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      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOMMY NEVITT, Defendant-Appellant."
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    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Tommy Nevitt, was convicted by a jury of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 12\u2014 14(bXl)). The trial court sentenced him to 18 years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant appeals and raises the following contentions: (1) defendant was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict where the State\u2019s evidence failed to corroborate defendant\u2019s confession; (2) defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial where the trial court erroneously showed favoritism toward the prosecution and bias against the defense; (3) defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel where his counsel failed to object to inadmissible evidence and failed to introduce medical evidence to show the victim was not sexually abused; (4) the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument to the jury was unduly prejudicial and denied defendant a fair trial; and (5) the 18-year sentence is excessive.\nFor the reasons stated below, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.\nThe record indicates the following. Pamela testified that she is the mother of the alleged victim, a boy <P-k years old at the time of the alleged incident. On August 27, 1984, around 7:30 a.m., Pamela bathed her son and as part of her daily routine, checked the boy\u2019s body, including his genital area. Pamela found no unusual conditions on the boy\u2019s body. After dressing, the mother and son went to the Accounted Community Day Care Center at 81st Street and Racine Avenue in Chicago, approximately two blocks from their home. The boy had been attending the center for seven to eight months. Pamela took her son to his classroom and gave her son\u2019s hand to his teacher, Tommy Nevitt, the defendant. Pamela identified defendant at trial as that teacher.\nAround 3 p.m. on August 27, 1984, Pamela returned to the day care center to pick up her son. The boy was sitting in the lobby with other children. He was not talking and said nothing to his mother when he saw her. Pamela took her son to her car, and they both got in. The boy said nothing. Pamela testified that her son\u2019s behavior was unusual, since he normally kisses her and talks to her. Instead, the boy was \u201cwithdrawn.\u201d\nWhen they arrived home, Pamela and her son went to the kitchen of their second-floor apartment. The boy sat at the table, and Pamela gave him a cupcake, his usual afternoon snack. Pamela stated that normally, her son \u201cdevour[s]\u201d the cupcake. On that day, however, the boy merely \u201cpicked at\u201d the cupcake. Pamela left the kitchen for about two minutes. When she returned, the boy was still sitting quietly, slowly eating the cupcake. Pamela then asked the boy what was wrong. The boy blurted out, \u201cTeacher Tony, bit my dingdong.\u201d At trial, the prosecutor asked Pamela if she knew someone by the name of \u201cTeacher Tony.\u201d Pamela said the person was her boy\u2019s teacher, Tommy Nevitt. Pamela testified that after the boy made the statement, he demonstrated what he meant by gnawing on the end of the table.\nPamela stated that she then went downstairs to the first-floor apartment where her mother, Doris, lives. Pamela asked her mother to come upstairs. The women went into the kitchen, and Pamela told her mother what had happened. Doris placed the boy on the counter and pulled down his pants to examine him. When Doris touched the boy\u2019s penis, the boy hollered and said, \u201c[I]t\u2019s sore,\u201d and \u201c[0]uch.\u201d Pamela saw a pinkish discoloration around the head of the boy\u2019s penis. Pamela had not seen the discoloration that morning when she bathed the boy.\nPamela telephoned the day care center and asked to speak to Mrs. Mays, the center\u2019s director. Mays was unavailable, and Pamela spoke to Betty Powell. Pamela then walked to the center. She spoke with Powell regarding what happened with her son. Pamela then spoke to Mays. At Mays\u2019 request, Doris and the boy then came to the center. When the three returned home, Pamela called the child abuse hotline. Police officers Radigan and Pancer arrived at Pamela\u2019s home and discussed the alleged incident with Pamela in the presence of the boy and Doris.\nDoris, the alleged victim\u2019s grandmother, testified that on August 27, 1984, her daughter Pamela came to her door, \u201ccrying, very hysterical.\u201d Doris went upstairs with Pamela and went to the kitchen, where Doris saw her grandson. He was sitting at the table, \u201cpinching\u201d a cupcake, being very quiet and keeping his head down. Doris stated that the boy\u2019s behavior was unusual, as normally he would hug and kiss her. After Pamela told Doris what the boy had said, Doris picked up the boy, placed him on the counter, and pulled down his pants. Doris looked at the boy\u2019s genitals. When she touched his penis, the boy said, \u201c[0]uch, sore.\u201d Doris stated that the tip of the boy\u2019s penis was red in an area about the size of a dime. Pamela telephoned the day care center and then went to the center. Around 6 p.m., after Pamela telephoned, Doris took the boy to the center. She and the boy went to Mays\u2019 office, where they saw Mays and Pamela. Mays questioned the boy. After approximately 30 minutes, Doris, Pamela and the boy went home.\nChicago police officer William Radigan testified that on August 27, 1984, he was assigned to investigate a reported sexual abuse case which occurred at the Accounters Center. He and his partner, Officer Pancer, went to the home of the alleged victim. The officers spoke to the boy\u2019s mother, in the presence of the boy and his grandmother. The officers were not able to interview the boy, as he was very quiet and was wringing his hands. The officers took the boy and his mother to the hospital.\nThe next day, August 28, 1984, Radigan and Pancer went to the Accounters Center in an attempt to locate the offender. They obtained the home address and telephone number of defendant and left at the center a card containing their telephone number and address. Later that day, defendant called the officers at the police station. The officers arranged for defendant to come to the station at 10:30 p.m. When defendant failed to arrive, the officers contacted defendant and arranged to meet him at 41st and South Prairie Street and then take him to their office on East 111th Street. The officers and defendant arrived at the station around 11:30 p.m.\nRadigan and Pancer took defendant to an interview room, gave defendant Miranda warnings, and then asked defendant questions regarding the reported abuse. Initially defendant denied the allegations.\nThen defendant confessed that he committed the offense. The police asked defendant to give a written statement, which defendant did. At trial, Radigan read defendant\u2019s written statement into the record as follows:\n\u201cDated: 8/2/84 [sic]. Accounters Community Center, 1155 West 81st. In washroom on first floor, on Monday, August 27th. I took [J.B.] to the washroom and pulled out his penis and began to suck it, perenthesis [sic], [J.B.], age 3.\nI did this on. [sic] my own free will.\u201d\nDefendant signed the statement and Radigan and Pancer witnessed the statement. After obtaining defendant\u2019s statement, the officers telephoned the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Georgia Buglass testified that about 1 a.m. on August 29, 1984, she received a telephone call from Officer Pancer of the Area 2 police station. Buglass proceeded to the station, talked with Officers Pancer and Radigan, then reviewed police reports and the written statement of Tommy Nevitt. Buglass then saw defendant, gave him Miranda warnings, and questioned him regarding the alleged abuse. Buglass wrote down the substance of defendant\u2019s oral statement. Buglass read the statement aloud to defendant. Defendant then signed the statement in the presence of Buglass and Pancer. As Buglass was preparing to leave the room, defendant made another oral statement. Buglass wrote down the second oral statement at the end of the first statement she recorded. She read the second statement to defendant. Defendant signed the statement, and Buglass and Pancer witnessed it. At trial Buglass read defendant\u2019s statements into the record as follows:\n\u201cMy name is Tommy Nevitt. I am employed as a pre-school teacher at Accounters Community Center. And I\u2019ve worked there for two years.\nOn Monday, August 27, 1984, I got to work at about 8:30 a.m. [J.B.] was already there when I got there. And Marcus, a program aide was watching [J.B.], and other \u2014 and the other two kids, girls, got there right after I did. And then, (Celia and Tiffany Adams) [sic] Marcus was the only other aide on duty. And I was in charge.\n10:15 a.m. is snacktime. So, at ten o\u2019clock a.m., I told [J.B.] to come to the washroom with me to wash his hands. The girls were sitting at the table when I took [J.B.] to the boy\u2019s [sic] washroom. And Marcus was watching the girls. I asked [J.B.], if he had to use the toilet, but he said, no, he just had to wash his hands. So, I lifted him up to the sink so he could wash his hands. Then, I pulled his pants down. He laughed. While he stood on the floor, I kneeled down and put his penis in my mouth. I had his penis in my mouth for about one minute, but, I only sucked on it for 30 seconds or so. I didn\u2019t bite his penis, and I didn\u2019t hurt him. I did this to [J.B.], just because I wanted to try something new. I figured it would be safe with him.\nThe police have treated me fine, and no one has threatened me or promised me anything.\u201d\nDefendant signed the statement and Buglass and Pancer witnessed the statement. Below the two signatures, defendant\u2019s second statement appears. Buglass read it into the record as follows:\n\u201cI have never had sex with a male before, but some of my male friends have. I figured it would be safe to try it with [J.B.].\u201d\nDefendant signed this second statement, and Buglass and Pancer witnessed it.\nChicago police officer James Pancer testified that after defendant gave the statement to Buglass, the police asked the alleged victim and his mother to come to the police station. The officers asked the mother and child to go to an interview room that had a two-way glass so that the child would be able to observe defendant. Before the boy was able to look at defendant, however, defendant looked through the glass and stated, \u201c[Tjhere is the boy right there. That\u2019s the one I was with.\u201d\nAt trial the defense attempted to call as its first witness Betty Powell. The State objected and the trial court ruled that Powell would not be allowed to testify since the defense failed to include her name in its answer to the State\u2019s discovery request.\nDefendant then called Mary Mays, who testified that she has been the executive director of the Accounters Center since 1967. She stated that defendant was on vacation from work on August 27, 1984. Mays stated that during the week of August 27, 1984, the center was being cleaned and repaired in preparation for the opening of the school in September. The center normally is open for 65 children; however, during that week, the school was open only for those parents unable to find a service for their children outside the school. There was a \u201cskeleton crew\u201d of employees working at that time. Mays stated that the outer door of the center is left open. In order to enter the inner door, however, a person must be \u201cbuzzed in\u201d by someone inside.\nMays stated that she spoke to Pamela at the center on the afternoon of August 27, 1984. First she spoke to Pamela alone, and then the alleged victim was brought to the center. Mays stated that the child did not appear to be withdrawn. Mays asked Pamela to show her the boy\u2019s penis. Pamela unzipped the boy\u2019s pants and moved the boy\u2019s penis around. Mays stated that the boy did not say \u201couch\u201d or make any other noises, but sat quietly playing with a toy Mays had handed to him.\nOn cross-examination, Mays testified that the name \u201cAccounters\u201d has a religious meaning and that Mays gave theological lectures at the center every Sunday. Mays also was questioned on cross-examination regarding the accounting procedures relating to defendant\u2019s employment at the center.\nHarry Cox testified that he performed maintenance and security work for the Accounters Center. He stated that on August 27, 1984, he arrived at work at 7 a.m., his usual time. The buzzer system on the front door at the center was working on that date. Cox stated that on that day, he and Steve Rogers were painting the hallway and boys\u2019 bathroom, which is located approximately five feet from the front door of the center. Cox stated that there were three or four students, one teacher, and two teacher\u2019s assistants at the school that day.\nCox saw defendant enter the school on August 27, 1984, some time after the children went to sleep. Cox stated that the children ate at 11 a.m. and then slept from 11:30 a.m. until 2:30 p.m. Cox \u201cbuzzed\u201d defendant into the building, and defendant remained at the center for 15 to 20 minutes \u201cat the most.\u201d Cox saw defendant enter the time keeper\u2019s office in the center. Cox did not see defendant enter the washroom, nor did he see defendant with any of the children.\nCarolyn Douglas testified that she was a teacher\u2019s aide at the Ac-counters Center in August 1984. Douglas did not see defendant at the center on August 27, 1984. On that date, the boys\u2019 washroom was being painted. Four children, including the alleged victim, attended the center that day. Douglas worked at the center from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. Douglas took the two girls to the washroom during the day. Marcus Cassell, another Accounters employee, took the two boys and the two girls to the washroom. Douglas stated that other than the time when Cassell took a student out of the classroom to the washroom, the four students were with her. Douglas stated that on August 27, 1984, the alleged victim did not act in an unusual manner.\nDeborah Harvey testified that she is Tommy Nevitt\u2019s girlfriend. Harvey stated that defendant picked her up from Olive Harvey College in Chicago at 1 p.m. on August 27, 1984. Defendant drove her home and was with her until 2 p.m. He left and returned again at 2:45 p.m., and they were together until 10 p.m.\nThe State called several rebuttal witnesses. Pamela and Doris both testified that Mary Mays never examined the boy\u2019s penis. In addition, Loretta Brown, investigator for the Department of Children and Family Services, testified that Mays told her that defendant sometimes is alone with the children when he greets them at the center at 7 a.m.\nI\nDefendant initially contends on appeal that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict where the State failed to prove the corpus delicti. Defendant asserts that the State failed to present competent evidence to corroborate defendant\u2019s confession. Defendant cites People v. Neal (1985), 111 Ill. 2d 180, 194, 489 N.E.2d 845, cert, denied (1986), 476 U.S. 1165, 90 L. Ed. 2d 733, 106 S. Ct. 2292, in which the supreme court held:\n\u201cIn order for a conviction founded on a confession to be upheld, the confession must be corroborated by some evidence, exclusive of the confession, tending to show that a crime did occur and that the defendant committed it.\u201d\nDefendant also cites People v. Calhoun (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 727, 467 N.E.2d 1037, which held that in order to establish both the corpus delicti and the essential trustworthiness necessary to corroborate a confession, there must be some independent evidence (1) tending to prove that an offense occurred; and (2) corroborating the facts contained in the confession.\nDefendant asserts that the only evidence tending to link him to the alleged offense is his own statements consisting of the following: an oral statement to police; a written statement in his own handwriting; an oral statement given to and transcribed by an assistant State\u2019s Attorney; and on oral statement in which defendant allegedly identified the victim through a two-way window as the boy he had been with.\nDefendant asserts that the evidence presented by the State to corroborate the confessions was the testimony of Pamela, which indicated the following: Pamela placed her son in the care of defendant at school on the morning of the incident; the boy told his mother that \u201cTeacher Tony, bit my dingdong\u201d; Pamela knew defendant Tommy Nevitt as Teacher Tony; and Pamela and her mother, Doris, examined the boy\u2019s penis and saw that the end of it was \u201cpinkish\u201d or \u201cred.\u201d\nDefendant asserts that the State\u2019s evidence was insufficient. First, the statement of the boy that \u201cTeacher Tony, bit my dingdong\u201d was hearsay. The trial court admitted the statement of the boy, through the testimony of his mother, as a spontaneous declaration.\nDefendant asserts that the boy\u2019s statement is ambiguous; the term \u201cdingdong\u201d was never defined or explained; and the boy\u2019s statement does not describe an event likely to produce an unreflecting statement. Defendant further asserts that the boy\u2019s statement fails to indicate when the alleged incident occurred. In addition, defendant contends that the statement was a product of his mother\u2019s interrogation and therefore was not spontaneous. Finally, defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to indicate that the boy was upset or shaken by some experience to produce an excited utterance. There is no evidence that the boy complained to Carolyn Douglas or Marcus Cassell, who were in charge of the children at school that day, nor did Douglas testify that the boy acted in an unusual manner.\nIn order for a statement to qualify under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, the following factors must be shown: (1) the occurrence of an event or condition sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) the absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence. (People v. Damen (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 464, 193 N.E.2d 25.) Whether a statement qualifies under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule is a preliminary question to be determined by the trial court. (People v. Grover (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 116, 120, 451 N.E.2d 587.) The trial court\u2019s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Bitler (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 477, 481, 497 N.E.2d 137.\nWe do not find an abuse of discretion in the instant case. The boy\u2019s statement sufficiently met the requirements for qualifying as a spontaneous declaration. First, the boy\u2019s statement describes a sexual act upon him, an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement. While the prosecution failed to present specific evidence which defined the term \u201cdingdong,\u201d a reasonable inference from the statement is that the boy used the term to describe his genitals. The mother\u2019s testimony that she became upset, went downstairs to get her mother, and the two women examined the boy\u2019s genital area indicates that the boy\u2019s statement referred to a sexual act.\nFurther, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that a short period of time passed from the time of the event until the boy made his complaint. The mother indicated that when she gave her son a bath on the morning of the incident, there was no discoloration of the boy's penis; after the boy\u2019s complaint, she and her mother saw that his penis was \u201cpinkish.\u201d Further, Pamela testified that the morning of August 27, 1984, was an uneventful one for her and her son. Her son was acting in a highly unusually way, however, when Pamela picked him up from school that day. The boy did not kiss and greet his mother in his usual way; he was unusually withdrawn and quiet; and he merely \u201cpicked at\u201d his afternoon snack, when normally he would \u201cgobble it down.\u201d Pamela\u2019s testimony regarding the marked change in the boy\u2019s behavior from the morning to the afternoon of August 27, 1984, indicates the occurrence complained of took place on that same day.\nThe evidence also indicates there was an absence of time to fabricate. The boy\u2019s failure to complain to Carolyn Douglas or Marcus Cassell at the center is understandable. The alleged incident occurred at the center, which the boy associated with Douglas and Cassell. The boy did not have an opportunity to leave that setting until his mother picked him up at the end of the school day. Little time passed from the time the boy saw his mother until he made the statement. He and his mother left the center shortly after she arrived, traveled the short distance (two blocks) home, and immediately went upstairs into their apartment. Pamela then gave the boy his snack. She left the room for a very short time and returned to find the boy still had not eaten his cupcake and remained withdrawn. It was at that time that she asked him, \u201cWhat is wrong?\u201d The boy then responded, \u201cTeacher Tony, bit my dingdong.\u201d\nIllinois courts have recognized that a child of tender years is unlikely to fabricate a story of sexual abuse. In People v. Bitter (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 477, 497 N.E.2d 137, the court, citing a Wisconsin case, stated that a very young child will not fabricate such a story for the following reasons: \u201c(1) the child is apt to repress the incident; (2) it is often unlikely the child will discuss such a stressful incident with anyone but the mother; and (3) the characteristics of young children work to produce declarations free of conscious fabrication for a longer period after the incident than adults.\u201d (Bitter, 146 Ill. App. at 481-82, citing State v. Padilla (Wis. App. 1982), 110 Wis. 2d 414, 329 N.W.2d 263.) Further, our supreme court has held that asking a question of the declarant such as \u201cWhat happened?\u201d is insufficient to destroy the spontaneity of the statement. People v. Damen (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 464, 193 N.E.2d 25.\nIn the instant case, we find that Pamela\u2019s question, \u201cWhat is wrong?\u201d similarly was insufficient to destroy the spontaneity of her son\u2019s statement. Further, the boy repressed the statement only until he had the opportunity to talk to his mother regarding the incident. Finally, the statement meets the third requirement of a spontaneous declaration. The statement relates to the circumstances of the event, that is, it describes the sexual act committed upon the boy. Pamela testified that the boy further described the act by \u201cgnawing\u201d on the end of the table.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court applied an incorrect test in determining that the victim\u2019s statement qualified as a spontaneous declaration. Defendant points to the trial court\u2019s statement, \u201cThe underlying fact *** is the age of the victim involved, herein.\u201d While defendant acknowledges that the young age of the boy lessens the likelihood of fabrication, defendant contends that the trial court considered the age of the boy as the determining factor in qualifying as a spontaneous declaration. We disagree. As indicated above, we have found that the boy\u2019s statement clearly came within the requirements of a spontaneous declaration. The trial court\u2019s statement reflects the importance of the child\u2019s age in determining the spontaneity of his statement in view of the nature of the crime involved. (People v. Bitler (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 477, 497 N.E.2d 137.) We find no error.\nIn addition, defendant asserts that, assuming arguendo that the boy\u2019s statement qualifies as a spontaneous declaration and was an excited response to some nefarious activity, the statement should have been excluded since it did not inculpate defendant. Defendant asserts that the only link between the boy\u2019s statement and defendant was Pamela\u2019s' statement that \u201cTeacher Tony\u201d was defendant, Tommy Nevitt. After testifying to the boy\u2019s complaint, Pamela was asked if she knew a person at that time by the name of \u201cTeacher Tony.\u201d She answered yes, and then stated that it was her son\u2019s teacher. Then she pointed to defendant sitting in the courtroom.\nWe find that the prosecution failed to present specific evidence regarding whom the child new as \u201cTeacher Tony.\u201d The evidence does not clearly indicate that the boy knew defendant as \u201cTeacher Tony.\u201d The mother\u2019s testimony indicates that she was aware that \u201cTeacher Tony\u201d was defendant. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor\u2019s question erroneously asked Pamela to comment upon the statement of the alleged victim. Defendant cites, among other cases, People v. Linkogle (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 830, 833, 368 N.E.2d 1075, in which the court held that testimony as to a witness\u2019 opinion is not admissible and that a witness may not testify as to what was meant by another witness\u2019 statement.\nThe question by the prosecutor in the instant case was regarding whom Pamela knew as \u201cTeacher Tony,\u201d rather than whom the boy knew as \u201cTeacher Tony.\u201d Therefore, the question did not come squarely under the facts in Linkogle. Nevertheless, the effect of the question and the response by Pamela likely were to imply to the jury that Pamela\u2019s son knew defendant as \u201cTeacher Tony.\u201d In any event, in asking such a question, the prosecutor should have established a foundation regarding the basis of Pamela\u2019s knowledge that \u201cTeacher Tony\u201d was defendant. The prosecution\u2019s failure to establish such a foundation constitutes error.\nThe State contends that the identity of defendant was not at issue, apparently since defendant\u2019s confessions are in evidence. A confession may generally serve to establish the defendant\u2019s identity, one of the necessary elements to convict. In the instant case, however, the victim used the name \u201cTeacher Tony\u201d in referring to the offender, while defendant\u2019s name was not \u201cTony\u201d but rather was \u201cTommy.\u201d Thus, evidence regarding whom the child knew as \u201cTeacher Tony\u201d would have aided the jury in determining whether defendant \u201cTommy\u201d was the offender whom the child called \u201cTeacher Tony.\u201d\nIn asserting that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant also contends that testimony by Carolyn Douglas and Harry Cox shows that defendant was not present at the center on the morning of August 27,1984.\nIt is the province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. (People v. Heidorn (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 933, 449 N.E.2d 568.) A court of review will not disturb a jury verdict unless it is so unreasonable as to mandate a contrary result. (People v. Camden (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 946, 955, 414 N.E.2d 823.) In the instant case, the evidence also includes the confession of defendant and the testimony of Pamela. That evidence indicates that defendant was present at the center in the morning on August 27, 1984. The jury could reasonably have found that defendant was present at the center on that day.\nDefendant also asserts that the State failed to present medical evidence to corroborate the alleged physical injury to the boy. The State did not call any hospital personnel to testify to the results of the medical examination performed on the boy on August 27, 1984, and the State would not stipulate, at the opening of trial, to the medical records offered by the defense.\nWe find that the absence of medical evidence was not fatal, where the boy complained to his mother and the mother and grandmother testified that the boy\u2019s genitals appeared red or pinkish. Further, the evidence indicated that the boy was taken to the hospital to be examined. Thus, there was some evidence to indicate that the boy had suffered sexual abuse. While the admission of medical records reflecting the results of the hospital examination could have been helpful to a determination regarding the physical harm allegedly suffered by the boy, we cannot say that the absence of such medical records itself warrants a new trial. See People v. Lambert (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 375, 380, 472 N.E.2d 427.\nII\nDefendant next contends that he was denied a fair trial through judicial error where the trial judge displayed favor toward the prosecution and bias against defendant. Defendant asserts that the error was so prejudicial as to constitute reversible error since the evidence in this case was closely balanced.\nFirst, defendant contends that the trial court erroneously \u201cpersonally insinuated himself\u201d into the questioning of police officer Radigan and elicited hearsay testimony from Radigan. During direct examination, the prosecutor asked Radigan regarding his visit to the home of the victim and his mother. The prosecutor asked whether Radigan knew, at the time he went to the victim\u2019s home, the name of the offender the police were seeking. Defense counsel objected, asserting that such information was hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection and stated that Radigan could testify to the fact that he knew the name. The prosecutor resumed questioning and asked Radigan what he proceeded to do after he spoke to the victim. The court then interjected, asking whether Radigan testified to the name of the individual the police were seeking. The prosecutor responded, \u201cNo.\u201d The court then asked Radigan whom the police were looking for, and Radigan responded, \u201cTommy Nevitt.\u201d Defense counsel again objected and the trial court overruled the objection.\nA trial judge may question a witness for the purpose of clarifying testimony. (People v. Godbout (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 356 N.E.2d 865.) The trial court has discretion to question witnesses in order to elicit the truth, although the court may not be an advocate. The correctness of each examination depends on the circumstances of the case. People v. Hopkins (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 260, 194 N.E.2d 213.\nIn the instant case the trial court\u2019s questioning of the police officer was improper. The basis of the officer\u2019s knowledge regarding the identity of defendant was not revealed, and the statement is hearsay. We find that the trial court\u2019s questioning was prejudicial to defendant. (People v. Wells (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 436 N.E.2d 688.) That the question came from the trial court heightened the error.\nWe already have found that the prosecution erroneously failed to' establish a foundation for Pamela\u2019s identification of defendant as \u201cTeacher Tony.\u201d The trial court\u2019s error in questioning Officer Radigan added to the prejudice suffered by defendant at trial. In addition, as discussed below in section IV of this opinion, we find merit in defendant\u2019s assertion that the prosecution\u2019s closing argument was prejudicial. The combination of trial errors committed resulted in manifest prejudice to defendant. Therefore, we are compelled to reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this matter for a new trial. We will address in turn each remaining issue raised by defendant on appeal, although we do not find error on each ground asserted.\nDefendant\u2019s next assertion is that the trial court shifted the burden of proof from the State to defendant at the hearing on defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress his confessions. At the opening of the hearing, the trial court stated, \u201cYou may proceed, this is your motion, Mr. Berman [defense counsel].\u201d Defendant asserts that the trial court also \u201cacted as prosecutor\u201d during the hearing and \u201ctook over\u201d defense counsel\u2019s direct examination of witnesses, asking the witnesses questions tailored to elicit responses damaging to defendant.\nWe disagree. The burden is on the State to prove that a defendant\u2019s confession was voluntary. (People v. Kincaid (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 107, 429 N.E.2d 508, cert, denied (1982), 455 U.S. 1024, 72 L. Ed. 2d 144, 102 S. Ct. 1726.) The trial court may, however, in its discretion, request the defendant to present proof before the State presents its evidence. (People v. Allen (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 200, 498 N.E.2d 838.) In the instant case, while the court requested the defense to present evidence before the State presented evidence, the record fails to indicate that the court shifted the burden of proof from the State to defendant. We find no error or prejudice.\nFurther, we do not find that the trial court acted improperly in asking questions of certain witnesses during the pretrial hearing. The court asked a police officer his opinion regarding the sobriety of defendant at the time of the officer\u2019s interview of defendant. Further, the court asked the assistant State\u2019s attorney who recorded one of defendant\u2019s confessions whether she identified her office for defendant before questioning him. She said she did. The trial court then asked how defendant responded to her identifying herself as an assistant State\u2019s attorney. She stated that defendant understood and still wished to talk to her.\nA trial judge may question witnesses in order to elicit the truth or to clarify ambiguities in the witnesses\u2019 testimony. (People v. Costello (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 680, 420 N.E.2d 592.) The propriety of the court\u2019s questioning depends on the circumstances of each case and rests largely within the discretion of the trial court. (People v. Palmer (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 311, 314, 189 N.E.2d 265; Costello, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 686-87.) This is especially trae where the cause is tried without a jury and the danger of prejudice is lessened. (Palmer, 27 Ill. 2d at 315.) We have reviewed the portions of the record cited by defendant, including those questions described above, and find that the court was acting within its discretion in questioning certain witnesses at the hearing. We do not believe that the court\u2019s questions were improper nor did they show a bias against defendant.\nDefendant also asserts that the trial court conveyed to the jury a negative impression of defense witness Mary Mays, the director of Accounters Community Center. On two occasions during Mays\u2019 testimony at trial, the court ordered that the jury be removed from the courtroom so that it could speak to Mays regarding her \u2018evasive[ness],\u201d her failure to answer questions during cross-examination with a \u201cyes\u201d or \u201cno\u201d answer, and her answering of questions with questions. Defendant asserts that the court showed impatience toward the witness, thereby reducing her composure and affecting how the jury viewed her credibility.\nWe find no error here, as the trial court properly responded to the continued uncooperative behavior of the witness by calling a recess in order to clarify for the witness her function at trial and to admonish the witness regarding her improper responses and questions. The record does not indicate that the court\u2019s admonishments toward the witness were overly critical or were harsh. Further, we believe that any possible prejudice to defendant which may have resulted from the trial court\u2019s admonishments to the witness was very minimal.\nDefendant next asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine Mary Mays extensively and in a derogatory fashion regarding irrelevant and collateral matters, including her religious beliefs, her hiring of an employee other than defendant to work at the center, and tuition subsidies and State audits. We agree with the State that the prosecution\u2019s cross-examination of Mays regarding those matters was proper insofar as they showed Mays\u2019 interest and bias and impeached her credibility as a competent administrator. (People v. Gonzalez (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 332, 337-38, 472 N.E.2d 417.) The questions regarding Mays\u2019 religion related to Mays\u2019 interest in the Accounters Center as a weekly gathering place for her theological lectures. Mays stated that the name \u201cAccounters\u201d had a religious significance. The State also noted that questions regarding the accounting and record-keeping system were relevant in that Mays testified that defendant was on vacation on the day of the alleged incident. An analysis of the employee sign-in procedure was relevant to impeach Mays\u2019 testimony regarding an alibi of defendant. Finally, the questions regarding the method of hiring another employee was relevant to contrast the method utilized for hiring defendant and to impeach the competency of Mays as an administrator and as a witness who was vouching for defendant.\nThe latitude to be allowed in cross-examination of witnesses rests largely within the discretion of the trial court. (People v. Gallo (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 343, 297 N.E.2d 569.) In the instant case we find no abuse of discretion. We do not find that the questions on cross-examination of Mays went beyond the scope of Mays\u2019 direct examination. Further, we note that Mays\u2019 uncooperative behavior, and the necessity of the trial court to admonish the witness on two occasions during cross-examination, contributed to the lengthiness of her testimony.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense to elicit from State witness Pamela, the alleged victim\u2019s mother, testimony that when she took the boy to the hospital on the evening of the alleged incident, hospital personnel found nothing to indicate the boy had been sexually abused. The State responds that the defense\u2019s cross-examination question regarding the results of the hospital examination was improper as it went beyond the scope of direct examination. The State did not ask Pamela on direct examination regarding taking her son to the hospital. We note that there was no objection when, during cross-examination, Pamela was asked whether she took her son to the hospital that day and she responded affirmatively.\nWe believe that the State\u2019s objection to defense counsel\u2019s question regarding the results of the medical examination was properly sustained in that it was attempting to elicit hearsay. Thus, the trial court properly acted within its discretion. (People v. Bristow (1980), 80 Ill. App. 3d 535, 400 N.E.2d 511.) The medical records were not admitted at trial, nor was there any testimony of hospital personnel regarding the type of examination that was conducted or the results of the exam. The mother\u2019s response to defense counsel\u2019s question would be unverifiable hearsay regarding the alleged lack of permanent or other physical injury to the boy.\nFurther, defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow potential defense witness Betty Powell to testify. Defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously relied on the standard that counsel must attest to the credibility of his witness before the witness may testify. Defendant asserts that that standard was laid to rest with the adoption of Supreme Court Rule 238.\nSupreme Court Rule 238 (107 Ill. 2d R. 238) deals with hostile witnesses and the impeachment of one\u2019s own witnesses and does not apply to the issue raised. As noted by the State, defense counsel failed to include the name of Betty Powell in its answer to written discovery prior to trial. The first time that defense counsel notified the court or opposing counsel that he intended to call Powell was on the third day of trial. When questioned by the trial court, defense counsel said that he had just met Powell that third day of trial. Defense counsel stated that Powell would testify that she was at the center on the morning of the alleged incident. The State contended that it was not made aware of what the content of Powell\u2019s testimony would be and it had no opportunity to interview the witness or prepare for a cross-examination of her.\nWe find that defendant\u2019s failure to include Powell\u2019s name as a potential alibi witness in its answers to pretrial discovery violated a direct order of the trial court, entered pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 413(d) (107 Ill. 2d R. 413(d)). Supreme Court Rule 413 (dXi) requires that a defendant disclose prior to trial a list of witnesses he intends to call at trial. (107 Ill. 2d R. 413(d)(i).) Failure to comply with this disclosure requirement subjects a defendant to possible sanctions, including exclusion of the undisclosed witness. (People v. Partee (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 231, 252, 511 N.E.2d 1165, cert, denied (1988), 484 U.S. 1072, 98 L. Ed. 2d 1006, 108 S. Ct. 1043.) Whether or not to impose such a sanction is within the discretion of the trial court. (People v. McKinney (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 591, 596, 453 N.E.2d 926.) We find that under these circumstances, the trial court properly acted within its discretion in precluding defense counsel from calling Powell.\nIll\nDefendant also contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel where his trial counsel failed to object to inadmissible evidence linking defendant to the charge and failed to introduce medical evidence showing that the victim had not been sexually abused. Defendant asserts that the alleged trial errors meet the two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052, adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246, cert, denied (1985), 471 U.S. 1044, 85 L. Ed. 2d 335, 105 S. Ct. 2061. Strickland provides that ineffective assistance of counsel is shown where: (1) the attorney\u2019s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and the shortcomings of counsel were so severe as to deprive defendant of a fair trial; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney\u2019s unprofessional errors, the results of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693,104 S. Ct. at 2064.\nSpecifically, defendant asserts that defense counsel failed to object to Pamela\u2019s testimony regarding her belief that \u25a0 \u201cTeacher Tony\u201d meant defendant, and that defense counsel failed to argue during closing argument that the evidence did not show what the boy meant by \u201cTeacher Tony\u201d or \u201cdingdong.\u201d The record indicates that defense counsel objected to Pamela\u2019s testimony as to the child\u2019s statement, \u201cTeacher Tony, bit my dingdong,\u201d on the grounds that it was hearsay. Defense counsel, however, apparently failed to object on the ground of a lack of basis to the mother\u2019s identification of defendant as \u201cTeacher Tony\u201d or regarding the boy\u2019s definition of \u201cdingdong.\u201d\nAs stated earlier, we believe that the evidence supports a reasonable inference that the boy was referring to his genitals when he used the term \u201cdingdong.\u201d Regarding the use of the term \u201cTeacher Tony,\u201d defense counsel did object to the question by the prosecution, but on a different ground than defendant suggests on appeal. We do not believe that defense counsel\u2019s conduct was so unreasonable as to fall within the scope of Strickland.\nFurther, defendant asserts that defense counsel failed to argue during closing argument that the evidence failed to show what the boy meant by \u201cdingdong\u201d and \u201cTeacher Tony.\u201d We do not believe that but for counsel\u2019s failure to object or to argue this point during closing argument that the results of defendant\u2019s trial would be different. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.\nDefendant also asserts that defense counsel failed to object when the court questioned Officer Radigan in the presence of the jury regarding Radigan\u2019s statement that defendant had been identified as the offender. We find no merit in defendant\u2019s assertion. The record indicates that defense counsel did object to the court\u2019s question.\nDefendant also asserts that defense counsel failed to object to the State\u2019s closing argument that the school authorities must have told police that \u201cTeacher Tony\u201d was defendant. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated that \u201ccommon sense\u201d would lead the jury to the conclusion that the employees at the Center identified defendant as the offender. On appeal defendant contends that the evidence indicates that at the Accounters Center the police asked only for the address and telephone number of Tommy Nevitt, and that it is the only information given to them at the time.\nWe agree with defendant that the evidence failed to indicate that the employees of the Accounters Center identified defendant as \u201cTeacher Tony.\u201d We do not believe, however, that but for defense counsel\u2019s failure to object to the prosecutor\u2019s statement in closing argument that the results of the trial would have been different.\nDefendant also contends that defense counsel failed to introduce medical testimony that the alleged victim was examined at the hospital and no sign of trauma to his genitals was found. Defense counsel failed to attempt to obtain medical testimony until after the trial began. Further, defendant asserts, the State would not stipulate at that time to the medical records. Defendant also contends that his trial counsel failed to argue at the close of trial that the boy was examined at the hospital and the State failed to present evidence of the results of the examination. Further, defendant asserts that since defense counsel subpoenaed the hospital records and record keeper to trial indicates that counsel was aware of the helpfulness of the records to defendant. However, defendant argues, his counsel apparently was unaware of the statute which precludes the admission of such medical records into evidence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 5(c)(1)).\nAs stated earlier, we do not find that the absence of medical records was fatal to defendant\u2019s case. Therefore, we cannot say that the results of the proceeding would have been different but for defense counsel\u2019s failure to make those arguments.\nFurther, defendant contends that defense counsel apparently was unaware, during the pretrial hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his confession, that the burdens of going forward with evidence and proving the voluntariness of a confession were on the State. As we have found that the burden of proving the voluntariness of the confession never shifted from the State in this matter, and that the trial court acted within its discretion in requesting the defense to present evidence before the State presented evidence, we find no merit in defendant\u2019s argument.\nDefendant also contends that his trial counsel failed to ask the court to instruct the jury that defendant could not be found guilty on the basis of his confessions alone, but that the State must prove by independent evidence that the crime occurred and that defendant committed it.\nDefense counsel\u2019s tendering such an instruction for the jury\u2019s use . would have resulted in a useful clarification of the law regarding this issue. As the function of jury instructions is to convey to the jury the principles of law applicable to the charge and the evidence (People v. Peebles (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 213, 465 N.E.2d 539), such an instruction should, in all reasonableness, have been given to the jury. We do not find, however, in view of the other evidence the State presented which corroborated the confession, that the second part of the Strickland test, namely, that but for counsel\u2019s conduct or omission the results of trial would have been different, is met.\nDefendant also contends that his trial counsel failed to elicit from Pamela what time she arrived at school with her son. Defendant asserts that the evidence is contradictory, in that Pamela testified that defendant already was at school when she and her son arrived, while defendant\u2019s confession to the assistant State\u2019s Attorney indicates that the boy was already at school when defendant arrived.\nWe do not find that defense counsel\u2019s failure to point out this inconsistency between the testimony of a State\u2019s witness and defendant\u2019s confession itself resulted in an unfair trial for defendant. The effect of such conduct by defense counsel would have been to highlight for the jury the inconsistency and urge the jury to consider it carefully in determining the weight to be given to each statement and the credibility of each person. The jury was instructed that it was to judge the credibility of witnesses and to determine the credibility and weight of defendant\u2019s confession. In view of such instructions, we cannot say that the results of defendant\u2019s trial would have been different but for defense counsel\u2019s failure to attempt to impeach Pamela\u2019s testimony.\nDefendant also asserts that counsel failed to call Marcus Cassell, one of the employees of the center who was in charge of the children on August 27, 1984. Defense counsel had obtained an affidavit from Cassell and listed him as a potential alibi witness in its answer to discovery.\nAs the State points out, the decision whether or not to call a witness generally is a question of trial strategy and therefore is not reviewable on appeal. (People v. Wright (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 18, 488 N.E.2d 973.) We find no grounds here to look to an exception to that rule. Cassell\u2019s affidavit indicates that Cassell was with the victim from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. on August 27, 1984, and that defendant was not present during that time. Cassell said the only time that the boy was out of his sight was when Cassell accompanied him to the washroom, when Cassell waited outside for him and returned him to his cot. While Cassell might have been a helpful alibi witness, we cannot say that defense counsel\u2019s failure to call him to testify changed the result of defendant\u2019s trial.\nCassell\u2019s affidavit may contradict the testimony of Carolyn Douglas, who also was in charge of the children at the center that day. Douglas testified that she took both boys and girls to the washroom and may have taken the victim to the washroom on that day. In view of the circumstances, we do not find that counsel\u2019s failure to call Cassell was so unreasonable as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, nor that the failure changed the result of the trial. People v. Wright (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 18, 488 N.E.2d 973.\nFurther, defendant contends that defense counsel failed to provide the State the name of defense witness Betty Powell until the third day of trial. The record indicates that defense counsel never saw Powell at the center when he was investigating the case, but met her for the first time in the hallway after the trial began. Whether defense counsel\u2019s failure to meet and interview Powell prior to that time was the result of an unreasonable failure by defense counsel to obtain the identity of potential witnesses or not is unclear from the record.\nDefense counsel indicated at trial that Powell would testify that she was at the center during the morning of August 27, 1984, what time she arrived at the center, and what she was doing there. Defense counsel failed to indicate, however, that Powell\u2019s testimony would exonerate defendant. The failure of counsel to obtain the identity of and to interview Powell prior to trial, therefore, was not so unreasonable as to deny defendant a fair trial, nor would the results of trial have been different but for counsel\u2019s failure to call Powell to testify. People v. Wright (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 18, 488 N.E.2d 973.\nFinally, defendant asserts that counsel failed to attempt to amend the defense\u2019s answer to discovery with the name of Renee Dishman until after the jury was sworn. The court granted the State\u2019s motion to exclude Dishman as a witness. Defense counsel failed to make an offer of proof regarding the substance of Dishman\u2019s testimony.\nDefendant has failed to indicate in what way the results of the trial would have been different but for counsel\u2019s failure to amend the discovery answer to include the name of Dishman and what effect Dishman\u2019s testimony would have on the trial. Absent such an indication, we do not find merit in defendant\u2019s argument. People v. Wright (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 18, 488 N.E.2d 973.\nIV\nDefendant also contends that he was denied a fair trial where the State\u2019s closing argument was improper and prejudicial. Defendant cites People v. Guyon (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 522,. 453 N.E.2d 849, in which the court held that a prosecutor\u2019s comments in closing argument may constitute reversible error where the comments relate to matters not properly in evidence and pertinent to the issues in the case.\nSpecifically, defendant asserts that the prosecutor \u201cmanufactur[ed] evidence\u201d when he stated that the victim\u2019s mother took the boy to school and handed him over to his teacher, who was Teacher Tony, also known as Tommy Nevitt. Further, the prosecutor asserted, without support in the record, that the employees of Accounters Community Center apparently gave the name of defendant to police when the police arrived at the center to investigate the reported incident.\nImproper remarks in argument of counsel do not constitute reversible error unless they result in substantial prejudice to defendant. (People v. Pittman (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 169, 442 N.E.2d 836.) We find that the comments referenced above, in addition to other trial errors committed, resulted in substantial prejudice to defendant and therefore constitute reversible error. The prosecutor\u2019s comment, \u201cTeacher Tony, also known as Tommy Nevitt,\u201d was based on the testimony of Pamela that she knew \u201cTeacher Tony\u201d to be defendant, Tommy Nevitt. As we have held, however, the prosecution failed to establish the basis of Pamela\u2019s knowledge of \u201cTeacher Tony\u201d as defendant or to show that the victim knew defendant as \u201cTeacher Tony.\u201d The prosecutor\u2019s comment during closing argument, therefore, was not well supported by the evidence. (People v. Holman (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 133, 469 N.E.2d 119, cert, denied (1985), 469 U.S. 1220, 84 L. Ed. 2d 347, 105 S. Ct. 1204.) Further, there is no specific evidence in the record supporting the prosecutor\u2019s comment that the employees of the center probably gave police information that defendant was known as \u201cTeacher Tony.\u201d\nDefendant also asserts that the State improperly referred to defendant\u2019s failure to provide an alibi stating where he was on the morning of August 27, 1984. At trial, defense counsel objected, asserting that defendant had no burden of proof. The trial court overruled the objection, stating that there was no question that defendant need not prove his innocence and that the prosecutor\u2019s comment was a reasonable inference from the evidence.\nWe find that the prosecutor\u2019s comment constituted error. (People v. Eddington (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 745, 776-77, 473 N.E.2d 103, 125.) The comment was fairly lengthy, approximately D/s pages long in the transcript. We agree with the trial judge that the prosecutor\u2019s comment did not indicate that the burden was on defendant to prove his innocence. However, the prosecutor stated that it seemed \u201cstrange\u201d that defendant would not call any witnesses to testify regarding where he was that morning. We do not believe that the trial court\u2019s instructions or comments to the jury regarding the burden of proof in the case served to cure the error resulting from the improper comment regarding defendant\u2019s failure to present alibi witnesses. See Eddington, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 777.\nFurther, defendant asserts that the prosecutor erroneously told the jury that no one from the school told police that defendant was on vacation. The testimony of Mary Mays was unclear in that she stated that she told police that defendant was on vacation during the week that the alleged incident occurred. Then she stated that she \u201cmight have used the term vacation,\u201d and merely stated that defendant did not work that week.\nHowever, since Mays\u2019 testimony seemed to indicate that she did tell police that defendant was on vacation that week, the prosecutor\u2019s comment that no one told the police that defendant was on vacation was improper. This comment contributed to the reversible error committed at trial.\nFinally, defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly alluded to Mays\u2019 religious beliefs and stated that Mays \u201cis going to be accountable *** for what condition that place [the center] is in.\u201d The comment regarding Mays\u2019 being accountable clearly was improper, as May\u2019s accountability regarding the center was not at issue in the instant case. This comment also contributed to the reversible error committed in this case.\nV\nFinally, defendant asserts that the sentence of 18 years, while within the statutory range of 6 to 30 years (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(3)), is excessive in view of his lack of a criminal record, his young age, and his potential for rehabilitation.\nWe need not address defendant\u2019s issue regarding sentencing, however, since we are reversing the judgment of the circuit court and ordering a new trial.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.\nJudgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.\nWHITE, P.J., and RIZZI, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mary Ellen Dienes, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth T. McCurry, Anthony J. Carballo, and Catharine M. Forest, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOMMY NEVITT, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 86\u20141993\nOpinion filed August 24, 1988.\nMary Ellen Dienes, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth T. McCurry, Anthony J. Carballo, and Catharine M. Forest, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0326-01",
  "first_page_order": 348,
  "last_page_order": 372
}