{ "id": 3550437, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TONY R. WILEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wiley", "decision_date": "1988-05-19", "docket_number": "No. 2-86-0821", "first_page": "140", "last_page": "145", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 140" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3612499 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3435705 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3491171 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2821367 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/100/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 2d 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2553954 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/84/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Ill. App. 3d 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2836651 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 A.L.R.2d 831", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "698 P.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10410390 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/698/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 S.W. 34", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Mo. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 935550 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/111/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "651 P.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10431222 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/651/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Kan. 679", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 264234 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" }, { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/169/0679-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3520548 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674-75" }, { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 998", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5660452 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1000" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0998-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 1027", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3501088 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1033-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/1027-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. App. 3d 978", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3646471 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "981" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/154/0978-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3129386 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0301-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 579, "char_count": 11028, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.913866710680059e-08, "percentile": 0.535861743290825 }, "sha256": "69f3051587c1eeb5a6274676d17ac8d56b5b26666a6240d9f60c7895b0de03da", "simhash": "1:bf640e987fd3d365", "word_count": 1849 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:49.091625+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TONY R. WILEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOPF\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Tony Wiley, appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County finding him guilty in a bench trial of residential burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 3). Defendant contends that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt or that, in the alternative, his conviction must be reduced to a lesser included offense such as attempted residential burglary or burglary because the trial court found that defendant did not enter a dwelling.\nRobert Berogan testified that he was awakened at approximately 10 p.m. on February 6, 1986, by the sound of breaking glass. He went to the kitchen and found that a window had been broken and the window raised. On the enclosed porch behind the kitchen he discovered a broom handle which did not belong to him.\nRockford police officer Timothy Ferguson responded to a call from Berogan. He testified that the porch was enclosed, had a window looking into the kitchen, and doors leading to the kitchen and the garage. He discovered two sets of footprints in the snow, one leading up to the back porch door and the other going away from it. Ferguson followed the footprints in the snow for about two blocks to a house on Furman Street. Upon being admitted to the house, he discovered a pair of wet snow boots. Defendant was in the house and admitted that they were his. Defendant said the boots were wet because he had been blowing snow at a neighbor\u2019s house that evening. Ferguson testified that the size and tread of the boots were similar to the prints he had followed.\nDefendant did not testify, but presented the testimony of two neighbors who stated that defendant had in fact been blowing snow for them on the night in question. The second neighbor, Mary Helser, testified that defendant finished at her house at about 9:45 p.m. and last saw him heading north in the direction of the Berogan house. She lived about two blocks from Berogan\u2019s home. After hearing this evidence, the trial judge reserved his ruling because he was unsure whether the evidence proved the defendant guilty of residential burglary or some other offense.\nFollowing a three-day recess, the court found the defendant guilty of residential burglary. The court stated:\n\u201cI don\u2019t think there\u2019s any question that the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that it was Tony Wiley who committed the offense. If the State of the law is that you cannot find a person guilty of burglary when he\u2019s charged with residential burglary, I will accept that proposition and find him guilty of residential burglary. However, on appeal, the upper court should know that I would have found him guilty of burglary rather than residential burglary if burglary was a lesser included offense. Seems to me that a porch area was not a dwelling at the time.\u201d\nDefendant appeals.\nWe first consider defendant\u2019s second issue, that his conviction must be reduced in degree since the trial court implicitly found in his favor as to an essential element of residential burglary. Defendant contends that the trial court found that Berogan\u2019s porch was not a \u201cdwelling\u201d place as defined by the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 2 \u2014 6), and thus negated one of the essential elements of residential burglary. We disagree.\nDefendant points to the language quoted above, particularly the court\u2019s remark that \u201ca porch area was not a dwelling at the time.\u201d The Criminal Code of 1961 defines residential burglary as \u201cknowingly and without authority enterpng] the dwelling place of another with the intent to commit therein a felony or theft.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 3.) At the time of the offense, the Code defined \u201cdwelling\u201d as \u201ca building or portion thereof, a tent, a vehicle or other enclosed space which is used or intended for use as a human habitation, home or residence.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 2 \u2014 6.) Defendant thus argues that the trial court\u2019s statement constitutes an implied acquittal of at least one element of the offense of residential burglary.\nAn implied acquittal results from a ruling which resolves in the defendant\u2019s favor some or all of the required elements of the offense. (People ex rel. Daley v. Crilley (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 301, 311; People v. Pender (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 978, 981.) However, an erroneous ruling of law where the trial court does not rule on the sufficiency of the evidence is not such an implied acquittal. See People v. Batson (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1033-34.\nFurthermore, contrary to defendant\u2019s assertions, the court\u2019s statement that the porch was not a dwelling place does not amount to a finding of fact. The fact of defendant\u2019s presence on the porch cannot be seriously questioned. Although defendant argues that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was defendant who entered Berogan\u2019s porch, the evidence showed that Ferguson followed the footprints to defendant\u2019s home and that defendant admitted owning a pair of wet snow boots which were similar to the ones that had made the tracks outside Berogan\u2019s house. Moreover, defendant\u2019s alibi, that he was blowing snow at a house a few blocks from the scene until a few minutes before the incident was reported, is fully consistent with defendant\u2019s guilt. The evidence clearly supports the court\u2019s finding that it was defendant who committed the offense. The only remaining question is the application of the law to those facts.\nThe Code defines \u201cdwelling place\u201d as a \u201cbuilding, or portion thereof *** used *** as a human habitation.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 2 \u2014 6.) We think the porch was clearly a \u201cportion\u201d of the house. The residential burglary provisions apply to buildings intended to be used as residences. regardless of whether they are actually being occupied. (People v. Sexton (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1000.) Thus, whether anyone actually occupied the porch area of the house on a regular basis is not determinative.-In People v. Dawson (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 672, the court held that a defendant who entered an attached garage had made sufficient entry into a \u201cdwelling place\u201d to establish the offense of residential burglary. Dawson, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 674-75.\nAlthough the specific issue has apparently never been considered by an Illinois reviewing court, other courts which have considered the question have held that a porch constitutes a part of a \u201cdwelling\u201d for purposes of various criminal statutes. For example, in State v. Gatewood (1950), 169 Kan. 679, 221 P.2d 392, the porch in question was similar to the one in the instant case, having been screened in and connected to the kitchen by a door and a window. The court held that the porch constituted part of a dwelling house for purposes of the Kansas burglary statute. (Gatewood, 169 Kan. at 682, 221 P.2d at 395.) Other cases have reached similar results. (See, e.g., People v. Jiminez (Colo. 1982), 651 P.2d 395, 396-97 (attached garage); State v. Hutchinson (1892), 111 Mo. 257, 261, 20 S.W. 34, 34 (storage room); Hendricks v. State (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), 698 P.2d 477, 479 n.1 (garage); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 831 (1955 & Supp. 1987).) These cases establish that a porch or similar structure is considered a portion of a dwelling.\nIn the instant case, the evidence establishes that defendant entered the porch area. Thus, the element of entering a dwelling was complete at that time. The trial court\u2019s statement that the porch was not a dwelling was an incorrect statement of law and does not negate any factual element necessary to sustain defendant\u2019s conviction for residential burglary.\nDefendant further contends that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the mere act of breaking a window is insufficient to establish a design to commit a burglary. We have already determined that defendant entered the dwelling place when he stepped onto the porch. The only remaining question is whether the evidence supports the trial court\u2019s implicit conclusion that defendant possessed the requisite intent to commit a felony or theft. By finding defendant guilty, the trial court evidently found the necessary intent. Intent to commit a felony can be implied from such a situation. (See People v. Dawson (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 672, 675 (\u201cOnce the defendant had broken the close of the garage, he had sufficient entry into [the victim\u2019s] \u2018dwelling place\u2019 to establish residential burglary\u201d); cf. Hendricks v. State (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), 698 P.2d 477, 479 n.1.) The evidence supports the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant had the requisite intent. The reasonable inference from the facts is that defendant, finding nothing to steal on the porch, attempted to enter a more secure area of the house by knocking out the window but was frightened off when he heard the owner wake up.\nThe cases which defendant cites establish only that the mere breaking of a window, without more, is insufficient to establish the entry of a dwelling and thus would support only a conviction for attempt. They also establish, however, that the breaking of a window or other attempted entry will establish intent. (See People v. Davis (1972), 3 Ill. App. 3d 738, 739-40; People v. Borden (1967), 84 Ill. App. 2d 442, 444; cf. People v. Roldan (1968), 100 Ill. App. 2d 81, 85-86.) In the instant case, defendant had already completed his entry into the building, and the breaking of the window could properly be used to infer intent to commit a theft or felony within the secure portion of the house.\nFinally, although it is evident to us that the trial court in reaching its determination that defendant was guilty of residential burglary based its judgment on improper statements, i.e., by incorrectly stating that burglary is not a lesser included offense (People v. Johnson (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 399, 400-01) and by commenting that a porch area did not constitute a dwelling, it is the court\u2019s judgment and not what else may have been said by the trial court that is on appeal to this reviewing court. (People v. Holloway (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 290, 306.) Thus, we may affirm the trial court when its judgment is correct for any reason appearing in the record even though, as here, its decision may be based on improper reasoning. People v. Treece (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 397, 413.\nAccordingly, based on this court\u2019s foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County finding defendant guilty of residential burglary is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nL1NDBERG, P.J., and DUNN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOPF" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford, and Richard L. Salon, of Chicago (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TONY R. WILEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201486\u20140821\nOpinion filed May 19, 1988.\nRehearing denied June 2, 1988.\nG. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford, and Richard L. Salon, of Chicago (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0140-01", "first_page_order": 162, "last_page_order": 167 }