{ "id": 3616239, "name": "KRISS L. STUTZMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Stutzman v. Board of Education", "decision_date": "1988-05-04", "docket_number": "No. 87-3140", "first_page": "670", "last_page": "675", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 670" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5493033 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 L. Ed. 686", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "376 U.S. 254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 379234 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/376/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994390 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 N.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469094 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 N.E.2d 1082", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045930 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "735 F.2d 264", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 581117 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/735/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 U.S. 693", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12027375 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/424/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 F.2d 360", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10593817 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/722/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 N.E.2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5442540 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 N.E.2d 810", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill. 2d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5333040 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 998", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3628275 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2995754 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 1222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188237 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 N.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 974", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2996869 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0974-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 N.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Ill. App. 3d 879", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2703595 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/25/0879-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 649, "char_count": 11429, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.016553732576677e-08, "percentile": 0.31610433658487425 }, "sha256": "e37e4feb033de9c67d59e65373b60eaf3d16f3d37cf4327280c063ab062e6bce", "simhash": "1:2f59d04b875fedd4", "word_count": 1786 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:27.168167+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "KRISS L. STUTZMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Board of Education of the City of Chicago suspended its employee, plaintiff Kriss L. Stutzman, for 24 days. Plaintiff filed suit and, after reviewing the pleadings and motions, and hearing argument, the trial court entered judgment for defendant on count I, which sought a writ of certiorari. The court dismissed count II, alleging due process violations, and count III, alleging first amendment violations. The court also dismissed count IV alleging retaliatory suspension and count V alleging defamation. Plaintiff appeals.\nPlaintiff served as a principal in the Chicago school system. In 1982, plaintiff counseled a tenured teacher at the school regarding problems occurring in her classroom. Plaintiff later began a remediation process, and the Board, consistent with his recommendation, issued a notice of remedial warning to the teacher. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 122, par. 34 \u2014 85.\nA 50-day remediation period followed the warning. During that period, plaintiff made approximately 30 observations of the teacher. Plaintiff wrote contemporaneous notes regarding these observations. On October 1, 1984, plaintiff wrote to the district superintendent that his observations indicated that the teacher failed to correct her deficient teaching performance.\nThe Board\u2019s legal department began preparation for the hearing before an officer appointed by the Illinois State Board of Education. Based upon plaintiff\u2019s observations and evaluation of the teacher, the legal department prepared charges and specifications for the suspension and discharge of the tenured teacher. A dismissal hearing was set for June 21, 1985. Throughout May and early June of 1985, plaintiff met with the Board\u2019s attorneys numerous times to discuss the charges and review the supporting documentation, which consisted mainly of plaintiff\u2019s recorded observations of the teacher. Plaintiff reviewed the chronology of events, the documentation, and the hearing procedure with legal counsel.\nThree days before the hearing, the Board\u2019s attorneys met with plaintiff to hold a mock direct examination, using plaintiff\u2019s observation notes as a basis for the questioning. Plaintiff denied any memory of his observations of the teacher, denied any knowledge as to the dates on which he observed her, and denied that his notes could refresh his recollection of the relevant events. Plaintiff insisted that if he testified based upon his notes he would be lying, and that he could only read the notes verbatim. Despite several other meetings with various attorneys for the Board, plaintiff maintained that he could not recall anything and insisted that his memory could not be refreshed. Plaintiff informed legal counsel that there was no way acceptable to him that he could testify.\nThe Board\u2019s legal counsel directed plaintiff to comply with the law department in the preparation of his testimony and then went on to begin a mock direct examination with a district superintendent. When she set forth an observation which she had made of the teacher, plaintiff interrupted, insisting that the superintendent was lying and could not remember such an observation.\nThe Board\u2019s legal department determined that it could not proceed against the teacher, absent the cooperation of plaintiff as the observing principal. The charges were dropped and the teacher was transferred out of plaintiff\u2019s school.\nOn October 11, 1985, the general superintendent of schools sought the suspension of plaintiff for 30 school days, stating that the request was \u201cbased on allegations that you were guilty of insubordination on more than one occasion and that you deserted your professional responsibility as a Principal in connection with your role as a witness in a recent teacher suspension/dismissal proceeding.\u201d In accordance with the relevant procedural requirements, a presuspension hearing was scheduled for October 17, 1985, and plaintiff was advised of his right to counsel. The hearing was postponed until October 24,1985.\nOn October 23, plaintiff\u2019s counsel requested a more specific statement of the reasons for the suspension. On the same day, the general superintendent replied in writing that the reasons included:\n\u201c1. Insubordination (specifically the Principal\u2019s repeated refusal to comply with the directive of the District Superintendent *** to cooperate with the Board of Education\u2019s legal department in preparation for the termination hearing of a tenured teacher) and\n2. Desertion of the Principal\u2019s professional responsibility in his role as a witness in said teacher dismissal proceeding.\u201d\nAt the suspension hearing, plaintiff\u2019s counsel examined the witnesses. The hearing officer later recommended the suspension for 24 school days. The Board adopted that recommendation, and plaintiff served the suspension from January 29 through March 5,1986.\nThe trial court entered judgment for defendants on count I, which sought a writ of certiorari. Where the agency is not arbitrary in its findings and the record fairly tends to support its findings, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment. (Quinlan & Tyson, Inc. v. City of Evanston (1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 879, 324 N.E.2d 65.) The trial court here found that a common law writ of certiorari should be treated as an administrative review. This court, therefore, must inquire whether the agency had jurisdiction and acted within its jurisdiction, whether it proceeded according to law and acted on the evidence, and whether there is anything in the record which fairly tends to sustain the action of the agency. Odell v. Village of Hoffman Estates (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 974, 443 N.E.2d 247.\nThe Board clearly had jurisdiction to hear the suspension case of its employee. (Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical Congre gation, Inc. (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 389, 515 N.E.2d 1222.) The Board also proceeded according to law. Plaintiff received notice, and the notice was sufficiently clear so as to allow plaintiff to prepare a defense. (Altman v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 282, 442 N.E.2d 305.) The notice was timely, in that it was received by plaintiff on October 16; the hearing began on October 24; and the hearing was adjourned until November 1, prior to plaintiff\u2019s cross-examination of the Board\u2019s chief witness. The trial court found that the hearing was impartially conducted, and plaintiff presented no facts showing the officer\u2019s bias or any due process violation. Moreover, discharge and suspension hearings need not follow the same procedures. (Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical Congregation, Inc. (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 389, 515 N.E.2d 1222.) In addition, we note that the Board\u2019s preservation of the hearing officer\u2019s findings for review was sufficient. O\u2019Boyle v. Personnel Board (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 648, 456 N.E.2d 998.\nFurthermore, the record shows that the Board acted on the evidence presented to the hearing officer and that the record fairly tends to sustain the Board\u2019s action. An agency\u2019s findings and conclusions are prima facie true and correct and will not be disturbed unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Fenyes v. State Employees\u2019 Retirement System (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 106, 160 N.E.2d 810.\nAfter repeatedly observing the tenured teacher, and making extensive notes, plaintiff concluded that the teacher should be dismissed. For some time thereafter, plaintiff cooperated with the Board\u2019s legal counsel in preparing for the hearing. Only a few days prior to the hearing, plaintiff maintained that he remembered nothing about the observations and that the detailed notes failed to refresh his memory. In effect, plaintiff refused to testify regarding his 50-day period of observation and documentation. Plaintiff\u2019s insistence that the Board called on him to perjure himself is not supported by the record.\nThe trial court enumerated four possible inferences which the hearing officer could make from the evidence and which could support a suspension: plaintiff inexplicably could not refresh his memory; plaintiff\u2019s notes were fabricated; plaintiff believed that the notes were untrustworthy and that they should not be submitted to cross-examination; or plaintiff chose to cooperate with the teacher, or not cooperate with the Board, for some ulterior reason. We agree with the trial court that the evidence supports the Board\u2019s decision to suspend plaintiff. The trial court\u2019s entry of judgment in favor of defendants as to count I was proper.\nCounts II through V were dismissed by the trial court. A cause of action should not be dismissed unless it appears that no set of properly pleaded facts could be proved which would permit recovery. Fitzgerald v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 179, 380 N.E.2d 790.\nCount II alleged violations of plaintiff\u2019s due process rights. The fourteenth amendment due process rights are not triggered by a 24-day suspension because a property interest is only implicated in a termination. (See Brown v. Brienen (7th Cir. 1983), 722 F.2d 360.) In addition, no liberty interest was implicated. (See Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 96 S. Ct. 1155; Hirshinow v. Bonamarte (7th Cir. 1984), 735 F.2d 264.) Furthermore, no substantive due process rights were violated by the Board\u2019s suspension policy. (See Scott v. Department of Commerce & Community Affairs (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 42, 416 N.E.2d 1082.) The trial court properly dismissed count II.\nIn count III, plaintiff alleges that the Board violated his right to free speech. The complaint is wholly insufficient in its unsupported assertions concerning these alleged violations, and the trial court properly dismissed this count.\nIn count IV, plaintiff alleges a new cause of action, \u201cretaliatory suspension.\u201d We know of no authority in Illinois indicating an expansion of the retaliatory discharge cause of action (Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876; Kelsey v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353) to include 24-day suspensions from employment, and we do not believe such an expansion should be created under the facts presented here. The trial court properly dismissed count IV.\nCount V alleges defamatory comments were made by certain members of the Board, including a remark that plaintiff was an \u201camnesia principal.\u201d Plaintiff has failed to plead more than bare allegations that defendants acted wilfully or with malice and thus has failed the relevant test stated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 686, 84 S. Ct. 710. Plaintiff fails to adequately allege facts indicating that the statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for their truth. (See Colson v. Stieg (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 205, 433 N.E.2d 246.) The trial court properly dismissed count V for failure to state a cause of action.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nWHITE, P.J., and FREEMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kriss L. Stutzman, of Park Forest, appellant pro se.", "Gottlieb & Schwartz, of Chicago (Therese Linden Hodges and Marc R. Jacobs, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KRISS L. STUTZMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 87\u20143140\nOpinion filed May 4, 1988.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied July 20, 1988.\nKriss L. Stutzman, of Park Forest, appellant pro se.\nGottlieb & Schwartz, of Chicago (Therese Linden Hodges and Marc R. Jacobs, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0670-01", "first_page_order": 692, "last_page_order": 697 }