{ "id": 3472431, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES E. HUGHES, JR., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hughes", "decision_date": "1988-03-17", "docket_number": "No. 3-87-0455", "first_page": "265", "last_page": "269", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 265" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "491 N.E.2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3448752 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 868", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3567860 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3369311 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/47/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3135199 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 1162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3650437 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106990 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 N.E.2d 931", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 1105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3234926 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/80/1105-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3489221 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0745-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 465, "char_count": 8278, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.488779596717002e-07, "percentile": 0.6626448105661759 }, "sha256": "acd085643beb5cba3ee61a38f43d3af9adc7cc4820d01c4fa69dcfedc80afb4c", "simhash": "1:1254fd0e3eba28d7", "word_count": 1402 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:30.258145+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES E. HUGHES, JR., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA jury convicted the defendant, James E. Hughes, Jr., of threatening a public official (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 9). The defendant appeals, contesting certain prosecutorial statements made during closing arguments, the amount of credit he received for time served while awaiting trial, and the amount of his fine.\nThe general facts of the defendant\u2019s offense are not at issue. We will therefore only discuss those facts relevant to the issues raised on appeal.\nThe defendant first argues on appeal that he was denied his right to a fair trial due to the prosecutor\u2019s statements which lessened and misstated the State\u2019s burden of proof. Specifically, in his closing argument the prosecutor stated:\n\u201cThe State has shown with clear and convincing evidence, witnesses, and testimony that the Defendant is guilty of the crime of threatening a public official; and I ask you to return a verdict that fairness demands and justice requires \u2014 a verdict finding the Defendant guilty.\u201d\nLater, during his rebuttal, the prosecutor stated:\n\u201cIt\u2019s been said many times that it\u2019s the burden of the People to prove the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We\u2019re not required to prove the Defendant guilty beyond all doubt; just a reasonable doubt. And that\u2019s been the burden of every prosecutor in every criminal case since this country was founded. It\u2019s up to you to determine what reasonable doubt is and whether that burden has been met.\n* * *\nWe have shown clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant is guilty of the crime of threatening a public official; and I ask you to sign your name to the form of verdict finding the Defendant guilty.\u201d\nThe term \u201creasonable doubt\u201d should not be defined for a jury. (People v. Eddington (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 745, 473 N.E.2d 103.) Further, it is reversible error for the State to misstate its burden of proof. (People v. Cole (1980), 80 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 400 N.E.2d 931.) However, merely characterizing the State\u2019s burden as one which is \u201cnot unreasonable\u201d and which is \u201cmet each and every day in courts\u201d does not reduce the State\u2019s burden (People v. Bryant (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 514, 447 N.E.2d 301); nor is characterizing the State\u2019s evidence as \u201cuncontradicted\u201d improper (94 Ill. 2d 514, 447 N.E.2d 301).\nIn the instant case, the State did not attempt to define reasonable doubt for the jury. In fact, the prosecutor specifically stated that the jurors would have to determine what \u201creasonable doubt\u201d meant. Further, we find the prosecutor\u2019s statement that proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been \u201cthe burden of every prosecutor in every criminal case since this country was founded\u201d even less intrusive into the jury\u2019s function than other statements which the supreme court has ruled were permissible. See People v. Bryant (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 514, 447 N.E.2d 301.\nRegarding the State\u2019s use of the term \u201cclear and convincing evidence,\u201d we find after examining the entire closing arguments that the prosecutor used the words only in their generic sense. Further, the jurors were repeatedly instructed on the proper burden of proof. Accordingly, while we doubt that the average layperson would even realize that \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d is a legal standard, we find that even if any of the jurors were cognizant of this standard, there was no confusion in the instant case as to the proper burden of proof.\nThe defendant\u2019s second argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying him an additional 121 days of sentence credit for time served while awaiting trial and sentencing.\nSection 5 \u2014 8\u20147(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) provides:\n\u201cThe offender shall be given credit on the determinate sentence or maximum term and the minimum period of imprisonment for time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-7(b).\nIn the instant case, the defendant was in prison on a forgery conviction when he sent the threatening letters leading to the conviction before us. On January 28, 1987, while the defendant was still in prison for forgery, a warrant for his arrest on the threats charge was executed and bond was set. The defendant did not post bond. On May 22, 1987, the jury found the defendant guilty of threatening a public official. On May 29, 1987, he finished serving his forgery sentence, but was not released from prison due to his failure to post bond on the threats charge. On June 9, 1987, the trial court sentenced the defendant to three years of imprisonment for threatening a public official. The court awarded the defendant sentence credit for the time served after May 29, 1987. The defendant now contends that under section 5 \u2014 8\u20147(b) of the Code, he is entitled to credit from January 28,1987, the date of his arrest and failure to post bond.\nThe Fifth District Appellate Court recently decided a factually similar case in which a defendant was tried and convicted of perjury while serving prison sentences on unrelated offenses. (People v. Powell (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 689, 513 N.E.2d 1162.) The court held that defendant Powell was entitled to credit on the perjury sentence for all the time he served after being arrested on the perjury charge, even though his custody following the perjury arrest was served simultaneously with his prison sentences on the unrelated convictions.\nThe cases we have previously decided under section 5 \u2014 8\u20147(b) are factually distinguishable from the instant case. However, in People v. Stuckey (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 260, 417 N.E.2d 203, we pronounced the general rule that section 5 \u2014 8\u20147(b) applies only where the custody was the result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed. In so holding, we relied on People v. Roberts (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 524, 362 N.E.2d 106, in which the Fourth District considered a case where the defendant was imprisoned in another State on an unrelated conviction, when an Illinois detainer warrant was served on him for a second offense. The Roberts court ruled that he was not entitled to credit on the second conviction for the time when he was both in prison for the first conviction and being held on the warrant for the second offense. See also our decisions in People v. Vilt (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 868, 488 N.E.2d 580, and People v. Hope (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 171, 491 N.E.2d 785.\nHaving reexamined section 5 \u2014 8\u20147(b) under the instant facts, we find from the plain language of the statute that the legislature only intended to ensure that defendants who cannot post bond or are not eligible for it serve no longer than their actual sentences. The legislature did not intend to provide defendants with a windfall by awarding them sentence credit for time served while awaiting trial where, independent of the charge at issue, they would have been in prison for a prior, unrelated conviction. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly held here that the instant defendant was entitled to credit only for the time he served after he finished serving his first s\u00e9ntence.\nThe defendant\u2019s third argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in fining him $25 under the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 510). The defendant contends that the Act provides a $25 fine only for certain defined violent crimes and a $20 fine for any other felony or misdemeanor. Noting that his offense is not one of the defined violent crimes, he asks this court to reduce his fine to $20. The State agrees that the defendant\u2019s fine should be reduced to $20.\nWe have examined the Act and find that the defendant\u2019s position is correct. Accordingly, we modify his fine to $20.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Fulton County is affirmed as modified.\nAffirmed as modified.\nHEIPLE and SCOTT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kenneth D. Brown, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Joan Scott, State\u2019s Attorney, of Lewistown (Gary F. Gnidovec, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES E. HUGHES, JR., Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201487\u20140455\nOpinion filed March 17, 1988.\nKenneth D. Brown, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJoan Scott, State\u2019s Attorney, of Lewistown (Gary F. Gnidovec, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0265-01", "first_page_order": 287, "last_page_order": 291 }