{ "id": 5070277, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES BLUETT, Defendant-Appellee (Jim Edgar, Secretary of State, Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bluett", "decision_date": "1988-02-19", "docket_number": "No. 2-87-0170", "first_page": "593", "last_page": "600", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 593" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 1263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130572 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 1042", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. App. 3d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3507391 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/162/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426382 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 N.E.2d 531", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2762963 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/16/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.E.2d 109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5436677 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 N.E.2d 285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2934980 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 N.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156411 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 860", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469982 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 N.E.2d 606", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 1018", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3031871 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/1018-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 U.S. 105", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2000 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "1728" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/431/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 859", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3194695 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "865" }, { "page": "865" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0859-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5582794 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" }, { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188649 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 767, "char_count": 16932, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.02064639131332e-07, "percentile": 0.745360057671316 }, "sha256": "a82071176152d5e723e5aca9707e01885a43fc8a6a2cd86cdbfab0008cbf9e25", "simhash": "1:3125ea973964d52d", "word_count": 2912 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:55:23.036295+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES BLUETT, Defendant-Appellee (Jim Edgar, Secretary of State, Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE NASH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nJim Edgar, Secretary of State (Secretary), appeals from a judgment of the circuit court directing the Secretary to issue a judicial driving permit (JDP) to defendant, James Bluett, and contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the JDP as defendant had a prior conviction for DUI within a five-year period of his arrest for the present offense.\nNo appellee\u2019s brief has been filed in response, and we consider the appeal pursuant to the standards of First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493.\nThe record discloses that defendant was arrested on September 28, 1986, for the offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. ll-501(a)). He refused to submit to a breathalyzer test after being advised of that requirement by the arresting officer and was given notice of the summary suspension of his driving privileges pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014 501.1.) On October 15, 1986, the circuit clerk of Stephenson County-sent to defendant a confirmation of statutory summary suspension which notified him that his driver\u2019s license would be suspended for a 12-month period commencing November 14, 1986, for failure to submit to a drug-alcohol test.\nOn January 5, 1987, defendant filed a petition in the circuit court for the issuance of a JDP (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 206.1). The petition alleged, inter alia, that defendant was a first offender as defined in section 11 \u2014 500 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 500) and requested that the court grant a judicial driving permit to relieve undue hardship. A hearing of the petition was held the same day, at the commencement of which the following colloquy took place:\n\u201cTHE COURT: All right, let\u2019s proceed as to the petition for judicial driving permit.\nMR. LEAHY [defense counsel]: Like to call Mr. Bluett.\nMR. LENTZ [assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Your Honor, for purposes of the J.D.P. hearing only the State would move to amend the date of the charge to 12-28-86 as to the driving while under the influence.\nTHE COURT: All right, on the complaint ticket on its face?\nMR. LENTZ: Yes.\nTHE COURT: Any objection?\nMR. LEAHY: No objection.\nTHE COURT: So instead of September 28, it should read 12, is that right?\nMR. LEAHY: Yes, your Honor.\nMR. LENTZ: It is just for the purposes of the statute, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: All right.\u201d\nDefendant testified relating to the allegations of his petition that he needed the JDP for purposes of his employment in another city. He stated, inter alia, that he had not been convicted of DUI within the past five years but had been convicted of DUI in Stephenson County in 1981, \u201caround December 20, 15th, somewhere in that area.\u201d At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made findings that defendant had not been convicted of or assigned supervision for any DUI offense within the last five years and on January 20, 1987, entered an order that the Secretary of State issue a JDP to defendant pursuant to section 6 \u2014 206.1 of the Vehicle Code, to be effective February 13, 1987. The permit was limited to allow defendant to drive to and from his place of employment on specified days and hours and for alcohol treatment and medical care, as is required by the statute.\nOn February 2, 1987, a supervisor of the JDP review unit of the Secretary of State\u2019s office sent a letter to the circuit clerk stating, \u201cWe are unable to issue the judicial driving permit to James A. Bluett, as the driving record indicates Mr. Bluett is a second offender. If this person has an undue hardship, you may refer him to a hearing officer at the nearest Secretary of State Drivers License Facility for consideration of driving relief.\u201d On February 20, 1987, the Secretary filed a notice of appeal from the order of January 20, 1987, \u201centered by the Honorable Barry Anderson issuing a Judicial Driving Permit to the defendant-appellee in contravention of the applicable statutes.\u201d\nThe record also discloses that after a bench trial on March 4, 1987, defendant was found guilty of DUI and placed under one-year conditional discharge and fined $600. No appeal has been taken by defendant from the conviction or from the order for a JDP.\nThe Secretary contends in his brief that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the JDP as defendant had a prior conviction for DUI within five years of his arrest for the present offense and a JDP may only be granted to first offenders, as defined in section 11 \u2014 500 of the Vehicle Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 V2, par. 11 \u2014 500.) The Secretary notes that defendant had been convicted of DUI on December 21, 1981, and was arrested in this case for DUI on September 28, 1986, less than five years later. The Secretary argues that the assistant State\u2019s Attorney was not authorized to amend the date of the current DUI arrest from September 28 to December 28, 1986, with the consent of defendant\u2019s counsel, in order to circumvent the five-year requirement of sections 6 \u2014 206.1 and 11 \u2014 500 of the Vehicle Code to make defendant eligible for the JDP, and that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the amendment and must be reversed.\nBoth subsection (A) of section 6 \u2014 206.1, the version of the statute which was in force at the time of defendant\u2019s arrest for this offense, and subsection (B), which was in effect at the time defendant petitioned for a JDP, provide that \u201cthe first offender as defined in Section 11 \u2014 500 may petition the circuit court of venue for a Judicial Driving Permit *** to relieve undue hardship.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 206. l(A)(a).) (Subsection (A) effective until January 1, 1987; subsection (B) effective on January 1, 1987, and thereafter.) Issuance of a JDP is limited to use for driving to a place of employment and for alcohol, drug or medical treatment. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 6 \u2014 206.1(A)(a)(l), (A)(a)(2).) The permit may not be issued unless the court is satisfied that granting limited driving privileges will not endanger the public; that petitioner has not been convicted of reckless homicide within the previous five years; and had a valid driver\u2019s license at the time of his arrest for DUI. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 6 \u2014 20 6. l(A)(a)(3)(i) through 6\u2014 206.1(A)(a)(3)(iii).) The statute also provides for additional matters the court should consider before issuing a JDP and for limitations of the times and places petitioner may exercise his limited driving privileges under a JDP. The statute provides that the court may consider cancellation of the permit if petitioner is subsequently issued a citation for a traffic offense or is convicted of such an offense. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 6 \u2014 206.1(A)(b), (A)(c); see People v. Inghram (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 140, 514N.E.2d 977.\nAs correctly noted by the Secretary, a JDP may only be issued to a first offender, who is defined in section 11 \u2014 500, as follows:\n\u201cFor the purposes of interpreting Sections 6 \u2014 206.1 *** of this Code, \u2018first offender\u2019 shall mean any person who has not had a previous conviction or court assigned supervision for violating Section 11 \u2014 501 [DUI] *** within the last 5 years ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95%, par. 11 \u2014 500.\nAlthough there is no question in this case that petitioner-defendant had been convicted of DUI on December 21, 1981, a time within five years of his arrest on September 28, 1986, for the present offense, it is equally clear that more than five years had elapsed, as was determined by the trial court, by January 5, 1987, when the petition for a JDP was presented to and heard by the circuit court, and at the time the order was entered on January 20. The Secretary offers neither authority nor argument in support of his assumption that five-year period must be determined as of the date of petitioner\u2019s arrest, rather than the date of the filing or hearing of his petition for the JDP after the period of ineligibility had expired. As may be seen by the provisions for cancellation of a JDP which had been ordered issued by a court under section 6 \u2014 206.1(A)(c), the legislature considered that a subsequent offense could properly be evidenced, in that circumstance, simply by the issuance of a traffic ticket. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 95%, par. 6 \u2014 206.1(A)(c).) In defining a \u201cfirst offender\u201d for the purpose of determining initial eligibility for a JDP, however, the legislature arguably intended that the five-year period should be determined as of the time a petition for JDP relief was filed or heard in the circuit court. In that event, as the petition was filed on January 5, 1987, in this case, the petitioner-defendant would have been properly considered by the trial court to be a first offender for purposes of the statute as he had not been previously convicted of violating section 11 \u2014 501 \u201cwithin the last five years.\u201d\nWe need not decide this question, however, as we have determined that the Secretary of State lacks standing to bring this appeal.\nAfter the Secretary\u2019s brief was filed, this court directed him to show on what basis he was authorized and had standing to bring this appeal, as the Secretary was not a party to the trial court proceedings nor did he intervene therein. The Secretary responded that he may appeal under Supreme Court Rule 301, as his rights and responsibilities are affected by the circuit court\u2019s judgment. Rule 301 provides:\n\u201cEvery final judgment of a circuit court in a civil case is appealable as of right. The appeal is initiated by filing a notice of appeal. No other step is jurisdictional. An appeal is a continuation of the proceeding. All rights that could have been asserted by appeal or writ of error may be asserted by appeal. No formal exception need be taken in order to make any ruling or action of the court reviewable.\u201d 107 Ill. 2d R. 301.\nThe Secretary states that a nonparty has standing to appeal if he has some direct, immediate and substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation which would be prejudiced by the judgment or benefited by its reversal. (Layfer v. Tucker (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 333, 336, 389 N.E.2d 252, appeal denied (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 612.) A nonparty is prejudiced or aggrieved in the legal sense when his legal right has been invaded or pecuniary interest is directly, not merely indirectly, affected. (Metropolitan Sanitary District ex rel. O\u2019Keeffe v. Ingram Corp. (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 859, 865, 407 N.E.2d 627.) Also, Illinois has a paramount interest in protecting its public roads and highways (Dixon v. Love (1977), 431 U.S. 105, 114, 52 L. Ed. 2d 172, 181, 97 S. Ct. 1723, 1728), and Illinois has given the Secretary of State the power, duty and jurisdiction to enforce its Vehicle Code, including the implied consent law. People v. Ortega (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 436 N.E.2d 606.\nThe Secretary argues that section 6 \u2014 206.1 of the Vehicle Code authorizes the court to grant a JDP only to first offenders, as defined therein, and as petitioner was not a first offender because he had a prior DUI, the circuit court\u2019s order to issue the permit threatens the power of the Secretary to enforce the Vehicle Code and protect the public roads and was properly challenged by this appeal by virtue of Supreme Court Rule 301.\nWe do not agree that the administrative and ministerial responsibilities relating to the Illinois Vehicle Code given to the Secretary by the legislature are sufficient to give him standing as a non-party to appeal in this case. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, pars. 2 \u2014 101, 2 \u2014 104). While two of the cases cited upon which the Secretary relies do address the limited circumstances in which a nonparty to a civil action may have standing to appeal a judgment entered therein, no case has extended a general right to do so to the Secretary of State to enforce the Vehicle Code.\nIn Layfer v. Tucker (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 333, 389 N.E.2d 252, appeal denied (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 612, this court determined that the Attorney General and the Treasurer of Illinois had a \u201cdirect, immediate and substantial interest in the subject matter which would be prejudiced by a judgment or benefited by its reversal\u201d (71 Ill. App. 3d at 336), and thus had standing to appeal an award of attorney fees which would have to be satisfied from State funds. The Secretary has no pecuniary interest or responsibility in the present case. Metropolitan Sanitary District ex rel. O\u2019Keeffe v. Ingram Corp. (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 859, 865, 407 N.E.2d 627, cited by the Secretary, was reversed by our supreme court (Metropolitan Sanitary District ex rel. O\u2019Keeffe v. Ingram Corp. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 458, 426 N.E.2d 860), to permit derivative appellate standing to a taxpayer to challenge an award of attorney fees assessed against a governmental body, in a narrow ruling to protect the public interest. No similar pecuniary interest in public funds on the part of the Secretary is seen in the present case. The other cases relied upon by the Secretary do not discuss the issue of standing.\nIt is true that the Attorney General, as chief legal officer of the State, has a recognized standing in limited circumstances to appeal judgments or orders entered in proceedings below to which he was not a party. (See, e.g., Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. EPA (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 119, 138, 464 N.E.2d 238; People ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Racing Board (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 569, 301 N.E.2d 285; In re Estate of Tomlinson (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 382, 359 N.E.2d 109; Layfer v. Tucker (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 333, 389 N.E.2d 252, appeal denied (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 612.) However, the Secretary has not submitted, nor has our research disclosed, any authority giving his office, or any other State officer or director of a State department or agency, the general standing urged hereto by this means seek to enforce the laws which they aid in administering. Essentially, the Secretary suggests that he has standing to appeal any circuit court judgment affecting the Illinois Vehicle Code with which he may disagree. We do not find that the broad standing urged by the Secretary is supported by prevailing law and conclude that his interest as a nonparty is not direct, immediate and substantial as required by Supreme Court Rule 301. In re Estate of Tomlinson (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 382, 387, 359 N.E.2d 109; City of Alton v. County Court (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 23, 30, 156 N.E.2d 531.\nStanding to appeal in this case would also be rejected on narrower grounds. The judicial driving permit statute provides that upon receiving a court order to issue a JDP to a successful petitioner, the Secretary shall do so. It now further provides that \u201cany submitted court order that contains insufficient data or fails to comply with this Code shall not be utilized for JDP purposes or entered to the driver record but shall be returned to the issuing court indicating why the JDP cannot be so entered.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6\u2014 206.1(B)(d), effective January 1,1987.\nWhile we do not here address the validity of the quoted provision (see People v. Farr (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 209, 214, 347 N.E.2d 146), it is apparent that the Secretary complied with its requirements upon receiving the order from the circuit court to issue a JDP to petitioner. The Secretary reviewed the order and made his contrary determination that petitioner was not a first offender, thus not entitled to a JDP. The record does not indicate that any further action was taken by the circuit court to require the Secretary to comply with its order, i.e., contempt proceedings (see People v. Minor (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 140, 514 N.E.2d 1042), and no prejudice to the Secretary resulted from the order from which he seeks to appeal. It is well settled that standing requires some injury in fact to a legally recognized interest (Glazewski v. Coronet Insurance Co. (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 243, 254, 483 N.E.2d 1263), and that did not occur here.\nAs the Secretary of State lacks standing to appeal from the order in issue, the appeal must be dismissed.\nAppeal dismissed.\nLINDBERG, P.J., and INGLIS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE NASH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil E Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roma Jones Stewart and Shawn W. Denney, Solicitors General, and Casandra E. Melton and Eddie Santiago, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.", "Charles R. Hartman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Freeport (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES BLUETT, Defendant-Appellee (Jim Edgar, Secretary of State, Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2-87-0170\nOpinion filed February 19, 1988.\nNeil E Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roma Jones Stewart and Shawn W. Denney, Solicitors General, and Casandra E. Melton and Eddie Santiago, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nCharles R. Hartman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Freeport (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0593-01", "first_page_order": 615, "last_page_order": 622 }