{ "id": 3585688, "name": "DONACIANO CORRALES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMERICAN CAB COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Corrales v. American Cab Co.", "decision_date": "1988-04-20", "docket_number": "No. 87\u20142908", "first_page": "907", "last_page": "912", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "170 Ill. App. 3d 907" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "494 N.E.2d 152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3500467 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 N.E.2d 651", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 932", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5539544 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0932-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 N.E.2d 1199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3452092 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0668-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 536, "char_count": 9401, "ocr_confidence": 0.794, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.155500683854406e-08, "percentile": 0.47467284772201007 }, "sha256": "0f194a1a78e5d4f3e3fccb7fd97ee96efd625961df3fab78d3f32104d5001c2e", "simhash": "1:b30c80b874c5211c", "word_count": 1504 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:52:57.912624+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DONACIANO CORRALES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMERICAN CAB COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA jury found plaintiff Donaciano Corrales and defendant American Cab Company each to be guilty of 50% causative negligence in an action for personal injuries. Consequently, it awarded plaintiff $100,000 and reduced the award to $50,000. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict. Defendant appeals, contending that the verdict of 50% negligence is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and that the trial court erred in precluding plaintiff\u2019s treating physician from testifying as a nonexpert witness.\nAt noon on July 23, 1982, plaintiff was walking across the intersection of Broadway and Montrose in Chicago, when defendant\u2019s agent, driving a taxicab, struck plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that he waited at the corner for about 10 seconds and when the traffic light turned green, he entered the crosswalk. He saw the taxicab while he stood at the curb, but was unsure of the cab\u2019s speed. He looked at the cab, but then turned and looked straight ahead as he walked across the street. He looked straight ahead because he had the \u201cgreen light so that I could cross and he had the red light.\u201d He denied telling the police that he crossed against the light.\nPlaintiff testified further that at the hospital he could not see well because everything looked foggy and his eyes were moving around. He testified that upon discharge he still could not see well. He never noticed this problem prior to the accident. He denied not complaining about the vision problems at the hospital. He also denied that his eye problem was the same as it was before the accident.\nDr. Fournier, an ophthalmologist, testified for plaintiff regarding his eye injury. He diagnosed a cerebral concussion, laceration to the right eyebrow, nystagmus mobility disorder of the eyes, traumatic posterior vitreous detachment and vitreous hemorrhage related to the trauma, and multisystem injuries. Dr. Former believed the nystagmus was congenital, but aggravated by a cerebral concussion as a result of the accident. He concluded that the nystagmus was mild prior to the accident because it had not been noticeable to lay people. Dr. Fournier was questioned about plaintiff\u2019s denials, made at the hospital emergency room, of any visual complaints. The hospital record read, \u201cDenies loss of consciousness, nausea vomiting, visual/hearing disturbances.\u201d Dr. Fournier stated \u201cThat\u2019s what it says, but I don\u2019t know if that\u2019s what it means.\u201d He explained: \u201cI don\u2019t think that you can make that conclusion by looking at this. You can say that he denies loss of consciousness. However, without knowing what was in the mind of Dr. Garcia, the way the sentence is punctuated, we don\u2019t know whether that [\u201cdenies\u201d] carries over to the nausea and vomiting, visual and hearing disturbances. I think we\u2019re making an assumption in interpreting that sentence.\u201d\nRoger Dickens, plaintiff\u2019s employer, testified that he never noticed plaintiff\u2019s eyes shaking and wandering prior to the accident.\nMohammed Sadeghian, a cab driver for defendant, testified that he was driving 25 miles per hour and had the green light when he entered the intersection. The light was never yellow or red. Plaintiff ran into the street, crossing at an angle and eight feet away from the crosswalk. Sadeghian immediately applied his brakes, but was unable to avoid striking plaintiff.\nBarbara Ham, a passenger in the cab, testified for defendant that Sadeghian was driving about 25 miles per hour, and the traffic light was green as he approached the intersection. Plaintiff was looking straight ahead and ran into the street.\nJulius Bronstein, the investigating police officer, testified for defendant that he interviewed plaintiff at the hospital, where plaintiff said he had the green light. His report, however, states that the pedestrian said \u201che went against the red light.\u201d At trial, the officer stated: \u201cHe said he didn\u2019t have the green light \u2014 excuse me, I\u2019ll retract that statement, he didn\u2019t have the red light.\u201d The court would not allow the testimony to be corrected, and an offer of proof was made. \u201cAt the Weiss Hospital, in the emergency room, he was on the table. I asked him. \u2018Did you go against the light?\u2019 He said, \u2018Yes, I did go against the light.\u2019 \u201d\nDefendant attempted to call Dr. Jose Velasco, the attending physician on call in the emergency room when plaintiff was treated. The trial court ruled that his testimony would be barred because of defendant\u2019s failure to respond to a Supreme Court Rule 237 (107 Ill. 2d R. 237) request from plaintiff and because of a pretrial order excluding all undisclosed experts pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 220.\nIn an offer of proof, Dr. Velasco testified that on the night plaintiff was treated, he was the attending physician on call, and his team treated plaintiff. Dr. Velasco reviewed the emergency room records and stated that \u201c[i]n the history taken by one of my residents, he specifically writes down, \u2018denies any visual or hearing disturbances.\u2019 \u201d Throughout his hospitalization, plaintiff never complained of vision problems.\nDefendant first contends that the jury verdict finding both parties to be 50% at fault is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence because, regardless of which party had the red light, their relative culpability could not be equal. Defendant argues that a finding of \u201cgreen for plaintiff and red for defendant\u201d leaves no room for a jury determination that each party was 50% at fault. Similarly, a finding of \u201cred for plaintiff and green \u2014 or even beginning yellow \u2014 for defendant\u201d permits no decision that each party was 50% at fault. In view of our disposition of the second issue raised on appeal, however, we need not address this issue.\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred in precluding defendant from calling Dr. Velasco as a witness. Prior to trial, plaintiff disclosed Dr. Velasco as a consulting physician in response to an interrogatory. At trial, defendant sought to introduce Dr. Velasco\u2019s testimony to explain notations on the emergency room records after Dr. Fournier testified that he was uncertain what these notations meant. Plaintiff objected on the ground that a pretrial order limited the parties to calling only disclosed experts. Plaintiff also relied on the fact that defendant had never responded to plaintiff\u2019s pretrial request, made pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 237, to disclose any occurrence witnesses.\nThe trial court barred the testimony on the basis of both objections made by plaintiff. Plaintiff now concedes that Dr. Velasco was not presented as an expert witness, and thus Rule 220 is not applicable. (107 Ill. 2d R. 220.) Furthermore, plaintiff concedes that defendant was not required to disclose Dr. Velasco, a treating physician, as an occurrence witness pursuant to Rule 237 (107 Ill. 2d R. 237).\nPlaintiff relies, therefore, on an argument raised for the first time on appeal. Plaintiff points to an order in limine which bars the parties from calling witnesses who had not been previously disclosed. Dr. Velasco\u2019s identity and function were disclosed to defendant by plaintiff, and thus plaintiff cannot claim surprise or prejudice. (See Waterford v. Halloway (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 668, 491 N.E.2d 1199; Manila v. Kaminski (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 932, 412 N.E.2d 651.) The in limine order does not bar Dr. Velasco\u2019s testimony.\nPlaintiff also asserts that Dr. Velasco\u2019s testimony was impermissible hearsay because he had no independent recollection of treating plaintiff, and the hospital records did not refresh his recollection. Dr. Velasco testified that the records refreshed his recollection. The extent to which the records refreshed his memory merely goes to the weight, not the admissibility of his testimony. See Country Casualty Insurance Co. v. Wilson (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 28, 494 N.E.2d 152.\nA key element of plaintiff\u2019s action concerned the visual disorder which the accident allegedly caused or aggravated. Other than the nystagmus condition, plaintiff had fully recovered from the accident. Dr. Fournier testified that the word \u201cdenies,\u201d found in the emergency room notation, might not apply to the phrase \u201cvisual/hearing disturbances.\u201d If plaintiff did in fact deny visual disturbances, the jury could infer that he suffered no aggravation to his congenital nystagmus condition. Consequently, Dr. Velasco\u2019s testimony that the word \u201cdenies\u201d applied to the phrase \u201cvisual/hearing disturbances,\u201d might have offered the jury strong evidence that plaintiff suffered no eye injury as a result of the accident. Thus, in this closely balanced case where credibility was crucial, the trial court\u2019s erroneous decision to bar Dr. Velasco\u2019s testimony severely prejudiced defendant and requires us to remand for a new trial.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nWHITE, P.J., and FREEMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Williams & Montgomery, Ltd., of Chicago (Barry L. Kroll, Karl R. Fink, and Lloyd E. Williams, Jr., of counsel), for appellant.", "Leonard M. Ring & Associates, of Chicago (Leonard M. Ring and Leslie J. Rosen, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DONACIANO CORRALES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMERICAN CAB COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 87\u20142908\nOpinion filed April 20, 1988.\nRehearing denied June 22, 1988.\nWilliams & Montgomery, Ltd., of Chicago (Barry L. Kroll, Karl R. Fink, and Lloyd E. Williams, Jr., of counsel), for appellant.\nLeonard M. Ring & Associates, of Chicago (Leonard M. Ring and Leslie J. Rosen, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0907-01", "first_page_order": 929, "last_page_order": 934 }