{ "id": 5072460, "name": "VELPO ANTHONY et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. SHENEATHER Y. BUTLER et al., Respondents-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Anthony v. Butler", "decision_date": "1988-02-19", "docket_number": "No. 88-0412", "first_page": "575", "last_page": "582", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 575" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5545106 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 1374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3167435 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "620 F.2d 144", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1372594 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" }, { "page": "148" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/620/0144-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 571, "char_count": 14702, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.766457503795204e-08, "percentile": 0.40931575547454696 }, "sha256": "fe281bd5788a9a341516f3fe1d902f7d1373cae58c9720a8cbb007d884b30c1a", "simhash": "1:96b806586cbeda38", "word_count": 2325 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:55:23.036295+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "VELPO ANTHONY et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. SHENEATHER Y. BUTLER et al., Respondents-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nSheneather Butler (Butler) filed nominating papers for the office of Democratic ward committeeman in the city of Chicago for the March 15, 1988, primary election. A week later, Butler filed a second set of nominating papers for the same office for the same primary election. Velpo Anthony and others (hereinafter collectively Anthony) filed an objection to Butler\u2019s nominating papers. Following a hearing before a hearing officer of the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, ex officio Chicago Electoral Board (Board), the officer determined that Butler\u2019s nominating papers were sufficient to place her name upon the ballot for the primary election. Thereafter the Board issued a decision which also reached this conclusion.\nAnthony filed an action for administrative review of the Board\u2019s decision in the circuit court of Cook County. Upon such review, the trial court entered an order that reversed the Board\u2019s decision and remanded the matter with directions. Butler appeals.\nButler\u2019s appeal presents three questions: (1) does section 7 \u2014 10 of the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10) permit a candidate to file more than one set of nominating papers for the office sought; (2) does section 7 \u2014 10 permit a candidate to file photocopies, rather than originals, of petition sheets in the candidate\u2019s nominating papers; and (3) does the Election Code permit a trial court\u2019s invalidation of all petition signatures in excess of the maximum number allowed under the Code, when the Board has adopted no rule or regulation, to govern the validity of excess signatures included in a candidate\u2019s nominating papers, in accordance with the directives of Richards v. Lavelle (7th Cir. 1980), 620 F.2d 144.\nWe reverse trial court\u2019s order in part, affirm in part, and remand the matter to the Board for further proceedings.\nBackground\nOn December 7, 1987, Butler filed nominating papers for the office of Democratic ward committeeman of the 27th ward in the city of Chicago for the March 15, 1988, primary election. The papers included approximately 7,000 signatures on individual petition sheets. A week later, Butler filed a second set of nominating papers for the same office in the election. These papers included approximately 2,000 signatures.\nIn late December, Anthony filed an objection to Butler\u2019s nominating papers, contending that the papers were invalid because two sets of nominating papers had been filed and because the papers included more than the maximum number of signatures permitted in the Election Code. Anthony also contended in his objection that certain signatures were invalid and should not be counted because, inter alia, the signatures appeared on \u201csheets on which the purported names are photocopied.\u201d Anthony requested a hearing on his objections, a declaration that Butler\u2019s nominating papers were insufficient, and an order that Butler\u2019s name be stricken and not printed upon the official ballot for the March 15, 1988, primary election.\nThe Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, ex officio Chicago Electoral Board, assigned the matter to a hearing officer. Butler filed a motion to strike Anthony\u2019s objection, to which Anthony filed a response. After argument, the hearing officer overruled Butler\u2019s motion to strike the objection, determined that Butler\u2019s two petitions constituted a single filing, and ordered a binder check to review the signatures against objections. The hearing officer further determined that photocopies of petition sheets, not otherwise duplicated or appearing in the nominating papers, should be included in the binder check. Thereafter it was determined, and the hearing officer so found, that Butler\u2019s nominating papers contained the requisite minimum number of valid signatures, because there were sufficient signatures appearing therein to which Anthony had not otherwise objected.\nThe Board then issued its decision on Anthony\u2019s objections, overruled the objections, and found Butler\u2019s nominating petitions sufficient. Specifically, the Board found, inter alia, that: (1) Butler could properly file two complete sets of nominating papers for the same office, since the Code does not prohibit such dual filing; (2) Butler could properly submit papers which contained photocopies of signatures on the petition sheets, because the Code does not prohibit such a procedure; and (3) Butler could properly submit papers containing more than the maximum number of signatures required under the Code, since the \u201cBoard, in the absence of rules governing this issue, [cannot] per se invalidate signatures filed in excess of the maximum. The Board\u2019s practice *** has been to count all signatures, even those in excess of the maximum.\u201d\nAnthony then filed an action for administrative review of the Board\u2019s decision in the circuit court of Cook County. Upon such review, the trial court found that: (1) Butler could properly file only one set of nominating papers under the Code, and as a result the second set of nominating papers filed by Butler was \u201cnull and void and should be treated as a surplusage and not as part of the nominating petition\u201d; (2) Butler could not properly submit papers which contained photocopies of signatures, and such photocopies of signatures \u201cshould not be counted as valid signatures\u201d; and (3) inasmuch as Butler\u2019s paper contained more than the maximum number of signatures permitted under the Code, \u201conly the first 2,445 signatures should be counted for purposes of determining the validity of the nominating petition[;] *** in calculating the maximum number of signatures, those signatures on the photocopies shall be included.\u201d The trial court reversed the Board\u2019s decision and remanded the matter for rehearing in accordance with these findings. Butler appeals. The Board has filed no brief before this court upon appeal from the trial court\u2019s order.\nOpinion\nI\nButler asserts that section 7 \u2014 10 of the Election Code permits a candidate to file more than one set of nominating papers for the office sought by the candidate. Butler maintains that this construction is based on the plain and ordinary language of section 7 \u2014 10 of the Code; since section 7 \u2014 10 does not expressly prohibit multiple filings of nominating papers for the same office, Butler urges, this court must interpret section 7 \u2014 10 to permit such multiple filings.\nThe role of the court in construing a statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature; where the statute\u2019s terms are unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. (Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 362, 489 N.E.2d 1374.) Also, the provision called into question for judicial construction must be interpreted in its overall context, bearing in mind the purpose of the statute and the objectives to be achieved thereby. Penkava v. Kasbohm (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 149, 154, 510 N.E.2d 883.\nSection 7 \u2014 10 sets forth certain minimum requirements with respect to the nominating papers a candidate must file in order to appear upon an election ballot. As pertinent here, the section calls for a statement of candidacy, the candidate\u2019s statement, and petition sheets containing signatures of persons who request that the candidate\u2019s name appear upon the election ballot. Section 7 \u2014 10 requires, inter alia, that these documents must be bound at the edge, to form a comprehensive booklet for submission to the proper election official. Section 7 \u2014 10 also provides that \u201c[t]he petitions, when filed, shall not be withdrawn or added to.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10; cf. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 12(9) (permitting withdrawal in accordance with stated procedure).) Furthermore, signatures may be properly revoked only under certain specific circumstances.\nButler argues that section 7 \u2014 10 permits multiple filing of nominating papers because \u201c[s]ection 7 \u2014 12(9) of the Election Code provides in pertinent part that if petitions for nomination have been filed for the same person with respect to 2 or more offices which are incompatible, then such person must withdraw as a candidate for all but one of such offices within the 5 days following the last day for petition filing.\u201d According to Butler, because section 7 \u2014 12(9) provides for dual filings by the same candidate, \u201ceven for incompatible offices, [section 7 \u2014 10 of] the Election Code also contemplates multiple filings by the same candidate [for the same office].\u201d\nBased on this reasoning, Butler suggests that because she could file two sets of nominating papers for two different offices provided one set was withdrawn by a certain date, she could also file two sets of nominating papers for the same office. Butler also asserts that the Code prohibits supplements to a petition, but does not prohibit the filing of complete multiple sets of nominating papers.\nButler\u2019s analysis fails to take into account the language in section 7 \u2014 10 that nominating petitions for an office \u201cshall not be *** added to.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10.) Although the legislature could have allowed for the addition to a candidate\u2019s nominating papers for one office, the legislature chose not to do so. (Cf Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 12(9) (permitting withdrawal of nominating papers).) Also, under Butler\u2019s proffered construction of section 7 \u2014 10, a candidate could file an unlimited number of sets of nominating papers. Such a procedure could easily work an unduly cumbersome administrative burden upon the Board.\nGiven these considerations, we conclude that section 7 \u2014 10 does not permit a candidate to file multiple sets of nominating papers for the same office. To so construe the statute would render meaningless the provision\u2019s express terms that petitions \u201cshall not be withdrawn or added to.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10.) Butler\u2019s suggested interpretation of section 7 \u2014 10 would also substantially burden the Board in its efforts to determine the validity of signatures appearing in a candidate\u2019s nominating papers. See Richards v. Lavelle (7th Cir. 1980), 620 F.2d 144, 147.\nII\nThe second question presented herein is whether section 7\u2014 10 of the Election Code permits a candidate to file nominating papers containing photocopied sheets of individuals\u2019 signatures, provided those photocopies are not otherwise duplicated in the candidate\u2019s set of nominating papers. Butler claims that section 7 \u2014 10 does not explicitly state that nominating petitions be only the \u201coriginals\u201d signed by the registered voters eligible to sign the candidate\u2019s petition; consequently, the section does not prohibit the inclusion of photocopied petition sheets.\nAnthony does not contend that the express or plain language of section 7 \u2014 10 precludes the filing of photocopied sheets, nor does he maintain that section 7 \u2014 10, when interpreted in conjunction with other provisions of the Code, precludes the inclusion of photocopied petition sheets. Rather Anthony argues simply that photocopies should always be prohibited as a matter of policy to prevent the possibility of fraud.\nOn the record in this case, we decline to adopt a per se rule invalidating all photocopied petition sheets on no more than the broad, generalized policy consideration offered by Anthony here. In our view, Anthony\u2019s argument is insufficient ground to overturn the Board\u2019s decision with respect to Butler\u2019s nominating papers in the case at bar.\nIll\nButler claims that section 7 \u2014 10 of the Code, in light of the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Richards v. Lavelle (7th Cir. 1980), 620 F.2d 144, does not require that all signatures in excess of the maximum number allowed under that section be automatically invalidated and not considered in determining whether the candidate\u2019s nominating petition contains the required number of genuine signatures.\nIn Richards, the court held that section 7 \u2014 10\u2019s requirement of removal from the ballot of the name of any candidate whose nominating petition contained more than the maximum number of signatures violated due process. The court observed, \u201cAssuming that limitations [upon the number of signatures contained in the petition sheets] have an administrative justification, the same purpose can be served in a rational electoral system by returning the excess petitions, by refusing to consider any signatures beyond the statutory maximum or by concluding the objection hearing as soon as the minimum required signatures have been validated.\u201d 620 F.2d at 148.\nAlthough the court in Richards suggested certain alternative methods of handling this situation, it did not specifically require that any or all of those methods be adopted. In its decision with regard to Butler\u2019s nominating papers, the Board noted, \u201cAlthough the candidate\u2019s petition exceeded the maximum number of signatures, under Richards v. Lavelle, the Board cannot remove the candidate from the ballot, nor can the Board, in the absence of rules governing this issue, per se invalidate signatures filed in excess of the maximum. The Board\u2019s practice since Richards v. Lavelle, has been to count all signatures, even those in excess of maximum.\u201d\nWe need not and do not reach the question of which of Richards\u2019 suggested alternatives the Board should or must adopt in this case or in all cases. Rather than infringing on the Board\u2019s authority.to choose an appropriate sanction by ordering the application of one sanction in this case, we urge that the Board, on remand, determine which of the sanctions suggested in Richards v. Lavelle, or another similar sanction, would be most appropriately applied to the facts of this case.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s decision that the Election Code does not permit multiple filings of nominating papers of a candidate for one office, such that Butler\u2019s second set of nominating papers should be disregarded;, we reverse the trial court\u2019s decision that the Board\u2019s decision to consider photocopied petition sheets was in error under the facts and arguments of this case; we reverse the trial court\u2019s decision that the Board must disregard all signatures over the statutory maximum; and we remand the matter to the Board for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.\nJIGANTI, P.J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph C. Greune, of Evergreen Park, for appellants.", "Sheldon Gardner, of Fos, Schuman, Drake & Barnard, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VELPO ANTHONY et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. SHENEATHER Y. BUTLER et al., Respondents-Appellants.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 88-0412\nOpinion filed February 19, 1988.\nRandolph C. Greune, of Evergreen Park, for appellants.\nSheldon Gardner, of Fos, Schuman, Drake & Barnard, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0575-01", "first_page_order": 597, "last_page_order": 604 }