{ "id": 3516407, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRYL REID, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Reid", "decision_date": "1988-08-03", "docket_number": "No. 85\u20142582", "first_page": "1009", "last_page": "1022", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 1009" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "101 S. Ct. 59", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 L. Ed. 2d 14", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 811", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11719968, 11719936, 11720160, 11720292, 11720006, 11720073, 11720117, 11719897 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0811-03", "/us/449/0811-02", "/us/449/0811-07", "/us/449/0811-08", "/us/449/0811-04", "/us/449/0811-05", "/us/449/0811-06", "/us/449/0811-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070652 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 1310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3563775 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 S. Ct. 1726", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 L. Ed. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 1024", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11381769, 11382028, 11382157, 11381712, 11381585, 11381650, 11381876, 11382100, 11381975, 11381822, 11381503 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/1024-05", "/us/455/1024-09", "/us/455/1024-11", "/us/455/1024-04", "/us/455/1024-02", "/us/455/1024-03", "/us/455/1024-07", "/us/455/1024-10", "/us/455/1024-08", "/us/455/1024-06", "/us/455/1024-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 508", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3031402 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 411", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 L. Ed. 2d 287", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 927", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6431553, 6431714, 6432426, 6432203, 6432076, 6432528, 6432753, 6432854, 6431959, 6432633, 6431835, 6432956, 6432317 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0927-01", "/us/434/0927-02", "/us/434/0927-08", "/us/434/0927-06", "/us/434/0927-05", "/us/434/0927-09", "/us/434/0927-11", "/us/434/0927-12", "/us/434/0927-04", "/us/434/0927-10", "/us/434/0927-03", "/us/434/0927-13", "/us/434/0927-07" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 56", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811436 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8-9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 N.E.2d 718", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 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App. 3d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3642754 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 N.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3358125 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 N.E.2d 1192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3134988 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S. Ct. 249", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 872", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6419368, 6418891, 6419473, 6419122, 6419253, 6419002 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/0872-05", "/us/479/0872-01", "/us/479/0872-06", "/us/479/0872-03", "/us/479/0872-04", "/us/479/0872-02" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 949", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126394 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 N.E.2d 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542309 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2991135 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3400400 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 N.E.2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3205263 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 N.E.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 837", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5535610 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 N.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 771", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2965450 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0771-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 N.E.2d 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404489 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.E.2d 1214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2975074 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 287", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3563701 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 N.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982839 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 1310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3563775 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 1093", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5501895 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/1093-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 N.E.2d 1313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 1135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3103049 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/99/1135-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1223, "char_count": 32541, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.340644678726283e-08, "percentile": 0.440396138925474 }, "sha256": "9b87f4451a083cb6ca08d362e172cdba907efb708bfbbc248f838853cca3efb8", "simhash": "1:223a34e633c8fdd4", "word_count": 5400 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:34.473456+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRYL REID, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WHITE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA jury found defendant Darryl Reid guilty of murder and armed robbery and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 20 years\u2019 and 9 years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant appeals.\nOn July 26, 1984, defendant was in his family\u2019s apartment with his older sister Joanne, her boyfriend Robert Davis, and their friend Joseph Brooks. At that time defendant was 15 years old, 4 feet 8 inches tall, and he weighed 70 pounds. Brooks had a .22 caliber revolver and bullets. In defendant\u2019s presence, Davis and Brooks discussed robbery and decided to look for an old man to rob. Brooks gave Davis the gun and the three boys left the apartment. They saw Herbert Madison get out of a car and enter a nearby apartment building. The three boys went into that building and one of the boys knocked on the door to Michelle Matthews\u2019 apartment. Madison was standing at the doorway of the apartment across the hall, talking with the occupant of that apartment. Defendant asked Matthews whether their friend Nate was in her apartment. He was not.\nMadison left the building and Brooks and Davis followed him while defendant continued to talk to Matthews. Defendant saw Brooks and Davis talking to Madison outside and he went to join them. Davis and defendant stood in front of Madison, each to one side, and Brooks stood behind Madison. Madison and Davis struggled briefly over Madison\u2019s wallet, then Davis shot Madison. Madison died a few hours later.\nDefendant, Davis and Brooks ran back to defendant\u2019s apartment. Davis left to get change for Madison\u2019s $20 bill. Within an hour after the robbery, police found a wallet and several pieces of identification for Madison on the ground outside an apartment building. An officer also noticed a card on a window sill above the wallet. Police went to that apartment, where they found defendant, his sister, and the gun which had been used in the robbery. They placed defendant under arrest. This was defendant\u2019s first contact with the criminal justice system. That afternoon, after talking with his mother, defendant discussed the incident with an assistant State\u2019s Attorney, Patricia DeOca, who reduced defendant\u2019s statement to writing. Defendant made a more extensive statement later that evening in the presence of his mother, a police officer, a court reporter, and DeOca.\nPrior to trial defendant moved to suppress the statements on the grounds that he had not received Miranda warnings before he made his initial statements to police in the police car after his arrest and he had never understood his rights. At the hearing on the motion defendant testified that the officers who took him to the police station asked defendant about the crime, although they had not given defendant his Miranda warnings, and he answered their questions. After defendant arrived at the police station, a woman told him that he had the right to remain silent, and she asked if he understood what that meant. He testified that he said \u201cYes\u201d although he did not understand, because he did not want to be embarrassed. She told him anything he said could be used against him in court, and asked him if he understood. Again he said \u201cYes\u201d although he did not understand. He did not understand the other warnings she gave him because he did not know what \u201cattorney,\u201d \u201cappoint,\u201d \u201crepresent,\u201d and \u201cright\u201d meant. When defendant\u2019s mother arrived at the police station, she told defendant to tell the truth.\nOn cross-examination defendant admitted that he knew what \u201clawyer,\u201d \u201ccourt,\u201d \u201cused,\u201d \u201cpresent,\u201d and \u201csilent\u201d meant. However, defendant maintained that he did not understand what the assistant State\u2019s Attorney meant when she told him that he had a right to remain silent. Defendant testified that he read the first two or three pages of each of the transcribed statements, but he did not finish reading either one. He initialed all of the pages and he signed at the end of each statement. Defendant testified that a police officer stepped on his foot and slapped him. Defense counsel then amended the motion to suppress statements, adding the allegation that the statements were the product of physical coercion. The trial court responded, \u201cI\u2019ll recess at this point, so we are sure where the burden of proof lies.\u201d\nSaul Levy, school psychologist for the Chicago Board of Education, testified that on March 15, 1984, he spent three hours testing defendant\u2019s intelligence because defendant was doing poorly and becoming disruptive in school. Defendant\u2019s full-scale IQ score was 78.\nDr. Joseph Hahn, administrator of the program bureau of child studies for the Chicago public schools, testified for the defense as an expert on the interpretation of psychological tests. Based on the results from Levy\u2019s testing of defendant, Hahn concluded that defendant was a slow learner. Although defendant graduated eighth grade when he was 15, his test results showed that his reading and cognitive abilities were around third-grade level. His reading comprehension score was equal to the average for children beginning third grade. In Hahn\u2019s opinion, a child at that reading level would not comprehend exactly what \u201cYou have the right to remain silent\u201d means. The child would not understand the statements, \u201cYou have a right to have an attorney represent you,\u201d and \u201cIf you cannot afford an attorney, one would be appointed for you to represent you during this interrogation.\u201d The child would not fully grasp the concepts involved in the statement, \u201cAnything you say here may be used against you in a court of law.\u201d\nSeveral police officers testified that they saw defendant on July 26, 1984, and they did not slap defendant or hit him in any way, and they did not see any other police officers hit or slap defendant. Detective Catherine Reardon testified that she took custody of defendant after his arrest, and she drove defendant to the police station. She did not discuss the case with defendant and she did not hear any other officer discuss the case with defendant.\nDeOca testified that defendant appeared to read each page of the statements, although he did not suggest any corrections. Defendant never mentioned that police had hit or stepped on him, and he never stated that he did not understand the rights which DeOca read to him.\nNaomi Cartwright, school psychologist for the Chicago Board of Education, testified for the State that on December 18, 1984, she tested defendant, using three standard intelligence tests. On the Test of Nonverbal Intelligence, defendant received a score of 88 which reflects low average nonverbal intelligence. On a reading test in which Cartwright asked defendant to pronounce a set of words, defendant showed that he had the ability to pronounce written words at a fifth grade, second month, level. Cartwright also administered the Monroe-Sherman Achievement Test, to determine defendant\u2019s ability to understand paragraph meaning, but she did not time the test. The test is a timed test, and therefore defendant\u2019s scores were not comparable to the standard scaled scores. However, if he had been able to give all of the responses which he eventually gave in the standard amount of time, his score would have been equal to that of the average student starting sixth grade. Ms. Cartwright admitted on cross-examination that it is not unusual for a child of defendant\u2019s mental age to try to conceal his lack of knowledge or understanding out of embarrassment.\nIn ruling on the motion to suppress, the court stated:\n\u201cIn a sense, [defense counselors] have the burden of persuasion, even though there was an issue which suggested that perhaps they could argue the voluntariness issue that the State was assuming as part of the motion, I think, to quash the [statements].\nI can say, based on the record before me that there, really, is no merit to that portion of the motion, so what is left is what was originally set forth in the motion, and that is the question of whether the defendant sufficiently understood the rights he allegedly waived at the time he made a statement to the police.\u201d\nBoth of defendant\u2019s statements were introduced into evidence at trial. In his statements defendant admitted that, after Davis and Brooks stopped Madison, Davis told defendant to check Madison\u2019s pockets for a wallet. Defendant put his hand into a pocket and found some change, but he did not take any of it. After they returned to defendant\u2019s apartment Davis offered to split the money with Brooks and defendant. Brooks received his share but defendant never received any money. Defendant\u2019s statements were substantially corroborated by eyewitnesses who saw Davis rob Madison.\nIn its instructions to the jury, the court stated:\n\u201cA person is legally responsible for the conduct of another person when either before or during the commission of an offense and with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of that offense, he knowingly *** attempts to aid the other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\n* * *\nA person commits the offense of murder when he kills an individual if, in performing the acts which cause the death, *** he knows that such acts created a strong probability of death ***; or he\u2019s committing the offense of armed robbery.\u201d\nAfter the jurors began deliberations, they sent to the judge a question regarding whether they could find defendant guilty of one charge and not guilty of the other. The judge called both attorneys and told them he had decided to respond only that the jurors should continue deliberating on the basis of the instructions they had received. Defense counsel raised no objection when he received the call, but he objected in court the next morning and he asked the court to answer the question. The court refused. The jury deliberated about 14 hours before it returned verdicts of guilty on both counts. In his motion for a new trial defendant again objected to the court\u2019s refusal to answer the jury\u2019s question.\nDefendant argues on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error when it responded to the jurors\u2019 question without answering the question. The State contends that defendant waived this objection when defense counsel failed to object promptly when the trial judge called him. Even if this failure can be construed as a waiver of the objection, we must address the issue under the doctrine of plain error (People v. Jackson (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 461, 479, 411 N.E.2d 893), especially because the evidence in this case was closely balanced, as the length of the jury\u2019s deliberations indicated (People v. Palmer (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 703, 712, 466 N.E.2d 640).\nThe law pertaining to jury questions in Illinois is clear: \u201cWhere a jury has raised an explicit question on a point of law arising from the facts over which there is doubt or confusion, the court should attempt to clarify the question in the minds of the jury members.\u201d (Jackson, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 479.) Although a trial court may, in its discretion, refrain from answering some jury questions, the court \u201chas the duty to instruct the jury where clarification is requested, the original instructions are incomplete, and the jurors are manifestly confused.\u201d People v. Gathings (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 1135, 1138, 425 N.E.2d 1313.\nThe jury manifested its confusion in this case when it asked the question, and the legal issue is clearly pertinent to this case. The jury had received no instruction explicitly stating that a finding of guilty on one count did not require a finding of guilty on the other count. The State contends that the original instructions were adequate to answer the jury\u2019s question because the trial court submitted four verdict forms: guilty and not guilty of murder, and guilty and not guilty of armed robbery. We believe that this is not an adequate substitute for an explicit response to the jury\u2019s question. The State also argues that the trial court exercised its discretion properly because it could not have answered the jury\u2019s question without becoming involved in an extended discussion with the jury. We disagree. The trial court could readily have answered the question by stating that the jury could find defendant guilty on one count and not guilty on the other count. (Compare People v. Ross (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 1097, 427 N.E.2d 868.) We find that the trial court erred when it failed to answer the jury\u2019s question of law arising from the facts of the case when the instructions previously given provided no direct answer to the question.\nThe State contends that evidence regarding the jury deliberations establishes that the error did not prejudice defendant. At a post-trial hearing a juror testified that after the jury had received the judge\u2019s response to its question, and after it had voted to convict defendant for armed robbery, on the first ballot the jury voted nine to three in favor of acquitting defendant on the murder charge. In the course of deliberations the nine votes for acquittal changed to votes for conviction. The voting shows that at least nine jurors initially thought that they could vote for acquittal on the murder charge even though they had voted for conviction for armed robbery. However, the evidence did not show how the nine jurors were persuaded to change their votes. If even one juror was swayed by confusion concerning the issue raised in the jury\u2019s question, the defendant\u2019s conviction was improper. We find that under the circumstances of this case, where the evidence was closely balanced, defendant has adequately shown that he was prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s refusal to answer the jury\u2019s question. Therefore, we reverse.\nDefendant argues that the case should be reversed without remand for retrial because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was legally accountable for Davis\u2019 actions in the robbery and murder of Madison. In order to prove that defendant was accountable for the crimes, the State needed to prove that, before or during the commission of the offenses, defendant attempted to aid Davis, with the specific intention of facilitating commission of the offenses. (People v. Young (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 984, 994, 452 N.E.2d 718.) The trier of fact may consider the circumstances surrounding the offense, including defendant\u2019s presence at the scene, his failure to oppose the crime, and his actions after the commission of the offense. (Young, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 994.) In the case at bar defendant saw Brooks give Davis a gun and he heard them discuss robbing an old man. He accompanied Davis and Brooks, and when they stopped Madison, defendant stood in front of Madison, partially blocking his way. Defendant reached into one of Madison\u2019s pockets when Davis told him to do so. After Davis shot Madison, defendant fled the scene, and when he, Davis and Brooks returned to his apartment, they agreed to split the proceeds three ways. We find that evidence at trial is sufficient to support a finding that defendant attempted to assist Davis in the commission of the crimes. (See People v. Morgan (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 1, 8-9, 364 N.E.2d 56, cert, denied (1977), 434 U.S. 927, 54 L. Ed. 2d 287, 98 S. Ct. 411.) Therefore, we remand for retrial.\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress statements. Since the State is likely to attempt to introduce the statements into evidence on remand, we address defendant\u2019s arguments here. Defendant maintains that the State did not prove that he understood the Miranda warnings. Before a defendant\u2019s confession may be admitted into evidence, the State must \u201cestablish[ ] that [the] statement was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made.\u201d (People v. Kincaid (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 107, 116, 429 N.E.2d 508, cert, denied (1982), 455 U.S. 1024, 72 L. Ed. 2d 144, 102 S. Ct. 1726.) \u201cIn examining the facts and circumstances surrounding a purported waiver of an individual\u2019s constitutional rights, the courts of this State have long recognized the special care which should be exercised when evaluating the confessions of youthful or mentally deficient individuals.\u201d People v. Redmon (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 342, 347, 468 N.E.2d 1310.\nIn the case at bar, defendant originally moved to suppress statements based on his inability to understand the Miranda warnings, and after cross-examination of defendant, defense counsel amended the motion to include allegations of physical coercion. In deciding the motion the trial court stated that defendant bore \u201cthe burden of persuasion.\u201d This was clearly incorrect: whenever the State seeks to introduce a confession into evidence, it bears the \u201cheavy burden [of] showing] that [the] defendant has waived his constitutional rights in a knowing, intelligent and voluntary manner.\u201d (People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 508, 516, 404 N.E.2d 181, appeal dis missed (1980), 449 U.S. 811, 66 L. Ed. 2d 14, 101 S. Ct. 59.) The court qualified its misstatement, indicating that the State had the burden of persuasion on the second portion of the motion, regarding allegations of physical coercion. The court found that the State met its burden on that portion of the motion, as it stated: \u201c[T]here, really, is no merit to that portion of the motion, so what is left is what was originally set forth in the motion, and that is the question of whether the defendant sufficiently understood the rights he allegedly waived ***.\u201d In regard to this part of the motion, the court never rectified its misstatement of the burden of persuasion. At trial on remand, the court must determine whether the State has met its burden of proving that defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.\nFor the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for retrial.\nReversed and remanded.\nRIZZI, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WHITE" }, { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent from the majority holding, which reverses defendant\u2019s conviction and finds that the trial court erred when it directed the jury to continue its deliberations using the instructions which it had already received. Those instructions were in fact proper and complete, and the giving of further instructions eight hours after the question had been posed could have been misconstrued by the jury. I also disagree with the majority finding that reversible error resulted from a statement made by the trial court outside the presence of the jury, which did not misstate the law regarding defendant\u2019s burden as to the issue of the voluntary nature of his confession, and which did not affect the court\u2019s finding regarding the knowing and intelligent factors of the waiver issue.\nThe majority maintains that the jury received no instruction explicitly stating that a finding of guilty on one count did not require a finding of guilty on the other count.\nThe original charge to the jury was complete and proper, particularly as to the separate offenses for which the jury was to return verdicts. The jury instructions separated the definitions of the offenses, separated the elements of each offense, and separated the verdicts.\nThe majority fails to accord proper weight to the fact that the jury received four verdict forms: guilty of murder; not guilty of murder; guilty of armed robbery; and not guilty of armed robbery. The majority merely offers the assertion that it believes \u201cthis is not an adequate substitution for an explicit response to the jury\u2019s question.\u201d 174 Ill. App. 3d at 1015.\nThe jury received separate, standard IPI instructions on the definition of legal accountability (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.06 (2d ed. 1981) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 2d)); the definition of murder (IPI Criminal 2d No. 7.01); and the definition of armed robbery (IPI Criminal 2d No. 14.01). It also received separate instructions on the elements of murder (IPI Criminal 2d No. 7.02) and the elements of armed robbery (IPI Criminal 2d No. 14.02), along with the direction that if the jury were to \u201cfind from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty.\u201d At the conclusion of the court\u2019s charge to the jury, it gave a concluding instruction (IPI Criminal 2d No. 26.01), which stated: \u201cThe defendant is charged with the offense of murder and armed robbery. You will receive four forms of verdict. As to each charge, you will be given both a \u2018not guilty\u2019 and \u2018guilty\u2019 form of verdict.\u201d The court continued:\n\u201cThe forms read, \u2018We, the jury, find the defendant, Darryl Reid, guilty of the offense of murder.\nWe, the jury find the defendant, Darryl Reid, not guilty of the offense of murder.\nWe, the jury, find the defendant, Darryl Reid, guilty of the offense of armed robbery.\nWe, the jury, find the defendant, Darryl Reid, not guilty of the offense of armed robbery.\u2019 \u201d\nThere is no question, therefore, that the jury received legally accurate and complete instructions on the offenses charged. This case differs considerably, for example, from People v. Gathings (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 1135, 425 N.E.2d 1313, where the initial instructions did not fully state the law regarding the question of whether the jury could find defendants guilty of certain offenses and not guilty of other offenses, and where the IPI instruction was modified such that it no longer accurately stated the law.\nGenerally, it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine when giving a supplemental instruction is appropriate. (People v. Preston (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 274, 391 N.E.2d 359; People v. Ross (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 427 N.E.2d 868; People v. Gathings (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 1135, 425 N.E.2d 1313.) The trial court in the present case understood the relevant law. In regard to an unrelated jury question, the court accurately set forth the case law:\n\u201cI think the case law in Illinois is clear; that when the jury reaches a question regarding the meaning of an instruction, which is succinctly stated, fairly stated, the Court has an obligation to eliminate the confusion through an accurate states ment [sic] of the law that clarifies or responds directly to the question asked.\u201d\nSee, e.g., People v. Sanders (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 471, 469 N.E.2d 287.\nDuring the first evening of deliberations, the jury asked whether it could find defendant guilty of one charge and not guilty of the other charge. After obtaining the agreement of the attorneys for both sides by telephone, the court instructed the jury to continue its deliberations using the instructions it had already received.\nThe following morning, the court conferred with counsel concerning a separate, unrelated question posed by the jury. In regard to the question asked the night before, the court cited strong support for its response made the night before. \u201cClearly the jury might have been asking whether or not they compromise by entering a guilty on one but not the other. That clarification could be detrimental to the position of either the State or the defense.\u201d\nAfter it was decided to clarify a different point of law for the jury, defense counsel stated that the court should provide a more substantive answer to the jury\u2019s question of the previous night:\n\u201cI\u2019m not saying that I did not agree to the procedure last night. But I think as we\u2019re going to answer one question that in your Honor\u2019s mind is clear and concise, we ought to answer the other question that was asked last night, which is very clear and succinct, and tell the jury they [can] find him guilty of one charge and not guilty of the other.\u201d\nThe prosecutor correctly replied that eight hours of deliberation had passed since the prior night\u2019s question and response, with no renewal of the question by the jury. The prosecutor also correctly noted that changing the answer could cause the jury to interpret it as urging them towards one conclusion or another.\nThe trial court may properly exercise its discretion by not giving additional jury instructions where any answer or explanation more specific than that given by the court might have constituted an improper expression of opinion and where the instructions given were clear and in common understandable language. (People v. Charles (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 485, 360 N.E.2d 1214.) A trial court may exercise its discretion to refrain from answering a jury\u2019s inquiries. (People v. Queen (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 560, 310 N.E.2d 166.) It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to decline to elaborate on complete and understandable instructions. (People v. Ross (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 427 N.E.2d 868.) Once the trial court has ascertained the nature of the jury\u2019s confusion, it is not required to issue additional instructions in all cases, especially if the trial judge determines that further instructions would serve no useful purpose. (People v. Jones (1976) , 40 Ill. App. 3d 771, 353 N.E.2d 79.) I believe the trial court properly refused defendant\u2019s request to alter the original, agreed response given to the jury. I find no abuse of discretion. See, e.g., People v. Tostado (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 837, 416 N.E.2d 353; People v. Jedlicka (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 483, 405 N.E.2d 844; People v. Hooker (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 53, 369 N.E.2d 147; People v. Charles (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 485, 360 N.E.2d 1214.\nThe majority finds that the failure to answer the jury\u2019s question was plain error, and that the error was prejudicial to defendant, \u201cespecially because the evidence in this case was closely balanced.\u201d The rule which provides that substantial defects are not waived by failure to make a timely objection applies where the interests of justice require, and it constitutes an exception which is limited to correcting grave errors, or to be applied where the case is close factually and fundamental fairness required that the jury be properly instructed. People v. Roberts (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 1, 387 N.E.2d 331.\nI do not believe that the facts presented here could be described as \u201cclosely balanced.\u201d This was a heinous crime and the proof of defendant\u2019s guilt was overwhelming. The majority itself points out that the triers of fact could consider defendant\u2019s presence at the scene; defendant\u2019s failure to oppose the crime; and defendant\u2019s actions after the commission of the offense. The majority highlights certain evidence, including that defendant saw Brooks give Davis a gun; that defendant heard Brooks and Davis discuss robbing an old man; that defendant accompanied Brooks and Davis outside; that defendant stood in front of the victim, partially blocking his way; that defendant reached into the victim\u2019s pocket when Davis told him to do so; that defendant fled the scene after Davis shot the victim; that defendant, Davis and Brooks all returned to defendant\u2019s apartment; and that defendant agreed with the others to split the proceeds three ways.\nAdditionally, Glenda Davis watched out her apartment window as the victim entered the building and defendant, Brooks and Davis followed him. She saw them exit the building soon thereafter and watched the robbery and shooting from her window. Michelle Matthews identified Brooks and defendant, whom she had known for two years, as the boys who came to her apartment near that of the victim on that day, just before the shooting. Brooks wore a burgundy scarf around his head and defendant wore a gold T-shirt.\nThe police arrived at the scene and immediately began looking for three teenagers, one wearing a yellow T-shirt and one with a red scarf. A man told the police that three teenagers ran into a nearby apartment building. The officers found the victim\u2019s wallet on the ground behind the building. An open third floor window was above the wallet. In the third floor apartment, the police found defendant, wearing a yellow T-shirt, sweating, breathing hard and acting excited. The officers found a red scarf stuck between the mattress and box spring. A purse contained a .22 caliber revolver with four live rounds, one expended shell and one empty chamber. Defendant thereafter confessed to the crime.\nThe circumstances here differ substantially from a \u201cclosely balanced case.\u201d\nI would find that no error occurred as a result of the trial court\u2019s reliance on the instructions as originally given to the jury. (See People v. Jones (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 771, 353 N.E.2d 79.) If any error occurred, it was harmless.\nI also disagree with the majority\u2019s other basis for reversal. It finds that the trial court misstated the burden in regard to the motion to suppress defendant\u2019s statements. In his lengthy brief, defendant addresses this point in three sentences and merely cites the general proposition that the burden rests on the prosecution to show a knowing and intelligent waiver. People v. Redmon (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 342, 468 N.E.2d 1310.\nDuring cross-examination at the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant alleged for the first time that the police officers slapped him and stepped on his foot before he made his two statements. Defense counsel amended the motion to suppress to include the allegations regarding the involuntary nature of the statements. The challenged language occurred at a point where the court began to address the knowing and intelligent waiver issue. The court then backed up to summarily dismiss the newly added argument regarding the alleged physical coercion. Having disposed of that issue, the court returned to the question which had been extensively argued. While the remarks made during this extended conference with counsel may lack perfect clarity, I find nothing even approaching reversible error.\nThe majority highlights only a few words, i.e., \u201cthe trial court stated that defendant bore \u2018the burden of persuasion.\u2019 \u201d (174 Ill. App. 3d at 1016.) The trial court\u2019s statement in context reads:\n\u201cIn a sense, [defense attorneys] have the burden of persuasion, even though there was an issue which suggested that perhaps they could argue the voluntariness issue that the State was assuming as part of the motion, I think, to quash the motion.\nI can say, based on the record before me that there, really, is no merit to that portion of the motion, so what is left is what was originally set forth in the motion, and that is the question of whether the defendant sufficiently understood the rights he allegedly waived at the time he made a statement to the police.\u201d\nFurthermore, a reasonable interpretation of the trial court\u2019s remarks, when read in the context of the lengthy discussion, is that the court merely referred to the burden of proof defendant carried following the evidence the State had produced regarding the entire waiver issue. In determining whether a confession was voluntarily made, the State bears the burden to establish the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Clark (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 450, 501 N.E.2d 123; People v. King (1986), 109 Ill. 2d 514, 488 N.E.2d 949, cert, denied (1986), 479 U.S. 872, 93 L. Ed. 2d 173, 107 S. Ct. 249.\nHowever, once the State makes out a prima facie case of voluntariness, the burden shifts to the defense to produce evidence that the confession was involuntary. (People v. Cozzi (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 94, 416 N.E.2d 1192; People v. Slaughter (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 159, 376 N.E.2d 33.) Moreover, it is within the discretion of the trial court to reverse the order of proof requiring the defendant to present evidence prior to the State so that the State may meet its burden of proof after the defense has presented evidence on the issue of voluntariness. People v. Allen (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 200, 498 N.E.2d 838.\nI disagree with the majority that the court misstated the law to counsel, or that reversal of the conviction is required because \u201c[i]n regard to this part of the motion, the court never rectified its misstatement of the burden of persuasion.\u201d\nBecause I do not believe that any of the errors claimed by defendant were prejudicial or require reversal, I would affirm defendant\u2019s conviction.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA," } ], "attorneys": [ "Steven Clark and Karen Daniel, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., John A. Gasiorowski, and Susan J. Crane, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRYL REID, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 85\u20142582\nOpinion filed August 3, 1988.\nRehearing denied October 5, 1988.\nMcNAMARA, J., dissenting.\nSteven Clark and Karen Daniel, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., John A. Gasiorowski, and Susan J. Crane, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1009-01", "first_page_order": 1031, "last_page_order": 1044 }