{
  "id": 3515003,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JODI L. JOINER, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Joiner",
  "decision_date": "1988-09-26",
  "docket_number": "No. 3-87-0487",
  "first_page": "927",
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  "citations": [
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 406",
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    {
      "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:34.473456+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JODI L. JOINER, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals the rescission of the statutory summary suspension of the driver\u2019s license of the defendant, Jodi L. Joiner. We reverse.\nInitially, we note that the defendant failed to file a brief. However, we choose to decide the merits of this appeal. First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493.\nOn May 3, 1987, the defendant was issued a uniform traffic citation charging her with driving under the influence of alcohol. The defendant subsequently took a breathalyzer examination which disclosed a blood-alcohol concentration of .10. On May 12, 1987, the defendant was notified that her driver\u2019s license would be suspended for three months, effective June 18,1987.\nOn May 19, 1987, the defendant filed a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of her license. The petition was scheduled for a hearing on June 11, 1987. On June 1, 1987, the defendant filed a motion for substitution of judge. The motion was granted on June 9, 1987. The cause was assigned to Judge Fred Wagner. On June 12, 1987, the defendant filed notice calling for a hearing before Judge Wagner on the petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. After several continuances, the petition hearing was held on June 24, 1987. At the hearing, the judge granted the petition because more than 30 days had elapsed from the filing of the petition to rescind, in violation of section 2 \u2014 118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951/2, par. 2 \u2014 118.1(b)).\nOn appeal, the State argues that the trial court erroneously granted the defendant\u2019s petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. We agree.\nSection 2 \u2014 118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) in relevant part provides that when a person receives notice of the statutory summary suspension of her driver\u2019s license pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95x/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1), she may request a hearing to rescind the statutory summary suspension (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95x/2, par. 2 \u2014 118.1(b)). According to section 2 \u2014 118.1(b), the hearing is to be held within 30 days of the filing of the request or the first appearance on the driving under the influence charge. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95x/2, par. 2 \u2014 118.1(b).) When a defendant files a petition to rescind statutory summary suspension of her driver\u2019s license, the burden of proceeding and the burden of proof is on the defendant. People v. Brandt (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 406; In re Trainor (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 918, 510 N.E.2d 614.\nIn Trainor, the Fourth District was presented with a situation similar to that confronting the court here. The defendant Trainor filed a request for a summary suspension rescission hearing. Before 30 days had elapsed from the filing of the request, the defendant filed a motion for substitution of judge. The motion was granted. Still within the 30-day limit, the defendant requested from the new judge a date for the rescission hearing. Two weeks after the expiration of the 30-day period, the defendant filed a motion to rescind suspension for lack of a timely hearing. The motion was denied.\nOn appeal, the Fourth District initially held that the 30-day time limit set forth in section 2 \u2014 118.1 is mandatory. The court explained that because failure to hold a hearing within the required 30 days violates a driver\u2019s due process, the only appropriate remedy is rescission of the suspension. The Trainor court then held that where a driver requests a change of judge, the 30 days would not start running until the new judge is furnished with a request of hearing.\nThe reasoning and holding in Trainor is applicable to the case at bar. We find that the 30-day time period prescribed in section 2\u2014 118.1(b) did not begin to run until the newly assigned judge received the defendant\u2019s request for a hearing on her petition for rescission. The judge received that request on June 12, 1987. The hearing on that petition was held on June 24, well within 30 days of its request. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling rescinding the defendant\u2019s statutory summary suspension of her license for failure to hold a rescission petition hearing within 30 days. We remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nHEIPLE and WOMBACHER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gary L. Peterlin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Ottawa (William L. Browers and Dale M. Wood, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.",
      "Jodi L. Joiner, of Joliet, appellee pro se."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JODI L. JOINER, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3-87-0487\nOpinion filed September 26, 1988.\nGary L. Peterlin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Ottawa (William L. Browers and Dale M. Wood, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nJodi L. Joiner, of Joliet, appellee pro se."
  },
  "file_name": "0927-01",
  "first_page_order": 949,
  "last_page_order": 951
}