{ "id": 3511643, "name": "PATSY HASHEY LORENZ, Special Adm'r of the Estate of Jerome R. Lorenz, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AIR ILLINOIS, INC., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Lorenz v. Air Illinois, Inc.", "decision_date": "1988-04-18", "docket_number": "No. 87\u20140873", "first_page": "1060", "last_page": "1071", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 1060" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "506 N.E.2d 1326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. App. 3d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3647836 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/154/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 690", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3577512 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 1242", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1252" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3075714 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3074247 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "803 F.2d 304", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1629624 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/803/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 990", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3641087 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141616 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3578993 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 N.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3561093 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 F. Supp. 955", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 603619 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "958" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/71/0955-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 S. Ct. 49", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 L. Ed. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 U.S. 833", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173444, 6173800, 6173550, 6173103, 6173232, 6173685, 6173340 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/352/0833-04", "/us/352/0833-07", "/us/352/0833-05", "/us/352/0833-01", "/us/352/0833-02", "/us/352/0833-06", "/us/352/0833-03" ] }, { "cite": "133 N.E.2d 288", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Ill. 2d 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2715560 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/8/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 1081", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472722 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/1081-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5678553 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 923", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3613412 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0923-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5475697 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3529793 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3430519 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 N.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Ill. App. 3d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2914579 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/4/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 1232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3638840 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0762-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1146, "char_count": 23454, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.614488447768702e-07, "percentile": 0.6861459876618289 }, "sha256": "529143f52b197b3b4b44fba9c03a57085e883d8c03a66de3ae97bcfe6b9e67b3", "simhash": "1:6baf9cd77d6d85ff", "word_count": 3738 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:02:50.417384+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PATSY HASHEY LORENZ, Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Jerome R. Lorenz, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AIR ILLINOIS, INC., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is the third in a series of actions arising out of the crash of Air Illinois, Inc. (defendant), flight 710, en route from Springfield to Carbondale, Illinois, on October 11, 1983. Patsy Hashey Lorenz, special administrator of the estate of her husband Jerome E. Lorenz (decedent), a passenger on flight 710, was awarded $925,000 following a jury trial on the issue of damages. The trial court subsequently reduced the verdict by $232,346 to account for a settlement reached by plaintiff and other named defendants (settling defendants). Defendant now appeals this judgment, alleging numerous errors regarding certain evidence and jury instructions. Defendant also urges error with respect to the trial court\u2019s dismissal of its third-party claims against settling defendants, its refusal to grant defendant\u2019s requests for continuances, and its alleged failure to discount the settlement in the same manner as the jury\u2019s award. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.\nThe evidence at trial revealed that decedent was bom on August 21, 1944, and received a bachelor\u2019s degree, a master\u2019s degree, and a Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin. At the time of his death, decedent, who was in excellent health, was a full professor and director of the rehabilitation institute at Southern Illinois University in Carbondale earning an annual income of approximately $43,716. In this position, decedent taught as well as administered programs involving academics, rehabilitation of the handicapped, and child abuse.\nThe evidence further disclosed that decedent was survived by his widow and two daughters, ages 13 and 16 at the time of decedent\u2019s death, all three of whom were dependent upon decedent for financial support. Decedent had a close and loving family relationship, performed various household chores, and participated in his children\u2019s moral and intellectual development.\nOn appeal, defendant initially contends that the trial court erred in dismissing its third-party claims against those who settled with plaintiff and granting \u201cgood faith\u201d findings in their favor. Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s actions were taken without a hearing, thereby depriving defendant of its constitutional right to due process, and that the Illinois Contribution Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, pars. 301 through 305) (Act), upon which these actions were taken, is vague and ambiguous and denies defendant equal protection under the law. The Act provides, in substance, that a tortfeasor who settles with a claimant in good faith is discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor. Perez v. Espinoza (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 762, 484 N.E.2d 1232.\nWe note that nowhere in defendant\u2019s post-trial motion and supporting memorandum, or in its brief in opposition to the good-faith finding, does defendant raise any of the above constitutional challenges. Accordingly, they are deemed waived. (Danielson v. Elgin Salvage & Supply Co. (1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d 445, 280 N.E.2d 778.) Despite defendant\u2019s contention to the contrary, we believe that raising these issues in a prior appeal or in a motion for Rule 308 (107 Ill. 2d R. 308) certification is an insufficient basis upon which to preserve them for our review.\nIn any event, based on counsel\u2019s representations at a hearing held on March 31, 1986, to set an immediate trial date, it appears that a hearing was in fact conducted on the issue of good faith on March 19, 1986, although the transcript of this proceeding was not furnished by defendant in the record on appeal. In addition, defendant argued at length the parties' \u201cbad faith\u201d in reaching the settlement at the March 31 hearing and was permitted to file a brief in opposition to the court\u2019s good-faith finding.\nNotwithstanding these facts, defendant was not entitled to the hearing it seeks as a matter of law. In Lowe v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 80, 463 N.E.2d 792, Barreto v. City of Waukegan (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 119, 478 N.E.2d 581, and Perez v. Espinoza (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 762, 484 N.E.2d 1232, the appellate court, after noting that the Act makes no provision for such a hearing, declined to require separate evidentiary hearings for the determination of good faith. Rather, it chose to leave the type of hearing necessary to fully adjudicate the issue to the discretion of the trial court. Here, the trial court heard arguments of counsel, an appropriate basis upon which to make a determination of good faith. (Barreto v. City of Waukegan (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 119, 478 N.E.2d 792.) Consequently, the trial court did not err in reaching its decision without conducting a trial.\nDefendant next maintains that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of Dr. Sam Goldman, the former dean of the college of human resources at Southern, that had decedent lived, he would have become dean of the university. Defendant argues that this event was not likely to happen, and therefore such testimony permitted the jury to speculate about future salary increases decedent would have obtained in that position.\nAfter reviewing the record, it appears that Goldman\u2019s projection was reasonably certain to occur. In reaching his conclusion, Goldman, whose testimony was based upon his own experience as well as his familiarity with decedent\u2019s career and potential for advancement, considered the fact that decedent had already achieved the highest professorial rank, had held a very strong administrative post at the university, and was quite young. Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Christou v. Arlington Park Race Track (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 257, 432 N.E.2d 920, where such testimony was in error, becoming dean of the university was not merely an \u201cambition\u201d of decedent\u2019s, but rather a goal which decedent had the ability to attain. Clearly, any lack of certainty concerning decedent\u2019s advancement was elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination of the witness. Despite Goldman\u2019s testimony that decedent would have eventually become dean, he offered no opinion as to salary or income that might have resulted therefrom. Rather, the record reveals that Goldman only discussed those salary increases decedent would have received in his current position as director. Accordingly, his testimony was proper.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred when it permitted plaintiff\u2019s expert economist, Dr. Charles Linke, to testify regarding information contained in a report he prepared in 1986 on the present value calculation of decedent\u2019s earning capacity. Specifically, defendant contends that this report, which it received shortly before trial, contained assumptions and conclusions different from those in Linke\u2019s original 1984 report, and as a result, the 60-day requirement of Supreme Court Rule 220(b) was violated. (107 Ill. 2d R. 220(b).) As noted in our related decision Singh v. Air Illinois, Inc. (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 923, where we addressed the same challenge to Linke\u2019s testimony, the 60-day limitation in Rule 220(b) is implemented to insure that discovery regarding expert witnesses not otherwise disclosed is completed sufficiently before trial. Here, Linke was otherwise disclosed to defendant, and thus Rule 220(b) does not apply. Moreover, having reviewed the two reports, there appears to be no material change in the basic methodology or tables used by Linke to calculate present cash value. Any changes appearing in the 1986 report merely update the prior report with more recent data and sources, an issue on which defense counsel was permitted to depose Linke prior to trial.\nDefendant further urges that the trial court erroneously permitted the jury to consider an editorial, published in the Journal of Rehabilitation Administration of which decedent had been editor, commemorating decedent\u2019s accomplishments. Defendant asserts that the editorial was not only irrelevant, but also constituted hearsay, as its \u25a0authors were not available for cross-examination. Defendant\u2019s hearsay objection clearly has no merit as the record discloses that the editorial in question was introduced through the testimony of Dr. William Emener, one of its co-authors. With respect to defendant\u2019s relevancy objection, we must presume that the trial court acted properly in admitting the exhibit into evidence as it was not made part of the instant record. In re Estate of Friedman (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 82, 462 N.E.2d 692 (appellate court is bound to review the circuit court\u2019s judgment solely in light of the evidence contained in the record on appeal).\nAs in the prior two wrongful, death actions this court has considered arising from- the crash of flight 710, defendant attacks the trial court\u2019s exclusion of the annuity testimony of Robert Ross, an insurance broker, and Mitchell Serota, an actuary. Specifically, pursuant to the offer of proof made in Exchange National Bank v. Air Illinois, Inc. (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 1081, Mr. Ross would have attested to the cost of a particular annuity, while the offer of proof made in Singh for Mr. Serota indicated that he would describe to the jury the mathematical calculations underlying that cost.\nWhile our supreme court, has sanctioned the use of annuity tables to establish present cash value (Allendorf v. Elgin Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288, cert. denied (1956), 352 U.S. 833, 1 L. Ed. 2d 53, 77 S. Ct. 49), it has never approved testimony of the character that defendant sought to introduce. On the contrary, an expert is only \u201cto describe to the jury a mathematical process that will simplify the jury\u2019s task of determining the present value\u201d using \u201cneutral figures.\u201d (8 Ill. 2d at 178, 133 N.E.2d at 295.) To hold otherwise, as one court has noted, would \u201cmislead the jury into accepting the hypothetical figure of another instead of an actual figure to be arrived at by them under the instructions, or a figure based on such use of \u2018annuity table as they might consider proper ***.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Caldwell v. Southern Pacific Co. (S.D. Cal. 1947), 71 F. Supp. 955, 958.\nAside from the foregoing evidentiary issues, defendant contends that the trial court submitted several erroneous instructions to the jury, the first of which instructed the jury, in part, on the issue of future earnings and on the loss of \u201cinstruction, moral training, superintendence of education and society\u201d suffered by decedent\u2019s children. As to decedent\u2019s future earnings, defendant argues that the testimony presented on this subject was speculative, yet defendant failed to make this objection at the jury instruction conference, and thus, cannot now raise it on appeal. (Henderson v. Hudson (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 780, 460 N.E.2d 10.) Even assuming otherwise, as noted earlier, Dr. Sam Goldman provided competent testimony on this issue to sustain that portion of the instruction.\nMoreover, contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, there was ample evidence introduced as to the losses suffered by decedent\u2019s children to support the other challenged portion of the instruction, as well as plaintiff\u2019s tendered instruction No. 8, which further directs the jury to consider the children\u2019s damages. Plaintiff testified that decedent \u201cmade a special effort to spend time with [their children], to take them places, do things with them, discipline them.\u201d She also stated that decedent helped them with their homework and thinking processes, and frequently took them swimming, on picnics, and to the circus. Further, there was testimony that decedent provided financial support for both his daughters. In light of this undisputed evidence, the above instructions were properly submitted to the jury.\nEqually unavailing are defendant\u2019s objections to that portion of plaintiff\u2019s tendered instruction No. 9A which provides that \u201c[d]am-ages for loss of companionship, sexual relations and society are not reduced to present cash value,\u201d and plaintiff\u2019s instruction No. 10 which defines the term \u201csociety\u201d as:\n\u201c[T]he mutual benefits that each family member receives from the other\u2019s continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, guidance, and protection.\u201d\nDefendant contends that the former instruction, which is taken from an unpublished but revised draft of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, does not accurately reflect the law in Illinois and that the latter instruction, also taken from the revised draft, was not supported by the evidence at trial, unduly highlights certain damages, and is cumulative of other instructions. Both contentions are without merit.\nWith respect to instruction No. 9A, not only does defendant fail to cite any authority to support its position that such damages are to be reduced to present cash value, but it also overlooks the fact that Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, Nos. 34.02 and 34.04 (2d ed. 1971) (hereinafter IPI Civil 2d), make clear that future noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering, disfigurement, and disability, damages which are akin to those in No. 9A, are not to be so reduced. Regarding defendant\u2019s challenge to instruction No. 10, while plaintiff\u2019s tendered instruction No. 7 mentions the word \u201csociety,\u201d it is not defined anywhere in any of the given instructions, and therefore is not cumulative, as defendant claims. Furthermore, plaintiff testified extensively to the loss of society both she and her children suffered as a result of decedent\u2019s death, thus warranting the giving of this instruction.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give seven instructions to the jury. The first two instructions, Nos. 6 and 6A, would allow the jury to infer that any evidence or witness\u2019s testimony, respectively, not offered but within the control of a party is adverse to that party. (IPI Civil 2d No. 5.01.) Specifically, the IPI instruction reads:\n\u201cIf a party to this case has failed [to offer evidence] [to produce a witness] within [her] power to produce, you may infer that the [evidence] [testimony of the witness] would be adverse to that party if you believe each of the following elements:\n1. The [evidence] [witness] was under the control of the party and could have been produced by the exercise of reasonable diligence.\n2. The [evidence] [witness] was not equally available to an adverse party.\n3. A reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances would have [offered the evidence] [produced the witness] if he believed [it to be] [the testimony would be] favorable to him.\n4. No reasonable excuse for the failure has been shown.\u201d (IPI Civil 2d No. 5.01.)\nDefendant maintains that these negative inference instructions were warranted as plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of decedent\u2019s income from his consulting practice and failed to make decedent\u2019s children available for trial.\nPlaintiff asserts on appeal, as she did in the trial court, that there was no evidence within her control as to decedent\u2019s future income from consulting work, and since defendant has failed to establish otherwise, the instruction as it relates to evidence was correctly refused. Likewise, there has been no showing that decedent\u2019s children were not equally available to defendant. More importantly, given that their relationship with decedent was fully described by plaintiff, no prejudice resulted from the children\u2019s absence at trial.\nAdditionally, defendant claims that the trial court committed reversible error in denying its non-IPI instruction No. 10, which states that the jury must deduct those amounts in determining present cash value which decedent could not or would not have contributed to his wife\u2019s support, on the ground that in its absence, the jury would not take into account the consequences of decedent\u2019s personal consumption and income taxes. The measure of damages in a wrongful death action, however, was adequately addressed in plaintiff\u2019s IPI instruction No. 7, which admonished the jury to consider, among other things, \u201c[w]hat money, goods and services the decedent customarily contributed in the past\u201d and \u201cwas likely to have contributed in the future,\u201d as well as what he \u201cspent for customary personal expenses.\u201d To have given further instruction on these elements as defendant urges would have unduly highlighted certain evidence resulting in prejudice to plaintiff. (Monier v. Winkler (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 724, 511 N.E.2d 246.) Furthermore, the jury had before it expert testimony on behalf of both parties regarding personal consumption and evidence of decedent\u2019s income taxes for the years 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983. These issues were specifically called to the jury\u2019s attention by defense counsel in closing argument. For these reasons, the trial court did not err in rejecting defendant\u2019s instruction No. 10.\nThe above reasoning applies with equal force to defendant\u2019s refused non-IPI instruction No. 11, which provides that decedent\u2019s earning capacity and wages are not themselves the measure of the economic support and pecuniary loss by his heirs.\nFurther, defendant\u2019s tendered instruction No. 12, which states that any award to plaintiff is exempt from income tax, is contrary to Klawonn v. Mitchell (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 450, 475 N.E.2d 857, where our supreme court held that a jury should not be advised as to the nontaxability of damage awards. (See also Wiedemann v. Industrial Erectors, Inc. (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 47, 483 N.E.2d 990.) While the Federal appellate court has ruled otherwise in Lux v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (7th Cir. 1986), 803 F.2d 304, that decision is of no precedential value in the instant case, where our supreme court has clearly decided the issue concerning State law.\nSimilarly, defendant was not entitled to a non-IPI instruction informing the jury that other defendants had reached a settlement with plaintiff. Again, defendant cites no controlling authority to support the submission of such an instruction, and it would be pure speculation to find, as defendant suggests, that the jury inflated its damage award because it assumed defendant was solely responsible for the crash. The amount of damages awarded plaintiff was clearly within the range of reasonable compensation based on the evidence, and therefore was properly assessed by the jury. In fact, the procedure followed by the trial court in this case, applying \u201csetoff\u201d once the jury had determined total damages without knowledge of any prior settlement between plaintiff and any other defendant, was specifically upheld by this court in Webb v. Toncray (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 78, 429 N.E.2d 874.\nPursuant to its instruction No. 15, defendant requested that the jury value the \u201csociety\u201d and \u201cmoney, goods, and services\u201d decedent would have provided from the \u201cdate of death to the date of trial and in the future.\u201d Although not originally tendered as one, defendant now argues that this \u201cspecial interrogatory\u201d should have been submitted to the jury as \u201cIt is upon an ultimate question of fact and is in proper form.\u201d (Stack v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 397, 411, 429 N.E.2d 1242, 1252.) Defendant\u2019s argument must fail on both counts. First, the mere itemization of damages does not involve an \u201cultimate question of fact,\u201d and second, given that the instruction excludes certain damages not within the purview of \u201csociety\u201d as defined by other instructions, its form was inappropriate. Defendant\u2019s reference to section 2 \u2014 1109 of the Code of Civil Procedure is misplaced, as that provision permits itemized verdicts in cases \u201cwhere damages for injury to the person are assessed,\u201d not in wrongful death actions. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1109.\nNext, defendant asserts it was denied a fair trial when the trial court refused to grant its requests for continuances based upon the poor health of its expert economist Dr. Rawleigh Ralls and its mistaken impression that decedent\u2019s ex-wife and adopted daughter would be subpoenaed by plaintiff. It is well established that the exercise of a trial court\u2019s discretion in granting or denying a continuance shall not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. (Madison Associates v. Bass (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 526, 511 N.E.2d 690.) Here, when the trial court was first made aware of Ralls\u2019 malignant melanoma on October 20, 1986, the date scheduled for trial, Ralls was not undergoing any treatment nor was any date set for its commencement. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly stated, \u201cIn the absence of any evidence of physical or mental change in Ralls\u2019 condition, I would deny the motion.\u201d Moreover, two days later, on October 22, 1986, Ralls testified extensively on defendant\u2019s behalf regarding present cash value. Consequently, no harm accrued to defendant.\nRegarding decedent\u2019s ex-wife and adopted daughter, decedent did not request a continuance until the conclusion of the jury instruction conference, after all of the evidence was presented in this case. Since nothing precluded defendant from serving these two witnesses earlier, there was no \u201csufficient excuse\u201d for the delay as required by Supreme Court Rule 231(f) (107 Ill. 2d R. 231(f)).\nFinally, it is necessary to consider defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in reducing the verdict by $232,346, the cost of an annuity, as opposed to the present cash value of the $281,500 settlement agreed upon by plaintiff and the settling defendants. Defendant argues that the action violated La Salle National Bank v. City of Chicago (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 456, 506 N.E.2d 1326, which requires that a settlement and a jury award be discounted in the same manner. While the trial court\u2019s March 12, 1987, order prepared by defense counsel refers to the $232,346 as \u201cbeing the cost of an annuity,\u201d it is apparent that the trial court intended that this figure reflect the present cash value of future installments totaling $199,000 and the present cash payment of $82,500 pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement. The court\u2019s intention was expressed at a hearing held on February 20,1987, during which the court stated:\n\u201cAnd I think John [referring to plaintiff\u2019s counsel] kind of wraps it up with his suggestion that the verdict was in present cash value, therefore, any deduction from it should also be in that form. For that reason, I would allow the setoff in the amount of the present cash value of the structured settlement.\u201d\nTherefore, in applying setoff, the trial court complied with the ruling in La Salle National Bank, and no error occurred.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCAMPBELL, P.J., and O\u2019CONNOR, J., concur.\nIn Singh v. Air Illinois, Inc. (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 923, and Exchange National Bank v. Air Illinois, Inc. (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 1081, this court upheld damage awards of $400,000 and $1,500,000, respectively, to the estates of two passengers on Flight 710.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, of Chicago (Michael. J. Merlo, Robert Marc Chemers, and Michael G. Bruton, of counsel), for appellant.", "Feirich, Schoen, Mager, Green & Associates, of Carbondale (John C. Feirich and Michael F. Dahlen, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PATSY HASHEY LORENZ, Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Jerome R. Lorenz, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AIR ILLINOIS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 87\u20140873\nOpinion filed April 18, 1988.\nPretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, of Chicago (Michael. J. Merlo, Robert Marc Chemers, and Michael G. Bruton, of counsel), for appellant.\nFeirich, Schoen, Mager, Green & Associates, of Carbondale (John C. Feirich and Michael F. Dahlen, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "1060-01", "first_page_order": 1082, "last_page_order": 1093 }