{ "id": 3472722, "name": "EXCHANGE NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, Special Adm'r of the Estate of Regina Heagy, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AIR ILLINOIS, INC., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Exchange National Bank v. Air Illinois, Inc.", "decision_date": "1988-03-08", "docket_number": "No. 86-3530", "first_page": "1081", "last_page": "1093", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 1081" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3074247 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "719 P.2d 710", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10413204 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/719/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5790915 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/30/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2717353 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 990", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3641087 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141616 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 N.E.2d 1311", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 702", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3557914 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0702-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 N.E.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 Ill. 2d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2704027 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/5/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3592075 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2802750 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 N.E.2d 558", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 749", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3520871 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 N.E.2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2632881 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/36/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5536774 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 N.E.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5390368 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 N.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5607765 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/79/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 779", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3590812 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 N.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "hereinafter IPI Civil 2d No. 31.07" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1577233 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "hereinafter IPI Civil 2d No. 31.07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/125/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 923", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3613412 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0923-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3529793 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 N.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5381903 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 1061", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3440513 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/132/1061-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 1368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 1046", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3495836 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/1046-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S. Ct. 322", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 L. Ed. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 983", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6421856, 6422113, 6421734, 6422023, 6421545, 6422253, 6421652, 6421300, 6421943, 6421435, 6422397 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0983-06", "/us/409/0983-09", "/us/409/0983-05", "/us/409/0983-08", "/us/409/0983-03", "/us/409/0983-10", "/us/409/0983-04", "/us/409/0983-01", "/us/409/0983-07", "/us/409/0983-02", "/us/409/0983-11" ] }, { "cite": "283 N.E.2d 230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5392511 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5475697 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 S. Ct. 49", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 L. Ed. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 U.S. 833", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173444, 6173800, 6173550, 6173103, 6173232, 6173685, 6173340 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/352/0833-04", "/us/352/0833-07", "/us/352/0833-05", "/us/352/0833-01", "/us/352/0833-02", "/us/352/0833-06", "/us/352/0833-03" ] }, { "cite": "133 N.E.2d 288", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" }, { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Ill. 2d 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2715560 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176-77" }, { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/8/0164-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1104, "char_count": 21977, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4082563643121192e-07, "percentile": 0.6464411631720614 }, "sha256": "d7d63ad890a5d6010feac9f9eb7deb5f5e7ed5542dd3df469ead01f15c2a338b", "simhash": "1:3b32796315ce0da4", "word_count": 3501 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:30.258145+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EXCHANGE NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Regina Heagy, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AIR ILLINOIS, INC., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe present wrongful death action is one of several arising from the crash of Air Illinois, Inc. (defendant), flight 710, bound from Springfield to Carbondale, Illinois, on October 11, 1983. Exchange National Bank of Chicago (plaintiff), special administrator of the estate of Regina Polk Heagy (decedent), a passenger on Flight 710, was awarded $1,500,000 on behalf of decedent\u2019s husband, Thomas Heagy, following a jury trial on the issue of damages. Defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial was denied, and it appeals, contending that the trial court committed numerous errors, including: (1) erroneously admitting and excluding certain evidence; (2) permitting plaintiff\u2019s attorney to make inappropriate arguments to the jury; (3) improperly instructing the jury; and (4) refusing to submit essential instructions to the jury. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.\nThe evidence at trial disclosed that decedent was born on February 14, 1950, and received a college degree from Mills College in California. She subsequently entered a master\u2019s program at the University of Chicago, where her concentration was industrial relations. During that time, she became a union organizer at Local 743 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in Chicago, Illinois, and in 1979, was promoted within the organization to the position of business agent, in which decedent earned an annual salary, along with bonuses, of approximately $33,895. At the time of her death, decedent was involved in a retraining program for approximately 1,800 workers left unemployed by the bankruptcy of a large Chicago mail order house. In that regard, she was appointed in 1982 by Governor Thompson to the Employment Training Council for Illinois. Decedent was en route to a meeting of that council in Carbondale when she was killed in defendant\u2019s aircraft.\nAside from being dedicated to her work, decedent had a loving relationship with her husband, Thomas Heagy, whom she married in April 1980. The two enjoyed traveling and entertaining, and other than her miscarriage in 1982, decedent was in good health and hoped to raise a family. Despite those plans, decedent intended to continue working beyond retirement age.\nOn appeal, defendant initially contends that the trial court erred in allowing testimony as to decedent\u2019s future earnings within Local 743 since such earnings are merely speculative and not reasonably certain to occur. Specifically, defendant challenges the testimony of Kenneth Hester, secretary-treasurer of Local 743 and member of the executive board, and Donald Peters, president of the organization, that had decedent lived, she would have become a trustee and ultimately president of Local 743, earning $69,133 and $200,000 per year, respectively.\nHaving reviewed the record, we conclude that there is competent evidence to establish with reasonable certainty that decedent would have become a trustee or president of the union and that her salary would have been comparable to those who currently hold such positions. Hester, whose testimony was based on extensive experience in the labor field, daily contact with decedent, and his knowledge that elderly board members and trustees would continually need to be replaced, stated unequivocally that decedent would have become a member of the executive board. Similarly, Peters was certain that decedent would advance, given the ages of existing board members and the need for female representation. In fact, Peters stated that he had intended to personally recommend decedent to fill an April 1984 vacancy in the council. He also testified that given decedent\u2019s youth, knowledge, and experience, she would have succeeded to his position as president of Local 743 within four to five years of the date of trial.\nWe acknowledge, as did our supreme court in Allendorf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288, cert, denied (1956), 352 U.S. 833, 1 L. Ed. 2d 53, 77 S. Ct. 49, that testimony involving the occurrence of future acts or events regarding one\u2019s employment is somewhat \u201cproblematical,\u201d yet \u201cit is the best that can- be produced to establish earning capacity over a period of years.\u201d As the Allendorf court further noted, \u201c[a] jury of twelve average citizens ordinarily can be depended on to assess damages fairly, after they have heard and considered such evidence.\u201d (8 Ill. 2d at 176-77, 133 N.E.2d at 294.) It was for this reason that the jury in Allendorf could properly consider that the decedent was \u201centerprising and industrious and had good prospects for advancement.\u201d (8 Ill. 2d at 180, 133 N.E.2d at 296.) Similarly, in the case at bar, no error was committed by the trial court in allowing the jury to hear testimony concerning decedent\u2019s prospects for increased future earnings and the amount of those earnings.\nChristou v. Arlington Park-Washington Park Race Tracks Corp. (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 257, 432 N.E.2d 920, relied on by defendant is factually distinguishable from the present case. In Christou, the court held that permitting the plaintiff\u2019s witness to testify about the average earnings of a restaurant owner constituted error where \u201c[o]wning a restaurant was merely an ambition of plaintiff\u2019s which had never materialized.\u201d (104 Ill. App. 3d at 260, 432 N.E.2d at 923.) Here, however, the record discloses that decedent not only had an ambition to advance within Local 743, but more importantly, also had the ability and opportunity. The evidence produced at trial clearly indicated that decedent would have experienced job advancement and commensurate increases in pay had she lived.\nDefendant next maintains that the trial court improperly admitted Kenneth Hester\u2019s testimony regarding the future benefits decedent would have received from union pension funds. Again, defendant argues that this testimony was speculative and not based on events reasonably certain to occur. This argument also must fail in light of Raines v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 428, 283 N.E.2d 230, cert, denied (1973), 409 U.S. 983, 34 L. Ed. 2d 247, 93 S. Ct. 322, where our supreme court specifically held that a presently existing but contingent right to a pension is admissible to show damages for loss of future earnings, even where an employee has worked for only nine days prior to injury. Here, the evidence showed that decedent\u2019s entitlements were based on her continued employment with Local 743. As in Raines, there was testimony that decedent intended to continue working for her current employer, and accordingly, the jury was entitled to consider decedent\u2019s prospective pension rights.\nDefendant further argues that the testimony of James Warren, a Chicago Tribune labor reporter, should have been barred due to plaintiff\u2019s noncompliance with Supreme Court Rule 220 (107 Ill. 2d R. 220), which directs disqualification of any expert who has not previously been disclosed. The record discloses, however, that Mr. Warren was not tendered as an expert but merely as a lay witness whose very brief testimony was confined to his observations as to the work performed by decedent and the manner in which she performed that work. Contrary to defendant\u2019s assertions, Mr. Warren was neither asked nor ventured an opinion about decedent\u2019s future in the labor movement. As a result, no violation of Supreme Court Rule 220 occurred.\nDefendant additionally assigns error to the trial court\u2019s admission of a videotape into evidence which depicted decedent responding to a reporter\u2019s question about a job program in which she was involved. It is well established that videotape and photographs are admissible if their probative value is not outweighed by their inflammatory effect. (Barenbrugge v. Rich (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 490 N.E.2d 1368, cert, denied (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 570.) In wrongful death actions, such evidence is admissible to show the decedent\u2019s state of well-being prior to his death. (Fedt v. Oak Lawn Lodge, Inc. (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 478 N.E.2d 469; Ross v. Pfeifer (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 789, 350 N.E.2d 797.) Admission of photographic evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Barreto v. City of Waukegan (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 119, 478 N.E.2d 581.\nIn the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the videotape of decedent. As defendant concedes, the segment in which decedent appears is \u201cvery brief,\u201d and no assertion was made that the tape did not accurately portray decedent prior to her death. Moreover, defendant\u2019s insistence that the tape was merely cumulative of other photographic evidence presented at trial is unpersuasive in light of Barenbrugge v. Rich (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 490 N.E.2d 1368, where a similar claim was made and rejected. On these facts, the videotape was properly admitted and no undue prejudice accrued to defendant.\nSimilarly, defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s refusal to permit defendant's alleged expert, Robert Ross, from attesting to the cost of an annuity. We addressed the propriety of Ross\u2019 proposed testimony earlier in Singh v. Air Illinois, Inc. (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 923, and concluded that in light of our supreme court\u2019s admonition that annuity testimony should be presented only with neutral figures to describe a mathematical process to aid the jury in determining present value (Allendorf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288, cert, denied (1956), 352 U.S. 833, 1 L. Ed. 2d 53, 77 S. Ct. 49), it was not error for the trial court to preclude its admission. We also noted in Singh that as an insurance broker relying on final quotations from outside sources, Ross could not be effectively cross-examined as to the basis of his figures. For these reasons, Ross\u2019 testimony was properly barred here, particularly where defendant apparently had available expert economist Dr. Rawleigh Ralls to testify as to the pecuniary damage sustained by plaintiff.\nWe also reject defendant\u2019s assertion that the trial court erred in prohibiting defense counsel from inquiring into the financial status of Thomas Heagy, decedent\u2019s husband, to rebut the presumption of substantial loss. Illinois law makes clear that the wealth, health, poverty or helplessness of the beneficiary cannot be considered in determining the damages in an action for wrongful death. (Freehill v. DeWitt County Service Co. (1970), 125 Ill. App. 2d 306, 261 N.E.2d 52.) Indeed, Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 31.07 (2d ed. 1971) (hereinafter IPI Civil 2d No. 31.07) expressly provides that in determining pecuniary damages, a jury may not consider the poverty or wealth of the widow and next of kin.\nDefendant further argues that it suffered prejudice by not being permitted to cross-examine decedent\u2019s husband about discount rates and investment yields. While Mr. Heagy was in fact chairman of the asset liability committee of Exchange National Bank, he did not testify in the capacity of an expert during direct examination, and therefore, may not properly be cross-examined as one on matters beyond the scope of direct examination. Nunley v. Mares (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 779, 449 N.E.2d 864 (scope of cross-examination is limited to matters elicited on direct examination).\nDefendant next contends that on three occasions, plaintiff\u2019s attorney improperly asked the jury to place a value on human life, and that during closing argument, he erroneously introduced the concept of inflation. A careful review of the record reveals that with respect to counsel\u2019s references to human life, defendant objected only once, and in that instance, plaintiff\u2019s counsel merely stated, \u201c[Yjour responsibility and obligation in this case is to assess damages for human life.\u201d This statement is not only innocuous, but is also legally correct when viewed in the context of counsel\u2019s entire closing argument, which delineated the proper elements of damages in wrongful death cases. Accordingly, no prejudice resulted, and even assuming otherwise, it did not amount to reversible error. See Crump v. Universal Safety Equipment Co. (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 202, 398 N.E.2d 188 (statement must be so \u201cclearly improper and prejudicial\u201d to meet the standard for reversal of a verdict due to improper argument).\nSimilarly, plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2019s reference to inflation in closing argument was not so clearly improper and prejudicial. The comment merely analogized inflation to the concept of growth rate attested to by plaintiff\u2019s expert, Dr. Peter Senn. Moreover, in those decisions where a reference to inflation has been challenged, reviewing courts, while not reaching the propriety of such statements, have refused to set aside the verdicts because they were supported by \u201cother proper evidence.\u201d (Raines v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 428, 283 N.E.2d 230, cert, denied (1973), 409 U.S. 983, 34 L. Ed. 2d 247, 93 S. Ct. 322; Meador v. City of Salem (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 572, 284 N.E.2d 266; Crabtree v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 35, 411 N.E.2d 19; Kapelski v. Alton & Southern R.R. (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 37, 343 N.E.2d 207.) Here, too, the verdict was supported by \u201cother proper evidence.\u201d At the time of her death, decedent was 33 years old, a loving wife, and earning $33,895 annually with the potential to earn approximately six times that amount within a relatively short period of time. We therefore cannot say that counsel\u2019s argument warrants reversal of the $1,500,000 verdict against defendant.\nDefendant additionally maintains that the trial court submitted five erroneous instructions to the jury, the first of which omitted that portion of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 21.02 (2d ed. 1971) which enables the jury to find for the defendant if any of the burden of proof propositions have not been proved. As given, plaintiff\u2019s tendered instruction number 8 provided, \u201cThe plaintiff has the burden of proving the amount of pecuniary damage suffered by the husband of the decedent Regina Polk Heagy.\u201d Since liability was not in issue in the instant proceeding and only damages were to be assessed, this instruction was not in error, as no defense verdict could have properly been rendered under the evidence presented at trial. Seward v. Griffin (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 749, 452 N.E.2d 558 (no instruction need be presented to jury concerning issue not raised by pleadings or proof).\nAccording to defendant, the trial court also erred in instructing the jury pursuant to Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 31.04 (2d ed. 1971) (hereinafter IPI Civil 2d No. 31.04), which listed the factors to be considered in arriving at pecuniary loss. Specifically, defendant argues that the evidence presented on the amount of money, goods and services decedent was likely to have contributed in the future was based solely on conjecture and speculation. As noted earlier, such evidence was not speculative, but was based on unequivocal testimony from competent witnesses. Consequently, defendant\u2019s argument must fail.\nLikewise, defendant\u2019s objection to IPI Civil 2d No. 31.07, which provides that the grief, sorrow, and poverty or wealth of the widower may not be considered in determining pecuniary injuries, is without merit. This instruction accurately reflects Illinois law (Freehill v. DeWitt County Service Co. (1970), 125 Ill. App. 2d 306, 261 N.E.2d 52), and therefore, it is improper for defendant to argue that decedent\u2019s husband is entitled to less because of his financial status.\nDefendant also challenges plaintiff\u2019s instruction number 13 which states that \u201c[d]amages for loss of companionship, sexual relations and loss of society are not reduced to present cash value.\u201d While Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, Nos. 34.02 and 34.04 (2d ed. 1971), make clear that all future economic damages are to be reduced to present value, future noneconomic damages (i.e., pain and suffering, disability and disfigurement) are not, the reason being that noneconomic damages \u201chave no commercial value to which a jury can refer\u201d and cannot be translated \u201cinto monetary units with *** precision.\u201d (Coley v. Manicke (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 390, 392, 182 N.E.2d 206, 208.) Just as pain and suffering, loss of companionship, sexual relations and society cannot be calculated to the same arithmetic certainty as economic injury. Accordingly, the jury was properly instructed.\nLastly, defendant urges that the portion of plaintiff\u2019s tendered instruction number 16 which read that \u201c[tjhere is no issue as to the liability of the defendant for the damages\u201d misled the jury into believing defendant was responsible for the crash. On the contrary, the jury was advised at the outset that the only issue in question was the amount of damages to award. In order to avoid confusion, the jury was properly instructed that there was no issue before it as to the liability of defendant for damages which may have proximately resulted from the occurrence. Since the instruction does not suggest that defendant admitted liability, it is not incorrect or prejudicial.\nWe now consider defendant\u2019s claim that the trial court erred in refusing to give three instructions to the jury. The first of these non-IPI instructions stated that decedent\u2019s earning capacity and wages are not themselves the measure of the economic support and pecuniary loss suffered by the decedent\u2019s heirs. This same point, however, was addressed in plaintiff\u2019s instruction 9 (IPI Civil 2d No. 31.04), which governs the measure of damages in wrongful death actions. Given that plaintiff\u2019s IPI instruction accurately stated the law, the trial court did not err in refusing defendant\u2019s non-IPI instruction. Korpalski v. Lyman (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 563, 449 N.E.2d 211.\nFor the first time on appeal, defendant contends that by refusing to tender the foregoing instruction, the trial court precluded the jury from considering the impact of taxes. Yet, the record is devoid of any indication that defendant attempted to introduce evidence with respect to this issue. Equally unpersuasive is defendant\u2019s related argument that he should have been permitted to demonstrate that net, rather than gross, wages are the proper measure of damages. In Hall v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77, our supreme court ruled that gross earnings, not net, is the proper figure to use in computing earning capacity and damages. See also McCann v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire Protection District (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 702, 450 N.E.2d 1311.\nAlso unavailing is defendant\u2019s position that the jury should have been instructed that any award in favor of plaintiff would not be subject to income tax. Not only was such an instruction never tendered by defendant at trial, but also the Illinois Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Klawonn v. Mitchell (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 450, 475 N.E.2d 857, and held that in cases involving purely State law, juries should not be advised as to the nontaxability of damage awards. See also Wiedemann v. Industrial Erectors, Inc. (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 47, 483 N.E.2d 990.\nDefendant\u2019s non-IPI instruction number 4, which states that the jury must deduct from decedent\u2019s future earnings those amounts which decedent could not or would not have contributed to her husband, was also properly denied. Given that this principle of law was adequately contained in plaintiff\u2019s instruction 9 (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil No. 31.06 (2d ed. 1971)), which admonished the jury to consider \u201cwhat [decedent] spent for customary personal expenses and other deductions,\u201d it was not error for the trial court to reject defendant\u2019s instruction. (Miceikis v. Field (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 763, 347 N.E.2d 320.) Further, defendant\u2019s tendered instruction isolates one of the several factors to be considered in calculating damages and, therefore, was improper for emphasizing that factor over others. Handell v. Chicago Transit Authority (1961), 30 Ill. App. 2d 1, 173 N.E.2d 529.\nFinally, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing defendant\u2019s instruction number 5, which stated that the jury should consider that other defendants, once sued by plaintiff, had settled with plaintiff. To support its position, defendant relies on Greenemeier v. Spencer (Colo. 1986), 719 P.2d 710, contending that this instruction was necessary so that the jury would not infer that defendant was solely responsible for the accident. In Singh v. Air Illinois, Inc. (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 923, where defendant sought to introduce the same instruction, we determined that Greenemeier was unpersuasive since this court advocates that the court, and not the jury, apply \u201csetoff\u201d once the jury has determined total damages without knowledge of any prior settlements between plaintiff and any other defendants. (See Webb v. Toncray (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 78, 429 N.E.2d 874.) Given that defendant here failed to offer evidence as to any settlements during its case in chief, we believe that defendant\u2019s instruction number 5 was correctly refused.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCAMPBELL, P.J., and MANNING, J., concur.\nIn Singh v. Air Illinois, Inc. (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 923, filed by this court, we affirmed a $400,000 damage award to the estate of Dalbir Singh, a passenger on flight 710.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, of Chicago (Michael J. Merlo, Robert Marc Chemers, and Michael G. Bruton, of counsel), for appellant.", "Asher, Pavalon, Gittler & Greenfield, Ltd., of Chicago (Eugene I. Pavalon and Gary K. Laatsch, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EXCHANGE NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Regina Heagy, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AIR ILLINOIS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 86\u20143530\nOpinion filed March 8, 1988.\nPretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, of Chicago (Michael J. Merlo, Robert Marc Chemers, and Michael G. Bruton, of counsel), for appellant.\nAsher, Pavalon, Gittler & Greenfield, Ltd., of Chicago (Eugene I. Pavalon and Gary K. Laatsch, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "1081-01", "first_page_order": 1103, "last_page_order": 1115 }