{ "id": 3554041, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RANDY L. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Brown", "decision_date": "1988-10-28", "docket_number": "No. 2-87-1142", "first_page": "676", "last_page": "679", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 676" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2871194 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/33/0736-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3547899 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" }, { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 871", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5082538 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "872" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/0871-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3447854 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0197-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 410, "char_count": 7450, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5738925652454708e-07, "percentile": 0.6791743456857909 }, "sha256": "936e5efe2cca157d11269369581121324eab03cd01e3c50f1a2acd6cd4c719d4", "simhash": "1:0da416d253039ce7", "word_count": 1249 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:24:13.630237+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RANDY L. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE INGLIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was arrested on September 26, 1986, and charged with the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to section 11\u2014501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014501).\nPrior to trial, the State went forward with a petition to revoke supervision with respect to defendant\u2019s prior 1985 DUI conviction. After a full evidentiary hearing as to the subsequent 1986 arrest, the trial court granted the State\u2019s petition to revoke supervision. Defendant appeals. We affirm.\nOn September 26, 1986, at approximately 3:50 in the morning, Naperville police officers Cunningham and Gustin were on routine patrol doing business checks at the Naperville Plaza Shopping Center. Officer Cunningham testified that his attention was drawn to defendant\u2019s vehicle because it had its parking lights on. The car was parked across from a drinking establishment called Benjamin\u2019s. When the officers approached the vehicle they noticed that the interior dash lights were on, that the radio was on, and that there were keys in the ignition. Defendant was slumped over the steering wheel on the driver\u2019s side of the car. The engine of the vehicle was not running. Officer Gustin had to shake defendant on his shoulder to wake him up. The officer observed that defendant had vomited on his clothing and also observed a strong odor of alcoholic beverage on defendant\u2019s breath. When asked what he was doing there, defendant stated that he had fallen asleep. The officers administered field sobriety tests to defendant and, based on their opinion of defendant\u2019s demeanor and performance on the tests, arrested him for DUI. Officer Gustin stated that the key was in the on position and the dashboard lights were illuminated. Officer Gustin also testified that he put his hand on the hood of the car and it felt warm.\nDefendant testified that at the time of the arrest, he was living with his parents, two blocks away from the shopping center. He further testified that he arrived at Benjamin\u2019s at approximately 10 p.m. the evening before the arrest. After about 45 minutes, defendant encountered Nancy Markham in the bar. He testified that during the time he was in the bar he played darts and had a few beers. He also testified that he left the bar with Nancy and went with her to Corporate Headquarters, a bar south of Naperville in Will County. Defendant testified that Nancy drove them in her car and that his car remained in the same place that he parked it when he arrived at Benjamin\u2019s earlier that evening. Defendant testified that he remained at Corporate Headquarters for about one hour, after which he and Nancy drove to Elmwood School parking lot, where they talked for a while. Nancy then drove him back to his car, which had remained parked in Benjamin\u2019s parking lot. Defendant testified that he got out of his car, put his seat back, rolled down the windows, and then threw up. He testified that he decided not to drive and that he went to sleep after putting the seat in a reclining position. Defendant further testified that the windows in his car were electric and that the key is needed to operate the windows. Defendant also stated that he did not believe that the key was in the on position as the officer stated, but that it was in the accessory position.\nNancy Markham testified that she arrived at Benjamin\u2019s at approximately 8 p.m. that evening and stayed there until 1 a.m. when it closed. She testified that she then drove in her car with defendant to Corporate Headquarters outside of Naperville. She further testified that they stayed there approximately one half hour to an hour and that they then went to Elmwood School parking lot where they talked for about 20 minutes. Markham testified that she then went back to Benjamin\u2019s and dropped defendant off by his car. Markham further stated that she never saw defendant operate his vehicle in any way that evening.\nThe parties stipulated that defendant was administered a breathalyzer test on September 26, 1986, and that the result of that test was .19.\nThe trial court found that the facts were sufficient to prove that defendant was in control of the vehicle by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court then revoked defendant\u2019s supervision.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that to be convicted of DUI, defendant must be proved to have driven or attempted to drive. We disagree.\nSection 11 \u2014 501 states:\n\u201cA person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this State while:\n(1) The alcohol concentration in such person\u2019s blood or breath is 0.10 or more based on the definition of blood and breath units in Section 11\u2014501.2;\n(2) Under the influence of alcohol ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 11\u2014501(a)(1), (a)(2).\nDefendant goes on at great length to argue that \u201cdriving\u201d and \u201cactual physical control\u201d are not the same thing. Defendant further appears to contend that the language of section 11\u2014501, \u201cactual physical control,\u201d means attempted driving. We agree with defendant that driving and actual physical control are not the same. However, we disagree with defendant as to the meaning of \u201cactual physical control.\u201d Whereas driving would appear to require defendant to be in actual physical control, actual physical control does not require evidence that defendant drove or even attempted to drive. \u201cActual physical control of a vehicle requires only that one is behind the steering wheel in the driver\u2019s seat \"with the ignition key and physically capable of starting the engine and moving the vehicle.\u201d (People v. Heimann (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 197, 199; see also People v. Karjala (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 871, 872; People v. Barlow (1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 281, 287.) In Barlow, the court found evidence that the defendant was in the driver\u2019s seat and keys were in the ignition was sufficient to have reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was in actual physical control. (Barlow, 163 Ill. App. 3d at 287.) Similarly, we find that such evidence is sufficient to prove actual physical control.\nDefendant was asleep at the time that the officers approached his vehicle. Nevertheless, the evidence adduced at the hearing indicated that the key had been put in the ignition and turned to the on position and that defendant was in the driver\u2019s seat. This is sufficient evidence to make it reasonable to conclude that defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle before the police arrived. We therefore affirm the decision of the trial court.\nWhile it may be preferable, as defendant argues, for an intoxicated individual to seek refuge in his car as opposed to driving it (see People v. Guynn (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 736, 739), the legislature has made driving while intoxicated and being in actual physical control while intoxicated equally culpable. We are therefore constrained to affirm the decision of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nLINDBERG, P.J., and UNVERZAGT, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE INGLIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of Cynthia R. Lyons, of Naperville (Cynthia R. Lyons, of counsel), for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RANDY L. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201487\u20141142\nOpinion filed October 28, 1988.\nRehearing denied November 21, 1988.\nLaw Offices of Cynthia R. Lyons, of Naperville (Cynthia R. Lyons, of counsel), for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0676-01", "first_page_order": 698, "last_page_order": 701 }