{ "id": 3514130, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARK WIEDMAN, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wiedman", "decision_date": "1988-03-16", "docket_number": "No. 87\u20142341", "first_page": "199", "last_page": "210", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 199" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 1182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1185" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3412346 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 N.E.2d 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3306893 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 N.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "392 Ill. 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2516582 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/392/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 N.E.2d 851", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "398 Ill. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2459986 ], "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/398/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ill. 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App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1582664 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/121/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12127077 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450611 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 U.S. 721", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179734 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/394/0721-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1057, "char_count": 26427, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1618609884625897e-07, "percentile": 0.5842217055897854 }, "sha256": "b5f05bdde1abf6dc0b779ab1463b6c12674a3b38415ddd937bf3d28d0a4598e6", "simhash": "1:a535391cb7c30551", "word_count": 4438 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:02:50.417384+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARK WIEDMAN, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STAMOS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (107 Ill. 2d R. 604(aXl)), from an order of the circuit court of Cook County entered on the motion of defendant, Mark Wiedman, to quash his arrest and suppress evidence against him. We affirm.\nThe order was based on the court\u2019s finding that the subject matter of the motion had already been litigated in the circuit court of Du Page County, which had sustained a similar motion filed by defendant during proceedings involving another charge against him.\nThe issue is whether the circuit court of Cook County clearly erred when it found, in effect, that the circuit court of Du Page County had finally decided a common and controlling question of ultimate fact material to determining defendant\u2019s instant motion.\nFacts\nOn July 16, 1986, defendant was arrested in Du Page County after being discovered sitting in his parked automobile on the side of a street in the postmidnight hours of the morning. During the arrest, cannabis and a set of scales were found in the automobile\u2019s glove compartment, and a portable television set, clothing, and a jewelry box or boxes in a partly opened bag were found on the rear seat and the floor of the vehicle.\nOn July 31, 1986, defendant was charged by information in the circuit court of Cook County with home invasion, residential burglary, aggravated battery, and robbery, which allegedly occurred on or about July 15, 1986, in violation of sections 12 \u2014 ll(aX2), 19 \u2014 3(a), 12\u2014 4(bX10), and 18 \u2014 1(a), respectively, of the Criminal Code of 1961 (111. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 12-ll(aX2), 19-3(a), 12-4(bX10), 18-1(a)). On June 25, 1987, a hearing was held, by the trial judge, the Honorable John K. Madden, on defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence.\nAt the June 25 Cook County hearing, the parties stipulated as to hearings that had occurred on February 17, March 10, and March 16, 1987, before a trial judge of the circuit court of Du Page County, the Honorable Maryellen T. Provenzale, on defendant\u2019s motion in that court to quash his arrest and suppress evidence on a charge related to possession of cannabis.\nAccording to the arresting deputy sheriff\u2019s testimony at one of the DuPage County hearings, he had first asked defendant whether he would mind if the deputy \u201ctook a look in his vehicle,\u201d and defendant had answered, \u201cNo, go right ahead. Everything in here is mine. There is nothing stolen.\u201d The deputy testified that he could see the television set through the vehicle\u2019s window, although he subsequently obtained the set\u2019s serial number by entering the vehicle and examining the set. The deputy also testified that through the vehicle\u2019s window he saw the cloth bag and the jewelry box and \u201cbumps from boxes\u201d that it contained, though he subsequently had to enter the vehicle to reach into the bag. The deputy testified that he then entered the vehicle and asked defendant to open his glove compartment and that defendant did so, whereupon the deputy found the cannabis and scales. Against the deputy sheriff\u2019s testimony of consent, defendant testified that the deputy did not ask him for permission to enter the glove compartment and that defendant never gave the deputy consent to enter or search the automobile.\nJudge Provenzale had sustained defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence in the Du Page County proceedings, entering a written order finding that \u201cthere was no probable cause for the search of Defendant\u2019s motor vehicle and no consent for the search.\u201d Judge Provenzale later had sought to clarify her order. By way of clarification, Judge Provenzale had sought to limit her order to the cannabis charge and to evidence that had been seized pertinent thereto during defendant\u2019s arrest. At the Cook County hearing, Judge Madden reviewed the Du Page County transcripts and Judge Provenzale\u2019s written orders, from which the State had not appealed.\nDefendant now sought to prevent introduction of the other items seized from his automobile as evidence in the Cook County proceedings and to quash his arrest as to those proceedings. Defense counsel argued that Judge Provenzale had held the search and arrest to be unlawful, that the State had thereby acquired evidence intended for use in the Cook County proceedings, and that on res judicata or collateralestoppel principles the State should be barred from using the evidence in the Cook County proceedings. The State asked leave of the Cook County court \u201cto reopen the motion\u201d and, according to the transcript, argued as follows:\n\u201cThe only thing that was before the Court in Du Page County was a misdemeanor marijuana was found in the glove box, when the Court rules on the motion to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence, it only was ruling on the marijuana, was not making adjudication as to the consent or anything else in the back seat because that was not before the Court, therefore, she made her first ruling on the 17th. The State went back and for clarification on the clarification order, she stated she was only talking about the marijuana, nothing else, therefore she had made no ruling as to probable cause or consent as to the items in the back seat of the car.\u201d\nAccording to the transcript, the following exchange between Judge Madden and the Cook County prosecutor then occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Your argument is the Court was correct in this ruling in Du Page County, that marijuana that was recovered from the glove compartment should have been suppressed because maybe there was no consent by the Defendant given.\nMR. KLAPMAN: To go into the glove box, yes.\nTHE COURT: To go into the glove compartment, that was the limit of that particular ruling and there was consent by the Defendant according to the officer\u2019s testimony to look at the other items in the back of the car.\nMR. KLAPMAN: Yes, that would be our offer of proof and proof of calling the officer for that purpose because we don\u2019t think that has been litigated yet.\u201d\nJudge Madden then stated on the basis of the DuPage Comity transcripts that \u201c[p]rior to looking at the items in the back seat, [the deputy sheriff] went into the glove compartment, found marijuana, subsequent to finding the marijuana and placing the man under arrest, he then inventoried the items in the back seat taking serial numbers of certain physical items that were recovered out of the back seat and those physical items, serial numbers eventually led to a charging her [sic] in Cook County because those particular items in the back seat were proceeds of a home invasion.\u201d The Cook County prosecutor replied, \u201cThat\u2019s correct,\u201d and then noted that a photograph of defendant taken after the arrest had also led to charging him in the Cook County proceedings. A bit later in the hearing, this exchange between prosecutor and defense counsel occurred with regard to Judge Madden\u2019s acknowledgement of Judge Provenzale\u2019s March 10 order clarifying that her February 17 suppression order \u201cwent to the search of the glove compartment *** and the evidence obtained from said search\u201d:\n\u201cMR. KLAPMAN [assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Yes, so we are saying based upon that, we have the motion to suppress should be heard as to the items in the back seat.\nMR. SINGER [assistant public defender]: Just for the record, our contention is there was a determination there was no probable cause, no consent, that is binding on the State as to all matters arising out of that.\nMR. KLAPMAN: Even though there was no jurisdiction over the matter because it was not before the Court in DuPage County, that is what we are saying.\u201d\nAccording to the transcript, the following exchange between Judge Madden and the prosecutor then took place:\n\u201cTHE COURT: The Court is of the opinion the matter has been litigated in Du Page County, there was finding of no probable cause and no consent that all items that were recovered and inventory in regard to the prosecution here in Cook County, were in fact all the inventorying taking down serial numbers occurred after an illegal seizure which marijuana which caused an arrest to occur, therefore the motion has been in fact litigated. I will not allow the State to reopen at this point.\nMR. KLAPMAN: The Court is saying you do not believe that, you do believe there has been litigation as to question of consent on items in the back seat.\nTHE COURT: That\u2019s correct.\u201d\nA few moments later, Judge Madden also sustained defendant\u2019s motion to suppress identification testimony based on photographs of defendant taken after his arrest.\nOpinion\nOn July 7, 1987, the State filed its notice of appeal from the Cook County trial court\u2019s order of June 25. On the same date, the State also filed its certification that \u201cthe order suppressing evidence\u201d substantially impairs the State\u2019s ability to prosecute. The notice of appeal did not describe the order in question except by date; in the \u201cNature of the Case\u201d section of its brief, the State identifies it as the order sustaining defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, although in the \u201cStatement of Facts\u201d section of its brief, the State purports to appeal from the trial court\u2019s disposition of that motion as well as the motion to suppress identification testimony. The State\u2019s argument on appeal deals exclusively with the motion to quash defendant\u2019s arrest and suppress evidence, even though it concludes variously by urging this court to remand the cause in order to allow the State \u201cto present evidence in opposition to defendant\u2019s pre-trial motions to suppress evidence and identification\u201d and by requesting that the court \u201cvacate the trial court\u2019s order.\u201d\nIn any event, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the State also appeals from Judge Madden\u2019s order suppressing identification testimony. Judge Madden sustained the identification motion on \u201cfruit of the poisonous tree\u201d grounds rather than those advanced in the motion itself; the State failed to appeal from and conceded the propriety of Judge Provenzale\u2019s order and the presumed dismissal of the charges insofar as the Du Page County cannabis arrest was concerned; and the photographs were undoubtedly made as a result of the cannabis arrest that concededly followed an unlawful glove-compartment search. Even if the State has also appealed from the order suppressing identification testimony, the order\u2019s predicate (the unlawfulness of the glove-compartment search that led to the cannabis arrest and photographs) is unchallenged by the State, and any such appeal thus must fail in accordance with Davis v. Mississippi (1969), 394 U.S. 721, 22 L. Ed. 2d 676, 89 S. Ct. 1394, Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407, People v. Albea (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 317, 118 N.E.2d 277, and People v. Bean (1970), 121 Ill. App. 2d 332, 257 N.E.2d 562. (See also People v. Bowen (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 164, 177-78, 517 N.E.2d 608, 617, appeal denied (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 561.) In addition, failure to argue any such appeal will constitute its abandonment. (People v. Spears (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 396, 493 N.E.2d 1030; 107 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).) Therefore, we consider this appeal as touching only defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence.\nThe Cook County trial court felt that the subject matter of the motion to quash defendant\u2019s arrest and suppress evidence had been fully litigated in Du Page County and that, accordingly, the State was not permitted to relitigate it. If indeed the subject matter was fully litigated previously, the Cook County court was correct.\nThe doctrine of collateral estoppel, which bars relitigation of a decided question, applies to criminal as well as civil proceedings. (People v. Williams (1975), 59 Ill. 2d 557, 560, 322 N.E.2d 461, 462.) The principle means that \u201c \u2018when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.\u2019 \u201d (Williams, 59 Ill. 2d at 560, 322 N.E.2d at 462-63, quoting Ashe v. Swenson (1970), 397 U.S. 436, 443, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469, 475, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1194.) Stated otherwise, \u201c[wjhere some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both causes has been adjudicated in the former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction and the same fact or question is again at issue between the same parties, its adjudication in the first cause will, if properly presented, be conclusive of the same question in the later suit.\u201d Hoffman v. Hoffman (1928), 330 Ill. 413, 417, 161 N.E. 723, 725, quoted in People v. Haran (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 229, 231, 188 N.E.2d 707, 709.\nThe Du Page County suppression order, entered in the State\u2019s prosecution of defendant there, had not been appealed by the State, and it thus was final at the time of the Cook County hearing. (Williams, 59 Ill. 2d at 562, 322 N.E.2d at 463; People v. Busija (1986), 155 Ill. App. 3d 741, 745, 509 N.E.2d 168, 171.) A defendant may not repeatedly relitigate a pretrial motion to suppress. (People v. Miller (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 620, 623, 464 N.E.2d 1197, 1199.) Neither may the State. (People v. Taylor (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 136, 140, 277 N.E.2d 878, 881; People v. Nelson (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 964, 968, 423 N.E.2d 1147, 1150.) In the absence of additional evidence or exceptional circumstances, collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of an order sustaining or denying a pretrial motion to suppress evidence. People v. Strauser (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 128, 132, 496 N.E.2d 1131, 1133; People v. Neziroski (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 720, 723, 430 N.E .2d 265, 267; Nelson, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 967, 423 N.E.2d at 1150.\nIn the absence of a mistake in law, the Du Page County judge, having heard the testimony of witnesses ab initio, and having observed their demeanor while testifying, was in the best position to determine wherein the truth lay, rather than the subsequent Cook County court simply reading from a cold transcript. (Nelson, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 968, 423 N.E.2d at 1151.) While it is true that the State offered to present its witness again in Cook County on the suppression motion, there was no representation that the witness would testify differently from his DuPage County testimony, and thus the DuPage County order retained all of any collateral-estoppel vitality that it had. (See People v. Armstrong (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 159, 161, 306 N.E.2d 14, 15.) Presentation of the same testimony in a Cook County hearing would appear to be as \u201crepetitious\u201d as the court regarded a similar prosecution proposal to be in Bowen (Bowen, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 171, 517 N.E.2d at 613). Moreover, the salutary effect of excluding witnesses during the DuPage County suppression hearing would be vitiated if the witnesses were now permitted to reappear in Cook County and testify in the light of their Du Page County courtroom experiences.\nThe question remains, however, whether the Du Page County proceeding litigated fully the question of the legality of the automobile search. The State argues that the Du Page County order was limited to the glove-compartment search and to the seizure of cannabis found there and that the question whether defendant consented to the search of the rest of the vehicle remained undecided. Indeed, the DuPage County judge provided in her clarification order of March 10, 1987, that her suppression order \u201cwent to\u201d the glove-compartment search and cannabis only. However, defendant argues that \u201c[t]he material issue determinative of suppression in both cases is whether Mark Wiedman was legally arrested and whether the evidence the State sought to introduce was the tainted fruit of that arrest. *** [T]he legality of this seizuref ] and arrest was the controlling and d[i]spositive question in both cases.\u201d\nDefendant points out that the State conceded in Cook County that the glove-compartment search and resulting arrest were unlawful. As for the State\u2019s contention that consent by defendant had validated the search of the rest of the automobile and that the testimony offered in Cook County would so show, the Cook County court reviewed the Du Page County transcript, which in the Cook County court\u2019s view indicated that the same testimony there had showed that after defendant allegedly gave the deputy sheriff consent to look at the items not within the glove compartment, the deputy instead proceeded to inspect the glove compartment, find cannabis, arrest defendant, and then inventory the other items that defendant allegedly had given his original consent to be looked at.\nThe State agreed with the Cook County court\u2019s summary of the Du Page County testimony. By so doing, the State would appear to have agreed that the Cook County physical evidence had been seized not pursuant to the alleged consent (which in any event supposedly had allowed only inspection, not seizure) but as an incident of the unlawful cannabis arrest. But whether or not the State now agrees with that characterization of the seizure, the Cook County court implicitly so characterized it when stating that the inventorying of the Cook County physical evidence occurred after an unlawful seizure of cannabis that had led to an arrest. On that view of events, the Cook County court concluded that \u201cthe motion has been in fact litigated,\u201d and the State was denied leave to relitigate.\nEven if defendant had ostensibly given his consent not only to inspect but to seize the Cook County physical evidence, it is arguable that the consent was given only after he was in custody of the deputy who had \u201casked\u201d him several times, over his protests, to step out of his automobile (see People v. Reynolds (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 160, 165, 445 N.E.2d 766, 768); and in any case, once he had been unlawfully arrested for cannabis possession, the test of whether to suppress the Cook County evidence is whether, granting the primary illegality of the cannabis arrest, the evidence has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 488, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417; People v. White (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 194, 222, 512 N.E.2d 677, 687.\nThe only offer of proof made by the State in Cook County was that the deputy sheriff would testify that defendant had consented to the deputy\u2019s looking at the items not within the automobile\u2019s glove compartment. Yet the deputy had already so testified in Du Page County, and the Cook County court had a transcript of the testimony. The Cook County court concluded that the matter had been fully litigated in Du Page County and that the litigation showed that the seizure occurred after an unlawful arrest. On the basis of Wong Sun and its progeny, evidence so seized is suppressible.\nPerhaps the Cook County court did not articulate all of its reasoning, which could have led it to conclude that the DuPage County court, despite its clarifying order, had actually decided the facts determinative of the illegality of defendant\u2019s arrest and that on constitutional principles, because of the unlawful arrest, suppression of the Cook County evidence was required. Or perhaps the Cook County court felt, rightly or wrongly, that the Du Page County court had determined that no consent was given by defendant to the search of items outside the glove compartment. Still, a reviewing court will not disturb the circuit court\u2019s finding on a motion to suppress unless that finding is determined to be manifestly erroneous. (.People v. Reynolds (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 160, 165, 445 N.E.2d 766, 769.) And the Cook County circuit court\u2019s judgment may be sustained on any basis appearing in the record, regardless of the reasoning advanced or omitted by that court. See Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 382, 387, 457 N.E.2d 9, 12; Peters & Fulk Realtors, Inc. v. Shah (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 301, 307-08, 488 N.E.2d 635, 639.\nIn the case at bar, the Cook County court would have been clearly justified (1) in regarding the Du Page County determination of facts underlying the illegality of defendant\u2019s cannabis arrest as collaterally estopping the State from relitigating those facts and (2) therefore in treating the unlawful cannabis arrest as constituting a \u201cpoisonous tree\u201d of which the fruit in the form of the Cook County physical evidence was suppressible in Cook County. Indeed, the Cook County court acquiesced in just such a turn of phrase when sustaining defendant\u2019s separate motion to suppress identification testimony derived from the cannabis arrest. Thus, while the Cook County court couched its decision in the somewhat elliptical formulation that \u201cthe motion has in fact been litigated\u201d in DuPage County, we find no error, much less manifest error, in the Cook County suppression order and accordingly affirm the order.\nOrder affirmed.\nHARTMAN, P.J., and BILANDIC, J., concur.\nAt the same time, the trial judge also heard defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss the information and to suppress identification testimony. The former, based on a theory of res judicata and collateral estoppel resembling that argued as to the motion involved in the present appeal, was denied because \u201cit doesn\u2019t fall within the parameters of the motion to dismiss.\u201d The latter was sustained on the ground that the testimony flowed from the same arrest that was the subject of the motion involved in the present appeal and that the testimony as \u201cfruits of the poisonous tree is being suppressed also.\u201d Apparently, neither party appeals with regard to either of these other motions. See text accompanying footnotes 3 and 4.\nUncertified copies of written orders entered by Judge Provenzale in the earlier proceedings have been furnished as Appendix C of defendant\u2019s brief. The gist of her oral clarifications is embodied in her written order of March 10,1987.\nMoreover, it is not perfectly clear from the record and Du Page County transcript that the order entered by either Judge Provenzale or Judge Madden actually quashed defendant\u2019s arrest in addition to suppressing the evidence, and both parties\u2019 briefs are inconclusive as to their understanding of this latter point.\nThe written motion to suppress identification testimony was based on grounds that the exhibition of photographs to certain of the witnesses was improper because a properly conducted in-person lineup would have been possible, the photographic display was improperly suggestive, and a witness\u2019s emotional and physical condition impaired his ability to identify the offender.\nUnder section 114 \u2014 12(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 ( Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 114 \u2014 12(b)), if the Du Page County order had suppressed all the physical evidence seized from the automobile, the evidence could not thereafter have been used in the Cook County proceedings. Moreover, had the Du Page County court chosen to enter an order suppressing all the evidence seized during the arrest regardless of whether it was relevant to the cannabis prosecution, the court would have been within its authority in so doing, and the State could not on its own initiative successfully argue that such an order must be limited in its effect to the cannabis evidence only. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 114 \u2014 12(a), (b); Bowen, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 171-72, 517 N.E.2d at 613.\nThe transcript reveals that on March 16, 1987, the DuPage County judge remarked that \u201c[tjhe Court found there was no search of the vehicle itself, and I believe I made that very clear on the record on the last Court date.\u201d In fact, on the earlier court date of March 10, 1987, she had announced merely that \u201cthe Court\u2019s finding [of February 17, 1987] went to the search of the glove compartment because I don\u2019t find there was a search of the vehicle itself.\u201d On February 17, she had orally granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress because \u201c[t]he Court finds that the Officer did not have probable cause to search the vehicle nor did he have consent to do so.\u201d Her written order of February 17 had then granted the motion to suppress, \u201cthe Court finding that there was no probable cause for the search of Defendant\u2019s motor vehicle and no consent for the search.\u201d\n\u201cThe extent of an estoppel by judgment depends on the principles of law applied to the facts of the case; it is not determined by the court rendering the judgment, which has no power to say how far its judgment shall or shall not be conclusive ***,\u201d although \u201c[t]he estoppel does not extend to matters which the judgment expressly declares not to have been in issue in the action in which it was rendered or to have been omitted from consideration therein.\u201d (50 C.J.S. Judgments \u00a7712(d) (1947); see People v. Kidd (1947), 398 Ill. 405, 410, 75 N.E.2d 851, 854; City of Elmhurst v. Kegerreis (1945), 392 Ill. 195, 208-09, 64 N.E.2d 450, 455-56; Hilti, Inc. v. Griffith (1978), 68 Ill. App. 3d 528, 532, 386 N.E.2d 63, 65; City of Chicago v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 651, 654, 371 N.E.2d 1182, 1185.) The written Du Page County clarifying order did not expressly declare consent to inspect the items outside the glove compartment not to have been in issue or to have been omitted from the court\u2019s consideration; the written order merely stated that the court\u2019s suppression order \u201cwent to\u201d the glove-compartment search and cannabis seizure only.\nIn any event, after finally determining the facts that underlay the illegality of the cannabis seizure and arrest, the Du Page County court had no power through its clarifying order \u201cto say how far its judgment shall or shall not be conclusive,\u201d and on the basis of that factual determination as to illegality the Cook County court\u2019s suppression order would be properly grounded. Furthermore, the true collateral-estoppel issue is not to what charges or evidence the Du Page County suppression order applied but rather what facts were determined in the Du Page County litigation.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STAMOS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Lynda A. Peters, and Carol L. Gaines, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Paul P. Biebel, Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Andrea Monsees, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARK WIEDMAN, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 87\u20142341\nOpinion filed March 16, 1988.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Lynda A. Peters, and Carol L. Gaines, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nPaul P. Biebel, Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Andrea Monsees, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0199-01", "first_page_order": 221, "last_page_order": 232 }