{ "id": 5069226, "name": "JOHN MICHAEL DUGAN, Petitioner-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. THE COOK COUNTY OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellees (Herbert G. Lowinger, Objector-Appellee and Cross-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Dugan v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board", "decision_date": "1988-02-09", "docket_number": "No. 88-306", "first_page": "459", "last_page": "466", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 459" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "467 N.E.2d 1098", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1102" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3598313 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1315" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141137 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 1006", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3643951 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1012" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/1006-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 F.2d 1147", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1401514 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/614/1147-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 S. Ct. 309", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "58 L. Ed. 2d 318", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "439 U.S. 926", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11406528, 11406720, 11406403, 11406308, 11406663, 11406480, 11406577, 11406832, 11406773, 11406620, 11406367 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/439/0926-05", "/us/439/0926-09", "/us/439/0926-03", "/us/439/0926-01", "/us/439/0926-08", "/us/439/0926-04", "/us/439/0926-06", "/us/439/0926-11", "/us/439/0926-10", "/us/439/0926-07", "/us/439/0926-02" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3410230 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 N.E.2d 1308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2996829 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 S. Ct. 612", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "17 L. Ed. 2d 509", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "385 U.S. 456", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11339549 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/385/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 N.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2877462 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0495-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 700, "char_count": 19141, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2240919645422112e-07, "percentile": 0.5993569509264826 }, "sha256": "ac5130115403f9be9710c8752a5b710f8f07738460675807c782cd18d5a60fbd", "simhash": "1:f9bd961dea780bb0", "word_count": 3143 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:55:23.036295+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JOHN MICHAEL DUGAN, Petitioner-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. THE COOK COUNTY OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellees (Herbert G. Lowinger, Objector-Appellee and Cross-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RIZZI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff John Michael Dugan (Dugan) appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of Cook County affirming an administrative decision of the defendant, Cook County Officers Electoral Board (Board), invalidating the nominating petitions of Dugan as a candidate for the office of judge of the circuit court of Cook County. Defendant Herbert G. Lo-winger (Lowinger) cross-appeals the circuit court\u2019s denial of his request for attorney fees. On appeal, Dugan argues that (1) the objector\u2019s petition, filed by Lowinger, was invalid because it was not properly filed; (2) the absence of Morgan M. Finley from the Board meeting created a vacancy thereby invalidating the actions of the Board in reviewing Dugan\u2019s petitions; and (3) even if the objector\u2019s petition is not stricken, the 487 valid signatures Dugan obtained demonstrate substantial compliance with section 7 \u2014 10(h) of the Election Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10(h).) In his cross-appeal, Lowinger argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for attorney fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part.\nOn December 7, 1987, Dugan filed his nominating petitions for the office of judge of the circuit court of Cook County to fill the vacancy of Allen F. Rosin. Pursuant to section 7 \u2014 12(1) of the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 12(1)), which requires that petitions for judgeships be filed in the principal office of the State Board of Elections, Dugan filed his petitions in Springfield, Illinois. On December 21, 1987, the last day for objector\u2019s petition to be filed, Lowinger filed his objector\u2019s petitions to be filed, Lowinger filed his objector\u2019s petition to Dugan\u2019s nominating petitions at 4:55 p.m. in the branch office of the State Board of Elections in Chicago, Illinois. Lowinger\u2019s petition was first received in Springfield on December 22, 1987, at approximately 9:30 a.m.\nThe Board, which is the body that conducts hearings on the validity of objectors\u2019 petitions and nominating petitions of candidates, is composed of three members: Stanley T. Kusper, Jr., Morgan M. Finley and Richard M. Daley by Michael E. Shabat. At the hearing on Lo-winger\u2019s objector\u2019s petition, however, only Stanley T. Kusper, Jr., and Richard M. Daley by Michael E. Shabat were present. No explanation was given as to why Morgan M. Finley did not appear.\nDuring the hearing Dugan argued that Lowinger did not comply with the statute in filing his objector\u2019s petition because it was not timely filed in the principal office of the State Board of Elections. Following oral arguments and the presentation of evidence, the Board found that (1) the objection to the nominating petitions of Dugan was duly filed; (2) the use of the word \u201cor\u201d in section 10 \u2014 8 of the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 10 \u2014 8) provides the objector with a choice of places to file objections; (3) the objections made against Dugan\u2019s nominating petitions were valid and sustainable; and (4) Dugan\u2019s petitions contained only 487 valid signatures. By statute, 500 signatures are required to be a candidate for the office of judge of the circuit court. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10(h).) Based upon its decision, the Board removed Dugan\u2019s name from the ballot as a candidate for the office of judge of the circuit court of Cook County to fill the vacancy of Allen E Rosin.\nDugan appealed the Board\u2019s decision to the circuit court of Cook County. On administrative review, the circuit court affirmed the decision of the Board. This appeal followed.\nDugan first argues that Lowinger\u2019s objector\u2019s petition was invalid because it was not properly filed within the statutory time limit. We agree.\nThis is a case of first impression. We believe that resolution of this issue depends upon the interpretations given to sections 10 \u2014 8 and 7\u2014 12(1) of the Election Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, pars. 10 \u2014 8, 7\u2014 12(1).) Section 10 \u2014 8 provides in part:\n\u201cCertificates of nomination and nomination papers *** shall be deemed to be valid unless objection thereto is duly made in writing within 5 business days after the last day for filing the certificate of nomination or nomination papers ***.\n* * *\nAny legal voter of the political subdivision or district in which the candidate or public question is to be voted on *** having objections to any certificate of nomination or nomination papers or petitions filed, shall file an objector\u2019s petition together with a copy thereof in the principal office or the permanent branch office of the State Board of Elections, or in the office of the election authority or local election official with whom the certificate of nomination, nomination papers or petitions are on file.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 10-8.)\nSection 7 \u2014 12(1) provides in part:\n\u201cAll petitions for nominations shall be filed by mail or in person as follows:\n1. Where the nomination is to be made for a State, congressional, or judicial office, *** then such petition for nomination shall be filed in the principal office of the State Board of Elections not more than 99 and not less than 92 days prior to the date of the primary ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 7-12(1).\nThe Board argues that under the plain meaning of section 10 \u2014 8, the objector\u2019s petition was properly filed at the permanent branch office of the State Board of Elections. It is the Board\u2019s interpretation of section 10 \u2014 8 that an objector\u2019s petition may be filed in any office of the State Board of Elections rather than only where the nominating petitions must be filed. Any other interpretation, according to the Board, would leave the additional language of \u201cor the permanent branch office of the State Board of Elections\u201d superfluous and devoid of application. We cannot accept this position.\nThe fundamental role of a court in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and effectuate it accordingly. To determine legislative intent, the court will examine the entire statutory provision and attempt to identify the statutory objective. (City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 336, 341, 473 N.E.2d 1313, 1315.) The court must also choose a construction which gives the statute a clear and logical meaning rather than a meaning which renders it illogical, useless, or unreasonable. People v. Raseaitis (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 600, 604, 467 N.E.2d 1098, 1102.\nThe entire Election Code provides strict rules and regulations as to where nominating petitions are to be filed for various elective offices. We believe that the drafters of section 10 \u2014 8 intended the language \u201cor the permanent branch office of the State Board of Elections\u201d to apply to nominating petitions for elective offices that are properly filed in offices other than the principal office of the State Board of Elections. We are guided in this belief by the requirement of section 7 \u2014 12(1) that candidates for judicial office must file their nominating petitions in the principal office of the State Board of Elections. In enacting provisions of the Election Code, we believe that the legislature intended to treat persons filing nominating petitions for office and persons filing nominating petitions for office and persons filing objections to nominating petitions equally. Thus, it is illogical and unreasonable to require candidates for judicial offices to be restricted to filing their nominating petitions in the principal office, and yet allow objectors to a judicial candidate\u2019s nominating petitions to file their objection petitions either in the principal office or in the permanent branch office. Therefore, based upon our interpretation of the statute, we find that in order for objection petitions to be properly filed, they must be filed in the same place where the nominating petitions were filed.\nHaving determined that the objector\u2019s petition must be filed where the nominating petitions were filed, we now address whether Lowinger\u2019s objector\u2019s petition was timely filed. The statute provides that for an objector\u2019s petition to be valid, it must be \u201cduly made in writing within 5 business days after the last day for filing the *** nomination papers.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 10 \u2014 8.) Here, for Lowinger\u2019s objector\u2019s petition to be duly filed, it must have been filed in the State Board of Elections\u2019 principal office by December 21,1987.\nAccording to the record, Lowinger filed his objector\u2019s petition in the Chicago branch office of the State Board of Elections on December 21, 1987, at approximately 4:55 p.m. However, the petition was not received in the principal office located in Springfield until the following day, December 22, 1982, at 9:30 a.m. Therefore, pursuant to section 10 \u2014 8 of the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 10 \u2014 8), Lowinger\u2019s objector\u2019s petition is invalid because it was not timely filed. As a result, Dugan\u2019s nominating petitions as filed must remain unchallenged.\nBased upon our disposition of this case, we need not address the merits of the remaining issues raised on appeal, and we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of Lowinger\u2019s request for attorney\u2019s fees.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Board invalidating the nominating petitions of Dugan is reversed. The trial court\u2019s denial of Lowinger\u2019s request for attorney fees is affirmed.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part.\nFREEMAN, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RIZZI" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WHITE,\ndissenting:\nJohn Michael Dugan sought nomination to be the Democratic candidate for circuit court judge and on December 7, 1987, filed petition for nomination in the principal office of the State Board of Elections in Springfield. Herbert G. Lowinger filed an objector\u2019s petition to the Dugan nomination petition at the permanent branch office of the State Board of Elections in Chicago. The Cook County Officers Electoral Board (Board) denied Dugan\u2019s motion to strike the objections to his nomination papers, sustained the objections and removed Dugan\u2019s name from the ballot. The circuit court affirmed the Board\u2019s decision and Dugan appeals.\nDugan argues that \u201cthe objector\u2019s failure to file his objections *** in the principle [sic] office of the State Board of Elections should result in the finding that the Objector\u2019s Petition was not properly filed * * * in the proper location required by the Statute.\u201d The filing of objections to nomination papers has for years been governed by section 10 \u2014 8 of the Election Code, the relevant portions of which at the time of the filings in the instant case read as follows:\n\u201cAny legal voter of the political subdivision or district in which the candidate or public question is to be voted on, or any legal voter in the State in the case of a proposed amendment to Article IV of the Constitution or an advisory public question to be submitted to [ah of] the voters of the entire state, having objections to any certificate of nomination or nomination papers or petitions filed, shall file an objector\u2019s petition together with a copy thereof in the principal office or the permanent branch office of [with] the State Board of Elections, or in the office of the election authority or local election official with whom the certificate of nomination, nomination papers or petitions are on file.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 10 \u2014 8.)\nAdditions to the statute made by the 81st General Assembly in 1980 are indicated by underline and deletions by strikeout.\nSection 10 \u2014 8 states that an objector\u2019s petition should be filed with either (1) the State Board of Elections or (2) \u201cthe election authority or local election official with whom the *** nomination papers or petitions are on file.\u201d The 1980 amendment spells out that objections may be filed \u201cin the principal office or the permanent branch office of the State Board of Elections.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 10 \u2014 8.) This clarification was appropriate in view of the provisions of section 7 \u2014 12 of the Election Code which require that nomination papers be filed with the State Board of Elections at the principal office. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 12(1).) Here, the objections were filed in the permanent branch office in Chicago. Despite the plain wording of section 10 \u2014 8 as amended permitting such filing, Dugan contends that the filing there was not proper and that the objections should have been filed at the principal office in Springfield, where he filed his nominating petitions.\nIt is difficult to follow Dugan\u2019s argument urging us to interpret section 10 \u2014 8 as not permitting objections to be filed in the permanent branch office of the State Board of Elections when the statute expressly provides that it may be done. Somehow the argument hinges on the phrase at the end of the section, \u201cwith whom the *** nomination papers or petitions are on file.\u201d The punctuation of section 10 \u2014 8 in the Election Code used in the above citation, and the placement of the commas lead us to believe the phrase applies only to the election authority and local election officer. However, such reading of the statute is not required for our holding. As the Cook County officers correctly state in their brief:\n\u201cIn the instant case, it is clear from the plain language of the statute that objections to the petitioner\u2019s nominating petition could be filed with the State Board of Elections, at their principal office or at their permanent branch office. Since they were filed at the permanent branch office of the State Board, as provided by statute, they were filed at a proper location.\nThe language of the statue does not require that the objections be filed where the nomination papers are on file, as petitioner argues. Instead, it requires that the objection be filed 'with whom\u2019 the nomination papers are on file. The 'whom\u2019 in the present case is the State Board of Elections. It was with the State Board of Elections that the objections were filed.\u201d\nThe ruling of the State Board of Elections was consonant with the plain words of the statute, and since the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not advert to the construction placed upon it by the office or officer charged with its implementation. However, in the construction of a statute, the construction placed on it by offices or departments charged with the duty of applying or executing it has been variously described as entitled to great weight (Droste v. Kerner (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 495, 500, 217 N.E.2d 73, appeal dismissed (1967), 385 U.S. 456, 17 L. Ed. 2d 509, 87 S. Ct. 612); as persuasive (Gonzales-Blanco v. Clayton (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 197, 206, 441 N.E.2d 1308); and as a substantial factor in the court\u2019s construction of the statute (Ranquist v. Stackler (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 545, 550, 370 N.E.2d 1198, cert. denied (1978), 439 U.S. 926, 58 L. Ed. 2d 318, 99 S. Ct. 309). I find no basis here for deviating from the State Election Board\u2019s interpretation of the Election Code, and I hold with it and the circuit court that the objector\u2019s petition was properly filed.\nThe objector\u2019s petition alleges that Dugan\u2019s nomination papers \u201ccontain less than 500 valid signatures and therefore fall below the minimum required pursuant to the Illinois Election Code.\u201d A call was issued to the Cook County Officers Electoral Board for a hearing and to pass upon the objections to Dugan\u2019s nomination petition. That board in addition to denying Dugan\u2019s motion to strike the objector\u2019s petition, as discussed above, ordered removal of Dugan\u2019s name from the ballot for failure of the nominating petitions to meet the mandatory minimum number of signatures as required by law. Dugan does not contest the Board\u2019s finding that his petitions contained only 487 valid signatures, but argues that this should be considered substantial compliance with the statutory requirement of 500 signatures (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10(a)), and challenges the correctness of the Board\u2019s ruling on that basis. No authority has been presented for accepting anything less than the statutory minimum number of signatures as sufficient. Indeed, to do so would open the question of the sufficiency of nominating petitions to endless unnecessary harangue. As said by the court in Bowe v. Board of Election Commissioners (7th Cir. 1980), 614 F.2d 1147, 1151 n.7:\n\u201c[T]he legitimate interests of the state are served in a reasonable manner by removing from the ballot those who fail to meet the minimum requirement. If the minimum requirement itself is valid, then the state\u2019s interests are served by removing offending candidates from the ballot, because they have by definition not demonstrated a significant modicum of valid support.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nDugan\u2019s argument that 487 signatures complied with a statute requiring 500 signatures is patently without merit.\nEqually meritless is his argument that the findings and order of the Cook County Officers Electoral Board should be reversed because Morgan M. Finley, clerk of the circuit court of Cook County, did not appear at the hearing on the objection to his petitions. He claims this created a vacancy, which, despite his request, remained unfilled. The Election Code provides that the county officers electoral board passing on the nomination of judicial offices \u201cshall be composed of the county clerk, the State\u2019s attorney of the county or an Assistant State\u2019s Attorney designated by the State\u2019s Attorney, and the clerk of the circuit court of the county.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 10 \u2014 9(2).) Nowhere does it say that nonattendance by a member at a single hearing of the Board creates a vacancy required to be filled. Further, the Board is composed of three members; two members were present for the hearing. Their votes were sufficient to sustain Board action. (See Roti v. Washington (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1012, 500 N.E.2d 463.) The absence of the third member cannot be said to have prejudiced Dugan. His petition with only 487 valid signatures where 500 are required by statute would still have been found invalid.\nFor the reasons stated above the decision of the circuit court affirming the ruling of the Electoral Board, sustaining objections to the nomination petitions of John Michael Dugan, declaring them invalid, and ordering that his name not be printed on the Democratic ballot for the general primary election to be held on March 15, 1988, should be affirmed.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WHITE," } ], "attorneys": [ "John M. Dugan, of Chicago, appellant pro se.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry and Lawrence T. Krulewich, Assistant State\u2019s attorneys, of counsel), for appellees Cook County Officers Electoral Board, Stanley T. Kusper, Jr., and Michael E. Shabat.", "Burton S. Odelson, of Evergreen Park, for appellee Herbert G. Lowinger." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOHN MICHAEL DUGAN, Petitioner-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. THE COOK COUNTY OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellees (Herbert G. Lowinger, Objector-Appellee and Cross-Appellant).\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 88-306\nOpinion filed February 9, 1988.\nWHITE, P.J., dissenting.\nJohn M. Dugan, of Chicago, appellant pro se.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry and Lawrence T. Krulewich, Assistant State\u2019s attorneys, of counsel), for appellees Cook County Officers Electoral Board, Stanley T. Kusper, Jr., and Michael E. Shabat.\nBurton S. Odelson, of Evergreen Park, for appellee Herbert G. Lowinger." }, "file_name": "0459-01", "first_page_order": 481, "last_page_order": 488 }