{
  "id": 5084186,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. DAVID THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellee (Jim Edgar, Secretary of State, Appellant)",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Thompson",
  "decision_date": "1988-08-08",
  "docket_number": "No. 3\u201487\u20140309",
  "first_page": "894",
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      "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 374",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:07:18.987882+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. DAVID THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellee (Jim Edgar, Secretary of State, Appellant)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER\ndelivered, the opinion of the court:\nAfter receiving a statutory summary suspension, the defendant, David Thompson, was granted a judicial driving permit. On appeal, the Secretary of State argues that the permit was improperly granted because the defendant was not a first offender within the meaning of the statute. We reverse.\nOn April 18, 1984, the defendant was placed on court supervision for driving under the influence of alcohol. On January 15, 1987, the defendant was again arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. The defendant was unable to complete the breathalyzer exam, and his driver\u2019s license was summarily suspended pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951k, par. 11 \u2014 501.1).\nOn April 8, 1987, the defendant filed a petition for a judicial driving permit for the purpose of traveling to and from work and for ob-taming farm supplies. The trial judge granted the permit. The Secretary of State appeals, arguing that the defendant was not eligible to receive a judicial driving permit because he had previously received court supervision for driving under the influence.\nSection 6 \u2014 206.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code states that only first offenders are able to receive a judicial driving permit. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 206.1.) A first offender is defined as follows:\n\u201cFor the purposes of interpreting Sections 6 \u2014 206.1 and 6\u2014 208.1 of this Code, \u2018first offender\u2019 shall mean any person who has not had a previous conviction or court assigned supervision for violating Section 11 \u2014 501 ***; or any person who has not had a driver\u2019s license suspension for Section 11 \u2014 501.1 after January 1, 1982 ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 11\u2014 500.\nThe defendant argues that the placement of the semicolon followed by the word \u201cor\u201d in the statute indicates that the legislature intended to set out two alternative methods by which a person could qualify for first offender status. Since the defendant has not received a driver\u2019s license suspension since January 1, 1982, he argues that he should be considered to be a first offender under the second clause of the paragraph.\nThe primary rule in statutory construction is to give effect to the intention of the legislature. (People v. Thoma (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 374, 504 N.E.2d 539.) In determinating the legislative intent, the court should consider the language used as well as the purpose of the statute. (People v. Naseef (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 70, 468 N.E.2d 466.) The purpose of the legislature in enacting the summary suspension scheme is to protect those who travel on our highways. (Koss v. Slater (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 389, 507 N.E.2d 826.) The disjunctive \u201cor\u201d is not always employed in statutory drafting to express the true legislative purpose, and when it seems apparent that a literal meaning would produce a result not intended, the literal meaning may be altered to express the true legislative purpose. Apex Oil Co. v. Henkhaus (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 273, 454 N.E.2d 1032.\nThe instant issue was recently addressed in People v. Doyle (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 689, 512 N.E.2d 798. Therein, the Fourth District court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that a person was entitled to first offender status if he qualified under either of the clauses of section 11 \u2014 500. The court held that a person who had received a previous conviction, court supervision, or driver\u2019s license suspension was not a first offender within the meaning of the statute.\nWe agree with the analysis in Doyle. This interpretation is consistent with the legislative purpose of the summary suspension scheme to protect those who travel on Illinois highways. That purpose would not be served by requiring that a defendant receive both a conviction or assignment to supervision under section 11 \u2014 501 and a driver\u2019s license suspension under section 11 \u2014 501.1 before he would be denied first offender status.\nThe order of the circuit court of Grundy County granting the defendant a judicial driving permit is reversed.\nReversed.\nSTOUDER, P.J., and HEIPLE, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Neil E Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Diane M. CurryGrapsas, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.",
      "Frank J. Black, of Black & Black, of Morris, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. DAVID THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellee (Jim Edgar, Secretary of State, Appellant).\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201487\u20140309\nOpinion filed August 8, 1988.\nNeil E Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Diane M. CurryGrapsas, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.\nFrank J. Black, of Black & Black, of Morris, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0894-01",
  "first_page_order": 916,
  "last_page_order": 919
}