{
  "id": 3550606,
  "name": "THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PITTSBURGH NATIONAL BANK, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "City of Chicago v. Pittsburgh National Bank",
  "decision_date": "1988-05-04",
  "docket_number": "No. 87-2955",
  "first_page": "933",
  "last_page": "935",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 933"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "92 N.E. 266",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "245 Ill. 378",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        3408738
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/245/0378-01"
      ]
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:49.091625+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PITTSBURGH NATIONAL BANK, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff City of Chicago obtained an order of default as to the out-of-State defendant Pittsburgh National Bank after constructively serving defendant by publication pursuant to section 2 \u2014 206 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 206). A default judgment was entered, and the trial court rejected defendant\u2019s subsequent challenge to the service of process. Defendant appeals, contending that plaintiff failed to use due diligence in ascertaining defendant\u2019s address at which it could have been served.\n\u00d3n February 21, 1985, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant and certain persons in reference to the demolition of a piece of property in Chicago. Plaintiff alleged that the building, recently destroyed by fire, was in a dangerous condition. On February 27, 1985, plaintiff mailed a notice of the motion, a copy of the summons and the complaint to defendant at the address \u201cPittsburgh National Bank, 5th Ave., Pittsburgh Pa. 15222.\u201d\nOn May 14, 1985, plaintiff filed an affidavit for service by publication as to defendant and other persons. Notice was published, and on May 31, 1985, the clerk of the court sent a copy of the publication notice to defendant. The affidavit indicates that defendant \u201cresides outside the state so that process cannot be served upon the defendant.\u201d\nPlaintiff did not mark the box on the affidavit which stated \u201cdefendant\u2019s place of residence is ***.\u201d Plaintiff marked the box on the affidavit which stated that \u201cdefendant\u2019s place of residence *** upon diligent inquiry cannot be ascertained and his last known place of residence is at ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The address given for defendant is \u201cPittsburgh National Bank, 5th Ave., Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222.\u201d\nOn December 13, 1985, the trial court entered an order of default as to defendant and an order of demolition.\nOn September 9, 1986, defendant filed a petition for payment due to unlawful demolition, contending that no valid service of process had been made upon it. After a hearing, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s petition. The court recognized that the address given was incomplete, but concluded that the address was sufficient because the \u201cPost Office would know where to find a well known place such as a bank.\u201d Defendant appeals from the denial of that petition.\nSection 2 \u2014 206 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for service by publication. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 206.) The statute requires plaintiff to file an affidavit \u201cstating the place of residence of the defendant, if known, or that upon diligent inquiry his or her place of residence cannot be ascertained.\u201d Plaintiff here concedes that, upon claiming the benefit of a judgment based on constructive service, the statute demands that plaintiff strictly comply with its requirements. Correll v. Greider (1910), 245 Ill. 378, 92 N.E. 266.\nPlaintiff argues that it knew defendant\u2019s \u201cplace of residence,\u201d and thus did not need to show \u201cdiligent inquiry\u201d to ascertain the address. Thus, the address it used was \u201csufficient.\u201d Moreover, \u201cit was reasonably diligent for the City to have assumed that the address it had [used] was a complete one.\u201d\nPlaintiff explains further that it merely erred in checking the wrong box on the affidavit. It should have marked the box next to \u201cdefendant\u2019s place of residence is ***.\u201d It mistakenly marked the box next to \u201cdefendant\u2019s place of residence upon diligent inquiry cannot be ascertained and his last known place of residence is at ***.\u201d Plaintiff asserts that \u201cchecking the wrong box\u201d was merely a \u201ctechnical and irrelevant\u201d error which made no difference in the publication process. \u201c[T]his error is meaningless and is no basis upon which to reopen this valid and final judgment.\u201d We disagree.\nPlaintiff failed to use diligent inquiry to ascertain defendant\u2019s complete address, and strict compliance with the statutory requirements which protect defendant\u2019s right to due process may not be ignored. Plaintiff knew defendant\u2019s correct name, knew one of the two streets included in defendant\u2019s proper address of \u201cFifth and Wood,\u201d knew defendant\u2019s city, and even knew defendant\u2019s zip code. It is incredible that plaintiff did not obtain the final piece of information, i.e., \u201cand Wood\u201d to complete the address so as to provide defendant with notice of the action filed against it. The sworn statement that plaintiff used \u201cdiligent inquiry\u201d to obtain the full address was false, and thus plaintiff failed to obtain valid service of process by publication against defendant.\nWe hold that the trial court erred in finding that service on defendant was proper and thus .erred in not hearing defendant\u2019s petition for payment for unlawful demolition.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgement \u00f3f the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the holding contained herein.\nReversed and remanded..\nWHITE, P.J., and FREEMAN, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Fisher & Fisher, of Chicago (Lee Scott Perres and Karen R. Anderson, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Judson H. Miner, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Ruth M. Moscovitch and Mary L. Mikva, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PITTSBURGH NATIONAL BANK, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 87\u20142955\nOpinion filed May 4, 1988.\nFisher & Fisher, of Chicago (Lee Scott Perres and Karen R. Anderson, of counsel), for appellant.\nJudson H. Miner, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Ruth M. Moscovitch and Mary L. Mikva, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0933-01",
  "first_page_order": 955,
  "last_page_order": 957
}