{
  "id": 3516909,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAMUEL T. COOPER, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cooper",
  "decision_date": "1988-09-12",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:34.473456+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAMUEL T. COOPER, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE WOODWARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Samuel Cooper, appeals the judgment of the circuit court continuing the statutory summary suspension of his driver\u2019s license. Defendant contends that the court erred in finding that the notice of suspension given to defendant by the arresting officer was facially valid and in refusing to stay the suspension pending final disposition.\nDefendant was arrested at approximately 11 p.m. on April 11, 1987, and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95x/2, par. 11 \u2014 501). Defendant' agreed to submit to a breathalyzer test. The breathalyzer readout ticket indicated that defendant took the test at 1:11 a.m. on April 12, 1987, and that he had a blood-alcohol content of .16.\nAt some point during the course of defendant\u2019s arrest and detention, he was given a notice of statutory summary suspension of his driver\u2019s license as required by statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(f)). The officer also submitted a sworn report to the Secretary of State\u2019s office and the clerk of the circuit court. The notice is signed by the arresting officer and dated April 12, 1987, at 12:30 a.m. The sworn report, however, indicates that the notice of summary suspension was given to defendant on April 11, 1987. The sworn report states:\n\u201cBecause you submitted to testing conducted pursuant to Section 11 \u2014 501.2, which disclosed an alcohol concentration of .16 which is 0.10 or more, your driver\u2019s license and/or privileges will be suspended for a minimum of 3 months.\u201d\nThe report indicates that the test was administered April 12, 1987. The report is signed by the arresting officer and dated April 12, 1987. Defendant received notice from the Secretary of State indicating that the suspension would begin May 27, 1987.\nDefendant points out that the report states that the basis for the summary suspension was his failure of the breathalyzer test. Defendant also notes that the officer\u2019s sworn report indicates that defendant received a notice of suspension before he took the breath test and is therefore facially invalid. The State responds that the discrepancy is clearly a scrivener\u2019s error, which can be corrected pursuant to People v. Badoud (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 50. The State contends that since the defendant\u2019s arrest and detention began late in the evening of April 11 and carried over into the early morning hours of April 12, it is clear that the officer simply became confused about the exact sequence of events and wrote the wrong date in the blank for the date of notice.\nIn Badoud, the supreme court held that the failure of the arresting officer to swear to the report was a formal defect which could be cured anytime up to and including the date of the suspension hearing. (Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d at 60-61.) The problem with the State\u2019s reliance on Badoud is that the Badoud court expressly contemplated that the formal error would be corrected at some point. (Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d at 61.) In the instant case, the State has never attempted to amend the report to correct the alleged scrivener\u2019s error.\nA statutory summary suspension hearing is intended to be an expedient procedure to remove from the road the menace of those charged with drunk driving. Such a hearing is sui generis, although the rules of civil procedure generally apply. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951/2, par. 2 \u2014 118.1(b).) The officer\u2019s sworn report plays a unique role in this proceeding. It is similar to a complaint in a civil case, the jurisdictional step which starts the proceeding. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951/2, pars. 2 \u2014 118.1(a), 11 \u2014 501.1(f); see also People v. Martin (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 472, 474.) It may also constitute the evidence in the case, as the statute provides that the hearing may be conducted solely upon the sworn report. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95%, par. 2\u2014 118.1(b).) We have repeatedly held that the defendant has the burden of proof in a summary suspension hearing. (See, e.g., People v. Kurtz (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1070; People v. Martin (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 472, 474.) These holdings assume, however, that the sworn report establishes on its face the validity of the suspension. In the instant case, the report shows on its face that notice of the suspension was given before defendant completed the breathalyzer test. The notice defendant received from the Secretary of State\u2019s office stated that the suspension would begin 46 days from April 11, rather than April 12, when the breath test was administered. Since the sworn report is mandatory in order for the suspension to take effect, we must reverse the judgment of the circuit court continuing the suspension and remand the cause to that court.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court should have granted his request to stay the summary suspension pending final disposition. Defendant concedes that section 2 \u2014 118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code \u201cappears to be\u201d an absolute prohibition of any stay of the summary suspension. This issue is moot. Although the parties agree that the main issue of the rescission of the summary suspension is not moot, since such a suspension may have collateral consequences, it is clear that the decision to stay the suspension pending appeal can have no such collateral effect. However, we note that this court recently reaffirmed that the trial court is without authority to stay the suspension. (People v. Cronin (1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 911, 914.) Although defendant asserts that the no-stay provision is a violation of due process, he cites no authority for this conclusion and has therefore waived it. 113 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court continuing the statutory suspension of defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nLINDBERG, P.J., and UNVERZAGT, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE WOODWARD"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gordon F. DeHart, of Aurora, for appellant.",
      "Robert F. Casey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (William L. Browers and David A. Bernhard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAMUEL T. COOPER, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201487\u20140673\nOpinion filed September 12, 1988.\nGordon F. DeHart, of Aurora, for appellant.\nRobert F. Casey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (William L. Browers and David A. Bernhard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0500-01",
  "first_page_order": 522,
  "last_page_order": 525
}