{ "id": 3549777, "name": "ALEX E. BEACHAM, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARLENE ALMA PALMER, Adm'r of the Estate of Courtenay Palmer, Deceased, Defendant-Appellee (Rubson Bueser et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Beacham v. Palmer", "decision_date": "1988-04-26", "docket_number": "No. 87-2320", "first_page": "637", "last_page": "640", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 637" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "496 N.E.2d 1196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3572028 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 998", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 830", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3594160 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0830-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "407 Ill. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2640603 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/407/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 535", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5539941 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0121-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 486, "char_count": 8928, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.505882454708161e-08, "percentile": 0.5193908988516319 }, "sha256": "35ac236ac1dc53df257b8cfe58bda7491c5291c267b3e28ae0afd24a6b93cab8", "simhash": "1:3bef31b7cb7a331d", "word_count": 1468 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:49.091625+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ALEX E. BEACHAM, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARLENE ALMA PALMER, Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Courtenay Palmer, Deceased, Defendant-Appellee (Rubson Bueser et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCARIANO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff appeals the dismissal of her medical malpractice action against the estate of Courtenay Palmer, M.D. We affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the statute of limitations had run as against the estate.\nThis case arises from medical treatment plaintiff received in May 1981. On May 6, 1983, plaintiff filed his suit against various physicians, including the late Dr. Palmer, who had died in Florida on March 17, 1983. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney learned of the doctor\u2019s death that same month, and on April 29, 1983, letters of administration were issued in Florida to Dr. Palmer\u2019s widow, Marlene Palmer. Plaintiff was unaware of Mrs. Palmer\u2019s appointment, and without giving notice to Edward Zerbe, he requested and received a circuit court of Cook County order appointing Zerbe as special administrator of Dr. Palmer\u2019s estate. Zerbe was served with plaintiff\u2019s complaint on May 22, 1983.\nZerbe filed a special appearance and motion to quash service, based on his belief that he had never been appointed special administrator, and on August 23, 1983, the trial court granted his motion. Plaintiff\u2019s motion to vacate that order was denied on June 21, 1984, at which time the court found that the appointment of Zerbe as special administrator of Dr. Palmer\u2019s estate was void as a matter of law.\nOn February 5, 1985, plaintiff filed his amended complaint naming Adriana Luna as special administrator of Dr. Palmer\u2019s estate. Luna\u2019s motion to dismiss, alleging that plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 212), was granted by a second judge on April 10, 1986. (A transcript of that hearing is not included in the record on appeal.)\nPlaintiff filed his fourth amended complaint, naming Marlene Palmer as administrator of her late husband\u2019s estate, on July 23, 1986, and she was served on October 21, 1986. On June 18, 1987, the trial court granted her motion to dismiss, holding:\n\u201cThe action is time-barred as against the Estate of Courtenay Palmer regardless of whom the administrator is, and that will be the order; and I\u2019m granting the involuntary dismissal based on my findings that *** the order *** dated April 10th, 1986 finding the action to be time-barred as against the estate, as against Luna as Special Administrator of the Estate of Courtenay Palmer, deceased, which order provided that the order was final and appealable and no just reason existed to delay its enforcement or appeal, the Court finds that based upon the doctrine of the law of the case, this order was not appealed from, and consequently is the law of the case.\nThe action is time-barred as against the Estate of Courtenay Palmer regardless of whom the administrator may be. That will be the order.\u201d\nPlaintiff appeals from this order.\nOpinion\nInitially, it should be noted that the parties briefed and argued Palmer\u2019s motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata, and it was the trial judge who introduced the concept of the law of the case in these proceedings. On appeal, defendant argues that plaintiff waived argument on the trial court\u2019s ruling by failing to address the trial judge\u2019s reasoning that the law of the case required him to dismiss Marlene Palmer from the suit. In his initial brief plaintiff contended that Palmer should not have been dismissed based on res judicata, and in his reply brief plaintiff maintains that by arguing that res judicata did not apply, he \u201cargued in essence that law of the case did not apply.\u201d\nIt is not necessary for this court to decide whether plaintiff waived argument on the law of the case, as the trial judge was incorrect in applying that doctrine in this case. The doctrine of \u201claw of the case\u201d binds a court.to the rules of law made in earlier opinions in a case unless the facts presented require a different interpretation. (Bradley v. Howard Hembrough Volkswagen, Inc. (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 121, 411 N.E.2d 535.) The August 23, 1986, order is not the \u201claw of the case,\u201d as it is not a ruling made in this case. However, because an appellate court can affirm a trial court on any ground appearing in the record (Monarski v. Greb (1950), 407 Ill. 281, 95 N.E.2d 433; Best Coin-Op, Inc. v. Old Willow Falls Condominium Association (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 830, 458 N.E.2d 998), we must consider plaintiff\u2019s remaining arguments.\nPlaintiff contends that res judicata, which bars future actions between parties or their privies in the same cause of action in which a court of competent jurisdiction has already rendered a judgment on the merits, should not apply in this case because there is no privity between the administrators of an ancillary estate and the domiciliary estate. He further argues that because res judicata does not require Palmer\u2019s dismissal, the court must consider the issue of the statute of limitations de novo and should find that the untimely filing against Palmer relates back to the timely filing against Zerbe. In support of this part of his argument, defendant relies on Stringer v. Estate of Jasaitis (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 270, 496 N.E.2d 1196.\nPlaintiff maintains that the mere fact that Adriana Luna, an administrator in Illinois, was dismissed does not require that Marlene Palmer, the administrator appointed in Florida, should also be dismissed. As defendant correctly points out, however, plaintiff\u2019s argument is flawed because, although separate individuals are named as administrators, there is only one estate involved here. Luna was sued and dismissed in her capacity as representative of the estate, which is the real party in interest. (Stringer v. Estate of Jasaitis (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 270, 496 N.E.2d 1196.) The statute of limitations had run against the estate, and plaintiff cannot avoid that ruling by naming a new administrator.\nMoreover, plaintiff\u2019s reliance on Stringer v. Estate of Jasaitis (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 270, 496 N.E.2d 1196, is unwarranted. In that case, Stringer brought suit against the estate of Jasaitis, naming Barbara Campbell as special administrator three days before the applicable statute of limitations expired. However, the probate court did not actually appoint Campbell as administrator until one day after suit was filed. Subsequently, Jasaitis\u2019 widow filed a petition contesting the appointment of Campbell. The probate court vacated the order appointing Campbell as administrator and later named Mrs. Jasaitis as administrator, allowing Stringer to amend his complaint to name Mrs. Jasaitis as a defendant. Thereafter, Mrs. Jasaitis moved to dismiss the action, claiming that the estate did not have the legal capacity to be sued at the time suit was originally filed, because no administrator had been properly appointed, and that the statute of limitations had expired before she was named administrator and sued.\nThe appellate court reversed the trial court\u2019s granting of the motion, first finding that the filing of the original complaint was not a nullity. The court went on to apply section 2 \u2014 616 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 616), and said:\n\u201cThere is no question that the cause of action alleged in the second complaint was the same as was intended to be brought in the first complaint. They both arose out of the same occurrence. The first complaint was originally, filed within the prescribed time, and only this defendant has now been added and properly named as administrator. Additionally, there is no issue that adequate notice of the lawsuit was given the estate here. Thus, this seems clearly a situation where the legislative intent will be furthered by preserving the cause of action against the loss by the overly technical application of rules of pleading and, hence, within the meaning and language of section 2 \u2014 616.\u201d Stringer, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 274.\nThe instant case differs from Stringer in that here there has already been a dismissal of an administrator of the estate based on the running of the statute of limitations. Because plaintiff did not pursue his case against Luna after she was dismissed, he is barred from bringing further actions against the estate; and because he is barred, this court need not reach the question of whether the filing against Palmer could relate back to the filing against Zerbe.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTAMOS and BILANDIC, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCARIANO" } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of Joel H. Greenburg, Ltd., of Chicago (Mark Szaflarski, of counsel), for appellant.", "Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Chicago (Kay L. Schichtel and Robert M. Collins, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ALEX E. BEACHAM, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARLENE ALMA PALMER, Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Courtenay Palmer, Deceased, Defendant-Appellee (Rubson Bueser et al., Defendants).\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 87\u20142320\nOpinion filed April 26, 1988.\nLaw Offices of Joel H. Greenburg, Ltd., of Chicago (Mark Szaflarski, of counsel), for appellant.\nWildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Chicago (Kay L. Schichtel and Robert M. Collins, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0637-01", "first_page_order": 659, "last_page_order": 662 }