{ "id": 5070541, "name": "FEDERATED EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MIRO MOLD & DUPLICATING CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Federated Equipment & Supply Co. v. Miro Mold & Duplicating Corp.", "decision_date": "1988-02-22", "docket_number": "No. 2-87-0047", "first_page": "670", "last_page": "678", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 670" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515452 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070068 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 27", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. App. 3d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3238414 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/69/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 N.E.2d 1115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 957", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465748 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "961" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0957-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3595122 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 1350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5471797 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 N.E.2d 60", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3010812 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 N.E.2d 1360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3556513 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5406059 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 N.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3101623 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "424 N.E.2d 1271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 956", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8500195 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "959" }, { "page": "959" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0956-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "487 N.E.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3568015 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 N.E.2d 608", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3087570 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 N.E.2d 1322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3452677 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 N.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2536512 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/96/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3532082 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0158-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 851, "char_count": 19630, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.451974718220088e-08, "percentile": 0.4443137418436364 }, "sha256": "cb0141cf64756103284bdb5894aa3c495c0cf1542d99639cf82f48754c5fc4ce", "simhash": "1:3ba9902c2b70fdf4", "word_count": 3151 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:55:23.036295+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "FEDERATED EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MIRO MOLD & DUPLICATING CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE NASH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants, Miro Mold & Duplicating Corporation (MIRO), Co-Op Mold & Engineering, Inc. (CO-OP), and Jules Stein, appeal from a judgment entered in a bench trial awarding compensatory and punitive damages totaling $1,071,080 to plaintiffs, Federated Equipment and Supply Company, Inc. (FEDESCO), and Lukas American, Inc. (LUKAS). Defendants contend that the trial court erred: (1) in striking their sixth affirmative defense, which was based upon a claimed arbitration which was alleged to have resolved the dispute between the parties; (2) in issuing an injunction against defendants as the evidence failed to establish that plaintiffs had protectable trade secrets; (3) in finding there was sufficient evidence that defendant Jules Stein conspired with George Rademacher to misappropriate trade secrets; and (4) in awarding compensatory and punitive damages.\nIn February 1983, plaintiffs filed a five-count complaint against the defendants who have brought this appeal, and also against Viking Rescue Systems, Inc. (VIKING), Rad Engineering Co., Inc. (RAD), and George Rademacher. Count I alleged misappropriation of plaintiffs\u2019 confidential trade information and sought injunctive relief and damages. Count II sought damages alleging that MIRO and Jules Stein breached a contract with FEDESCO relating to the development of certain rescue tools. Count III alleged that a civil conspiracy existed between Jules Stein and George Rademacher to appropriate trade secrets and confidential information belonging to plaintiffs and sought injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. Count IV was premised upon the Illinois Antitrust Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 60 \u2014 1 et seq.) and sought injunctive relief, treble damages, compensatory and punitive damages. Count V also alleged misappropriation of plaintiffs\u2019 trade secrets and confidential information and sought compensatory and punitive damages.\nMIRO, CO-OP, and Stein filed their answer and set forth several affirmative defenses in the sixth of which they alleged the following: (1) that plaintiffs, through George Weigand, initiated an arbitration proceeding with the East Bolingbrook Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses against Jules Stein based upon the March 24, 1981, agreement between FEDESCO and MIRO concerning the development of rescue tools; (2) the matters raised in the arbitration were the same as those in the present litigation; (3) hearings were conducted in the arbitration; (4) in June 1982 the arbitration committee ruled in favor of plaintiffs and held that MIRO and Stein were precluded from disclosing, manufacturing, or selling the rescue tools; (5) to effectuate the decision, in June 1982, Stein executed a covenant not to develop the rescue tools, and Weigand executed a promissory note in favor of Stein in the amount of $14,434; (6) Stein and MIRO appealed the arbitration decision and a special committee of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society was appointed to consider the appeal; (7) on January 17, 1983, the appeals committee reversed the arbitration decision, and ruled that the covenant executed by Stein was unenforceable, that Stein and MIRO had the right to develop the rescue tools, and that Weigand must pay the balance of the promissory note; and (8) Weigand agreed that the arbitration decision would be final and binding.\nOn January 23, 1984, plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the affirmative defenses, which was designated as made pursuant to section 2\u2014 619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619(a)(9)), and presented a memorandum in support of their motion. In their memorandum, plaintiffs stated, inter alia, that the elders of the church of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses only entertain moral issues, and that the only sanction the elders could impose was expulsion from the congregation. On March 1, 1984, plaintiffs filed an affidavit of John H. Ponting, an ordained minister and elder of the Kankakee Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses, who was identified as the chairman of the congregational committee which had considered the actions of Jules Stein. According to the affiant, the hearings conducted by the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses church were concerned only with moral and not business matters and were not binding on the parties.\nOn March 13, 1984, at a hearing of the parties\u2019 motions relating to the affirmative defenses, defendants\u2019 counsel argued that well-pleaded facts in the affirmative defenses must be taken as true for purposes of plaintiffs\u2019 section 2 \u2014 619 motion, and that it was improper for the trial court to strike the sixth affirmative defense relating to arbitration without considering evidence. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel read to the court an excerpt from \u201cAid to Bible Understanding, Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society,\u201d which indicated that the church considered doctrinal and moral matters in deciding excommunication issues, and argued that the church considered only the morality of Stein\u2019s conduct. The trial court inquired whether an arbitration agreement between the parties existed, and, when defendants\u2019 counsel replied that there was no arbitration clause involved in this case, the court found that there had been no arbitration of the issues in the case and granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion to strike defendants\u2019 sixth affirmative defense. During the subsequent trial, defendants requested that the trial court reconsider its order striking the sixth affirmative defense and made an oral offer of proof; the trial court denied reconsideration.\nThe evidence at trial, which was quite voluminous, disclosed that FEDESCO and LUKAS were in the business of manufacturing and distributing tools used in rescue operations. In 1979, one of the principal owners of FEDESCO and LUKAS, George Weigand, engaged Jules Stein, a machinist and a principal owner of MIRO and CO-OP, to prepare replacement parts for the rescue tool distributed by LUKAS. Stein began experimenting with different designs and materials for rescue tools which eventually resulted in the execution of a contract on March 24, 1981, between FEDESCO and MIRO for the development of a spreader arm and cutter for the rescue tool. The contract provided, inter alia, that: MIRO was to produce prototypes of the spreader and cutter; all prototype materials, drawings, and samples were to be the property of FEDESCO; MIRO was not to compete with FEDESCO and would treat trade information confidentially; if FEDESCO chose to produce the rescue tools all samples, drawings, and other related items would be turned over to FEDESCO.\nIn the summer of 1981 George Rademacher, president of RAD and VIKING, became involved in the development of the spreader arm of the rescue tool through his association with Stein, who produced it for FEDESCO. After a prototype spreader arm was tested in September 1981, negotiations concerning production of the rescue tool began. Weigand wished to produce the rescue tool as cheaply as possible, and, when negotiations broke down in December 1981, Weigand sent Stein a letter withdrawing all prior offers and requesting the return of the drawings and other materials related to the project. Further attempts to resolve the differences between Weigand and Stein were unsuccessful. In June 1982, Weigand learned that VIKING was promoting a spreader and cutter which were the same as those developed for FEDESCO by Stein, and that a pamphlet promoting the VIKING rescue tools was published by RAD.\nThe trial court found for plaintiffs and, after a hearing on damages, awarded compensatory damages under counts I, II, III, and IV in the amount of $188,000 and, in addition, awarded plaintiffs $883,080 in punitive damages under counts III and IV. Defendants were enjoined from making or selling rescue tools which utilized the parts or features claimed by plaintiffs.\nDefendants contend first that the trial court erred in striking their sixth affirmative defense, which was based upon the alleged arbitration proceeding. They argue that none of the plaintiffs\u2019 arguments made in the trial court preclude the sixth affirmative defense, and the court should not have made a determination of factual issues without proper evidence. The plaintiffs respond that the church proceedings did not involve Rademacher and thus could not have been an arbitration of all the matters in this case. The plaintiffs also point to the affidavit of John H. Ponting, which they filed in support of their section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss the affirmative defense, as evidence that the church proceedings did not constitute an arbitration.\nThere are issues raised by defendants\u2019 first contention which the parties do not directly address in their briefs. It must first be determined whether arbitration is a proper affirmative defense and, if it is, whether a plaintiff may challenge an affirmative defense by use of section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619.\nAn affirmative defense has been defined as one in which defendant gives color to his opponent\u2019s claim but asserts new matter which defeats an apparent right in the plaintiff. (Doherty v. Kill (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 158, 488 N.E.2d 629; Horst v. Morand Brothers Beverage Co. (1968), 96 Ill. App. 2d 68, 237 N.E.2d 732.) In the present case, the claimed arbitration which was pleaded by defendants as an affirmative defense admitted that an agreement was entered into between FEDESCO and MIRO on March 24, 1981, but asserted that the contractual dispute which arose had been resolved through arbitration. Resolution of a dispute by arbitration is analogous to such well-recognized affirmative defenses as payment, release, satisfaction, or discharge (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 613(d)), and we conclude that arbitration can be pleaded as an appropriate affirmative defense. See Kostakos v. KSN Joint Venture No. 1 (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 533, 535, 491 N.E.2d 1322; Kessler, Merci, & Lochner, Inc. v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co. (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 502, 509, 428 N.E.2d 608.\nIt must then be determined whether plaintiffs may properly utilize section 2 \u2014 619 to strike an affirmative defense pleaded in defendants\u2019 answer to plaintiffs\u2019 complaint.\nSection 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon which plaintiffs\u2019 motion to strike was predicated, provides as follows:\n\u201cInvoluntary dismissal based upon certain defects or defenses.\n(a) Defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion for dismissal of the action or for other appropriate relief upon any of the following grounds. If the grounds do not appear on the face of the pleading attacked the motion shall be supported by affidavit:\n* * *\n(9) That the claim asserted against defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619(a)(9).\nIt is apparent that the statute provides a means by which a defendant, or other party against whom a claim is asserted (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619(b)), may seek dismissal of the action, or other appropriate relief, on the specified grounds although they may not appear on the face of the complaint. The historical and practice notes to section 2 \u2014 619 state that \u201c[t]he purpose of this section is primarily that of affording a means of obtaining at the outset of a case a summary disposition of issues of law or of easily proved issues of fact, with a reservation of jury trial as to disputed questions of fact. The basis of the motion must go to an entire claim or demand. This amounts to a summary judgment procedure on behalf of the defendant, or on behalf of the plaintiff in case of counterclaim.\u201d Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619, Historical and Practice Notes, at 662 (Smith-Hurd 1983).\nIn their briefs, neither party addressed the question whether section 2 \u2014 619 could appropriately be utilized by plaintiffs to strike defendants\u2019 affirmative defense. Defendants\u2019 brief appears to treat the motion as one brought under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615), asserting that a motion to strike an affirmative defense raises only a question of law as to the legal sufficiency of the pleading and admits all well-pleaded facts constituting the defense, citing, e.g., Farmer City State Bank v. Guingrich (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 416, 422, 487 N.E.2d 758, appeal denied (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 581, and Mazanek v. Rockford Drop Forge Co. (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 956, 959, 424 N.E.2d 1271, appeal denied (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 578. Defendants argue that plaintiffs\u2019 motion to strike raised factual issues which the trial court erroneously resolved without a hearing of controverted facts.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 brief did not address the procedure by which they induced the trial court to strike the affirmative defense of arbitration, and they argue, based upon the factual submissions made by plaintiffs in support of their motion to strike, that the trial court correctly granted it.\nWhen in oral argument this court inquired whether their motion was properly brought pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619, plaintiffs' counsel responded that it was actually treated as a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the affirmative defense in the trial court. Subsequent to oral argument, plaintiffs submitted additional authority and argument in which they contend that the trial court was authorized by section 2 \u2014 1005(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1005(d)) to make a summary determination of a major issue in the case, even though it does not determine the whole case, citing historical and practice notes to section 2 \u2014 1005 (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1005, Historical and Practice Notes (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)). Defendants respond that the amendment of section 2\u2014 1005 by Public Act 84 \u2014 316, effective September 14, 1985, which permits a partial summary judgment, did not exist on March 31, 1984, when the affirmative defense was stricken by the trial court. At that time, prevailing law did not permit the court to grant a partial summary judgment resolving factual issues unless, as a result, the court could render judgment on the whole case. Schutzenhofer v. Granite City Steel Co. (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 208, 211-12, 443 N.E.2d 563.\nThe difficulties which arise when parties and trial courts do not give effect to the differences which exist between sections 2 \u2014 615, 2\u2014 619, and 2 \u2014 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure are made apparent again in this case. The substantive and procedural errors which follow have been often noted and will not be discussed again here. See, e.g., Janes v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 398, 405-06, 312 N.E.2d 605; Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. La Salle National Bank (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 638, 641-43, 450 N.E.2d 1360; Davis v. Weiskopf (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 505, 508-10, 439 N.E.2d 60.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 motion to strike defendants\u2019 affirmative defenses was plainly labeled as brought under section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a provision which is limited by its terms to defendants who seek dismissal of an action, or other relief, on the grounds specified. We have seen no authority suggesting that section 2 \u2014 619 may be utilized by a plaintiff as in this case. If considered as a motion to strike an affirmative defense brought under section 2 \u2014 615, although wrongly labeled (see Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Sjostrom & Sons, Inc. (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 247, 253, 433 N.E.2d 1350, appeal denied (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 569), the motion would admit all well-pleaded facts constituting the defense (Farmer City State Bank v. Guingrich (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 416, 422, 487 N.E.2d 758, appeal denied (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 581; Bankers Life Co. v. Denton (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 576, 577, 458 N.E.2d 203) and would raise only a question of law as to the legal sufficiency of the pleading (Mazanek v. Rockford Drop Forge Co. (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 956, 959, 424 N.E.2d 1271). Although defendants did not object to the inappropriate section under which the motion was brought, they did correctly argue in the trial court, and on appeal, that the allegations relating to the affirmative defense must be taken as true for purposes of the motion, and could not be controverted without evidence. As we have determined that arbitration may be properly asserted as an affirmative defense, plaintiffs\u2019 motion, if treated as brought under section 2 \u2014 615, should necessarily have been denied.\nHere, the trial court summarily concluded in granting plaintiffs\u2019 motion that no effective arbitration had occurred as alleged in the affirmative defense. In doing so, it is apparent the court improperly-considered as evidence facts stated in plaintiffs\u2019 memorandum and the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses\u2019 literature referred to by counsel at the hearing, together with the affidavit of a church official submitted by plaintiffs. See Franzen-Peters, Inc. v. Barber-Greene Co. (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 957, 961, 508 N.E.2d 1115.\nWe have determined that plaintiffs\u2019 motion to strike could not properly be brought by them under section 2 \u2014 619, as labeled, and, if considered to have been brought under section 2 \u2014 615, the trial court erroneously resolved disputed factual matters in granting the motion. Nor could the arbitration issue then be determined by partial summary judgment pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1005(d), which had not yet been enacted.\nWe conclude that the motion procedure engaged in by plaintiffs, and sanctioned by the trial court, to remove from consideration defendants\u2019 affirmative defense of a claimed arbitration prejudiced defendants and requires reversal and a new trial. In doing so we do not consider the substantive merits of this appeal, including the issue of arbitration, but find that the injunction issued herein by the trial court should remain in force subject to its further order.\nAs the matter may arise again on retrial, we note that the trial court erroneously awarded compensatory and punitive damages under counts I and V of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint for alleged misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential trade information. It has been held that monetary damages may not be recovered in Illinois in such actions. (Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp. (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 106, 108, 387 N.E.2d 27, aff\u2019d on other grounds (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 475, 404 N.E.2d 205.) As these awards were combined with damages found under other counts of the complaint as portions of the total judgment, that error would also require reversal as to damages. We note too that punitive damages are not favored in the law, and courts must take caution to see that such damages are not improperly or unwisely awarded. Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 195, 211, 454 N.E.2d 210.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, except for its order for writ of injunction, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nDUNN and REINHARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE NASH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Johnson & Schwartz, of Chicago, and Carl P. Clavelli, of Schiller Park (Donald L. Johnson, of counsel), for appellants.", "Ralph J. Schumann and Richard E. Alexander, both of Alexander, Unikel, Zalewa & Tenenbaum, Ltd., of Chicago (Alan L. Unikel, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FEDERATED EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MIRO MOLD & DUPLICATING CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-87-0047\nOpinion filed February 22, 1988.\nJohnson & Schwartz, of Chicago, and Carl P. Clavelli, of Schiller Park (Donald L. Johnson, of counsel), for appellants.\nRalph J. Schumann and Richard E. Alexander, both of Alexander, Unikel, Zalewa & Tenenbaum, Ltd., of Chicago (Alan L. Unikel, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0670-01", "first_page_order": 692, "last_page_order": 700 }