 306 N.E.2d 299.) Fraud in law will be inferred only where the evidence shows the property to have been grossly overvalued, the assessed valuation being reached under circumstances showing either lack of knowledge of known values or a deliberate fixing of values contrary to the known value. Only where the evidence clearly establishes that an assessment was made in ignorance of the subject property\u2019s value, on a judgment not based upon readily ascertainable facts, or on a designedly excessive basis will a finding of constructive fraud against the taxing authorities be entered. (People ex rel. Munson v. Morningside Heights, Inc. (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 338, 341, 259 N.E.2d 27.) Once the presumption of the validity of the assessment is overcome, it becomes incumbent upon the Assessor to produce evidence to justify the assessment. (People ex rel. Hillison v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 88, 100, 174 N.E.2d 175.) Further, a determination of whether the Assessor has committed constructive fraud depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. People ex rel. Nordlund v. S.B.A. Co. (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 373, 378, 215 N.E.2d 233.\nWe hold that the trial court\u2019s finding that the assessment was constructively fraudulent is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we reverse its finding and reinstate the original assessment. (People v. International Business Machines Corp. (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 135, 487 N.E.2d 43.) We find that Ford failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the Assessor grossly overvalued the property or valued the property contrary to known values. Rather, the evidence supports the Assessor\u2019s finding that the property had a fair market value of $34,066,585.\nSpecifically, testimony by the Collector\u2019s expert, Bruce Brenner, indicated that the property had a value of $28 million, a sum which did not include the value of cranes worth between $1.5 and $2 million. More significantly, the report of Arthur Goepp, one of Ford\u2019s own employees, states that the property had a fair market value in 1980 of $34,150,000. We note that a statement of an agent, when made in the exercise of his duties and pertaining to matters within the scope of his authority, may constitute an admission binding on the principal which can be introduced substantively against the principal. (Oak Lawn Trust & Savings Bank v. City of Palos Heights (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 887, 450 N.E.2d 788.) Goepp\u2019s report constitutes an admission binding on Ford that the market value of the property approximated $34 million. The evidence indicates that Goepp prepared the report within the scope of his duties as a property assessment evaluator for Ford. The report itself provides that the document was prepared as an \u201cin-house suggestion of value\u201d for use by Ford\u2019s tax' representative in talking to the Assessor. Further, the evidence indicates that Ford ratified and adopted the report as its own when it submitted the report to the Assessor\u2019s office with regard to Ford\u2019s objection to the 1979 assessment of the same property. Oak Lawn Trust & Savings Bank, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 896.\nContradictory statements of a party constitute substantive evidence against the party of facts stated. (Guthrie v. Van Hyfte (1966), 36 Ill. 2d 252, 222 N.E.2d 492.) Generally, any statement made by a party or on his behalf which is inconsistent with his position in litigation may be introduced into evidence against him. (Mortell v. Insurance Co. of North America (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 458 N.E.2d 922.) In the instant case, the report of Goepp was properly introduced at trial as evidence against Ford regarding the valuation of the property. By filing its 1981 objection to the property and claiming that the fair market value was $19.5 million, Ford effectively was denying its own appraisal of $34,150,000 for the property as of 1980. The evidence of Ford\u2019s appraisal for 1980 was properly used against it. Further, we note that while Goepp\u2019s report showed the value of the property for 1980, rather than 1981, the year in question, there was no evidence presented to indicate that the value of the property radically changed between 1980 and 1981. Goepp\u2019s valuation of the property for 1980 provides a reasonable indication of an approximate valuation of the property for 1981.\nWe also note that there was a marked difference in the expert opinion regarding the valuation of the subject property. Ford\u2019s expert, John Shanahan, opined that the property had a market value of $19.5 million. The Collector\u2019s expert, Bruce Brenner, opined that the property\u2019s market value was at least $28 million, not including the value of certain cranes. It has been established, however, that an assessment of property for taxation cannot be impeached by any mere difference of opinion as to its value between the assessing officers and the court. (People ex rel. Tedrick v. Allied Oil Corp. (1944), 388 Ill. 219, 225, 57 N.E.2d 859.) Further, in view of all of the evidence in the instant case, including Goepp\u2019s report indicating a value of over $34 million for 1980, Ford failed to show that the Assessor grossly overvalued the property.\nThe collector also contends on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error by considering as evidence prior settlements and a subsequent assessment which were outside the record. Since we are reversing this matter on other grounds, however, we need not address the collector\u2019s argument that the trial court improperly considered matters outside the record.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the original assessment of the property is reinstated.\nJudgment reversed.\nWHITE, P.J., and RIZZI, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry, Mark R. Davis and Donald M. Devlin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellant.", "Tully & Weinstein, of Chicago (Thomas M. Tully, Donald A. McCarty, and Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re APPLICATION OF THE COUNTY TREASURER AND ex officio COUNTY COLLECTOR OF COOK COUNTY (County Collector of Cook County, Applicant-Appellant, v. Ford Motor Company, Objector-Appellee).\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 86-1931\nOpinion filed February 3, 1988.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry, Mark R. Davis and Donald M. Devlin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellant.\nTully & Weinstein, of Chicago (Thomas M. Tully, Donald A. McCarty, and Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0373-01", "first_page_order": 395, "last_page_order": 402 }