{ "id": 3514346, "name": "MARK ANTHONY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Anthony v. City of Chicago", "decision_date": "1988-03-29", "docket_number": "No. 87\u20142905", "first_page": "733", "last_page": "738", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 733" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3639350 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 1199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3604597 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 N.E.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3547937 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 N.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3292822 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 460", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 840", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5677500 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0840-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 1002", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 975", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3649242 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "980-82" }, { "page": "980" }, { "page": "982" }, { "page": "982" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0975-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3121711 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 942", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5451078 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 N.E.2d 1183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3626612 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" }, { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 960", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3434907 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507-08" }, { "page": "508" }, { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S. Ct. 2230", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 L. Ed. 2d 696", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 919", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12033347, 12033251, 12033502, 12033032, 12033162, 12033395, 12033555, 12033205, 12033461, 12032981, 12033082, 12033118 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0919-08", "/us/403/0919-07", "/us/403/0919-11", "/us/403/0919-02", "/us/403/0919-05", "/us/403/0919-09", "/us/403/0919-12", "/us/403/0919-06", "/us/403/0919-10", "/us/403/0919-01", "/us/403/0919-03", "/us/403/0919-04" ] }, { "cite": "262 N.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 2d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2652996 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/128/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 N.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 2d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2587475 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378-79" }, { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/71/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 69", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3489190 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3641263 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" }, { "page": "616" }, { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3468320 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 N.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2853150 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" }, { "page": "363" }, { "page": "363" }, { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 967", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3160713 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "969" }, { "page": "970" }, { "page": "970" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0967-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 638, "char_count": 11110, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5009912413901963e-07, "percentile": 0.6656606234571977 }, "sha256": "6f66da6c290c30889530f5c7df6e0560d3850cf749060f2e6e5aa634fe74502d", "simhash": "1:aaff14884740d4a7", "word_count": 1824 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:02:50.417384+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MARK ANTHONY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Mark Anthony, claims error in the dismissal of his second amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action against the City of Chicago (City), the Chicago Fire Department (Department) and an unknown city fireman. For reasons which follow, we reverse and remand.\nFollowing previous dismissals of earlier complaints, on April 9, 1987, Anthony filed a three-count, second amended complaint pursuant to leave of court. Count I, in relevant part, asserted defendants\u2019 negligence in that they permitted Anthony to remain on the premises and \u201cinstructed, directed and encouraged\u201d Anthony\u2019s aid in opening an elevator door from which smoke was escaping, in a burning building, without providing him with proper training, clothing, assistance or equipment and without warning him of the elevator\u2019s dangerous condition. In count II, Anthony alleged that because defendants \u201cknew or should have known he was likely to be injured\u201d by these same acts, defendants acted wantonly, wilfully and with a reckless disregard for his safety. Anthony attempted in count III to plead defendants\u2019 \u201cspecial duty\u201d to him and the breach thereof, in that: (1) \u201c[defendants were uniquely aware of the risk and danger to plaintiff in opening [the elevator] door\u201d; and (2) through their experience, defendants \u201cknew or should have known\u201d either: (a) \u201celevator shafts are a source of updrafts and associated rapid and explosive combustion\u201d; or (b) \u201c[t]he fire *** would explode when the elevator door was opened.\u201d Anthony further alleged defendants wilfully and wantonly \u201callowed, permitted and encouraged\u201d him to remain on the premises, \u201cdirected\u201d him to stand in front of and open an elevator door \u201ccontaining a fire,\u201d and failed to \u201cprovide him with proper training, clothing or assistance,\u201d although defendants knew or should have known these acts would likely result in injury to Anthony.\nThe City moved to dismiss, citing sections 5 \u2014 102 and 5 \u2014 103 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85, par. 1 \u2014 101 et seq.) and asserting that: (1) these sections provide fire fighters with blanket immunity from liability for injuries arising from fire fighting activities, subject only to exceptions enumerated in the Act; and (2) the exceptions stated in sections 5 \u2014 102 and 5 \u2014 103 of the Act, relating to the operation of a motor vehicle and fire services provided by \u201cfire protection districts or corporations,\u201d are inapplicable to the case at bar. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85, pars. 5\u2014102, 5\u2014103.\nFollowing a hearing on August 12, 1987, the court declined to recognize a \u201cspecial duty\u201d exception capable of piercing the statutory immunity shielding fire fighters from liability and dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice.\nAnthony appeals, requesting a vacatur or, in the alternative, a reversal of the August 12,1987, order.\nTo overcome a motion to dismiss, Anthony must assert facts supporting the allegations of the cause of action; in other words, he must allege facts which establish: a duty; a breach of that duty; and resulting injury. (Bell v. Village of Midlothian (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 967, 969, 414 N.E.2d 104.) Anthony contends the circuit court erred in dismissing his second amended complaint and failing to recognize the special duty exception to fire fighters\u2019 immunity under the Act.\nA municipality or its employees may not be held liable for failure to supply general police or fire protection. (Huey v. Town of Cicero (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 361, 363, 243 N.E.2d 214; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85, pars. 5\u2014102, 5 \u2014 103.) Where a public employee, however, exercises care or custody over an individual, the individual\u2019s status is elevated beyond that of a member of the general public, the \u201cspecial duty\u201d exception is activated and the employee is liable for injury proximately caused by his negligence. Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 Ill. 2d at 363; Fessler v. R. E. J. Inc. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 290, 295, 514 N.E.2d 515; Fryman v. JMK/Skewer, Inc. (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 611, 616, 484 N.E.2d 909; Santy v. Bresee (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 658, 662, 473 N.E.2d 69; Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge (1966), 71 Ill. App. 2d 373, 378-79, 219 N.E.2d 147, later appeal (1970), 128 Ill. App. 2d 157, 262 N.E.2d 829, cert, denied (1971), 403 U.S. 919, 29 L. Ed. 2d 696, 91 S. Ct. 2230.\nDefendants acknowledge the creation of the special duty exception by our supreme court, but argue that it has been applied to police only and urge that it not be extended to injuries caused by fire fighters. See Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 505, 475 N.E.2d 960; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Authority (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 172, 446 N.E.2d 1183; Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge (1966), 71 Ill. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147.\nIllinois case law does not limit the exception to a particular class or type of public official; instead, the exception has been held relevant to a variety of public entities. (See Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 Ill. 2d at 363; Fryman v. JMK/Skewer, Inc., 137 Ill. App. 3d at 616; Curtis v. County of Cook (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 400, 407, 440 N.E.2d 942, affirmed in part, reversed in part (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 158, 456 N.E.2d 116; Bell v. Village of Midlothian, 90 Ill. App. 3d at 970.) Moreover, this court recently recognized that the exception could be applied to fire fighters. (See Jackson v. Chicago Firefighters Union, Local No. 2 (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 975, 980-82, 513 N.E.2d 1002.) Cases relied upon by defendants, Adams v. Brooks (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 840, 463 N.E.2d 460, and Adams v. City of Peoria (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 683, 396 N.E.2d 572, lend little support to them. Although these decisions held that the Act provides fire fighters with blanket immunity from injuries arising from fire fighting activities, subject only to the two exceptions noted in section 5 \u2014 103(b) of the Act (see Adams v. Brooks, 123 Ill. App. 3d at 841; Adams v. City of Peoria, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 687), at issue were constitutional challenges to the Act; the parties did not raise, nor did the court consider, the special duty exception.\nDefendants further maintain that if this court applies the special duty exception to fire fighters, Anthony cannot meet the four elements necessary to the cause of action: (1) the municipality must be uniquely aware of the particular danger or risk to which plaintiff is exposed; (2) there must be specific acts or omissions on the part of the municipality; (3) the specific acts or omissions must be affirmative or wilful in nature; and (4) the injury must occur while plaintiff is under the direct and immediate control of municipal employees or agents. Bell v. Village of Midlothian, 90 Ill. App. 3d at 970; see also Jackson v. Chicago Firefighters Union, Local No. 2, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 980; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Authority, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 176; Curtis v. County of Cook, 109 Ill. App. 3d at 407.\nIn the case sub judice, the second amended complaint satisfies the first three requirements. The complaint alleges that defendants are experienced in combatting blazes and observing the dangerous effects of updrafts in elevator, shafts and that they permitted an untrained, unequipped civilian to open the door of a burning elevator. (See Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 Ill. 2d at 364; Rush v. City of Chicago (1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 725, 728, 517 N.E.2d 17; Fryman v. JMK/Skewer, Inc., 137 Ill. App. 3d at 617.) Anthony further contends that defendants, through the unknown fire fighter, placed him in that hazardous position by affirmatively instructing him to accompany the fire fighter in the burning building and open the elevator door. See Galuszynski v. City of Chicago, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 507-08.\nDefendants are particularly insistent that Anthony failed to allege that he was under the direct and immediate control of the Department and facts sufficient to satisfy the element of control. The fourth requirement of the special duty exception is met where the public employee \u201c[creates] a position of peril\u201d ultimately injurious to plaintiff, as opposed to situations where plaintiff merely seeks protection from the public employee which is not provided. (Jackson v. Chicago Firefighters Union, Local No. 2, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 982; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 508.) In Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge (71 Ill. App. 2d at 379), for instance, the court recognized the existence of a special duty where plaintiff acquiesced to police officers\u2019 \u201cexpress request\u201d to identify several criminal suspects and was subsequently beaten by those suspects. No \u201cdirect and immediate control\u201d was found, however, where plaintiffs alleged injuries arising from a tardy response by police to plaintiffs\u2019 911 emergency telephone call (Galuszynski v. City of Chicago, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 508) or where a police officer refused to accompany plaintiff to a subway platform and plaintiff was later beaten by youths waiting on the platform (Marvin v. Chicago Transit Authority, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 177). In Jackson v. Chicago Firefighters Union, Local No. 2 (160 Ill. App. 3d at 982), the court ruled that defendant fire fighters were not \u201cresponsible\u201d for the fire which destroyed plaintiffs\u2019 property and therefore did not maintain \u201cdirect and immediate control\u201d over plaintiffs.\nThe case at bar most closely resembles Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge (71 Ill. App. 2d 373): the second amended complaint alleged that the unknown fire fighter \u201cinstructed\u201d and \u201cdirected\u201d Anthony to open the elevator door and that Anthony was \u201cinstructed, directed and encouraged\u201d to \u201caid\u201d defendants in combatting the fire. The fire fighter arguably assumed responsibility for Anthony\u2019s safety when he requisitioned Anthony to assist in fighting the blaze and thereby initiated the events immediately accountable for Anthony\u2019s injuries. While the precise phrase \u201cdirect and immediate control\u201d is absent from the pleading, Anthony nonetheless alleged facts adequately demonstrating that defendants\u2019 affirmative acts created a position of peril. (See Playskool, Inc. v. Elsa Benson, Inc. (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 292, 301-02, 497 N.E.2d 1199; MBL (USA) Corp. v. Diekman (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 238, 243, 484 N.E.2d 371.) The circuit court thus erred in dismissing Anthony\u2019s second amended complaint.\nFor the reasons above stated, the circuit court\u2019s order of August 12, 1987, dismissing Anthony\u2019s second amended complaint must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nSTAMOS and BILANDIC, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James T. Newman, of Robert J. Cooney & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Judson H. Miner, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Ruth M. Moscovitch and Joanne Simboli Hodge, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARK ANTHONY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 87\u20142905\nOpinion filed March 29, 1988.\nJames T. Newman, of Robert J. Cooney & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJudson H. Miner, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Ruth M. Moscovitch and Joanne Simboli Hodge, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0733-01", "first_page_order": 755, "last_page_order": 760 }