{
  "id": 3618875,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLARENCE DACE, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Dace",
  "decision_date": "1988-06-14",
  "docket_number": "No. 3-87-0633",
  "first_page": "271",
  "last_page": "274",
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "year": 1988,
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    {
      "cite": "86 Ill. App. 3d 457",
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      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
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      "year": 1988,
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    {
      "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 891",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:27.168167+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLARENCE DACE, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nWhile awaiting trial for murder, the defendant, Clarence Dace, escaped from custody. On February 10, 1986, he was charged with one count of escape. El. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 31 \u2014 6(a).\nThe defendant was subsequently convicted of murder on February 19, 1986. On May 15, 1986, the defendant was sentenced to a natural life term of imprisonment. At the time of the sentencing hearing, the State moved to nol-pros the escape charge due to the natural life sentence.\nThis court took an appeal of the murder conviction and reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial. (See People v. Dace (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 891, 506 N.E.2d 332.) Thereafter, on April 13, 1987, the trial court granted the State\u2019s motion to reinstate the escape prosecution. The defendant pled not guilty to the charge, bond was set, and a trial date scheduled. On July 2, 1987, the defendant changed his plea to guilty to the escape charge and received a five-year term of imprisonment.\nThe defendant\u2019s subsequent motion to withdraw the guilty plea on grounds of misrepresentation by counsel was denied.\nThe defendant brings this appeal asserting that his counsel failed to raise a patently meritorious speedy trial issue. The State rebuts the defendant\u2019s contention by alleging that the intrastate detainer act (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1003 \u2014 8\u201410) controls the case. Alternatively, the State asserts that when it nol-prossed the escape charge, the statutory term was tolled.\nInitially, we note that the intrastate detainer provision has no application to this case. The act applies only to inmates of penitentiaries who commit offenses during their term of imprisonment.\nTurning to the speedy trial act (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5), it is the law that every defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to a speedy trial. (U.S. Const., amend. VI; 111. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a78.) The Illinois speedy trial statute requires that every person in custody in Illinois be tried within 120 days from the date he or she was taken into custody and that every person on bail or recognizance must be tried within 160 days from the date he or she demands trial. For a defendant who has more than one charge pending against him in the same county, trial on any of the charges must commence before the expiration of the statutory period for any of the charges, and all remaining charges must be tried within 160 days after the judgment is rendered in the first trial.\nWhen charges are dismissed, the nature of the dismissal usually will determine whether the statutory period has been tolled or whether it continues to run. Both the First and Fourth Appellate Districts have held that a motion by the State to nol-pros a case will toll the statutory period for the speedy trial requirement. See People v. Sanders (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 457, 407 N.E.2d 951; People v. Stinnett (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 1027.\nThe defendant narrowly applies the proposition of law in these cases to situations where the defendant is not in custody or on bond or recognizance. However, we believe these cases serve as persuasive authority in resolving the issue at bar.\nIn Sanders the decisive fact relied upon by the court was the lack of evidence to indicate that the State attempted to evade the speedy trial act by use of the nolle prosequi. Citing dieta from the supreme court\u2019s decision in People v. McAdrian (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 250, 287 N.E.2d 688, the court focused on whether the State sought to evade the limitation rule and deny the defendant his constitutional right to a speedy trial.\nThe instant nolle prosequi motion specified that the State believed it would not be in the interests of justice to prosecute the escape charge since the defendant was facing a life sentence. The nolle pro sequv motion was made at the sentencing hearing and as such was not a tactic to evade the speedy trial statute.\nSummarily, we hold that the defendant\u2019s statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated after the charges against him were nolprossed, and there is no evidence that the motion was undertaken to evade the statutory period.\nFor all the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHEIPLE and BARRY, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Thomas A. Lilien, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.",
      "Edward F. Masters, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Walter P. Hehner, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLARENCE DACE, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201487\u20140633\nOpinion filed June 14, 1988.\nThomas A. Lilien, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nEdward F. Masters, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Walter P. Hehner, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0271-01",
  "first_page_order": 293,
  "last_page_order": 296
}