{
  "id": 2512033,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Reno, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Reno",
  "decision_date": "1974-01-23",
  "docket_number": "No. 58025",
  "first_page": "348",
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      "year": 1972,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:57.081722+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Reno, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE DIERINGER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Cook County. The defendant, Ronald Reno, was found guilty of rape, aggravated battery, and deviate sexual assault. After a hearing in aggravation and mitigation, the defendant was sentenced to a term of from twenty to forty years for the rape and a consecutive term of from five to ten years for the aggravated battery. No sentence was imposed for the deviate sexual assault.\nThe issues presented on appeal are (1) whether a sentence of twenty to forty years for rape is excessive; (2) whether the court erred in accepting evidence of a prior juvenile commitment at the hearing in aggravation and mitigation; (3) whether the defendant\u2019s sentence of five to ten years for aggravated battery should be reduced in accordance with the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections, effective January 1, 1973.\nDuring the late evening hours of April 19, 1971, the complaining witness, Mrs. Clara Richardson, was doing her laundry in the basement of the apartment building where she lived. At approximately 11:45 P.M., the defendant, Ronald Reno, entered the laundry room, carrying a baseball bat. The defendant ordered Mrs. Richardson into an adjoining boiler room. The defendant then ordered Mrs. Richardson to disrobe, which she did. The defendant partially disrobed and then had sexual intercourse with Mrs. Richardson. Following the act of intercourse the defendant performed an act of deviate sexual assault, that is, oral copulation on the complainant. Mrs. Richardson was then tied up with an ironing cord and left naked. Shortly thereafter, the defendant returned to the scene of the crime. He ordered Mrs. Richardson into the furnace. She refused, and the defendant made no further effort to force her into the furnace. The defendant then brutally beat Mrs. Richardson into unconsciousness with the baseball bat. As a result of the beating the complainant incurred a fractured jaw and a wound on the head requiring twelve stitches to close. Approximately two weeks later, Mrs. Richardson observed the defendant on the street. She called the police and shortly thereafter the defendant was apprehended.\nIn a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of rape, aggravated battery, and deviate sexual assault. He was sentenced to a term of from twenty to forty years for rape and to a term of from five to ten years for aggravated battery. The sentences were to run consecutively.\nThe defendant first contends the sentence of twenty to forty years for rape is excessive. The defendant bases this contention on the decisions in People v. Williams (1972), 7 Ill.App.3d 733, and People v. Jones (1972), 6 Ill.App.3d 669, wherein the Appellate Court reduced sentences for rape where the sentences imposed by the trial court failed to provide for the possibility of rehabilitation. The defendant argues that the rape sentence in the instant case precludes any possibility of rehabilitation and is out of proportion to sentences in similar cases.\nIn view of the nature of the offense and the surrounding circumstances in the present case, we believe the sentence of twenty to forty years for rape was not excessive. The punishment imposed was within the limits prescribed by law. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, \u00a7 11 \u2014 1(c).) In People v. Taylor (1965), 33 Ill.2d 417, the Illinois. Supreme Court held:\n\u201c \u2018Where it is contended that the punishment imposed in a particular case is excessive, though within the limits prescribed by the legislature, this court should not disturb the sentence unless it clearly appears that the penalty constitutes a great departure from the fundamental law and its spirit and purpose, # \u201d\nIn People v. Chandler (1972), 7 Ill.App.3d 949, this court held that a sentence of from forty to seventy-five years for rape was not excessive where the trial judge took into consideration the rehabilitation of the defendant and the protection of the public from further offenses. We believe the trial judge in the instant case, understood the situation and acted prudently.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention is that the court erred in accepting evidence of a prior juvenile commitment at the hearing in aggravation and mitigation. The defendant argues the trial judge improperly elicited information from the defendant establishing that the defendant had been committed to the Sheridan Industrial School for Boys, and that from the age of fifteen the defendant had been in custody for six years.\nThe defendant\u2019s contention is without merit. A review of the record in the instant case discloses that the trial judge based the defendant\u2019s sentence on tire aggravated nature of the crime and not on any prior juvenile commitments. In People v. Bauer (1969), 111 Ill.App.2d 211, the appeUate court held that evidence of a prior juvenile commitment at the hearing in aggravation and mitigation did not constitute error where the record showed that the trial court placed no reliance on such commitment in passing sentence.\nThe defendant\u2019s final contention is that the consecutive sentence of five to ten years for aggravated battery should be reduced in accordance with the sentencing provisions of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections, effective Januay 1, 1973.\nWe agree with the defendant\u2019s contention. Under the classification of offenses under the Unified Code of Corrections, aggravated battery is a Class 3 felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, \u00a7 12 \u2014 4(d).) Section 5\u2014 8 \u2014 1(c) (4) of tire Code provides that the minimum sentence for a Class 3 felony \u201cshall not be greater than one-third of the maximum term set in that case by the court.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, \u00a7 1005 \u2014 8\u20141 (c)(4).) Section 8 \u2014 2\u20144 of the Code further provides as follows:\n\u201cProsecution for any violation of law occurring prior to the effective date of this Act is not affected or abated by this Act. If the offense being prosecuted has not reached the sentencing stage or a final adjudication, then for purposes of sentencing the sentences under this Act apply if they are less than under the prior law upon which the prosecution was commenced.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, \u00a7 1008 \u2014 2\u20144.\nIn the case at bar, no final adjudication has been reached. (People v. Bailey (1971), 1 Ill.App.3d 161.) It is appropriate, therefore, that the sentence for aggravated battery be modified in accordance with the provisions of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections. Accordingly, the defendant\u2019s sentence for aggravated battery is modified with a maximum term of ten years and a minimum term of three years and four months.\nIt is the opinion of this court that the ends of justice will best be served if the sentence for aggravated battery is made to run concurrently, rather than consecutively, with the sentence for rape. Section 5 \u2014 8\u20144 of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections provides:\n\u201c(b) The court shall not impose a consecutive sentence unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant, it is of the opinion that such a term is required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant, the basis for which the court may set forth in the record.\u201d\nThe record in the instant case does not indicate that a consecutive sentence is required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant. Therefore, under Supreme Court Rule 615, this court modifies the sentence for aggravated battery to run concurrently with the sentence for rape.\nFor the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County is affirmed in part and modified in part.\nADESKO, P. J., and BURMAN, J., concur.\nAffirmed in part and modified in part.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE DIERINGER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Ian Levin and Stanley Sacks, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth L. Gillis, and Mark R. Harms, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Reno, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 58025;\nFirst District (4th Division)\nJanuary 23, 1974.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Ian Levin and Stanley Sacks, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth L. Gillis, and Mark R. Harms, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0348-01",
  "first_page_order": 370,
  "last_page_order": 373
}