{ "id": 3551130, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN GILL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gill", "decision_date": "1988-05-10", "docket_number": "No. 86-1144", "first_page": "1049", "last_page": "1058", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 1049" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3630345 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 N.E.2d 1058", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 876", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3633191 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "883-84" }, { "page": "883-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3264742 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "885" }, { "page": "885" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0881-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3542691 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "399 Ill. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2460284 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/399/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "407 Ill. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2638746 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" }, { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/407/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472031 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" }, { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3639224 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 1086", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3610505 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1088" }, { "page": "1089" }, { "page": "1089" }, { "page": "1089-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/1086-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 N.E.2d 1033", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. App. 3d 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3646152 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/154/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 N.E.2d 1072", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. App. 3d 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3646440 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710-11" }, { "page": "710-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/154/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 N.E.2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3506197 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" }, { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0685-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 N.E.2d 1103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. App. 3d 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3539949 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/151/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 S. Ct. 3314", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 L. Ed. 2d 727", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "478 U.S. 1038", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6291041, 6290754, 6290409, 6290089, 6289769, 6289297, 6289532, 6291357 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/478/1038-07", "/us/478/1038-06", "/us/478/1038-05", "/us/478/1038-04", "/us/478/1038-03", "/us/478/1038-01", "/us/478/1038-02", "/us/478/1038-08" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3125912 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688, 694" }, { "page": "693, 698" }, { "page": "2064, 2068" }, { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 N.E.2d 816", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3644460 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 N.E.2d 870", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3548179 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 1091", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083259 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3575775 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 N.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3608513 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" }, { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 S. Ct. 2364", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 L. Ed. 2d 836", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 981", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6380213 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0981-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 1369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3122553 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518-19" }, { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0502-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1037, "char_count": 19737, "ocr_confidence": 0.796, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.525357953532159e-07, "percentile": 0.6701081800521961 }, "sha256": "1204f28f0f18ab1df1948d2caeeeea5235de842df0decd0d5bf9729b2c15fbc2", "simhash": "1:703f7dc0ab822b93", "word_count": 3201 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:49.091625+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN GILL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA jury convicted defendant of armed robbery and attempted murder. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 8 \u2014 4, 9 \u2014 1, 18 \u2014 2(a).) On appeal, we are asked to determine whether the State proved him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; a bullet found in his possession was improperly admitted into evidence; he was denied effective assistance of counsel; his sentence to life imprisonment was imposed pursuant to an unconstitutional statute; and his previous felony convictions were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\nAt 10 p.m. on March 6, 1985, defendant approached the front counter of a fast-food restaurant at Madison and Pulaski in Chicago and asked the cashier, Alice Campbell, for two pieces of chicken. As she reached for the cash he placed on the counter, defendant put his hand over it and told her to transfer money from the cash registers into a paper bag and not to alert the manager. He opened his black leather jacket to reveal a gun.\nThe restaurant manager, Greg Davis, saw Campbell emptying the registers and asked what she was doing, to which defendant replied, \u201cI am sticking up the place.\u201d Defendant grabbed the bag of money from Campbell\u2019s hand and ran out of the restaurant, pursued by Davis.\nDavis testified he chased defendant south on Pulaski until defendant stopped, turned and shot at him. As defendant proceeded west on Monroe, Davis flagged down a passing patrol car, and joined Officer Joseph Lombardi in the car. Lombardi and Davis drove a few blocks to Wilcox, where Davis saw defendant walking down the street and identified him for Lombardi.\nLombardi left his vehicle and exchanged fire with defendant. Defendant then ran into a gangway on the south side of Wilcox, followed by Lombardi; defendant and Lombardi again shot at each other in the gangway. At an alley between Wilcox and Adams, Lombardi stopped to reload his weapon and reported defendant\u2019s flight on his radio.\nIn response to a radio call, Officer Michael Mullen and his two partners drove their squad car into an alley between Adams and Jackson. Defendant \u201cdashed\u201d in front of the squad car and was attempting to shake off a black vinyl or \u201cleather-like\u201d jacket as he ran. All three officers left the car and gave chase, following defendant into the backyard of a building on Jackson. There, two of the officers shot at defendant as he turned on them in a crouched position. Defendant leaped a chain link fence surrounding the yard, proceeded south to Jackson, ran across the thoroughfare and into a gangway at 4037 W. Jackson. When Mullen entered the gangway, he found defendant pounding on its sealed back door; defendant then lay face down on the ground. In an immediate search of the chase route, officers recovered a black leather jacket containing $80 in cash, but no gun. In defendant\u2019s pants\u2019 pocket, Mullen discovered a live, .357 caliber bullet and $56.\nDefendant was arrested and charged with attempted murder, armed violence and armed robbery. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 8-4, 9-1, 18 \u2014 2(a), 33A-2.\nAt trial, the State presented the testimony of Campbell, Davis, a forensic chemist and officers involved in the incident. Defendant did not testify.\nThe trial returned a guilty verdict as first noted. Following a hearing determining his status as a habitual offender under the Habitual Criminal Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 33B \u2014 1 et seq.), defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals.\nI\nDefendant initially contends the State adduced insufficient evidence that he was armed during the events in question and therefore failed to prove him guilty of armed robbery and attempted murder beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIn particular, defendant observes that an armed robbery conviction requires a showing that defendant committed robbery while armed or carrying a dangerous weapon (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 18 \u2014 2(a)) and that the indictment charged him with attempted murder in that he \u201cattempted to kill [Davis and Lombardi] by shooting at [them] with a gun.\u201d Whether there was sufficient evidence to prove these charges was for the jury and its verdict will not be reversed unless the evidence is so unsatisfactory or improbable that a reasonable doubt as to defendant\u2019s guilt remains. People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 502, 518-19, 456 N.E.2d 1369, cert. denied (1984), 466 U.S. 981, 80 L. Ed. 2d 836, 104 S. Ct. 2364; People v. Helton (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 726, 734, 506 N.E.2d 307; People v. Calhoun (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 206, 209, 504 N.E.2d 266.\nHere, Campbell saw a gun handle protruding from an inside pocket of defendant\u2019s jacket in the restaurant. Davis swore defendant shot at him from a distance of five yards and that he saw the gun in defendant\u2019s hand as the shots were fired. Lombardi stated that he saw a gun in defendant\u2019s hand from 10 feet away on Wilcox and fired at him twice and defendant shot two more times at him in a gangway from a distance of 20 to 25 feet. Mullen averred he found a bullet in defendant\u2019s pants pocket. The forensic chemist testified that defendant\u2019s right palm bore traces of gunshot residue. From the foregoing it is clear that the jury had more than substantial bases upon which to arrive at its guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.\nDefendant focuses, however, on inconsistencies in the evidence: Campbell admitted she saw only the handle of the gun, which she remembered as five inches long and \u201cbrown and beige\u201d in color; Davis asserted the gun he saw in defendant\u2019s hand was silver; Lombardi described the barrel as \u201cblue-steel.\u201d As to the number of shots exchanged with defendant, Lombardi admitted his firearms use report stated defendant fired at him three times in the gangway, although he asserted at trial that defendant fired there only twice. Davis stated he never saw the gun in the restaurant although Lombardi testified that Davis said he did. No gun was found in the search following defendant\u2019s arrest, although the black leather jacket was located.\nWhere evidence is conflicting, it is the prerogative of the jury to ascertain the truth; a reviewing court may not substitute a different conclusion on questions regarding the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Yates, 98 Ill. 2d at 524; People v. Helton, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 734.) The inconsistencies here are minor and render the evidence neither so improbable nor so unsatisfactory as to justify overturning that verdict.\nII\nDefendant next insists the court erred in admitting the bullet retrieved from his pocket into evidence where the State failed to lay a proper foundation. Defendant notes that Mullen testified he found the bullet in a pocket of defendant\u2019s pants, but another detective stated that after defendant\u2019s arrest, other officers told him a bullet was found in a pocket of the black leather jacket.\nThe State responds that defendant waived this issue by failing to register timely objections to the evidence during and after trial. Defense counsel did move to exclude the bullet and objected to its admission into evidence; counsel\u2019s argument before the court, however, was limited to the prejudicial effect of introducing the bullet where the State failed to produce the weapon itself. Failure to object to a lack of foundation during trial and by post-trial motion waives the issue for consideration on appeal. People v. Lucas (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 245, 250, 430 N.E.2d 1091; People v. Bollman (1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 621, 637, 516 N.E.2d 870.\nFurthermore, if any error exists, it is harmless; the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt is overwhelming, even without the incriminating inference raised by the presence of a bullet on defendant\u2019s person. People v. Johnson (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 163, 170, 498 N.E.2d 816.\nIll\nDefendant also urges he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney conceded, during closing argument, defendant\u2019s guilt of robbery.\nAn attorney provides ineffective assistance when: (1) counsel\u2019s representation falls below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, absent the attorney\u2019s unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would be different. (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068.) Underpinning this test is the fundamental concern of whether counsel\u2019s conduct so undermines the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as producing a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 692-93, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.\nDefendant cites People v. Hattery (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 449, 488 N.E.2d 513, cert. denied (1986), 478 U.S. 1038, 92 L. Ed. 2d 727, 106 S. Ct. 3314, where defendant\u2019s attorney admitted, in opening and closing argument, defendant\u2019s guilt of the charge of murder, although defendant pleaded not guilty and maintained his innocence on the stand. The court reversed defendant\u2019s conviction for murder, finding that the prosecution\u2019s case eluded \u201cmeaningful adversarial testing\u201d because the attorney\u2019s strategy prevented the question of defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence from being submitted to the trier of fact. Indicating that its holding was limited to the facts before it, the court ruled that an attorney may not concede his client\u2019s guilt in the hope of obtaining a more lenient sentence where a plea of not guilty has been entered, unless the record adequately shows defendant knowingly and intelligently consented to the strategy. People v. Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d at 465.\nIn People v. Woods (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 687, 502 N.E.2d 1103, on which defendant also relies, defendant was charged with theft and burglary. The defense attorney conceded defendant\u2019s guilt of theft, despite his testimony to the contrary. The court reversed defendant\u2019s convictions, ruling that under the particular facts of the case, admission of theft was also tantamount to admission of burglary. Defendant was thus denied the opportunity to subject the State\u2019s case to adversarial testing. People v. Woods, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 694.\nThe case at bar is distinguishable from both Woods and Hattery. Here, counsel conceded defendant\u2019s guilt, not to the crimes charged, but rather to a lesser included offense, arguably in an attempt to remove defendant from the ambit of a life sentence as a habitual offender, and, as defendant did not testify at trial, cast no shadow on defendant\u2019s credibility. Furthermore, counsel vigorously cross-examined the State\u2019s witnesses as to whether defendant possessed a gun and moved the court to permit additional discovery; suppress evidence; sever the trials of certain counts; appoint an expert witness to testify on defendant\u2019s behalf; and order a new trial. The record thus demonstrates that defendant\u2019s attorney not only acted reasonably, but also tenaciously pursued his client\u2019s interests and thoroughly probed the State\u2019s case for weaknesses. See People v. Elam (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 685, 690, 509 N.E.2d 698.\nThis court also recognizes the legitimacy of admitting guilt to less than all counts in a multicount indictment or less than all elements of the crime(s) charged where evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt is overwhelming and counsel\u2019s strategy is to win a reduced sentence. (People v. Elam, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 689; People v. Weger (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 706, 710-11, 506 N.E.2d 1072; People v. Bone (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 412, 416-17, 506 N.E.2d 1033.) Such a tactical decision is not objectionable per se, and may even \u201cbe viewed as good defense strategy\u201d when appropriate. People v. Weger, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 710-11.\nIn the case sub judice, the State presented substantial evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt which, when considered together with defense counsel\u2019s certain knowledge of his client\u2019s criminal record, does not support a finding of ineffective assistance. Furthermore, the strength of the State\u2019s evidence renders the probability of a different verdict, even without counsel\u2019s alleged errors, almost negligible.\nIV\nDefendant next insists that the court imposed his sentence to life imprisonment pursuant to an unlawful statute and that the sentence must be vacated. In particular, defendant asserts the Illinois General Assembly ignored constitutionally mandated procedures when it amended the Habitual Criminal Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 33B \u2014 1 et seq.) (Act) in 1980, rendering the Act unconstitutional.\nThe State claims defendant waived this issue for consideration on review, having failed to raise it during the sentencing hearing. The constitutionality of a statute cannot be contested for the first time on appeal, without objecting to it during the proceedings below (People v. Cannady (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1088, 513 N.E.2d 118; People v. Fenwick (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 457, 459, 484 N.E.2d 915); nevertheless, this court may entertain defendant\u2019s argument and we elect to do so here. People v. Poole (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 7, 17.\nDefendant contends the legislature, in amending the Act, ignored the rule that all bills submitted for legislative approval must be read by title on three separate days in each house (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, \u00a78(d)); our courts, however, have twice considered this argument and twice found it meritless. (See People v. Poole, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 18; People v. Cannady, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 1089.) Furthermore, amendments germane to the subject matter of the bill as originally introduced are expected from the three-reading requirement. (Giebelhausen v. Daley (1950), 407 Ill. 25, 46, 95 N.E.2d 84.) When applied to legislative provisions, \u201cgermane\u201d means \u201ca common tie\u201d or a tendency to promote the object and purpose of the act to which it belongs. Giebelhausen v. Daley, 407 Ill. at 47; People v. Cannady, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 1089.\nIn the case at bar, the fifth House amendment to Senate Bill 1524 (81st Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 1524, 1980 Sess.), deleted entirely the bill\u2019s original text, pertaining to feticide, and replaced it with a paragraph amending the habitual criminal provision in the criminal code, 15 Legislative Synopsis & Digest, 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., vol. 1, at 332 (1980).\nDefendant maintains the amendment was not germane to the bill\u2019s subject matter as originally conceived in the Senate, namely, feticide. Defendant improperly focuses, however, on feticide as the subject matter to which the amendment must be germane. At its inception, Senate Bill 1524 was meant to amend the 1961 criminal code; the bill in its final form was similarly designed to alter the Code by expanding existing bases within it for finding an individual a habitual criminal. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 33B \u2014 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 33B \u2014 1; 15 Legislative Synopsis & Digest, 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., vol. 1, at 331-32 (1980).\nThe 1980 amendment promoted the \u201cobject and purpose\u201d of the criminal code and was thus germane to the actual statute amended. (People v. Cannady, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 1089-90.) The Habitual Criminal Act is constitutional insofar as the present challenge is concerned.\nV\nDefendant also argues he was wrongfully sentenced to life imprisonment because the State failed to prove his two prior felony convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe Act permits the imposition of an enhanced penalty for those individuals convicted of three Class X felonies within a 20-year period (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 33B \u2014 1), provided the State proves defendant\u2019s convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Casey (1948), 399 Ill. 374, 378, 77 N.E.2d 812; People v. Harris (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 70, 74, 510 N.E.2d 107, appeal denied (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 567.\nCertified copies of conviction demonstrating defendant\u2019s prior criminal record are prima facie evidence of that record only (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 33B \u2014 2(b)), and are not alone adequate to meet the burden of proof (People v. Langdon (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 881, 885, 392 N.E.2d 142). Instead, the convictions must be supported by evidence that the person named in the records and defendant are identical, such as testimony concerning the previous convictions by the arresting officer on the prior felony charge, the presiding judge at the previous trial, or parole counselors, correction officers and others. People v. Langdon, 73 Ill. App. 3d at 885.\nIn this case the State introduced certified copies of conviction from the circuit court of Cook County: one recorded a plea of guilty to armed robbery entered on January 25, 1980, by \u201cJohn Collins\u201d and his subsequent sentence of 12 years to the Illinois Department of Corrections; the second contained \u201cJohn Brown\u2019s\u201d guilty plea to armed robbery on March 4, 1976, and the resulting sentence of four to six years in the State penitentiary.\nThe State also presented the testimony of Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Peggy Frossard that, in January 1980, she was assigned to prosecute a case concerning armed robberies. On January 25, 1980, the individual accused of committing these robberies, John Collins, pleaded guilty and received a 12-year prison sentence. Frossard identified defendant as the man she knew as John Collins in January 1980.\nAn identification supervisor for the Illinois Department of Correetions averred that all inmates entering the department are assigned identification numbers; if an inmate released from the department returns at a later date, he is reassigned the same number. Comparing the fingerprint and photo \u201cintake\u201d card of John Brown and the intake card of John Collins, the supervisor asserted that the cards contained identical identification numbers, indicating that Collins and Brown were the same person.\nFinally, a fingerprint expert stated he compared defendant\u2019s fingerprints with those of Collins and Brown as recorded on their intake cards; defendant\u2019s prints matched Collins\u2019, which in turn matched Brown\u2019s, again indicating that they were all the same person.\nDefendant urges that Frossard\u2019s statements constitute hearsay improperly admitted into evidence; the State contends that defendant failed to object to the testimony at the sentencing hearing and therefore waived this issue on appeal.\nWhether the court erred in admitting Frossard\u2019s testimony is immaterial. The prison officials\u2019 statements sufficiently corroborate the certified records of conviction to establish defendant\u2019s identification beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. McNeil (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 876, 883-84, 466 N.E.2d 1058; People v. Mason (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 516, 522.) In McNeil, moreover, this court found that certified records of conviction, supported by testimony of, inter alia, two assistant State\u2019s Attorneys who prosecuted defendant in those convictions, \u201cjustified the [circuit] court\u2019s finding that defendant was, in fact, convicted of two previous armed robberies.\u201d (People v. McNeil, 125 Ill. App. 3d at 883-84.) The State here similarly proved defendant\u2019s convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the verdict rendered in the circuit court and the sentence imposed thereon.\nAffirmed.\nSTAMOS and SCARIANO, JJ., concur.\nJustice Stamos participated in the decision of this case prior to taking office as a supreme court judge.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul P. Biebel, Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Janet R. Stewart and James N. Perlman, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Sara Dillery Hynes, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Kenneth T. McCurry, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN GILL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 86\u20141144\nOpinion filed May 10, 1988.\nPaul P. Biebel, Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Janet R. Stewart and James N. Perlman, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Sara Dillery Hynes, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Kenneth T. McCurry, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1049-01", "first_page_order": 1071, "last_page_order": 1080 }