{
  "id": 3473733,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NOBLE SMITH, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Smith",
  "decision_date": "1988-03-09",
  "docket_number": "No. 3-87-0422",
  "first_page": "235",
  "last_page": "238",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 235"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "461 N.E.2d 991",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 309",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        3161103
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/101/0309-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "349 N.E.2d 31",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 534",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5427013
      ],
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/63/0534-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "505 N.E.2d 331",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 471",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        3179386
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/115/0471-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 375,
    "char_count": 7231,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.755,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08,
      "percentile": 0.09681278715477235
    },
    "sha256": "8e6150c72acab8fedd7b720e25a15d67e6b5310752881c947884bb0acc19c1b8",
    "simhash": "1:ac6f2249a2539e21",
    "word_count": 1160
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:30.258145+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NOBLE SMITH, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE SCOTT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, the court found that by reason of insanity, the defendant Noble Smith was not guilty of murder. In the related subsequent proceedings under section 5 \u2014 2\u20144 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20144), the court ordered the defendant involuntarily committed to the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (the Department).\nThe defendant brought the instant appeal, seeking a new involuntary admission hearing. The defendant argues that the court\u2019s commitment order must be reversed because the court refused the defendant\u2019s request for an examination by an independent mental health expert and because the court allowed testimony from psychiatrist Donald Rendleman although Dr. Rendleman had examined the defendant without giving a preexamination warning. He argues that these two failings were respective violations of sections 3 \u2014 804 and 3 \u2014 208 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, pars. 3-804, 3-208).\nSection 5 \u2014 2\u20144 of the Unified Code of Corrections provides that after a defendant is found guilty by reason of insanity, the Department shall evaluate him and report to the court. Thereafter, \u201c[t]he Court shall hold a hearing as provided in the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code\u201d and order the defendant to the Department if it determines that the defendant is subject to involuntary admission. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20144(a).\nSection 3 \u2014 804 of the Code provides that a respondent being tried for involuntary admission \u201cis entitled to secure an independent examination by *** [an] expert of his choice. If the respondent is unable to obtain an examination, he may request that the court order an examination to be made ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 3 \u2014 804.\nSection 3 \u2014 208 of the Code provides that \u201c[w]henever a petition has been executed pursuant to Section 3 \u2014 507 [admission of a minor with objections], 3 \u2014 601 [emergency involuntary admission by certification], or 3 \u2014 701 [involuntary admission by court order],\u201d the person examining the respondent for the purpose of certification may not \u201ctestify at any subsequent court hearing concerning the respondent\u2019s admission\u201d unless the examiner comprehensibly informed the respondent that he did not have to talk to the examiner and that any statements he made might be disclosed at a court hearing on whether the respondent was subject to involuntary admission. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 3 \u2014 208.\nThe record is clear that following the defendant\u2019s insanity acquittal, and during the resulting proceedings pursuant to section 5 \u2014 2\u20144 of the correctional Code, the court denied the defendant\u2019s request for appointment of an independent examiner of his mental health. Also, it is clear that Dr. Rendleman testified at the defendant\u2019s involuntary admission hearing although he had evaluated the defendant for the court without giving any preexamination warnings. The defendant submits that the involuntary admission proceedings were fatally flawed in that the court ignored sections 3 \u2014 804 and 3 \u2014 208 of the Code. He asserts that because of those errors we must reverse the involuntary admission order and remand for a new hearing. We disagree.\nWe need not address the merits of the defendant\u2019s argument that under section 3 \u2014 804 of the Code he should have been allowed an examination by an independent expert. He has waived that issue. The issue was broached at a hearing preliminary to the hearing on involuntary commitment. At that preliminary hearing, the defendant\u2019s counsel requested appointment of an additional expert to examine the defendant\u2019s mental health. The State objected \u201cif the statute does not provide for it.\u201d Defendant\u2019s counsel responded to the State\u2019s objection as follows: \u201cI don\u2019t think it is an issue of \u2014 statutory issue. It is a due process issue. I don\u2019t think we need to look at a specific statute for it, but I will be happy to leave that for the Court.\u201d\nObjections on specific grounds waive all grounds not specified. (See Bradfield v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co. (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 471, 505 N.E.2d 331.) We find that by failing to object on the relevant statutory grounds, the defendant waived his right to present this statutory argument on appeal. The defendant\u2019s invitation for the trial court to consider unspecified statutory grounds did not aid the court, did not provide the State an opportunity to respond, and was not sufficient to preserve the issue.\nRegarding the defendant\u2019s argument on the propriety of Dr. Rendleman\u2019s testimony, the State initially argues that the restraints of section 3 \u2014 208 do not apply to this proceeding. To examine the State\u2019s argument, we engage in basic statutory construction. In that regard, our primary goal is to effect the legislative intent. (People v. Bratcher (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 534, 349 N.E.2d 31.) That intent, of course, can best be determined by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. People v. Pettit (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 309, 461 N.E.2d 991.\nBy the clear language of section 3 \u2014 208, that section restricts an examiner\u2019s testimony in involuntary admission proceedings \u201c[whenever a petition has been executed pursuant to Section 3 \u2014 507, 3 \u2014 601 or 3 \u2014 701 [of the Code]\u201d and the examiner for the purpose of certification has omitted specific warnings to the respondent. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 3 \u2014 208.) As the statute enumerates the categories of involuntary admission proceedings which it affects, and as the statute omits any reference to the instant category of involuntary admission proceedings, i.e., proceedings initiated under section 5 \u2014 4\u20142 of the correctional Code following an insanity acquittal, we find that it reveals the legislative intent that the safeguards of section 3 \u2014 208 do not apply to insanity acquittal proceedings such as those before us. Hence, any noncompliance with the dictates of section 3 \u2014 208 is no basis to reverse the order of the trial court.\nBased on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY, P.J., concurs.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE SCOTT"
      },
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent from this court\u2019s finding that defendant waived his right to an independent examination by an expert of his choice, as provided by section 3 \u2014 804 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 3 \u2014 804). While the attorneys for the State and defendant, as well as the court, may have been unaware of this right of defendant, it does not necessarily follow that the defendant consciously and knowingly waived his rights. I would reverse and remand for a new hearing on the issue.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Verlin R. Meinz, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.",
      "William Herzog, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (Rita Kennedy Mertel, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NOBLE SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201487\u20140422\nOpinion filed March 9, 1988.\nWOMBACHER, J., dissenting.\nVerlin R. Meinz, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nWilliam Herzog, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (Rita Kennedy Mertel, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0235-01",
  "first_page_order": 257,
  "last_page_order": 260
}