{ "id": 5080872, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOTHAN ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rogers", "decision_date": "1988-07-13", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201486\u20141054", "first_page": "471", "last_page": "480", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 471" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146993 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 1096", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3018406 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/1096-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5494131 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 N.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3632643 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3489128 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 41", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5516622 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 N.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5392845 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3459317 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3565645 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 564", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 659", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3625850 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 N.E.2d 1217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3327923 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/65/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 N.E.2d 1121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3636697 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 30, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688, 694" }, { "page": "693, 698" }, { "page": "2064, 2068" }, { "page": "688" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2065" }, { "page": "688" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "2065" }, { "page": "688" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "694-95" }, { "page": "2065" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 840, "char_count": 21213, "ocr_confidence": 0.793, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3072392489443035e-07, "percentile": 0.7880428550081491 }, "sha256": "6589bc076f2f0fca815349cbdb4951a20126bc68008d90ba19f5948ee2739cc9", "simhash": "1:f63111447a3e9f80", "word_count": 3461 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:07:18.987882+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOTHAN ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LINDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn August 25, 1986, defendant, Dothan Rogers, was charged in the circuit court of Winnebago County with attempted robbery. (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 8 \u2014 4.) A jury trial was conducted, and the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The court declared a mistrial. A second jury trial was conducted, and on September 19, 1986, defendant was found guilty of attempted robbery and later sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment.\nOn appeal, defendant argues he was denied his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, defendant argues he was prejudiced by: (1) his counsel\u2019s failure to object at all during the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument, which contained numerous instances of improper and prejudicial arguments; and (2) statements elicited by defense counsel from a State\u2019s witness during cross-examination, which corroborated the complaining witness\u2019 allegations that defendant intended to rob her.\nThe complaining witness, Kathy Johnson, was the first witness called by the State. She testified that at approximately 3:20 p.m. on May 2, 1986, she was in her office when defendant walked in and asked her if she could direct him to a vocational training facility which was located in an office on that floor. Ms. Johnson told him that she would show him since she was on her way to the rest room. Ms. Johnson directed him to the office he sought, and she went into the rest room. As Ms. Johnson attempted to leave the rest room, defendant grabbed her by the face and neck and pushed her back into the rest room. Ms. Johnson testified that she then asked defendant what he wanted, and defendant allegedly responded, \u201cDo you have any money?\u201d According to Ms. Johnson, after she replied that she did not, defendant then asked, \u201cWell, do you have any money in your purse?\u201d She answered that she might have $10 in her purse back in her office, and she testified that defendant answered \u201cWell, fuck, that\u2019s not worth it.\u201d Ms. Johnson testified that she then told defendant that there might be additional money back in her office and that they should return there and look. As they were returning to Ms. Johnson\u2019s office, Ellen Conti, an employee on the floor, asked her if she was okay. Ms. Johnson testified that she then began running towards Ms. Conti and was not sure where defendant went.\nEllen Conti testified that at approximately 3:30 p.m. on May 2, 1986, she was in her office when she heard a scream. She looked out of her office door and after a few minutes observed Ms. Johnson and defendant walk out of the bathroom. She asked Ms. Johnson if she was okay, and Ms. Johnson began walking toward her. Defendant began running in the opposite direction. On cross-examination, she testified that although she did not tell the police when interviewed, Kathy Johnson stated to her that defendant asked for money. This allegedly occurred before the police arrived.\nFlorence Hofert testified that she was in her office at the time in question and heard a scream. She then observed defendant outside of her door and asked him what he was doing. She testified that defendant swiftly walked to the elevator and then exited the floor by use of the stairway.\nOfficer Steve Allen testified that he received a call at approximately 3:41 p.m. informing him of the alleged attempted robbery and a description of defendant. At approximately 3:50 p.m., Officer Allen observed defendant walking on a street and drinking a can of soda. Officer Allen then placed defendant under arrest. At the time defendant was arrested, he was six to eight blocks from the building where the incident occurred. Defendant did not resist the arrest.\nDetective Dominic Iasparro, a Rockford policeman, testified that at approximately 4:30 p.m. on May 2, 1986, he interviewed defendant, and defendant \u201cadmitted to me that he had attempted to rob the lady at the Nu-State building.\u201d Detective Iasparro testified that defendant admitted that he attempted to rob Ms. Johnson because she was an \u201ceasy mark for money,\u201d grabbed her around the neck, demanded money, and stated, \"Fuck it, it is not worth it,\u201d when Ms. Johnson told defendant that she only had $10 in her purse. On cross-examination, Detective Iasparro admitted that although the police obtained written statements from the other witnesses, they did not attempt to have defendant make a written statement and simply recorded a summary of defendant\u2019s alleged oral confession in a police report. Detective Iasparro concluded his testimony by stating that he used the police report containing the summary of defendant\u2019s oral confession to refresh his memory of the incident before he took the stand.\nThe State\u2019s next witness was Ray Ferguson. He testified that he was on the floor at the time in question and saw Ms. Johnson and defendant walk out of the bathroom together. He had come out into the hall after his secretary, Ellen Conti, asked Ms. Johnson if she was all right. He testified that Ms. Johnson then walked a few steps away from defendant and then began running toward them. He testified that defendant \u201cmumbled something, I couldn\u2019t quite hear, waved his hands, and then *** took off for the elevator.\u201d\nDefendant took the stand in his own defense. He testified that on the day before the incident, he attempted suicide. He had seen two physicians for his illness and had taken prescribed muscle suppressants on the day of the incident. He had also consumed \u201cthree or four Millers,\u201d two brandies, and used cocaine on the day of the incident. Defendant testified that he was in the building where Ms. Johnson worked because he was instructed to go there by Rock River Training, a special training program offered through Office Opportunities Industrialization Center. He could not find the office, so he walked into the office of Ms. Johnson to ask directions. Ms. Johnson offered to show him where it was and did so.\nDefendant testified that he soon realized that the office Ms. Johnson directed him to was not the office he needed and began walking back down the hallway. As defendant passed the rest room, Ms. Johnson came \u201cbolting out of the bathroom and she startled me, and I grabbed her and I pushed her back in the bathroom.\u201d Defendant explained that, \u201cI was high and in a panic and stuff from going to prison and the prison is like a combat zone and and when she come [sic] out of that bathroom I kind of like got a flashback and she just startled me and I grabbed her.\u201d He testified that once inside the rest room, he \u201cwas tripping out,\u201d and Ms. Johnson began screaming and wanting to know if he wanted her money. He replied he did not want her money and apologized. Defendant then left the rest room and walked out of the building by use of the stairs.\nDefendant testified that no other officer was present when he was questioned by Detective Iasparro. Defendant testified that he told Detective Iasparro what occurred. Defendant denied that he ever told Detective Iasparro that Ms. Johnson \u201cwas an easy mark,\u201d or that he ever asked her for money. He also denied ever making the statement \u201cFuck it, it ain\u2019t worth it\u201d to Ms. Johnson or to Detective Iasparro. Defendant testified on direct examination that he had pleaded guilty to and been convicted of kidnapping on January 16, 1980, and that he pleaded guilty to and was convicted of unlawful restraint on November 22,1985.\nThe State called Detective Steven Pirages as a rebuttal witness. Detective Pirages testified that he was also present when defendant allegedly confessed to Detective Iasparro. Detective Pirages testified that defendant admitted he attempted to rob Ms. Johnson because she was \u201can easy mark to get some money,\u201d grabbed her around the neck, demanded money from her, and made the statement, \u201cFuck it, it ain\u2019t worth it\u201d when Ms. Johnson told defendant that she only had $10 in her purse. Detective Pirages concluded- his testimony by stating that he and Detective Iasparro conferred with one another while Detective Iasparro was writing his report.\nIn Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052, the Supreme Court established a two-component test to review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on such a claim, defendant must establish: (1) trial counsel\u2019s representation \u201cfell below an objective standard of reasonableness\u201d; and (2) there is a reasonable probability \u2014 a probability which is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome but which need not be proof by a preponderance of the evidence \u2014 that \u201cbut for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\u201d Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246.\nWe first address the second component or prejudice prong of the Strickland test. We agree with defendant that the prosecutor, on numerous occasions during final argument, misstated the evidence and made improper and prejudicial arguments in front of the jury. Defendant admitted to pushing Kathy Johnson back into the washroom and grabbing her by the neck and face. The key factual dispute at trial was whether or not defendant asked for money, thereby expressing an intent to rob Kathy Johnson. On this disputed issue, the State presented the testimony of the complaining witness, Kathy Johnson and the two police detectives, Iasparro and Pirages, who testified to defendant\u2019s alleged confession of an intent to rob Kathy Johnson. Additionally, Ellen Conti stated that Kathy Johnson told her defendant asked for money. Defendant testified that he never confessed to such an intent or the statement \u201cFuck it, it ain\u2019t worth it.\u201d The jury was faced with defendant\u2019s word against the word of two detectives and Kathy Johnson and Ellen Conti.\nDuring final argument, the prosecutor repeatedly emphasized the alleged confession of defendant while keying on defendant\u2019s alleged statement of \u201cFuck it, it ain\u2019t worth it\u201d in response to Ms. Johnson\u2019s statement that she only had $10 in her purse. The prosecutor repeatedly argued how Detectives Iasparro and Pirages could not have known of this statement since they had no contact with the witnesses before they interviewed defendant. The prosecutor argued that only defendant could have told the officers of this statement. The record does not contain evidence that these officers had no contact with the witnesses prior to interviewing defendant. The State in its brief to this court admits that Detectives Pirages and Iasparro \u201cdid not directly testify that they had not talked to any witnesses before interviewing defendant.\u201d The State cites to Iasparro\u2019s testimony that he did not take the written statements of any of the witnesses to support the argument of the prosecutor. The prosecutor\u2019s argument was not a reasonable inference drawn from facts in evidence. (See People v. White (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 262, 479 N.E.2d 1121 (it is improper to make arguments which misstate the evidence or that are not based on the evidence).) The prosecutor\u2019s argument was speculation based on the absence of evidence which he may have easily presented to the jury but did not.\nThe prosecutor improperly argued his personal belief in the credibility of the testimony of Detectives Iasparro and Pirages. First, it is improper for a prosecutor to express'his personal belief in the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Valdery (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 375, 381 N.E.2d 1217.) Second, a police officer\u2019s testimony is to be evaluated in the same way as that of any other witness, and there is no presumption that a police officer\u2019s testimony is more credible than other witnesses\u2019 testimony. (People v. Ford (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 659, 447 N.E.2d 564.) The prosecutor stated:\n\u201cDominic Iasparro. Steve Pirages. What can I say about Dominic Iasparro and Steve Pirages, seasoned veterans on the police force. Credibility untouchable. Important testimony.\n* * *\nYou take all the evidence in consideration and look at the testimony of the witnesses and believe me you look at Iasparro and Pirages and they won\u2019t get on the stand and lie and make up something.\u201d\nThis type of argument from the prosecutor was not limited to a single instance and, taken in context, was used by the prosecutor to improperly interject his personal views and improperly bolster the credibility of the testimony given by Iasparro and Pirages. People v. Townsend (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 385, 483 N.E.2d 340 (although a proper subject of comment in closing argument, it is fundamental that an attorney may not intellect his personal belief in the veracity of a witness\u2019 testimony); People v. Johnson (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 465, 500 N.E.2d 728; People v. Ford (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 659, 447 N.E.2d 564.\nThe prosecutor referred to other evidence which was not supported by the record. The prosecutor stated that he did not know why \u201cthis defendant went to a house and hides [sic]. I don\u2019t know why he jumped in the car.\u201d The record contains no evidence at all that defendant ever attempted to hide. The only evidence concerning defendant\u2019s flight from the scene was testimony of Ray Ferguson that when he left the building to look for defendant, he spotted defendant walking about a block and a half away, and that defendant ran when Mr. Ferguson chased him. The prosecutor\u2019s argument improperly placed before the jury evidence not produced during trial and was directed at raising an inference of guilt based on defendant\u2019s flight from the scene. This improper argument prejudiced the plaintiff. (See People v. Harris (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 558, 288 N.E.2d 385 (flight from police is a circumstance tending to show consciousness of guilt).) Further, the prosecutor\u2019s reference to facts not in evidence left the jury free to speculate as to defendant\u2019s alleged actions to avoid capture. Insinuation that leaves the jury free to speculate may be more prejudicial than erroneously admitted specific proof. People v. Emerson (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 487, 455 N.E.2d 41.\nThe prosecutor made additional improper arguments which by themselves may not have been independently prejudicial, but when added to the other instances of improper and prejudicial argument raise serious doubts as to whether or not defendant received a fair trial. The prosecutor improperly referred to defendant\u2019s prior convictions as substantive proof that defendant was familiar with the legal system, and that because of this familiarity defendant was lying and trying \u201cto get out the easiest way he can.\u201d (People v. Simpson (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 822, 473 N.E.2d 350.) Additionally, the prosecutor stated that defendant\u2019s testimony, if believed, would imply that all of the State\u2019s witnesses were lying. This argument by which the prosecutor sought to impeach the credibility of defendant\u2019s testimony was improper because it misstated the evidence. A prosecutor may argue that a defendant is lying if there is testimony at trial which contradicts defendant. (See People v. Johnson (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 465, 500 N.E.2d 728.) However, where a defendant\u2019s testimony is not inconsistent with that of any of the other witnesses, it is improper to argue that defendant is a liar because there is no basis in the record for such an argument. (People v. Strange (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 43, 465 N.E.2d 616.) In the instant case, the prosecutor\u2019s argument incorrectly suggested that defendant\u2019s testimony was inconsistent with all seven of the State\u2019s witnesses. Defendant\u2019s testimony was only inconsistent with the testimony of Ms. Johnson, Ellen Conti and Detectives Iasparro and Pirages and only on the question of whether or not defendant requested money. The prosecutor\u2019s statement improperly characterized the testimony of the State\u2019s other witnesses as contradicting defendant\u2019s testimony and tending to show that defendant was lying.\nWe find it unnecessary to assess the individual prejudicial impact of each instance of defense counsel\u2019s failure to object to the prosecutor\u2019s improper argument, where, as here, the cumulative impact of defense counsel\u2019s repeated failures to object creates a reasonable probability that, but for defense counsel\u2019s failure to object, the result would have been different. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome); see People v. Whitlow (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 322, 433 N.E.2d 629 (the court under the plain error rule (107 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) found the cumulative impact of numerous instances of improper prosecutorial comment to have raised reasonable grounds for its finding that the jury had been prejudiced, and in reversing the defendants\u2019 convictions, the court declined to assess the prejudicial effect of each isolated comment); see People v. Johnson (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 465, 500 N.E.2d 728 (cumulative effect of improper argument could reasonably be determined to have prejudiced the jury and constituted a material factor leading to the defendant\u2019s conviction, requiring a new trial).\nWe now address the first component of the Strickland test, whether defense counsel\u2019s failures to object \u201cfell below an objective standard of reasonableness.\u201d (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065.) Defendant\u2019s trial counsel failed to object at all to these numerous instances of improper and prejudicial argument by the prosecutor. Nor did defendant\u2019s trial counsel attempt to counter the prosecutor\u2019s prejudicial argument in his closing argument. Defendant\u2019s trial counsel failed to meet his duty \u201cto bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.\u201d (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065.) Defendant\u2019s trial counsel\u2019s failure to object to the improper and prejudicial arguments of the prosecutor \u201cfell below an objective standard of reasonableness\u201d upon which effective assistance of counsel is judged. (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064; see People v. Frazier (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 438 N.E.2d 623.) This failure of defendant\u2019s trial counsel to object to the prosecutor\u2019s improper argument was serious enough to deprive defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.) Accordingly, we must reverse and remand for a new trial.\nNext, we briefly address defendant\u2019s second contention of ineffective assistance of counsel as it may arise again on retrial. Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective when he cross-examined Ellen Conti and elicited testimony which corroborated Kathy Johnson\u2019s testimony that defendant requested money from Kathy Johnson. We do not find trial counsel\u2019s cross-examination of Ellen Conti to have been ineffective. (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.) Effective assistance of counsel refers to competent, not perfect, representation. (People v. Stewart (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 463, 473 N.E.2d 1227.) In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim \u201cthe defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action \u2018might be considered sound trial strategy.\u2019 \u201d (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 694-95, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065.) In the instant case, defendant fails to overcome the presumption that his trial counsel\u2019s cross-examination of Ellen Conti was the result of sound trial strategy. The record clearly shows that defense counsel was attempting to impeach the trial testimony of Ellen Conti. While our review of the record shows that the effectiveness of this cross-examination may be debated, defense counsel\u2019s attempt to impeach Ellen Conti under the circumstances did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and could reasonably be determined to have been the result of sound trial strategy. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.\nIn light of our disposition of this appeal on the basis of defense counsel\u2019s ineffectiveness in failing to object to prejudicial argument of the prosecutor enumerated above, we need not address defendant\u2019s other arguments.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nWOODWARD and UNVERZAGT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LINDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and Daniel D. Yuhas and Richard D. Frazier, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers, Robert J. Biderman, and Kenneth R. Baumgarten, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOTHAN ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201486\u20141054\nOpinion filed July 13, 1988.\nG. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and Daniel D. Yuhas and Richard D. Frazier, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers, Robert J. Biderman, and Kenneth R. Baumgarten, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0471-01", "first_page_order": 493, "last_page_order": 502 }