{ "id": 5073124, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERALD S. MEYER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Meyer", "decision_date": "1988-03-09", "docket_number": "No. 4-87-0542", "first_page": "1030", "last_page": "1035", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 1030" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3612523 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 N.E.2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3526391 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 N.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5667591 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 N.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 3d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5376135 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3311225 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/67/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 N.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" }, { "page": "19" }, { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3482446 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 L. Ed. 891", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "900-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 U.S. 12", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1105068 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" }, { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/351/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 U.S. 56", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11721238 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70-74" }, { "page": "48-51" }, { "page": "872-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/405/0056-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 532, "char_count": 9600, "ocr_confidence": 0.783, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.144453685861826e-07, "percentile": 0.7676337500757766 }, "sha256": "976bf12f89d0b10c9851dff59fb9c851b79c6b29146200e705d8bd394401bc05", "simhash": "1:a5c704c76571d783", "word_count": 1604 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:55:23.036295+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERALD S. MEYER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LUND\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn July 24, 1987, the circuit court of Sangamon County denied defendant Gerald Meyer\u2019s petition for judicial driving permit, finding defendant was not a first offender. Defendant appeals. We affirm.\nOn January 26, 1987, defendant was placed under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in violation of section 11\u2014 501(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 501(a)(2)). At that time, he submitted to chemical tests with a result of a blood-alcohol content of .11. Accordingly, he received a statutory summary suspension pursuant.to sections 11\u2014 501.1 and 6 \u2014 208.1 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 11 \u2014 501.1, 6 \u2014 208.1) for a period of one year.\nOn June 9, 1987, the DUI charge was dismissed on motion of the State due to insufficient evidence. At the hearing on the petition for judicial driving permit, defendant stipulated that on December 13, 1982, he was placed on court supervision for a DUI offense. The court observed that only first offenders, as defined in the Code, could receive a judicial driving permit. The court then found that defendant was not such a first offender and denied the petition.\nDefendant raises two arguments based on his unusual situation of receiving a statutory summary suspension and having the DUI charge dismissed. The first is that the classification in the Code which only allows first offenders to request judicial driving permits is-deficient because in this case, defendant is not a repeat DUI offender, but he also cannot be considered a first offender under the statute. Defendant acknowledges that classifications which affect access to the courts are permissible if the classification is rationally related to the statute\u2019s purpose. (Lindsey v. Normet (1972), 405 U.S. 56, 70-74, 31 L. Ed. 2d 36, 48-51, 92 S. Ct. 862, 872-75; Griffin v. Illinois (1956), 351 U.S. 12, 22, 100 L. Ed. 891, 900-01, 76 S. Ct. 585, 592.) However, he argues that a rational relationship does not exist here.\nDefendant also argues due process of law is violated by the statutory summary suspension framework since he receives the same penalty (a one-year suspension of driving privileges) for a statutory summary suspension, which only requires a showing of probable cause, as he would for a DUI conviction, which carries a burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt. The basis of both arguments that defendant asserts is that since the DUI charge is dismissed, he should really be treated as a first offender, but due to the \u201cpoorly constructed statutory scheme,\u201d he is being treated as a second offender.\nThis premise to defendant\u2019s argument is faulty because defendant fails to appreciate the distinction between the civil administrative case (the statutory summary suspension) and the criminal case (the DUI prosecution).\nIt is well accepted that implied-consent proceedings, which are predecessors to our current statutory summary suspension proceedings, are not a part of the criminal action but are, rather, separate and distinct proceedings. (People v. Golden (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 150, 154, 453 N.E.2d 15, 19; People v. Cassidy (1978), 67 Ill. App. 3d 43, 47, 384 N.E.2d 599, 603.) The suspension of the driver\u2019s license is an administrative function and is not part of the punishment for driving under the influence of alcohol but merely a regulatory measure. (People v. Finley (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 335, 340, 315 N.E.2d 229, 232; People v. Griffith (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 683, 686, 493 N.E.2d 413, 416.) As such, it progresses independently of the related criminal prosecution for DUI and may be held subsequent to the disposition of the criminal charge. (Golden, 117 Ill. App. 3d at 154, 453 N.E.2d at 19.) In fact, a dismissal of the charge of DUI does not preclude a suspension of a defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license under section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11-501.1). Golden, 117 Ill. App. 3d at 154, 453 N.E.2d at 19.\nThe Code provides that a person operating a vehicle on the roads of Illinois with a blood-alcohol content of 0.10 or more shall receive a statutory summary suspension. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1.) This is an administrative function of the Secretary of State. (People v. Adams (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 725, 729, 471 N.E.2d 575, 578.) To comply with due process, a defendant can request a hearing to rescind the statutory summary suspension. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 2 \u2014 118.1.) This is a civil proceeding with a civil burden of proof.\nA person with a statutory summary suspension who is a first offender, as defined by section 11 \u2014 500 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 500), may petition the court for a judicial driving permit. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 206.1.) A first offender is defined basically as any person who has not received a conviction or has been placed on court supervision for a DUI violation within the last five years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6\u2014 206.1.) The legislature has set forth the policy behind the issuance of judicial driving permits:\n\u201cIt is hereby declared a policy of the State of Illinois that the driver who is impaired by alcohol or other drugs is a threat to the public safety and welfare. Therefore, to provide a deterrent to such practice and to remove problem drivers from the highway, a statutory summary driver\u2019s license suspension is appropriate. It is also recognized, that driving is a privilege and that in some cases the granting of limited driving privileges, within the bounds of public safety, is warranted during this period of driver\u2019s license suspension in the form of a judicial driving permit to allow the person to continue employment and drive in connection with other necessary activities where no alternative means of transportation is available.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 206.1.\nIt is evident that this statutory framework deals entirely with statutory summary suspensions without regard to the resolution-of the companion DUI case. The courts have consistently noted that the overall purpose of the legislature in enacting the summary suspension scheme was to protect those who travel on our highways and assist in the determination of whether motor vehicle drivers suspected of intoxication are, in fact, under the influence of alcohol. (People v. Doyle (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 689, 692, 512 N.E.2d 798, 800.) The legislature determined that to effect this purpose, persons receiving a statutory summary suspension who have received a conviction or court supervision for a DUI violation within the last five years are a bad safety risk and not entitled to ask for a judicial driving permit. As noted earlier, the outcome of the companion DUI charge has no bearing on this. This classification clearly has a rational and reasonable relationship to the statutory purpose.\nDefendant asserts this result leaves him without a court remedy. He realizes he can request a hearing to rescind his suspension under section 2 \u2014 118.1 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951/2, par. 2\u2014 118.1) but notes this only requires a finding of probable cause to sustain the suspension. To sustain the criminal DUI case, he must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He argues this results in inequity since it is possible for a person, as evidenced by this case, to receive a statutory summary suspension and yet have dismissed or be acquitted of the DUI charge. We can only direct his attention to the earlier discussion showing that the statutory summary suspension and the criminal DUI case are separate creatures, and the result in one does not affect nor is it contingent upon the result of the other.\nSimilarly, we find defendant\u2019s due process argument without merit. We again note that the statutory summary suspension and the DUI charge are separate entities with separate penalties. Simply because the penalty in one appears to mirror one of the penalties in the other does not raise questions of due process. We cannot help but note for the edification of defendant that the penalties imposed for each are quite dissimilar. In the case of the statutory summary suspension, the penalty is a suspension of driving privileges for up to one year which will be restored upon completion of the suspension with payment of all appropriate fees. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 208.1.) In the case of a DUI conviction, a person can receive up to 365 days in jail and/or up to a $1,000 fine, and his driving privileges will be revoked for one year. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501.) Upon expiration of the one year, the person convicted of DUI must reapply to receive his license. The Secretary of State must be satisfied that this person will not endanger the public\u2019s safety if he is allowed to drive. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951k, par. 6 \u2014 208.) This can be a time-consuming process, and often the new license is not issued.\nFor the reasons stated above, the decision of the circuit court of Sangamon County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LUND" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas R. Appleton, of Morse, Giganti & Appleton, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Donald M. Cadagin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and J. A. C. Knuppel, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERALD S. MEYER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-87-0542\nOpinion filed March 9, 1988.\nThomas R. Appleton, of Morse, Giganti & Appleton, of Springfield, for appellant.\nDonald M. Cadagin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and J. A. C. Knuppel, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1030-01", "first_page_order": 1044, "last_page_order": 1049 }