{
  "id": 3513916,
  "name": "DEVON OVERSTREET, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Defendants-Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Overstreet v. Department of Employment Security",
  "decision_date": "1988-03-09",
  "docket_number": "No. 86\u20142642",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:02:50.417384+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "DEVON OVERSTREET, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Defendants-Appellants."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Board of Review for the Illinois Department of Employment Security (Board) and the Chicago Transit Authority (employer) appeal an order of the circuit court of Cook County which reversed the Board\u2019s decision that plaintiff, Devon Overstreet, was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits.\nThe record reveals that plaintiff worked as a bus driver for the employer for &-k years. She took sick leave from January 30 to March 15, 1985. Because she had been on sick leave for more than seven days, plaintiff submitted to a medical examination as required by her employer\u2019s policy. The examination included blood and urine tests which, when analyzed, indicated the presence of cocaine. Upon receipt of this information, the employer removed plaintiff from service and required her to undergo a second test. The result of the second test also indicated the presence of cocaine. On March 20, 1985, plaintiff was suspended from her job and placed in the Employee\u2019s Assistance Program (EAP) for not less than 30 days, with a chance for reassignment to a nonoperating job if she successfully completed the program. The EAP is an alternative to discharge and is available at the election of the employee in accordance with an agreement between the employer and the plaintiff\u2019s union.\nPlaintiff thereafter filed for unemployment compensation benefits, indicating that she was on a medical suspension because she did not pass a company physical. The employer contested the plaintiff\u2019s claim for benefits, contending that she had been discharged for misconduct because she had been working while under the influence of a controlled substance in violation of a company policy. The claims adjudicator determined that plaintiff was ineligible for unemployment benefits. Plaintiff appealed and an administrative hearing was conducted by a hearing referee.\nAt the hearing, the referee stated that pursuant to an agency regulation, a suspension of seven days or longer is adjudicated as though it were a discharge. Plaintiff admitted that she had used narcotics and did not dispute the accuracy of the test results. She argued, however, that she should be eligible for benefits because she did not use narcotics while on the job and because she had successfully participated in the EAP, refraining from the use of narcotics since she began the program. The hearing referee affirmed the determination of the claims adjudicator concluding that plaintiff had been discharged for misconduct because she had tested positively for narcotics use after she had returned to work.\nAfter plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, the Board affirmed the referee\u2019s decision. Plaintiff thereafter brought an action for administrative review of the Board\u2019s decision. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 101 et seq.) The circuit court reversed the Board\u2019s decision, holding that plaintiff had been suspended but had not been discharged from her position. On appeal, the Board and the employer contend that the circuit court erred in finding that plaintiff was eligible for unemployment benefits because she had not been discharged. We must agree.\nThe agency\u2019s policy is that a suspension from work for a period of seven or more consecutive days, or of indefinite duration, is to be adjudicated as a discharge. (Mattson v. Department of Labor (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 724, 455 N.E.2d 278.) It has been held that this is a reasonable interpretation of the language of section 602(A) of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 602(A)), which disqualifies those discharged for misconduct. (Mattson v. Department of Labor (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 724, 455 N.E.2d 278; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 432(A).) The findings and conclusions of an administrative agency on questions of fact are considered to be prima facie true and correct. Flex v. Department of Labor (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 466 N.E.2d 1050.\nIn the instant case, the referee and the Board correctly found that plaintiff had been suspended from her job for not less than 30 days because she had used narcotics prior to reporting for work, in violation of a company policy. Thus, plaintiff\u2019s claim for benefits was to be adjudicated as if she had been discharged. Mattson v. Department of Labor (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 724, 455 N.E.2d 278.\nAdditionally, we find that plaintiff\u2019s conduct disqualified her for benefits under section 602(A) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, which provides as follows:\n\u201cAn individual shall be ineligible for benefits for the week in which he has been discharged for misconduct connected with his work and, thereafter, until he has become reemployed and has had earnings equal to or in excess of his current weekly benefit amount in each of four calendar weeks which are either for services in employment, or have been or will be reported pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act by each employing unit for which such services are performed and which submits a statement certifying to that fact.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 432(A).\nMisconduct has been defined as conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an employer\u2019s interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer had the right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer\u2019s interest or of the employee\u2019s duties and obligations to his employer. (Jackson v. Board of Review (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 501, 475 N.E.2d 879; Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck (1941), 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636.) We believe that plaintiff\u2019s use of cocaine prior to reporting for work constituted a deliberate violation of her employer\u2019s policy and indicated a disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer had the right to expect.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed.\nReversed.\nWHITE, P.J., and McNAMARA, J., concur.\nAlthough plaintiff has not filed a brief in this matter, we will consider the merits of the case. First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Neil E Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Diane M. Curry, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant Illinois Department of Employment Security.",
      "Edward J. Egan, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant Chicago Transit Authority.",
      "No brief filed for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "DEVON OVERSTREET, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 86\u20142642\nOpinion filed March 9, 1988.\nNeil E Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Diane M. Curry, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant Illinois Department of Employment Security.\nEdward J. Egan, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant Chicago Transit Authority.\nNo brief filed for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0024-01",
  "first_page_order": 46,
  "last_page_order": 49
}