{
  "id": 3516609,
  "name": "In re R.S. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Bernadette Sepulveda, Respondent-Appellant)",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sepulveda",
  "decision_date": "1988-08-30",
  "docket_number": "No. 3\u201487\u20140691",
  "first_page": "132",
  "last_page": "134",
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "jurisdiction": {
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
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      "cite": "61 Ill. App. 3d 323",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:34.473456+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re R.S. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Bernadette Sepulveda, Respondent-Appellant)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe respondent mother, Bernadette Sepulveda, appeals from the court\u2019s order terminating her parental rights to the children R.S. and A.S. The sole issue on appeal is whether the court properly interpreted the relevant statutory ground for finding her \u201cunfit.\u201d We affirm.\nThe mother\u2019s child R.S. was adjudicated dependent on March 19, 1985. The mother\u2019s child A.S. was adjudicated dependent on April 9, 1986. The State\u2019s supplemental petition to terminate the mother\u2019s parental rights to the two children was filed on June 16, 1987. It alleged the mother\u2019s unfitness in the language of subsection (m) of section 1 of the Adoption Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 1501(D)(m)).\nSubsection (m) provides that a court may find \u201cunfitness\u201d for parental rights to a child, based upon: \u201c(m) failure by a parent to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for the removal of the child from such parent, or to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to such parent within 12 months after an adjudication\u201d of neglect or dependency. (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 1501(DXm).\nAt the hearing on the State\u2019s termination petition, over the mother\u2019s objection, the court considered evidence of the mother\u2019s parenting \u201cefforts\u201d and \u201cprogress\u201d during a period which began with the adjudication of R.S.\u2019 and A.S.\u2019 dependency and extended beyond the 12 months following the respective adjudications. The mother argues on appeal, as she unsuccessfully argued to the trial court, that only the 12 months immediately following the relevant adjudication could be considered under subsection (m). We disagree.\nThe language of subsection (m) is ambiguous in defining the role of the designated 12-month period. The statutory language is equally capable of at least two interpretations, including those of the parties. The mother\u2019s view is that a court\u2019s determination of unfitness under that subsection must be based on parenting efforts or progress during the period beginning with the relevant adjudication and ending 12 months thereafter. The State\u2019s view is that at any time at least 12 months after the relevant adjudication, a court may determine unfitness under subsection (m), based upon a parent\u2019s parenting efforts or progress during the entire period between the adjudication and the filing of the termination petition; the length of that period is not limited by the statute. It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that if the statutory language is ambiguous, it must be interpreted to carry out the purpose of the statute. Bilek v. Board of Education (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 323, 377 N.E.2d 1259.\nUnder the Adoption Act, the best interests and welfare of a child to be adopted are the paramount considerations. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 1525.) Furthermore, subsection (m) evidences both the legislature\u2019s recognition of the problem of children removed from their parents but ineligible for adoption and the legislature\u2019s intent to better protect the interests of such children. In re Austin (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 344, 378 N.E.2d 538.\nGiven the nature of the Act generally, and of subsection (m) particularly, we reject the mother's and accept the State\u2019s interpretation of subsection (m). When more than 12 months have passed after an adjudication of a child\u2019s neglect or dependency and the child has not been returned to the parent, if the State alleges a parent\u2019s unfitness under subsection (m), it is clearly in the best interest of the child to consider the parent\u2019s conduct during the entire post-adjudication period. Further, not merely evidence indicating unfitness need be considered; probative evidence favorable to the parent\u2019s progress would also be entitled to consideration.\nFurther, we find support for the State\u2019s interpretation of subsection (m) in the 1977 enactment which shortened subsection (m)\u2019s designated period from 24 months to its current length of 12 months. (Pub. Act 80 \u2014 558, eff. Oct. 1, 1977.) Considering the purpose of the Act, the legislature could not have intended, as the mother would suggest, for that amendment to shorten .the period from which evidence could be considered. Rather, the legislature must have intended to shorten the removed child\u2019s period of uncertainty \u2014 that period during which he is removed from his parent but not eligible for adoption. It accomplished that goal by lessening the time which must pass following the child\u2019s removal, before his parent could be found unfit under subsection (m). (See Austin, 61 Ill. App. 3d at 351.) The designated time period of subsection (m) reflects the rehabilitation period before which unfitness may not be proved under that provision; it does not terminate the period from which evidence may be considered.\nBased on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County.\nAffirmed.\nSTOUDER, P.J., and HEIPLE, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Spencer Lee Daniels, of Peoria, for appellant.",
      "John A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (Edward P. Morrissey, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re R.S. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Bernadette Sepulveda, Respondent-Appellant).\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201487\u20140691\nOpinion filed August 30, 1988.\nSpencer Lee Daniels, of Peoria, for appellant.\nJohn A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (Edward P. Morrissey, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0132-01",
  "first_page_order": 154,
  "last_page_order": 156
}