{ "id": 5085506, "name": "LINDA MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CYNTHIA LINDEN, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Miller v. Linden", "decision_date": "1988-07-21", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201487\u20141037", "first_page": "594", "last_page": "598", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 594" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "76 Ill. B.J. 864", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ill. B.J.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3271060 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 N.E.2d 1319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1322" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542866 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" }, { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" }, { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2791226 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" }, { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "520 N.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3547685 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" }, { "page": "590" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.E.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767" }, { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463121 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89-90" }, { "page": "90" }, { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 978", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3489938 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "980-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0978-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 495, "char_count": 8772, "ocr_confidence": 0.8, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.87498104132158e-08, "percentile": 0.3682537090000228 }, "sha256": "aba22b61f9cc599c8d74372e3ff3508ecf1877f64f7e38dbec2937f6efb138f4", "simhash": "1:5185bfeaa3470cec", "word_count": 1396 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:07:18.987882+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LINDA MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CYNTHIA LINDEN, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE REINHARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Linda Miller, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Kane County dismissing her amended complaint against defendant, Cynthia Linden. Miller sought damages from Linden for intentional infliction of emotional distress.\nThe following allegations were made in Miller\u2019s amended complaint. Miller had been involved in a relationship with the co-owner of Linden\u2019s residence in Aurora since June 1, 1986. Linden was aware of this relationship and wished to interfere with it. On six separate occasions in June 1986, and two occasions in July 1986, Linden went to Miller\u2019s home, rang the doorbell, beat upon the door, and shouted obscenities at Miller. The former conduct in June was alleged to have occurred in the presence of Miller\u2019s family, friends, and neighbors. Linden went to Miller\u2019s home again in August, and, in the presence of Miller\u2019s minor child, accosted Miller and called her obscene names.\nLinden went to Miller\u2019s residence again, in November 1986, and shouted obscenities at her. On another occasion in November, Linden followed Miller while Miller was in her car. On December 9, 1986, Miller\u2019s attorney advised Linden that her actions were causing emotional and physical distress to Miller. Linden went to Miller\u2019s residence again on January 23, 1987. She used foul language and insulted Miller during this visit. Linden went to Miller\u2019s residence once again on March 14, 1987, arriving at about 3:40 a.m. Linden rang the doorbell, beat on the door, and yelled obscenities. At about 4:10 the same morning, Linden parked her car outside Miller\u2019s home and honked her car horn for several minutes. At about 4:15 a.m., she went up to Miller\u2019s home and continually rang the doorbell. At about 4:47 that morning, Linden began to ring Miller\u2019s doorbell again.\nThere was no special relationship between the parties which necessitated or justified Linden\u2019s visits to Miller\u2019s residence. As a direct and proximate result of Linden\u2019s intentional acts, Miller sought treatment from a physician and suffered weight loss, loss of sleep, stress anxiety, gastric disorder, and nervousness. The trial court dismissed Miller\u2019s amended complaint, and Miller appeals from the order of dismissal.\nIn order to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a party must allege facts which establish that: (1) defendant\u2019s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the emotional distress suffered by plaintiff was severe; and (3) defendant\u2019s conduct was such that defendant knew that severe emotional distress was substantially certain to result. (Harris v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 978, 980-81, 473 N.E.2d 457.) Defendant\u2019s conduct must extend beyond mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or trivialities in order to be considered to be extreme and outrageous. (Public Finance Corp. v. Davis (1976), 66 Ill. 2d 85, 89-90, 360 N.E.2d 765.) Liability will only exist if defendant\u2019s conduct was so outrageous in character and extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. (Public Finance Corp., 66 Ill. 2d at 90, 360 N.E.2d at 767.) Additionally, the emotional distress suffered by plaintiff must be such that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Public Finance Corp., 66 Ill. 2d at 90, 360 N.E.2d at 767.\nThe above principles must be applied on a case-by-case basis in order to determine whether a complaint states a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (McGrath v. Fahey (1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 584, 589, 520 N.E.2d 655, appeal allowed (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 559.) As stated in the seminal case of Knierim v. Izzo (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157, \u201ca line can be drawn between the slight hurts which are the price of a complex society and the severe mental disturbances inflicted by intentional actions wholly lacking in social utility.\u201d (Knierim, 22 Ill. 2d at 85, 174 N.E.2d at 164.) The determination of whether words or conduct are actionable in character is to be made on an objective rather than a subjective standard, from common acceptation. (Knierim, 22 Ill. 2d at 86, 174 N.E.2d at 164.) For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, however, a cause of action will not be dismissed on the pleadings unless it clearly appears that no set of facts can be proved which will entitle a plaintiff to recover. (Charles Hester Enterprises, Inc. v. Illinois Founders Insurance Co. (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 278, 286, 499 N.E.2d 1319.) Additionally, well-pleaded facts must be taken as true in judging the sufficiency of the complaint. Charles Hester Enterprises, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d at 286, 499 N.E.2d at 1322.\nWe first address the question of the outrageousness of Linden\u2019s conduct. Miller has complained of 13 separate incidents of Linden\u2019s conduct toward her over a 10-month period. The frequency and duration of the complained-of conduct has been stated to be a consideration in determining whether a cause of action for this tort is stated. (Sherman v. Field Clinic (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 21, 27-28, 392 N.E.2d 154.) Additionally, despite Linden being advised by Miller\u2019s attorney that her actions were causing Miller emotional and physical distress, she persisted in going to Miller\u2019s residence on two more occasions. (See McGrath, 163 Ill. App. 3d at 590, 520 N.E.2d at 659.) On the last visit she appeared at Miller\u2019s residence at four different times in the early morning hours, engaging in conduct ranging from beating on the door and shouting obscenities to honking her car horn for several minutes. Most of the prior incidents also occurred outside Miller\u2019s private residence and involved the beating on her door and the shouting of obscenities by Linden, some in the presence of Miller\u2019s family and neighbors. There is nothing in the relationship of the parties here that would, as in Public Finance Corp., give rise to Linden\u2019s exercising her legal rights in a permissible way. Both Miller and Linden are private parties, and there is a lack of a relationship between the parties, at least as shown at the pleading stage of the proceedings. We conclude that the complaint here alleges sufficient facts, well beyond mere insults and trivialities, to allege the outrageous conduct element of the tort.\nAdditionally, Miller pleaded facts sufficient to demonstrate that she suffered severe emotional distress as a result of Linden\u2019s conduct. According to her complaint, Miller suffered stress anxiety, a gastric disorder, loss of weight and sleep, and sought medical treatment. These allegations, if proved, establish the severe emotional distress necessary to the tort. As to whether Linden acted intentionally or with the knowledge that severe emotional distress was certain or substantially certain to result, the allegations support that element of the tort as well. Linden went to Miller\u2019s private residence on numerous occasions over a prolonged period of time, engaged in a variety of harassing conduct, and continued to do so even after being warned of Miller\u2019s physical and emotional distress. Such allegations sufficiently demonstrate that Linden intended, or at the very least, knew with reasonable certainty that her conduct would cause Miller to suffer severe emotional distress.\nWe believe that Miller\u2019s complaint, which must be taken as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, meets the requirement of pleading sufficient facts which establish that Linden\u2019s conduct was extreme and outrageous, that her emotional distress was severe, and that Linden\u2019s conduct was such that she knew severe emotional distress was substantially certain to result. While the appellate court decisions since Knierim and Public Finance Corp. have generally upheld the dismissals of complaints alleging this tort, a result that one author has criticized (Sabin, Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress\u2014 25 Years Later, 76 Ill. B.J. 864 (1987)), we conclude that Miller\u2019s specific pleading of Linden\u2019s many acts toward her, as detailed above, indicates, at this pleading stage of the proceedings, extreme and outrageous conduct going beyond mere indignities, annoyances, or trivialities, as well as severe emotional distress suffered by Miller and an intentional or reckless state of mind on the part of Linden.\nFor the foregoing reasons we reverse the order of the circuit court of Kane County dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint and remand for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nDUNN and INGLIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE REINHARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "David E. Camic, of Wilson & Camic, of Aurora, for appellant.", "James R. Street, of Aurora, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LINDA MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CYNTHIA LINDEN, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201487\u20141037\nOpinion filed July 21, 1988.\nDavid E. Camic, of Wilson & Camic, of Aurora, for appellant.\nJames R. Street, of Aurora, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0594-01", "first_page_order": 616, "last_page_order": 620 }