{ "id": 3551205, "name": "KENNETH A. MEERBREY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARSHALL FIELD & COMPANY, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co.", "decision_date": "1988-05-09", "docket_number": "No. 87-0370", "first_page": "1014", "last_page": "1018", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 1014" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1015" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2971907 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 N.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3643538 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 1005", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 1021", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5473187 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/1021-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5300142 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/52/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 Ill. App. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2779464 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/170/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 425029 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/45/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 N.E.2d 1179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3457963 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 N.E.2d 1123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3443836 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/132/0273-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 521, "char_count": 7400, "ocr_confidence": 0.788, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.729658224857483e-08, "percentile": 0.530502936657697 }, "sha256": "7a0ec8f676acf53613b871c60b31c10a0d0c50d641cb849adba19cb84a1261ed", "simhash": "1:0d34b9dd94667cd3", "word_count": 1230 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:49.091625+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "KENNETH A. MEERBREY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARSHALL FIELD & COMPANY, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn January 19, 1985, Kenneth A. Meerbrey (plaintiff), an employee of Marshall Field & Company, a corporation licensed to do business in the State of Illinois, was dismissed upon the store\u2019s discovery that $600 was missing from its register. When plaintiff attempted to reenter the store located on State Street in Chicago on February 12, 1985, he was stopped by police and subsequently arrested. On that day, the store filed a complaint against plaintiff charging him with criminal trespass, alleging that plaintiff remained on its premises after twice being notified that his \u201cpresence was forbidden.\u201d Thereafter, plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against Marshall Field & Company and its agent and member of store security Tim Marcolini (defendants), count I of which sought to enjoin defendants from barring plaintiff\u2019s entry into their premises. Pursuant to defendants\u2019 section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure motion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615), the trial court dismissed count I, and plaintiff appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nIn order for a preliminary injunction to issue, the plaintiff must plead and prove the following: (1) a clear and ascertainable right in need of protection; (2) an irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) an inadequate remedy at law; and (4) a likelihood of success on the merits. (Witter v. Buchanan (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 273, 476 N.E.2d 1123.) The issuance or denial of a preliminary injunction is addressed to the trial court\u2019s sound discretion. Thus, a reviewing court will not disturb the trial court\u2019s findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Junkunc v. S. J. Advanced Technology & Manufacturing Corp. (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 114, 498 N.E.2d 1179.) Here, plaintiff has failed to establish even the first element necessary for injunctive relief, namely, a clear and ascertainable right which needs protection.\nThe seminal case involving rights of property owners to exclude others is Woodman v. Howell (1867), 45 Ill. 367. In that case, the appellee, a grain inspector, was asked to leave the premises of appellant, a grain elevator operator, and when the appellee refused to do so, he was physically ejected. The trial court awarded $300 to appellee in its action for assault and battery against the appellant. The supreme court reversed the judgment and wrote:\n\u201cWe are aware of no rule which authorizes one man to go into or upon the premises of another, even if it be his business office or mercantile house, workshop, factory, or other place of business, when the owner shall have forbidden him. The fact that he has devoted it to such purposes, does not transfer the title to the public or give others the right to use it and occupy it, or deprive him of his control over it. The very fact that a professional man or a merchant or other person opens an office to transact business with and for the public, no doubt is a tacit invitation to all persons having business with him, and a permission to others to enter, unless forbidden. But he does not lose his control over it, or the right to prevent whom he pleases to enter, and to require any or all persons to depart, after they have once entered.\u201d (45 Ill. at 370.)\nApplying these principles to the instant case, plaintiff was properly excluded from defendants\u2019 store, despite the fact that it is devoted to public use.\nPlaintiff urges this court to disregard Woodman, on the ground that when the decision was rendered in 1867, human rights were not as prominent as they are today. Arguably, it was more detrimental to bar someone from a place of business 120 years ago when there were fewer alternative places of business. In any event, the principles articulated in Woodman are still in effect today and were specifically followed by this court in People v. Root (1912), 170 Ill. App. 608, where we recognized an attorney\u2019s right to exclude an unwanted client from his office.\nPlaintiff\u2019s reliance on O\u2019Hara v. King (1869), 52 Ill. 303, decided only two years after Woodman, is misplaced. The plaintiff in O\u2019Hara was ejected from a public government office, as opposed to a private business as we have here. This critical distinction was specifically noted by the O\u2019Hara court in determining that the plaintiff there was rightfully in the defendant\u2019s office:\n\u201c[This case] is not like the case of Woodman v. Howell, 45 Ill. 367. The office, in that case, was a private office, and the intruder had been requested to leave, and on his failing to do so, it was held he was properly ejected by force.\u201d 52 Ill. at 305.\nLikewise, plaintiff mistakenly relies on Robinson v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc. (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 433 N.E.2d 1005, and Adams v. Zayre Corp. (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 704, 499 N.E.2d 678, as neither of these cases involve injunctive relief where one is seeking to enter premises from which it is barred, but rather involve actions for false imprisonment. Morris v. Faulkner (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 625, 361 N.E.2d 112, also cited by plaintiff, lends credence to defendants\u2019 position as the court there upheld a tavern owner\u2019s right to exclude unwanted patrons from his bar. In so doing, the court noted that no authority exists for the presumption that an individual\u2019s right of liberty is superior to the property rights of a business owner. 46 Ill. App. 3d at 629, 361 N.E.2d at 1015.\nEqually unpersuasive is plaintiff\u2019s citation to the Illinois Human Rights Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 68, par. 1 \u2014 101 et seq.) for the purpose of defining individual rights with respect to a place of public accommodation. The Illinois Human Rights Act is only applicable where unlawful discrimination is charged, and such is not the case here. Moreover, the Act specifically states that its definitions are applicable \u201cstrictly\u201d in its own context. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 68, par. 5-101.\nFurthermore, plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege in count I of his complaint that he has no adequate remedy at law and that he will be irreparably injured if no injunction is issued. By virtue of counts II, III, and IV of his complaint in which he seeks damages for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff demonstrates that he does indeed have an adequate remedy at law. With respect to irreparable injury, clearly plaintiff can avoid any future arrests for trespassing by simply refusing to enter defendants\u2019 store. It is difficult for this court to perceive any irreparable harm which would befall plaintiff from being unable to shop at Marshall Field & Company, as there are other stores in the area which carry similar wares. Finally, count I does not even allege a likelihood of success on the merits.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County, dismissing count I of plaintiff\u2019s complaint is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCAMPBELL, P.J., and MANNING, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas P. Cernek and Mark H. Barinholtz, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Chicago (Douglas L. Prochnow and Mark P. Miller, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KENNETH A. MEERBREY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARSHALL FIELD & COMPANY, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 87\u20140370\nOpinion filed May 9, 1988.\nRehearing denied May 10, 1988.\nThomas P. Cernek and Mark H. Barinholtz, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nWildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Chicago (Douglas L. Prochnow and Mark P. Miller, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "1014-01", "first_page_order": 1036, "last_page_order": 1040 }