{
  "id": 3617340,
  "name": "CHARLES F. HLINKA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Defendants-Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hlinka v. Department of Employment Security",
  "decision_date": "1988-05-26",
  "docket_number": "No. 87-1239",
  "first_page": "163",
  "last_page": "165",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 163"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "134 N.E.2d 249",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "8 Ill. 2d 293",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2716524
      ],
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        {
          "page": "307"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:27.168167+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "CHARLES F. HLINKA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Defendants-Appellants."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE LINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants, the Illinois Department of Employment Security and the Board of Review (Board), appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Cook County on administrative review which reversed the decision of the Board denying plaintiff, Charles Hlinka, unemployment compensation. Defendants contend that the circuit court erred because plaintiff was not statutorily qualified to receive benefits.\nBackground\nThe facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff was the president and sole stockholder for a manufacturing company. Plaintiff worked throughout the calendar year, yet he drew his entire annual salary in the fourth quarter of the year after he determined what that salary should be. In the final quarter of 1984 plaintiff drew a salary of $10,000, and during the final quarter of 1985 the corporation dissolved.\nPlaintiff then filed his claim for unemployment compensation. The Board denied the claim because the evidence showed that plaintiff was not paid wages during the other three quarters of his \u201cbase period\u201d which, in this case, were the third calendar, quarter of 1984 and the first two calendar quarters of 1985. The Board concluded that plaintiff was therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits under section 500(E) of the Unemployment Compensation Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 420(E)).\nSection 500(E) provides:\n\u201cAn unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if ***:\n* * *\nE. *** With respect to any benefit year beginning or after January 3, 1982, he has been paid during his base period wages for insured work equal to not less than $1,600, provided that he has been paid wages for insured work equal to at least $440 during that part of his base period which does not include the calendar quarter in which the wages paid to him were highest.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 420(E).)\n\u201cBase period\u201d is defined, inter alia, as \u201cthe four consecutive calendar quarters ended on the preceding June 30, for benefit years beginning in November, December, or January.\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 347(3).) In this case the \u201cbase period\u201d in question covered the final two quarters in 1984 and the first two quarters of 1985.\nOn administrative review the trial court found that section 500(E) was \u201cunreasonable\u201d and expressed the view that the $10,000 should have been prorated over the entire year of 1984, thereby qualifying plaintiff for unemployment benefits.\nOpinion\nStating that no Illinois cases exist on this matter, defendants argue that the trial court\u2019s decision was an improper interpretation of section 500(E) because plaintiff had not been paid compensation in at least two of the four quarters comprising his \u201cbase period.\u201d Because the relevant statutory language is clear and unambiguous, defendants maintain that it should be given effect and plaintiff should have been denied benefits because he elected to pay himself only once per year.\nIn Belfield v. Coop (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 293, 307, 134 N.E.2d 249, the court stated:\n\u201cThe only legitimate function of the courts is to declare and enforce the law as enacted by the legislature, to interpret the language used by the legislature where it requires interpretation, and not to annex new provisions or substitute different ones, or read into a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions which depart from its plain meaning. [Citation.] The language of the statute in question is certain and unambiguous and this court is not warranted in reading into it an exception which the legislature did not see fit to make.\u201d\nThe present ease requires the same analysis.\nThe plain, unambiguous language of section 500(E) requires that wages be paid at a certain level during two quarters of a claimant\u2019s \u201cbase period.\u201d Section 500(E) does not permit engrafting the exception which would allow plaintiff to avoid this requirement by being paid only in one calendar quarter for work occurring over an entire year. While the circuit court considered application of section 500(E) in this case to be unreasonable, that criticism did not warrant abrogating the plain meaning of the statute.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nJIGANTI, P.J., and McMORROW, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE LINN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Shawn W. Denney, Solicitor General, and Karen S. Rosenwinkel, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.",
      "Charles F. Hlinka, of Franklin Park, appellee pro se."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "CHARLES F. HLINKA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 87\u20141239\nOpinion filed May 26, 1988.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Shawn W. Denney, Solicitor General, and Karen S. Rosenwinkel, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.\nCharles F. Hlinka, of Franklin Park, appellee pro se."
  },
  "file_name": "0163-01",
  "first_page_order": 185,
  "last_page_order": 187
}