{ "id": 3512445, "name": "ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES W. GOAD, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Illinois Central Gulf Railroad v. Goad", "decision_date": "1988-04-21", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201487\u20140698", "first_page": "541", "last_page": "545", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 541" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 1078", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1082" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5661773 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 N.E.2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2878710 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26-27" }, { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3046125 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" }, { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 534", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5437170 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 533", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535" }, { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "381 U.S. 926", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6200937, 6201934, 6201710, 6202127, 6201488, 6201273, 6202335 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/381/0806-01", "/us/381/0806-05", "/us/381/0806-04", "/us/381/0806-06", "/us/381/0806-03", "/us/381/0806-02", "/us/381/0806-07" ] }, { "cite": "203 N.E.2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. 2d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2840415 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3604102 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a751", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 468, "char_count": 7024, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.758261142846496e-08, "percentile": 0.5312601236597192 }, "sha256": "b8c2d78d6a4a55f76d60a21f4842a2660a802435c465883a61fde2108f703cdf", "simhash": "1:37e8ddfcbc85a8b5", "word_count": 1160 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:02:50.417384+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES W. GOAD, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LUND\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn September 8, 1987, the circuit court of Champaign County dismissed the complaint for declaratory relief filed by plaintiff Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company against defendant Charles W. Goad. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint for declaratory relief arises out of alleged injuries defendant received while working for plaintiff. The complaint alleges that on December 12, 1986, plaintiff made an offer to settle the claim for injuries, and defendant knowingly and voluntarily accepted the offer. The settlement would provide monetary relief for defendant without plaintiff admitting any liability, and defendant would release plaintiff from any further claims from the injury. It is alleged defendant was to sign a written agreement to that effect on December 15, 1986. It is further alleged that on that date plaintiff was ready to perform its part, but defendant refused to sign the appropriate papers. It finally alleges that on February 20, 1987, plaintiff received an attorney lien letter regarding defendant\u2019s injuries, which is a breach of the December 12 agreement. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint asks the court to declare that a binding and enforceable settlement agreement exists.\nOn April 6, 1987, defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The motion averred that defendant had filed a complaint in Federal court against plaintiff for damages resulting from defendant\u2019s injury pursuant to the Federal Employers\u2019 Liability Act (45 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a751 through 59 (1982)). It further stated that the alleged settlement agreement is a defense to defendant\u2019s claim and must be pleaded accordingly. Therefore, it asked plaintiff\u2019s action be dismissed. On September 8, after hearing argument, the court granted defendant\u2019s motion. This appeal followed.\nThe trial court did not enter a written order, relying instead on a docket entry which provided that the action was dismissed due to the action pending in Federal court. Accordingly, the parties have argued a number of different theories in support of their respective positions. It is settled that a reviewing court can uphold a dismissal on any grounds appearing in the record. (McGrew v. Heinold Commodities, Inc. (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 104, 115, 497 N.E.2d 424, 432.) In this case, our review establishes the court\u2019s dismissal order is a proper application of section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619).\nSection 2 \u2014 619 provides, in relevant part:\n\u201cDefendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion for dismissal of the action or for other appropriate relief upon any of the following grounds.\n* * *\n(3) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619(a)(3).)\nThis section refers to \u201cthe same cause,\u201d and not the same \u201ccause of action\u201d; actions are for \u201cthe same cause\u201d where relief is requested on substantially the same set of facts. (Skolnick v. Martin (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 55, 57, 203 N.E.2d 428, 429, cert, denied (1965), 381 U.S. 926, 14 L. Ed. 2d 684, 85 S. Ct. 1562; Catalano v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 195, 198, 434 N.E.2d 31, 34.) The crucial inquiry is whether the two actions arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, not whether the legal theory, issues, burden of proof, or relief sought materially differ between the two actions. (Tambone v. Simpson (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 865, 867, 414 N.E.2d 533, 535; Catalano, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 198, 434 N.E.2d at 34.) Even though the purpose of the two actions is not identical, section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) of the Code may be invoked where there is a substantial similarity of issues between them. People ex rel. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Gitchoff (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 249, 255, 357 N.E.2d 534, 538; Tambone, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 867, 414 N.E.2d at 535.\nThe fact that one action is filed prior to the other is not determinative to application of this section. (A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Swift & Co. (1980), 84 Ill. 2d 245, 252, 419 N.E.2d 23, 26-27.) This section\u2019s purpose is to foster orderly procedure by preventing a multiplicity of actions (People ex rel. Lehman v. Lehman (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 286, 290, 215 N.E.2d 806, 809), and the court\u2019s analysis should be geared toward effectuating that purpose. (Staley, 84 Ill. 2d at 252, 419 N.E.2d at 27.) Granting or denying dismissal on the basis of section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) of the Code is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court (Cummings v. Iron Hustler Corp. (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 327, 332, 454 N.E.2d 1078, 1082) and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.\nPlaintiff argues the court improperly dismissed the present case because this case and the Federal case are not \u201cfor the same cause.\u201d It asserts the present case is based on a contract theory, and the evidence presented will address whether an offer and acceptance occurred on December 12, 1986, creating an oral contract. Meanwhile, it asserts the Federal case is a Federal Employers\u2019 Liability Act action, and the evidence will address whether defendant suffered injury while in plaintiff\u2019s employment, the extent of the injury, and damages to be recovered. Therefore, it asserts relief is not requested on substantially the same set of facts, and the cases do not arise out of the same transaction.\nWe do not believe section 2 \u2014 619(aX3) is to be applied so restrictively. In its prayer for relief in this case, plaintiff asked the court to declare that a binding and enforceable settlement agreement existed and to declare that, due to the tender of the settlement amount to defendant, plaintiff is fully and completely discharged from any claims concerning the injury in question. It is clear the sole purpose of this case is to create a defense to defendant\u2019s action under the Federal Employers\u2019 Liability Act. Further, it is also clear that whatever the outcome of this case on the merits, the prevailing party would use that result in the Federal action. If the court found a settlement occurred, plaintiff would use that finding as a defense in the Federal case. Similarly, if no settlement was found, defendant would use that finding to preclude plaintiff from raising that defense in the Federal case. Plaintiff is correct that in the present case there is no need for evidence concerning defendant\u2019s injuries. However, for us to hold the cases do not arise from the same occurrence would be contrary to common sense and defeat the purpose of the section.\nAffirmed.\nGREEN, P.J., and McCULLOUGH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LUND" } ], "attorneys": [ "David B. Potter, of Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, of Chicago, and Timothy J. Forman, of Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, of Urbana, for appellant.", "M. Melinda Sanderson, of Kujawski, Rosen & Faerber, of Belleville, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES W. GOAD, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201487\u20140698.\nOpinion filed April 21, 1988.\nDavid B. Potter, of Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, of Chicago, and Timothy J. Forman, of Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, of Urbana, for appellant.\nM. Melinda Sanderson, of Kujawski, Rosen & Faerber, of Belleville, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0541-01", "first_page_order": 563, "last_page_order": 567 }