{ "id": 3473709, "name": "In re ESTATE OF MADGE H. KEENER, Deceased (Mary Gosney, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Phillip Lynn Gosney, Ex'r of the Will of Madge H. Keener, Deceased, et al., Defendants-Appellees (Daphne Gosney Hedges et al., Defendants))", "name_abbreviation": "Gosney v. Gosney", "decision_date": "1988-03-17", "docket_number": "Nos. 3-87-0280, 3-87-0319 cons.", "first_page": "270", "last_page": "274", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 270" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "401 N.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3229695 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.E.2d 742", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "405 Ill. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2628623 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/405/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "413 Ill. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313632 ], "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 288", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515419 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3158529 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 N.E.2d 464", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2863203 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/27/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 N.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 2d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1577213 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/125/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3229695 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/0402-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 531, "char_count": 10045, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.487990493479551e-07, "percentile": 0.6624903614071709 }, "sha256": "d5a24bf0fee005159e5eac6a0078a030c645e682387ef5a13563ae5559995cba", "simhash": "1:b3f3e9ce713216d9", "word_count": 1672 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:30.258145+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ESTATE OF MADGE H. KEENER, Deceased (Mary Gosney, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Phillip Lynn Gosney, Ex\u2019r of the Will of Madge H. Keener, Deceased, et al., Defendants-Appellees (Daphne Gosney Hedges et al., Defendants))." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nMadge Keener died testate on March 27, 1985. She left two grandchildren, sons of her deceased daughter. Keener\u2019s last will, dated February 20, 1985, was admitted to probate. The only unrelated devisee was the Kirkwood United Methodist Church, which was to receive $500. Keener\u2019s grandson Jan Carroll Gosney was to receive $100,000 and the remainder of her estimated $1,500,000 estate was left to her grandson Phillip Lynn Gosney.\nMary Gosney, wife of Jan Carroll Gosney, filed a petition to contest the will. On April 20, 1987, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s petition for the reason that the plaintiff was not an \u201cinterested person\u201d as that term is used in the Probate Act of 1975 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110%, par. 8 \u2014 1(a)). Plaintiff appeals such dismissal.\nMary Gosney had been named as a beneficiary in a will which Keener executed in September 1983. However, Gosney was not a beneficiary of the instant will admitted to probate, nor was she a beneficiary of three intervening wills and a series of codicils executed subsequent to the September 1983 will and prior to the instant will of February 1985.\nInitially we note that the instant appeal is one of right and the plaintiff\u2019s application for leave to appeal was not necessary in this case. Dismissal of an action on the ground that the plaintiff lacks standing operates as an adjudication upon the merits and is final and appealable. People ex rel. Howarth v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. (1970), 125 Ill. App. 2d 473, 261 N.E.2d 221.\nThe sole issue upon review is whether Mary Gosney is an \u201cinterested person\u201d under the law and has standing to contest the will.\nSection 8 \u2014 1 of the Probate Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110%, par. 8 \u2014 1), states in pertinent part:\n\u201cContest of admission of will to probate, (a) Within 6 months after the admission to probate of a domestic will in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 \u2014 4, or of a foreign will in accordance with the provisions of Article VII, any interested person may file a petition in the proceeding for the administration of the testator\u2019s estate or, if no letters were issued, in the court in which the will was admitted to probate, to contest the validity of the will ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110%, par. 8 \u2014 1(a).\nThe plaintiff, to be-an interested person, needs to have a direct, pecuniary, existing interest which would be detrimentally affected by the probate of the preferred will. (See Kelley v. First State Bank (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 402, 401 N.E.2d 247.) The term \u201cinterested person\u201d includes legatees of a prior will who stand to inherit if the contested will is set aside. In re Estate of Lipchick (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 331, 326 N.E.2d 464.\nIn Kelley, discussed at length in the dissent to this opinion, there was allegedly another will executed on March 1, 1973, which revoked a December 31, 1965, will, under which the plaintiffs Kelley stood to inherit a substantial portion of decedent\u2019s estate, although they were not heirs at law. Defendants argued that the intervening 1973 will barred the Kelleys from being \u201cinterested parties,\u201d resulting in lack of standing to contest a 1974 will, trust agreement, and codicil. This court found the alleged 1973 will to be \u201cnon-existent,\u201d and therefore the Kelleys were \u201cinterested parties\u201d as beneficiaries of the 1965 will, which, in effect, became the immediately preceding will.\nIn the instant case the petitioner is not pecuniarily interested in the prior will of January 18, 1985, which immediately proceeded the instant will now in probate. As well, that prior will was proceeded by other testamentary instruments omitting the petitioner as a beneficiary and revoking the September 1983 will in which she was named as a beneficiary. All such testamentary instruments were in existence.\nA will contest is purely statutory, having the purpose of determining whether the writing proffered is in fact the will of the testator-decedent. (Roeske v. First National Bank (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 669, 413 N.E.2d 476.) The purpose of section 8 \u2014 1 is to create stability in the administration of estates and to make administration of estates as orderly as possible because of the gravity of the interests at stake. Robinson v. First State Bank (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 174, 454 N.E.2d 288.\nTo interpret the statute as conferring upon the petitioner the status of an \u201cinterested person\u201d would also require the petitioner plead and prove facts attacking the validity of the four wills and several codicils drafted subsequent to the particular will naming her as a beneficiary. To interpret the statute in this manner would conflict with the orderly administration of estates and controvert the policy of the Probate Act. In interpreting statutes, consequences which are mischievous and absurd should be avoided, if possible. (People ex rel. Brenza v. Edwards (1952), 413 Ill. 514, 109 N.E.2d 754.) Statutes should be given a reasonable construction. Stiska v. City of Chicago (1950), 405 Ill. 374, 90 N.E.2d 742.\nThis court concludes that the petitioner is not an \u201cinterested person\u201d as that term is contemplated in the Probate Act. By defining the instant statute in such a manner we give efficient operation and effect to the Probate Act as a whole.\nFor the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court of Warren County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSCOTT, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE HEIPLE,\ndissenting:\nThe decision of the majority is in conflict with an earlier decision of this court in Kelley v. First State Bank (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 402, which reiterated a long-standing rule of this State. Moreover, it fails to comport with any reasonable standard of justice. Accordingly, I dissent.\nIn Kelley, the plaintiffs brought a will contest action to set aside a 1974 trust agreement, will, codicil, and certain gifts of the decedent. The plaintiffs stood to inherit a large portion of the decedent\u2019s estate under a 1965 will which would apparently be effective if the 1974 instruments were declared invalid and set aside. The defendants, who stood to inherit a large portion of the estate under the 1974 instruments, argued the plaintiffs had no standing to bring the action. They argued that there had been a March 1, 1973, will of the decedent which revoked all prior wills, including the 1965 will relied on by the plaintiffs. Since the 1965 will had been revoked, the defense argued, the plaintiffs had no right to contest the 1974 will and trust agreement. After noting that the March 1, 1973, will was nonexistent, this court disagreed, stating:\n\u201cIt has been found, expressly, that devisees and legatees of a prior will of the decedent, even though not heirs at law, are \u2018interested persons\u2019 within the meaning of [section 8 \u2014 1]. [Citations.] There is no question that plaintiffs, as devisees and legatees under a prior will, have a direct, pecuniary, existing interest which would have been detrimentally affected by the probate of the 1974 will and trust. They are interested persons and were entitled to contest the 1974 documents.\u201d Kelley v. First State Bank (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 402, 413.\nThe majority holds that to be an interested party within the meaning of paragraph 8 \u2014 1, the petitioner had to have a direct, pecuniary, existing interest in the will \u201cimmediately preceding\u201d the purported will sought to be probated. However, such is not the requirement of Kelley, which held that devisees and legatees of a prior will are interested persons within the meaning of section 8 \u2014 1. \u201cPrior\u201d has been defined as \u201c[ejarlier; elder; preceding\u201d (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1074 (5th ed. 1979), and \u201cearlier, coming before another or others in time or order\u201d (emphasis added) (Oxford American Dictionary 531 (1980)). Prior does to necessarily mean \u201cimmediately preceding.\u201d Thus, the rule stated in Kelley should be deemed to apply whether or not there are intervening wills between the will naming the plaintiff as a beneficiary and the will sought to be probated.\nAdditionally, by limiting the definition of an \u201cinterested person\u201d only to those who were named in the will immediately preceding the one sought to be probated, the majority completely ignores the possibility that more than one will may be invalid. In so ruling, the majority\u2019s opinion delineates a scheme for those who seek to defraud probate courts and beneficiaries named in a will. That is, if one is going to design a fraudulent will for probate, he should be sure to create two such documents, both of which are dated subsequent to the true will, and neither of which name the beneficiaries sought to be defrauded.\nIn further support of its holding, the majority notes:\n\u201cTo interpret the statute as conferring upon the petitioner the status of an \u2018interested person\u2019 would also require the petitioner plead and prove facts attacking the validity of the four wills and several codicils drafted subsequent to the particular will naming her as a beneficiary. To interpret the statute in this manner would conflict with the orderly administration of estates and controvert the policy of the Probate Act.\u201d (167 Ill. App. 3d at 272.)\nThat the petitioner may have burdensome and lengthy litigation ahead is really beside the point. It is certainly unjust if the \u201corderly administration of estates\u201d should either operate to condone a fraud or to deny a legal remedy to interested persons who may have a genuine challenge to the will sought to be probated. Such is not, and has never been, the policy of the Probate Act.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE HEIPLE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Churchill & Churchill, of Moline (Daniel Churchill and Channing L. Pratt, of counsel), for appellant.", "Barash, Stoerzbach & Henson, of Galesburg (Burrell Barash, of counsel) for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re ESTATE OF MADGE H. KEENER, Deceased (Mary Gosney, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Phillip Lynn Gosney, Ex\u2019r of the Will of Madge H. Keener, Deceased, et al., Defendants-Appellees (Daphne Gosney Hedges et al., Defendants)).\nThird District\nNos. 3\u201487\u20140280, 3\u201487\u20140319 cons.\nOpinion filed March 17, 1988.\nHEIPLE, J., dissenting.\nChurchill & Churchill, of Moline (Daniel Churchill and Channing L. Pratt, of counsel), for appellant.\nBarash, Stoerzbach & Henson, of Galesburg (Burrell Barash, of counsel) for appellee." }, "file_name": "0270-01", "first_page_order": 292, "last_page_order": 296 }