{
  "id": 3516258,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERNEST T. POTTER, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Potter",
  "decision_date": "1988-08-25",
  "docket_number": "No. 4\u201487\u20140896",
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    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:34.473456+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERNEST T. POTTER, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE LUND\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn 1985, defendant pleaded guilty to home invasion and intimidation in violation of sections 12 \u2014 11 and 12 \u2014 6, respectively, of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 12 \u2014 11, 12\u2014 6). He was sentenced to a 10-year term of imprisonment for home invasion and a four-year term for intimidation, the terms to be served concurrently. In November 1987, defendant sent a letter to the court entitled \u201cPetition for Release from Confinement.\u201d The circuit court of Pike County treated the petition as a petition for post-conviction relief under the authority of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 122 \u2014 1 through 122 \u2014 8). The court found the petition patently without merit and ordered it dismissed. Defendant appeals. We affirm.\nOn appeal, defendant does not question the propriety of the trial court\u2019s ruling that the petition is without merit. Rather, defendant argues the trial court followed the wrong procedure when dismissing the petition. Defendant submitted his petition unverified and without a proper heading. There is some question as to what defendant\u2019s intentions were because the petition he filed does not fit neatly into the box established by the Act. Counsel, on appeal, states in his brief that defendant probably was not \u201ceven aware that there is such a thing as a Post-Conviction Hearing Act, or that his letter might be construed as a petition for relief under that Act.\u201d Therefore, rather than simply dismissing the petition, defendant argues the court should have notified him of its intention to treat the petition as a post-conviction petition, and then the court should have given defendant an opportunity to comply with the technical requirements of the Act. Defendant argues this procedure should be followed because a defendant will normally be allowed to file only one post-conviction petition. (See People v. Free (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 367, 375-76, 522 N.E.2d 1184, 1188.) In effect, defendant argues he should be fully informed of the fact that, barring extraordinary circumstances, he gets one opportunity to identify for the court any constitutional errors that resulted in his incarceration. Where the petition bears no evidence that defendant understood this fact, the trial court should so inform him and give him an opportunity to be sure the petition he is filing is the one he really wants to file.\nWe will not read into the Act an obligation on the part of the courts to educate those seeking relief as to the proper form a petition and supporting documents must take. The current state of the law is to construe the Act liberally, taking into consideration the fact that those submitting petitions are often found to possess a limited education. A pro se post-conviction petition \u201cneed only contain a simple statement which presents the gist of a claim for relief which is meritorious when considered in view of the record of the trial court proceedings.\u201d (People v. Dredge (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 911, 913, 500 N.E.2d 445, 446.) This includes petitions improperly labeled, as well as those inartfully drawn. (See People ex rel. Palmer v. Twomey (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 479, 484, 292 N.E.2d 379, 382.) Defendant\u2019s petition clearly presented a claim sounding in a deprivation of constitutional rights. The substance of the claim was meritless, even though clearly communicated. The trial court had no other avenue to interpret the petition except as a petition for post-conviction relief. Presently, there is no duty on the part of the courts to make sure those filing petitions have read the Act and fully understand the risks inherent in filing a petition for post-conviction relief. We will not create such a duty.\nThe order of the circuit court of Pike County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nKNECHT and SPITZ, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE LUND"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daniel D. Yuhas and David Bergschneider, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.",
      "David B. Shaw, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pittsfield (Kenneth R. Boyle and Robert J. Biderman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERNEST T. POTTER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201487\u20140896\nOpinion filed August 25, 1988.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and David Bergschneider, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nDavid B. Shaw, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pittsfield (Kenneth R. Boyle and Robert J. Biderman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0217-01",
  "first_page_order": 239,
  "last_page_order": 241
}