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    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES THURMAN JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE SPITZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn October 22, 1987, defendant James Thurman Johnson was charged by information in the circuit court of Macon County with the offense of \u201cunlawful possession of hypodermic syringe or needle with a prior unlawful possession of hypodermic syringe or needle conviction\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 22 \u2014 50).\nDefendant was tried in absentia by a jury on January 25, 1988. Prior to trial, defense counsel made a motion in limine to bar evidence of the defendant\u2019s prior conviction for unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe. A hearing was held and the defense argued that the prior conviction was not an element of the offense but only a factor in sentencing. After hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion and the trial commenced. In reading the statement of the nature of the case and the allegations contained in the information to the jury, the trial court twice mentioned the defendant\u2019s prior conviction. Then during opening statements, the State asserted that it would present a certified copy of the defendant\u2019s 1982 conviction for unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe.\nIn its case in chief, the State called Yvonne Stuart, an emergency room orthopedic technician at St Mary\u2019s Hospital in Decatur, Illinois. Stuart testified that the defendant was admitted to the emergency room on August 29, 1987, with a large laceration on his neck and a small laceration behind his ear. The defendant was bleeding \u201cprofusely,\u201d was crying, and was very upset, confused, and hostile toward the nurses and doctors. It became necessary for the emergency room staff to remove the defendant\u2019s clothing in order to prepare him for emergency surgery. As Stuart removed the defendant\u2019s pants, she observed the top of a hypodermic syringe \u201csticking out\u201d of his pants pocket. Stuart removed the syringe and gave it to another emergency room nurse. Stuart identified the defendant from a photograph and identified the syringe and needle in court.\nOver defense counsel\u2019s objection on grounds of relevance, Stuart was allowed to testify that she observed several scarred areas on the defendant\u2019s arms which she referred to as \u201ctrack marks.\u201d Also over defense counsel\u2019s objection to Stuart\u2019s competence to render an opinion, Stuart was permitted to state what she meant by the term \u201ctrack mark.\u201d She indicated that \u201ctrack marks is a slang term used which means that the patient has been *** a user.\u201d When asked by the prosecutor if she meant a user of a hypodermic syringe or needle, Stuart responded: \u201cYes.\u201d Stuart also testified that she had seen the defendant on prior occasions during her employment at the hospital and that to her knowledge he did not have diabetes or any other medical condition that would require the lawful use of a hypodermic syringe.\nThe chain of evidence allowing the admission of the hypodermic syringe was established by two nurses and a police officer. Over defense counsel\u2019s objection, a certified copy of the judgment of conviction of a James T. Johnson, convicted in 1982 of the offense of unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe (People\u2019s exhibit No. 3), was admitted into evidence. Prior to the closing of the State\u2019s case, the trial court informed the jury of the contents of this exhibit as follows:\n\u201cExhibit No. 3 is a matter of a record that was presented in Cause No. 82 \u2014 CF\u2014474, People versus James T. Johnson, wherein the defendant, James T. Johnson, on December 9, 1982, in the Circuit Court of Macon County, was convicted *** of the offense of unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe or needle. On October 20, 1982, James T. Johnson stated in open court that his age was twenty-seven years at that time. That means we have completed the People\u2019s evidence.\u201d\nIn the State\u2019s closing argument, the prosecutor argued over defense objection that the defendant had track marks on his arms. The prosecutor further argued that \u201ctrack marks\u201d are made by injecting one\u2019s self with a hypodermic syringe and needle and stated, \u201cobviously you can draw the inferences from that that he knowingly possessed the hypodermic syringe that was found in his pocket.\u201d The prosecution also argued over defense objection:\n\u201cThe question is, whether he possessed that hypodermic syringe or needle or did he not possess it. I submit to you the evidence is uncontradicted, undisputed that, in fact, he did, and that he has a prior conviction for a like offense, unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe or needle. So, I\u2019d ask you, please, to use your common sense.\u201d\nDuring the jury instruction conference, defense counsel objected to any instructions which mentioned the defendant\u2019s prior conviction. This objection was overruled, and the trial court instructed the jury that an element of the offense was that the defendant had been previously convicted of unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe or needle. Following deliberations, the jury found the defendant guilty of unlawful possession of hypodermic syringe or needle with a prior conviction for unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe or needle. The trial court then entered judgment on the verdict.\nOn February 10, 1988, the defense filed a post-trial motion alleging, inter alia, that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant\u2019s prior conviction and in allowing testimony as to the \u201ctrack marks\u201d on his arms. A hearing was held that same day and the defendant failed to appear. After hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion. A sentencing hearing immediately followed, after which the defendant was sentenced to a term of three years\u2019 incarceration in the Illinois Department of Corrections, with credit for time served. This appeal followed.\nDefendant\u2019s first contention is that his prior conviction was not an element of the charged offense, but rather was a matter to be considered only in sentencing and therefore his conviction must be reversed. We disagree.\nThe defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe with a prior unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe conviction. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 22 \u2014 50, 22 \u2014 53.) At trial, the State introduced evidence of defendant\u2019s prior conviction in order to change the nature of the charged offense from a misdemeanor to a felony pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of \u201cAn Act to regulate the possession, delivery, sale or exchange of hypodermic syringes ***\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 22 \u2014 53). The introduction of the prior conviction at trial was proper as it was an element of the felony offense and had to be proved prior to a finding of guilt or innocence. Relying upon our supreme court\u2019s decision in People v. Palmer (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 340, 472 N.E.2d 795, we have held that when proof of a previous conviction for an offense will change a future violation of the law from a misdemeanor to a felony, the underlying conviction is an element of the felony offense. People v. Leckner (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 314, 500 N.E.2d 721; People v. Rice (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 285, 484 N.E.2d 514.\nThe defendant argues that the supreme court\u2019s decision in Palmer should not apply to this case but should be limited to interpreting unlawful use of weapons cases. This argument lacks merit. It is true that Palmer involved the offense of unlawful use of weapons; however, Illinois courts have applied the rule in Palmer to a number of other offenses. (See People v. Hicks (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 29, 518 N.E.2d 148 (theft); People v. Leckner (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 314, 500 N.E.2d 721 (deceptive practices); People v. Smith (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 739, 516 N.E.2d 335 (driving while license was revoked).) We believe the rule in Palmer applies in the instant case as well and the defendant has offered no principled reason why it should not.\nTherefore, we follow Palmer in holding that a prior conviction for unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe is an element of the offense of unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe when the nature of that offense has been changed from a misdemeanor to a felony due to a prior conviction. Furthermore, the previous conviction must be proved before the trier of fact prior to a finding of guilt or innocence. Consequently, the trial court in the case at bar did not err in allowing the State to present evidence of defendant\u2019s prior conviction to the jury as an element of the charged offense.\nIn so holding, we are unpersuaded by the defendant\u2019s contention that the amendment to the theft statute mandates a contrary result. This amendment, effective January 1, 1988 (Pub. Act 85 \u2014 691 (1987 Ill. Laws 2895, 2897-98)), has been interpreted by the supreme court as changing the law relating to theft \u201cto provide that a prior conviction must be alleged in the information or indictment but the prior conviction will not be considered an element of the offense of felony theft and therefore may not be disclosed to the jury during trial.\u201d (People v. Hicks (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 29, 34, 518 N.E.2d 148, 150.) However, no such change has been made in the statutes relating to unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe. Accordingly, Palmer and the other cases discussed above control here.\nThe defendant\u2019s remaining contention is that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the State, over defense counsel\u2019s objections, to elicit testimony from a prosecution witness concerning her observations of the defendant\u2019s \u201ctrack marks\u201d and the meaning of that term. The defendant argues that this testimony concerned unrelated criminal activity and was therefore inadmissible. The State contends that, this evidence was proffered to establish the defendant\u2019s requisite knowledge of his possession of the syringe and to dispel the argument that the syringe was placed on the person of the defendant by someone else.\nGenerally, evidence of other crimes is inadmissible if relevant merely to establish the defendant\u2019s propensity to commit crime. (People v. McKibbins (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821, cert, denied (1983), 464 U.S. 844, 78 L. Ed. 2d 136, 104 S. Ct. 145; People v. Lindgren (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 129, 402 N.E.2d 238.) Such evidence is admissible, however, when it is relevant to prove modus operandi, intent, identity, motive, or absence of mistake. (People v. Baptist (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 19, 389 N.E.2d 1200.) Moreover, the supreme court has held that evidence of other offenses is admissible if it is relevant for any purpose other than to show the propensity to commit crime. People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 448, 343 N.E.2d 489.\nIn order to sustain a conviction for unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 22 \u2014 50), the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the syringe and was in immediate and exclusive control of it. (People v. Washington (1974), 17 Ill. App. 3d 383, 308 N.E.2d 339; People v. Bolden (1968), 96 Ill. App. 2d 129, 237 N.E.2d 748.) In the instant case, the evidence concerning the \u201ctrack marks\u201d on the defendant\u2019s arms was properly admitted to show the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the syringe. It was also relevant to show that he did not have a medical condition or legitimate reason for his possession of the syringe.\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Macon County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH and LUND, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE SPITZ"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daniel D. Yuhas and Gloria A. Carroll, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.",
      "Jeffrey K. Davison, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Michael K. Blazicek, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES THURMAN JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201488\u20140185\nOpinion filed September 22, 1988.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Gloria A. Carroll, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJeffrey K. Davison, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Michael K. Blazicek, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0726-01",
  "first_page_order": 748,
  "last_page_order": 753
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