{ "id": 3618205, "name": "RICHARD WILLIAM STEINER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRIAN MARR et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Steiner v. Marr", "decision_date": "1988-06-23", "docket_number": "No. 2-87-1015", "first_page": "366", "last_page": "373", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 366" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2853699 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 921", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3531556 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0921-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5403562 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 813", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5535640 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816-17" }, { "page": "817" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0813-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3464987 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 976", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465875 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "983" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0976-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3428775 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0158-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 661, "char_count": 12466, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.5046715916883656e-08, "percentile": 0.2822512046069095 }, "sha256": "bdcc6b70f2d8deb1312f6e536e2db4ed241a9a4aa134d2fe87f78bcb9a33c262", "simhash": "1:72cf9e446a8a002b", "word_count": 2144 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:27.168167+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RICHARD WILLIAM STEINER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRIAN MARR et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOODWARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Richard William Steiner, brought an action to recover damages for personal injuries he sustained when the pickup truck in which he and defendants, Brian Marr and John Vann, were passengers went off a road and struck a fallen tree. The driver of the truck, John Schiera, is not a defendant in this case. Both defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which were granted by the trial court. Plaintiff appeals.\nThe sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting the motions for summary judgment. We affirm.\nOn January 23, 1984, after visiting several eating and drinking establishments, Schiera, plaintiff, and both defendants were proceeding north on Portwine Road in Lake County in Schiera\u2019s 1972 Ford pickup truck. The weather was cold, and although the road had been plowed, snow was blowing across the road, and the solid white lines on the sides of the road were not visible. According to Schiera, there was an ice glaze on some spots on the road due to the snow that had melted during the day. Because the truck had only a front seat, the four men sat shoulder to shoulder in the truck. Schiera was driving, the defendants were in the middle, and plaintiff was seated up against the passenger door, holding himself up with his hand against the dashboard.\nJust prior to the accident, plaintiff warned Schiera to move the truck to the center of the the highway because it was too close to the right shoulder. The truck began to fishtail, went off the ro\u00e1d, and struck a fallen tree. Plaintiff was pinned in the truck and suffered a complete spinal cord injury.\nPlaintiff contends that summary judgment should not have been granted in this case because there exist questions of fact as to whether the defendants\u2019 positions in the truck interfered with Schiera\u2019s ability to control the truck and as to whether the crowded conditions in the truck which necessitated plaintiff sitting in a cramped position caused plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\nSummary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is not a genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Wysocki v. Bedrosian (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 158, 164; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1005(c).) Summary judgment is a drastic measure and should not be granted unless the evidence, when construed most strongly against the moving party, establishes that the movant clearly and without doubt has a right to such relief. (Schwaner v. Belvidere Medical Building Partnership (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 976, 983.) Where the facts could lead a fair-minded person to draw more than one conclusion or inference, summary judgment must be denied. (Burns v. Grezeka (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 294, 297.) However, where the pleadings, depositions, and other evidence before the court in a motion for summary judgment show that at. trial a verdict would have to be directed, entry of summary judgment is proper. Kimbrough v. Jewel Cos. (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 813, 816-17.\nIn his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants violated section 11 \u2014 1406(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, which provides as follows:\n\u201c(b) No passenger in a vehicle or streetcar shall ride in such position as to interfere with the driver\u2019s or motorman\u2019s view ahead or to the sides, or to interfere with his control over the driving mechanism of the vehicle or streetcar. (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95!/2, par. 11-1406(b).)\nPlaintiff further alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the defendants\u2019 violation of section 11 \u2014 1406(b), there was interference with the control of the driving mechanism or steering wheel of the truck in which plaintiff was riding.\nTo prevail in a cause of action sounding in negligence, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed plaintiff a duty; that the defendant failed to perform such a duty; and that an injury proximately resulted from a breach of that duty. (Cunis v. Brennan (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 372, 374.) Plaintiff and defendants here rely on certain portions of Schiera\u2019s deposition to support their varying positions. In order to achieve a complete understanding of Schiera\u2019s testimony as it relates to the critical issue here, we have set that portion of his deposition out in toto as follows:\n\u201cQ. (By Mr. Dorn, defendant Marr\u2019s attorney) Immediately before your truck left the road, did the presence of any of the people, any of the passengers either individually or collectively impede or impair your ability to control the truck?\nA. Well, I mean it wasn\u2019t like it was comfortable driving, okay. I mean there were four people in the cab. It wasn\u2019t like it was totally \u2014 it wasn\u2019t like I was driving under normal conditions.\nI mean there was, you know, that added crowdedness, and the wheel, instead of being directly in front of me, was over to the right a little bit.\nQ. In other words you were all the way\u2014\nA. I was\u2014\nQ. \u2014over to the door?\nA. Right.\nQ. And the steering wheel, rather than being dead center was a little to your right?\nA. To my right.\nQ. That really doesn\u2019t answer my question.\nCould you read the question back? (Whereupon the Reporter read back the requested portion of the record)\nTHE WITNESS: Well, I wouldn\u2019t say individually, but collectively.\nMR. DORN: In what way?\nA. Well, if there was only one person in there I might have been able to drive the truck a little more comfortably, I guess is the word.\nQ. Aside from the question of comfort, which is not what I\u2019m asking you\u2014\nA. As far as what?\nQ. \u2014were you able to keep the truck\u2014\nMR. BASAK (plaintiff\u2019s attorney): You mean correcting the skid or whatever?\nMR. DORN: I\u2019m not at that point yet. I\u2019m talking immediately before the truck left the road did you have any problems in controlling the direction of your vehicle?\nTHE WITNESS: A. Of the truck? I have to say no but I\u2014 it\u2019s\u2014\nQ. Did the presence of any of the people in the front seat obstruct or impair your ability to turn the wheel or take evasive action \u2014 let me finish \u2014 as you felt the truck leave the roadway?\nA. Well, you know, I imagine when I turned the wheel to the left the people in the truck \u2014 you know, yes, they may have.\nI mean it was all instantaneous.\nQ. I\u2019m not asking you to guess and you\u2019re not here to speculate.\nI want you to tell me what you know. If you don\u2019t know, that\u2019s your answer, but I don\u2019t want your guesses or your speculation.\nA. I didn\u2019t have time to think about them if they were in the way or not.\nQ. So your answer is you don\u2019t know?\nA. I don\u2019t know.\nMR. BASAK: I\u2019m going to object. Now you\u2019re answering for him. He said yes, they may have.\nMR. DORN: Do you want to go back and read the question and then everything that follows? (Whereupon the Reporter read back the requested portion of the record.)\nMR. DORN: You don\u2019t know if any of the\u2014\nTHE WITNESS: I-\nQ. Let me finish.\nYou don\u2019t know if the presence of any of the people in the front seat impaired your ability to take evasive action or obstruct your means of doing so?\nA. I don\u2019t know. I wasn\u2019t really \u2014 I was worried about the matters at hand.\u201d\nIn Kimbrough v. Jewel Cos. (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 813, plaintiff filed suit for injuries she received when she fell on a ramp leaving the defendant\u2019s store. In her deposition, plaintiff testified that there appeared to be grease spots on the ramp where she fell, but she stated that she had no idea why she fell. In response to defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment, she filed no affidavits but contended in her response to the motion that an independent witness might be called to support her allegations as to the defective condition. In affirming the trial court\u2019s granting of the motion for summary judgment, the appellate court stated as follows:\n\u201cLiability cannot be predicated on surmise or conjecture as to the cause of the injury; proximate cause can only be established when there is reasonable certainty that defendant\u2019s acts caused the injury. [Citations.] No liability can exist unless the defendant\u2019s negligence is the legal cause of the plaintiff\u2019s injury and if the plaintiff fails to establish the element of proximate cause, she has not sustained her burden of making a prima facie case and a directed verdict is proper.\u201d Kimbrough v. Jewel Cos. (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 813, 817.\nSee also Monaghan v. DiPaulo Construction Co. (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 921.\nA plaintiff must prove that some condition caused the accident and that this condition was caused by the defendant. It is unnecessary for a defendant to. establish that there was no defective condition where the plaintiff cannot prove any causal connection between such condition and the accident. See Kimbrough v. Jewel Cos. (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 813.\nAfter reviewing the record before us, we are of the opinion that plaintiff has failed to show any evidence that the overcrowding of the front seat of the truck caused the accident or contributed to his injuries. Plaintiff relies heavily on the deposition testimony of the defendants and especially that of John Schiera. However, while, plaintiff asserts that Schiera testified that the passengers in the truck collectively impeded or impaired his ability to control the truck, the sections of Schiera\u2019s deposition which we have set forth above contradict that assertion. While Schiera testified that he might have been more comfortable with less people in the front seat of the truck, he first denied that there was any interference with his driving ability and then finally stated that he did not know if there was because he was concentrating on the immediate problem. In his deposition defendant Brian Marr was questioned as to a statement he made earlier to the effect that Schiera\u2019s movement of the steering wheel was somewhat restricted because of all of the people in the front seat. However, Marr categorized his answer as a guess. He also stated that everything had. happened so fast, and he was mainly concerned with bracing himself. Although earlier he had adjusted his seat to allow Schiera more room, this was for reasons of courtesy, not because Schiera was having difficulty with the steering wheel. In his deposition, defendant John Vann was also questioned as to a prior statement he made to the effect that if Schiera had had more room, he would have had a much better chance to do something. Vann described his statement as an opinion. Moreover, in his deposition, the following took place:\n\u201cQ. Based upon what you have observed, did it appear to be crowded to the point where John Schiera would have some difficulty moving the vehicle, moving the wheel sharply to straighten out his truck?\nA. He would have never had the chance to.\nMR. BASAK: Okay why do you say that?\nA. The accident happened far too fast.\u201d\nFinally, plaintiff himself testified on deposition that as he felt the truck going out of control, he did not see what the driver was doing. Therefore, we agree with the defendants that plaintiff\u2019s contention that either or both of the defendants interfered with Schiera\u2019s ability to control the truck is based upon mere conjecture and speculation, which cannot be the basis for relief. See Monaghan v. DiPaulo Construction Co. (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 921.\nPlaintiff concedes his own negligence in occupying the front seat of the truck in spite of the number of people. However, he contends, without citation to authority, that the defendants must also bear some responsibility for their alleged negligent actions. Inasmuch as plaintiff has not supported this contention with citations to relevant authority in violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(eX7), the contention is waived. See Flynn v. Vancil (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 236; 113 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).\nThere being no issue of material fact, the motions for summary judgment were correctly granted.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nNASH and REINHARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOODWARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Pollina & Phelan, of Northbrook (Leonard P. Basak, of counsel), for appellant.", "Joel S. Massel, of Brenner, Mavrias, Dorn & Alm, of Chicago (Bruce Farrel Dorn, of counsel), for appellee Brian Marr.", "Michael E. Maher, of Querrey, Harrow, Gulanick & Kennedy, Ltd., of Waukegan (Glen E. Amundsen, of counsel), for appellee John Vann." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RICHARD WILLIAM STEINER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRIAN MARR et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201487\u20141015\nOpinion filed June 23, 1988.\nPollina & Phelan, of Northbrook (Leonard P. Basak, of counsel), for appellant.\nJoel S. Massel, of Brenner, Mavrias, Dorn & Alm, of Chicago (Bruce Farrel Dorn, of counsel), for appellee Brian Marr.\nMichael E. Maher, of Querrey, Harrow, Gulanick & Kennedy, Ltd., of Waukegan (Glen E. Amundsen, of counsel), for appellee John Vann." }, "file_name": "0366-01", "first_page_order": 388, "last_page_order": 395 }