{ "id": 3550188, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAWRENCE E. WOODS, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Woods", "decision_date": "1988-04-29", "docket_number": "No. 2-86-0972", "first_page": "126", "last_page": "131", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 126" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3438697 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464541 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 N.E.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5605781 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 938", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "943" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 971", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3577462 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "978-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0971-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 N.E.2d 1207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. App. 3d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3583267 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/164/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ill. App. 3d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2524216, 2530252 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/5/0205-01", "/ill-app-3d/5/0205-02" ] }, { "cite": "316 N.E. 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "398 N.E.2d 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 1072", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5606576 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/1072-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 911", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3148466 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 N.E.2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5391034 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138191 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 U.S. 257", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172366 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/404/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 N.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. App. 3d 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2940308 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92-93" }, { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/22/0089-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 550, "char_count": 12038, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.124692602343847e-08, "percentile": 0.507145976464265 }, "sha256": "06a7dbed783c8622554c12f4e1eb8d5a36719651ca98741e469aba118e4f54d7", "simhash": "1:2c1d30ce61d3ed72", "word_count": 2026 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:49.091625+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAWRENCE E. WOODS, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LINDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn motion of defendant, Lawrence E. Woods, the circuit court of Kane County entered a judgment dismissing an information charging defendant with burglary of a motor vehicle in Kane County (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 1). The court found that there was an agreement between defendant and the State\u2019s Attorney of De Kalb County whereby defendant would plead guilty in De Kalb County case No. 85 CF 8 and that the instant Kane County charge would be dismissed. The court further found that in reliance upon the agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to the De Kalb County case and that, therefore, he is entitled to specific performance by the State\u2019s Attorney of Kane County of the agreement of the State\u2019s Attorney of De Kalb County. The State appeals.\nThe State argues that the State\u2019s Attorney of De Kalb County did not have authority to bind the State\u2019s Attorney of Kane County not to prosecute for a Kane County offense. The State relies on the authority of our holding in People v. Click (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 89, 316 N.E.2d 808.\nDefendant argues that: (1) the State does not deny that the evidence established the agreement by the State\u2019s Attorney of De Kalb County with the defendant that the Kane County offense would not be prosecuted; (2) one county\u2019s State\u2019s Attorney can bind another county\u2019s State\u2019s Attorney; (3) defendant\u2019s reliance on the agreement in pleading guilty to the De Kalb County offense implicates the principles of equity requiring that the defendant receive the benefit of his bargain; and (4) the circuit court of Kane County did not err in granting specific performance of the agreement.\nThe rule is well established that an unfulfilled promise which induced a defendant\u2019s plea renders the plea involuntary even though facts may be independently established to verify his guilt. (Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 U.S. 257, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495; People v. Starks (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 441, 478 N.E.2d 350; People v. Pier (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 96, 281 N.E.2d 289; People v. Harris (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 376, 414 N.E.2d 911; People v. Wadlington (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 398 N.E.2d 88.) However, the only issue which this case presents is whether, as a matter of law, one State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s agreement that a defendant will not be prosecuted for a particular offense in another county can bind that other county\u2019s State\u2019s Attorney. Also, not before us is the validity of defendant\u2019s De Kalb County conviction pursuant to the De Kalb County plea agreement. People v. Click (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 89, 316 N.E.2d 808.\nIn Click, the defendant contended that his plea agreement in Ogle County was based upon a letter sent by his public defender in Ogle County to the State\u2019s Attorney of Kane County \u201cattempting to clear up all matters\u201d involving the defendant. The letter sought the Kane County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s agreement that \u201call charges can be consolidated in one case\u201d wherein the defendant, under a plea agreement, would be sentenced to four years\u2019 probation in Ogle County with the first two years to be served in the Ogle County Public Safety Building. Pursuant to section 5 \u2014 4\u20142(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u20142(b)), the circuit court of Ogle County entered judgment upon defendant after he entered his plea of guilty to the Ogle County offense and the five specific offenses detailed in the Kane County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s written acknowledgement and approval of the entry of defendant\u2019s plea of guilty to the five Kane County offenses.\nThereafter, it was determined that defendant was charged with two other Kane County offenses not discussed by the parties, and of which the Kane County State\u2019s Attorney testified that he had no knowledge at the time he approved the defendant\u2019s plea to th\u00e9 other five Kane County offenses. After trial, the circuit court of Kane County entered judgments of conviction against defendant on the two Kane County offenses, and he appealed.\nThis court concluded:\n\u201cIt was pursuant to the foregoing provision [Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u20142(b)] that defendant made his plea bargain, as the statute provided, with the Ogle County State\u2019s Attorney (not with the Kane County State\u2019s Attorney). Moreover, the defendant himself certainly was aware of his proba- \u2022 tion status in Kane County, also that he had not reported to his probation officer there, and that he had violated the conditions of his probation in Kane County. It was incumbent upon him and his attorney to ascertain whether these probation -violations (or any petition to revoke such probations) were transmitted to Ogle County and included in the proposed disposition in that county.\u201d (People v. Click (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 89, 92-93, 316 N.E. 808, 811.)\nThe Click court held:\n\u201cIn any case the probation violation charges in Kane County were not transmitted to the clerk of the Circuit Court of Ogle County or included in the prosecution in that court. The judgment order of the Ogle County Court is in evidence and it lists the five Kane County cases being disposed of by number, and the two cases referred to in this appeal are not listed. The question of whether the defendant would be entitled to any relief in Ogle County based on an alleged breach of an unfulfilled promise made by the State\u2019s Attorney of Ogle County is not before us. Defendant\u2019s reliance in the instant case on Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 U.S. 257, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495; People v. White (1972), 5 Ill. App. 3d 205, and People v. Pier (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 96, is therefore misplaced. Each of those cases concerned a plea bargaining agreement between the prosecutor and the accused and would be relevant only in relating to any plea bargain the defendant entered into with the State\u2019s Attorney of Ogle County. There was no plea bargain here between the defendant and the State\u2019s Attorney of Kane County.\u201d 22 Ill. App. 3d at 93, 316 N.E.2d at 811.\nHere, as in Click, the State\u2019s Attorney of the county sought by defendant to be bound on principles of equity and agency did not approve of or agree to the disposition of the offenses occurring in his county as part of the plea agreement between the defendant and the other State\u2019s Attorney. Our holding in Click, while factually not precisely on all fours with the instant case, is, nonetheless,' dispositive of the legal issue common to both.\nWe further conclude that this court\u2019s recent decision in People v. Centanni (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 480, 517 N.E.2d 1207, is also dispositive of this case. In Centanni defendants argued that it was error for the circuit court of Lake County to deny their motion to exclude at their sentencing the facts of a separate Northbrook, Cook County, home invasion in which they participated. The defendants contended that their agreement with the Cook County State\u2019s Attorney provided that if they cooperated with the Northbrook police department, they would not receive any additional time or enhancement of their sentence in any other case. They contended in this court that, therefore, it was error for the trial court to consider evidence concerning the Northbrook home invasion in aggravation to enhance their sentence in the Lake County case. This court, relying on our opinion in Click, concluded that in Centanni and in Click there was no plea bargain between the defendant and the State\u2019s.Attorney sought to be bound.\nThe court in Centanni also noted the reliance upon Click by the Appellate Court for the Fourth District in another recent case on this issue, People v. Staten (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 971, 511 N.E.2d 938. In Staten, the defendant entered into a plea agreement in Iowa in reliance upon the representation of the Fayette County, Illinois, State\u2019s Attorney that he would not prosecute defendant for escape from an Illinois institution. However, the defendant was charged by indictment in the circuit court of Champaign County, Illinois, with the escape charge (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1003 \u2014 6\u20144) by reason of his failure to return to a community correctional center located in Champaign County. It was not disputed that the venue of the offense was Champaign County and that the State\u2019s Attorney of that county knew nothing of the Fayette County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s action.\nThe court in Staten, in addition to relying on the aforementioned rationale of Click, also overruled its earlier opinion in People v. Wantland (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 741, 397 N.E.2d 548. The Staten court in overruling Wantland, said: \u201cMoreover, insofar as Wantland suggests that the State\u2019s Attorney for one county functions as an agent of the State and can dismiss or agree to nol-pros charges outside his jurisdiction and without court approval, we expressly overrule it. Such unilateral, unlimited authority in a county State\u2019s Attorney without court involvement cannot be condoned.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Staten, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 978-79, 511 N.E.2d at 943.\nThe Staten court distinguished People ex rel. Cruz v. Fitzgerald (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 546, 363 N.E.2d 835, which was the authority cited by the Wantland court for its conclusion, rejected by the Staten court, that the State as principal is bound by the terms of a judicially approved and partially executed agreement even though one of the terms involved an agent of the State, the State\u2019s Attorney other than the one who executed the agreement. We agree, however, with the Staten court that Fitzgerald is distinguishable because it involved a promise of transactional immunity for compelled testimony pursuant to sections 106 \u2014 1 and 106 \u2014 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, pars. 106 \u2014 1, 106 \u2014 2). The provisions of that statute are not implicated in the instant plea agreement. We also question the propriety of the Wantland court\u2019s reliance on Fitzgerald.\nTo the extent that Staten can be read to authorize one county\u2019s State\u2019s Attorney to bind another county\u2019s State\u2019s Attorney without the latter\u2019s knowledge or approval but with circuit court approval, we specifically disagree with that part of the Staten holding. We find no authority in the statutes or case law for that part of the Staten court\u2019s holding.\nWe conclude it would be absurd to hold, without authority, that one county\u2019s State\u2019s Attorney could bind another county\u2019s State\u2019s Attorney without the latter\u2019s knowledge and approval regardless of court approval. Section 5 \u2014 4\u20142(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections specifically binds a State\u2019s Attorney to pleas of guilty and sentencing in another county for offenses in his county only if he has approved such disposition. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u20142(b); see also People v. Owens (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 381, 475 N.E.2d 649.) Under the theory advanced by defendant, we would be authorizing the dismissal of charges in another county, not even pleas of guilty as contemplated by section 5 \u2014 4\u20142(b), without the knowledge or approval of that other county\u2019s State\u2019s Attorney. Where the legislature has empowered a State\u2019s Attorney to dispose of charges in another county by pleas of guilty only with the approval of the other State\u2019s Attorney, it would be absurd to conclude that a State\u2019s Attorney could nol-pros offenses in another county without the approval of the other county\u2019s State\u2019s Attorney.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nINGLIS and NASH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LINDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert J. Morrow and Robert F. Casey, State\u2019s Attorneys, of Geneva (William L. Browers and David A. Bernhard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "G. Joseph Weller and Robert C. Cooper, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAWRENCE E. WOODS, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201486\u20140972\nOpinion filed April 29, 1988.\nRobert J. Morrow and Robert F. Casey, State\u2019s Attorneys, of Geneva (William L. Browers and David A. Bernhard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nG. Joseph Weller and Robert C. Cooper, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0126-01", "first_page_order": 148, "last_page_order": 153 }