{ "id": 3619032, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TROY E. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Brown", "decision_date": "1988-07-07", "docket_number": "No. 4-87-0821", "first_page": "500", "last_page": "505", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 500" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "426 F.2d 1161", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2247009 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/426/1161-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 F.2d 382", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1470511 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/678/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 F.2d 817", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 808506 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/447/0817-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 F.2d 711", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 861978 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/581/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "726 F.2d 1231", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1929501 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/726/1231-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 N.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 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Ed. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "421 U.S. 992", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541280, 541092, 541065, 541134, 541711, 541810, 541593, 541279 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0992-05", "/us/421/0992-03", "/us/421/0992-08", "/us/421/0992-02", "/us/421/0992-07", "/us/421/0992-04", "/us/421/0992-01", "/us/421/0992-06" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2958038 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 N.E.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 3d 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2462993 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/15/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 U.S. 778", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 10343 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/411/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6178423 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 N.E.2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5667529 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 N.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" }, { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2972144 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" }, { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 1285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. App. 3d 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3507545 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/162/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 1337", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1342" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "337 U.S. 241", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 572499 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" }, { "page": "1083" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/337/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" }, { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082585 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" }, { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0482-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 645, "char_count": 10364, "ocr_confidence": 0.789, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.72940530655915e-08, "percentile": 0.4083508343536631 }, "sha256": "2270e0b1adbe8e17db76512e04df3796df415a2bec28044db29e55e2da3a27a1", "simhash": "1:a1487d9c20372305", "word_count": 1695 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:27.168167+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TROY E. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LUND\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn January 2, 1987, defendant Troy Brown was arrested in Champaign County for the offense of armed robbery in violation of section 18 \u2014 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 18 \u2014 2) and indicted in case No. 87 \u2014 CF\u201410. On February 5, 1987, defendant was charged in the instant case (87\u2014 CF \u2014 46) with the offense of residential burglary in violation of section 19 \u2014 3 of the Code (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 3) for an incident which occurred approximately 20 minutes prior to that alleged in case No. 87 \u2014 CF\u201410. On April 6, 1987, the circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence seized in case No. 87 \u2014 CF\u201410.\nOn June 2, defendant pleaded guilty in the present case to the included offense of burglary (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 1) and was placed on 18 months\u2019 probation. On October 2, the court revoked defendant\u2019s probation for various and sundry curfew violations. At the resentencing hearing on November 2, the State asked the court to take judicial notice of the file in case No. 87 \u2014 CF\u201410 and allow testimony of the victim in that incident for purposes of aggravation. The court allowed this over defendant\u2019s objection. Defendant was sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment on the burglary conviction. Defendant filed this appeal.\nOn November 12, 1987, we reversed the order of the court suppressing the evidence in case No. 87 \u2014 CF\u201410. (People v. Brown (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 528, 515 N.E.2d 1285.) On April 7, 1988, the Illinois Supreme Court denied defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal in that case. On May 25, 1988, the supreme court stayed its mandate to allow defendant to apply for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. That application has not yet been resolved.\nDefendant\u2019s sole contention is that since the exclusionary rule should apply to probation revocation proceedings, the court erred by allowing illegally seized evidence from a collateral case to be used at the sentencing hearing. The State asserts this point is moot since the suppression order was reversed. Since the application for certiorari is still pending before the United States Supreme Court, we cannot agree with the State that the point is moot. Neither can we agree with defendant that the admission of the evidence is improper.\nIn People v. Dowery (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529, the supreme court held that the exclusionary rule was not applicable to probation revocation proceedings for violations of a defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights against an improper search except in cases of police harassment. In People v. Grubb (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 822, 493 N.E.2d 699, we extended this holding to supervision revocation proceedings. Justice Spitz, writing for the court, clearly and concisely explained Dowery where he stated:\n\u201cOur supreme court in People v. Dowery (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529, utilized this balancing test [set forth in United States v. Janis (1976), 428 U.S. 433, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046, 96 S. Ct. 3021] in determining that the exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation proceedings. The Dowery court determined that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, while normally inadmissible trader the exclusionary rule, is not patently untrustworthy and is admissible in a revocation hearing because all reliable evidence should be available to the hearing judge to gauge a defendant\u2019s rehabilitative effort. In reaching its determination the Dowery court stated:\n\u2018The grant of probation was imposed upon defendant in the present case after the trial court\u2019s consideration that he was not likely to commit another offense; that his rehabilitation would be advanced by probation; and, that the public interest would be served by such disposition. *** During a revocation hearing the interests of society must be amply considered. [Citations.] Merely because there may exist a technical deficiency in police conduct, a trial court should not be forced to release a defendant and return him to a probationary status where there is patent evidence of a serious probation violation.\u2019 62 Ill. 2d 200, 206, 340 N.E.2d 529, 532.\nFurthermore, the court considered the \u2018significant dissimilarities\u2019 between a probation revocation hearing and a criminal trial. (People v. Dowery (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 200, 204, 340 N.E.2d 529, 531.) A probation revocation proceeding is not a criminal adjudication. It does not determine guilt or innocence of the accused. (Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656, 93 S. Ct. 1756; People v. Beard, (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 663, 304 N.E.2d 707, affd (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 220, 319 N.E.2d 745, cert. denied (1975), 421 U.S. 992, 44 L. Ed. 2d 483, 95 S. Ct. 1999.) Hence, the same stringent requirements traditionally embodied in the usual prosecution for crime are not required in a revocation proceeding as it is not considered a stage of the criminal prosecution. People v. Beard (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 663, 304 N.E.2d 707; People v. Reese (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 820, 347 N.E.2d 451.\u201d (Grubb, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 824-25, 493 N.E.2d at 701.)\nThus, even though the present case deals with evidence presented at sentencing after revocation rather than at the revocation hearing, it appears at first blush Dowery is dispositive of this case.\nWhile defendant acknowledges the Dowery holding, he asserts that recent trends in decisions require a different result. However, it is well settled that where the supreme court has declared the law on any point, it alone can overrule and modify its previous opinion, and the circuit courts are bound by such decision, and it is the duty of such courts to follow the decision in similar cases. (Agricultural Transportation Association v. Carpentier (1953), 2 Ill. 2d 19, 27, 116 N.E.2d 863, 867.) This is true irrespective of contentions that the decision is erroneously decided (Panchinsin v. Enterprise Cos. (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 441, 444, 453 N.E.2d 797, 800), and notwithstanding the trend in judicial decisions elsewhere and the fact that the decision represents the minority view (14 Ill. L. & Prac. Courts \u00a782 (1968)). Accordingly, short of a United States Supreme Court opinion directly on point, we are bound by our supreme court holding in Dowery.\nFurther, we fail to find this asserted trend requires a change. Defendant cites three Federal cases which he asserts question or change previous decisions which the Dowery court partially relied on. However, in Egerstaffer v. Israel (7th Cir. 1984), 726 F.2d 1231, and United States v. Frederickson (8th Cir. 1978), 581 F.2d 711, the courts simply noted the question was raised but decided the cases on other grounds. This is hardly a repudiation of the holdings in United States v. Hill (7th Cir. 1971), 447 F.2d 817, and United States v. Frederickson (8th Cir. 1978), 581 F.2d 711, upon which the Dowery court relied and which our research indicates are still good law.\nIn United States v. Rea (2d Cir. 1982), 678 F.2d 382, the court held that evidence illegally seized by a probation officer could not be used in a probation revocation proceeding. This court distinguished its previous holding in United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick (2d Cir. 1970), 426 F.2d 1161, upon which the Dowery court relied. However, the facts in Rea would most likely fit under police harassment in Dowery, and the evidence would be suppressed. The general holding in Fitzpatrick is still valid.\nOur supreme court at the time it decided Dowery acknowledged there was a split among the jurisdictions. This is still true. Our review has ascertained that every case the supreme court relied on in Dowery is still valid law in its respective jurisdiction.\nAccordingly, sinc\u00e9 the supreme court has ruled on the question, and the law it relied on is still valid, what at first blush appeared controlling is, in fact, so.\nAffirmed.\nKNECHT, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LUND" }, { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH,\nspecially concurring:\nThe exclusionary rule should not be applied to sentencing hearings. As pointed out in Dowery and Grubb, the fourth amendment\u2019s exclusionary rule is not applicable to probation revocation proceedings or qualitatively comparable proceedings to revoke probation. More important, in the instant case, we are not dealing with a probation revocation proceeding, but only with a sentencing hearing.\nIn People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482, 496, 431 N.E.2d 344, 350, it is stated:\n\u201c[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the \u2018fundamental sentencing principle\u2019 that \u2018a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\u2019 \u201d\nAlso in La Pointe, the supreme court, quoting from Williams v. New York (1949), 337 U.S. 241, 247, 93 L. Ed. 1337, 1342, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 1083, stated:\n\u201c \u2018[MJodern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial.\u2019 \u201d (La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d at 497, 431 N.E.2d at 351.)\nThe fourth amendment should protect the defendant\u2019s rights only when the objective in obtaining the evidence by the police is to enhance the defendant\u2019s sentence and, second, where the police engage in outrag\u00e9ous constitutional violations. Neither of these exceptions is applicable here.\nThe supreme court\u2019s decision in Bowery, stating that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not apply in revocation proceedings, makes it clearly evident that it would not apply in a sentencing proceeding. The defendant\u2019s rights were protected because he was given the opportunity to confront the witness presented against him.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH," } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Lawrence J. Essig, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Michael Blazicek, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TROY E. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201487\u20140821\nOpinion filed July 7, 1988.\nMcCULLOUGH, J., specially concurring.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Lawrence J. Essig, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nThomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Michael Blazicek, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0500-01", "first_page_order": 522, "last_page_order": 527 }