{ "id": 3554721, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRUCE ARMSTRONG, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Armstrong", "decision_date": "1988-10-26", "docket_number": "No. 4-88-0191", "first_page": "874", "last_page": "880", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 874" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 N.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 1054", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2864577 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/27/1054-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 N.E.2d 460", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 Ill. App. 3d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2468092 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/6/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 N.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2971950 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 N.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Ill. App. 3d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2912211 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/4/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2790543 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3386432 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0985-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. App. 3d 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3241609 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/69/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 N.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3208788 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 S. Ct. 2666", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 L. Ed. 2d 371", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 1218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6270627, 6273278, 6273573, 6270953, 6272201, 6271533, 6269999, 6271920, 6270319, 6272783, 6272499, 6273007, 6273916, 6271230 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/1218-03", "/us/467/1218-12", "/us/467/1218-13", "/us/467/1218-04", "/us/467/1218-08", "/us/467/1218-06", "/us/467/1218-01", "/us/467/1218-07", "/us/467/1218-02", "/us/467/1218-10", "/us/467/1218-09", "/us/467/1218-11", "/us/467/1218-14", "/us/467/1218-05" ] }, { "cite": "444 N.E.2d 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3102209 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0309-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 736, "char_count": 12910, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.061447019797991e-08, "percentile": 0.3183137318044411 }, "sha256": "c731a993e8542c8d273cc22bf8c25486e9948010e7558b677bb4932ae21829d3", "simhash": "1:31443c85fb4a254b", "word_count": 2074 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:24:13.630237+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRUCE ARMSTRONG, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SPITZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of Morgan County, defendant Bruce Armstrong was found guilty of murder, home invasion, and armed robbery. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 9\u20141(a)(1), 12\u201411, 18\u20142.) Judgment was entered on the verdict and the defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 50 years, 20 years, and 20 years, respectively.\nIn this appeal, defendant raises two issues. The first issue is whether defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel because the attorney appointed as the public defender to represent defendant at the trial allegedly collected $15,000 from defendant\u2019s mother to represent defendant.\nDefendant admits there is no per se conflict of interest. Defendant also admits there is no actual conflict of interest demonstrated in the record. The record does not disclose defendant\u2019s mother would have benefitted by defendant\u2019s conviction. There is also nothing in the record which indicates defendant was unaware of or disapproved of the fee arrangement. Moreover, the trial court appointed substitute counsel for post-trial motions, and post-trial counsel was unable to establish from the affidavits of defendant\u2019s mother and brother that those persons had knowledge of facts which would have been admissible as evidence to exculpate defendant. Nor does the record require a characterization of defense trial counsel\u2019s performance as either actual incompetence or as being of such low caliber as to reduce the trial to a farce or sham.\nNevertheless, defendant demands a new trial because trial counsel\u2019s conduct was \u201creprehensible\u201d and \u201cunethical.\u201d The professional ethics of defendant\u2019s trial counsel is a matter for the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (107 Ill. 2d Rules 751 through 774). Such out-of-court activity in no way requires a reversal of defendant\u2019s convictions in the absence of a showing of actual prejudice to defendant.\nIn support of his contention that reversal is warranted by counsel\u2019s activities in accepting the fee, defendant cites People v. Williams (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 309, 444 N.E.2d 136, cert. denied (1984), 467 U.S. 1218, 81 L. Ed. 2d 371, 104 S. Ct. 2666. Williams, however, is distinguishable for several reasons. First, Williams alleged numerous inactions on the part of his trial counsel, including, but not limited to failure to move to suppress evidence seized from defendant\u2019s car, failure to object to testimony about a Canadian hair comparison study, failure to object to evidence defendant alleged was designed to show one of the codefendants had accused her codefendants, failure to object to information given to the jury about the manner of reviewing the verdict, failure to object to evidence of good character of decedent, failure to demand a full evidentiary hearing to discover certain written statements allegedly made by a witness to the crime within a few days of the murder, and failure to move for a new trial. Secondly, Williams involved a capital punishment trial, with defendant\u2019s counsel defending three clients before two juries, simultaneously. Third, at the time the supreme court decided Williams, the court had disbarred defendant\u2019s trial counsel as a result of an unrelated proceeding for neglecting legal matters entrusted to him, for committing acts prejudicial to the administration of justice, intentionally causing damage and prejudice to his clients, and commingling and converting funds. In Williams, the supreme court reasoned that although those errors alleged were not such plain error as to warrant review where no motion for new trial was filed and although the alleged failures on the part of trial counsel were perhaps errors in judgment which do not establish incompetency, in light of the disciplinary action the court could not characterize the failure of counsel to make the motion to suppress, et cetera, as professional misjudgment. Therefore, Williams is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar wherein the record discloses nothing to demonstrate defendant was actually prejudiced and prevented from receiving a fair trial as a result of trial counsel accepting the fee from defendant\u2019s mother.\nThe second issue raised is whether evidence defendant had previously served penitentiary time, and closing argument referring to this evidence, so unfairly emphasized defendant\u2019s prior bad acts as to necessitate a new trial. The State points out that no objection to the evidence and argument was made during the course of the trial. In addition, the post-trial motion failed to include this allegation of error. The references to which defendant objects involve testimony concerning statements made by defendant. This testimony was elicited on cross-examination by defense counsel from the State witnesses, in redirect examination of the same witnesses, or in the defendant\u2019s own testimony.\nThe rules relating to the propriety of admitting evidence of prior convictions or other crimes is summarized in People v. Chapin (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 778, 781-82, 406 N.E.2d 579, 581:\n\u201cThe general rule is firmly established that evidence of prior convictions or other crimes is inadmissible and incompetent evidence, prejudicial to the defendant. (People v. Goodwin (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 347, 387 N.E.2d 433; People v. Hughes (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 985, 367 N.E.2d 485.) The obvious basis for that rule of excluding such evidence is its suggestion to the jury that the defendant has criminal tendencies, which suggestion may affect their determination of his guilt or innocence in the case before them. (People v. Gregory (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 601, 177 N.E.2d 120.) In Goodwin, we found reversible error where an arresting officer testified that the defendant asked to be let go, because he didn\u2019t want \u2018to go back to prison.\u2019 (See People v. Hawkins (1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d 471, 281 N.E.2d 72.) Those cases, however, did not involve exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility. The exceptions were set forth in People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 448, 455, 343 N.E.2d 489[, 492]:\n\u2018Evidence which tends to prove a fact in issue is admissible though it may be evidence showing that the accused has committed a crime other than the one for which he is being tried, and evidence which goes to show motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake or modus operandi is admissible though it may show the commission of a separate offense.\u2019\nUnder the exceptions, references by a defendant to his prior prison time have been admitted into evidence as relevant to the defendant\u2019s intent (People v. Smith (1972), 6 Ill. App. 3d 259, 285 N.E.2d 460) and as probative of the defendant\u2019s actions in committing the crime (People v. Allen (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 327 N.E.2d 387). In People v. Smith the court states:\n\u2018The fact that the answer also suggested defendant\u2019s conviction of another crime did not make it inadmissible *** to show, by immediate inference, malice, deliberation, ill-will or the intent required for the offense charged. [Citation.] When evidence is admissible on other grounds, it is not objectionable because it also discloses other offenses.\u2019 6 Ill. App. 3d 259, 263[, 285 N.E.2d 460, 463].\u201d\nIn Chapin, the defendant referred to having been in the penitentiary as part of his threat to the victim. Thus emphasizing his seriousness and willingness to follow through on his threat to blow the victim\u2019s head off, the statement was relevant to prove the mental state as an element of the offense of intimidation.\nIn the instant case, State\u2019s witness George Hermes testified that on September 5, 1986, about 10:30 a.m., he went to the victim\u2019s barber shop to do some jewelry business with the victim. Present were the victim, defendant, defendant\u2019s sister, and another girl. In conducting business, the victim got out a roller of sterling silver necklaces, spreading the necklaces out on the table. Defendant was washing windows and talking. Defendant said he needed some money and ought to just grab the roller and take off. The victim said something to the effect that defendant had not gotten out of the building yet. Defendant replied that if he wanted them, he\u2019d just \u201cstick\u201d him and take the chains.\n\u25a0On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to get the witness to testify that defendant was only joking. However, Hermes testified defendant\u2019s statement made him nervous. When asked by defense counsel what made the witness nervous about defendant\u2019s statement, Hermes said:\n\u201cWell, he \u2014 -somebody, I think it was Peggy, come up with a remark, well, they\u2019d send you back to the joint if you did something like that. His reply, \u2018Well, I\u2019m institutionalized now, anyway, I\u2019d just as soon be in the joint anyway.\u2019 \u201d\nOn redirect examination, Hermes testified, \u201c[defendant] had just gotten out that day and seemed to have a chip on his shoulder.\u201d He also iterated that defendant\u2019s statement about being institutionalized made him nervous.\nAlso on cross-examination, witness Rosie Crawley testified that during a telephone conversation with defendant, defendant told her that \u201cif he had to go back to the pen for something, that he was going to go back to the pen for something good.\u201d In the same conversation, defendant threatened to kill the victim, according to this witness.\nIn taking the witness stand himself, defendant testified he had been convicted of five felonies and had been in prison for three. Defendant stated that a conversation testified to by State witness Richard Mansfield in which defendant complained the victim was having an affair with defendant\u2019s ex-wife could not have taken place because defendant was in the Graham Correctional Center the entire time that Mansfield said the conversation was held. On cross-examination, defendant stated that he was released from the penitentiary on September 3, 1986, and admitted drinking with Mansfield after his release and before going to Las Vegas following the murder on September 14. Defendant admitted to stating in front of Hermes that he was institutionalized anyway and liked it better back in the joint, but contended he was only kidding. Defendant referred to his release from the penitentiary when relating that he called his former employer and asked to return to work. He also referred to his penitentiary term when he tried to explain why he did not know what time it was when he and codefendant dropped by the victim\u2019s trailer in the middle of the night of the murder, saying he had been in the penitentiary the last three or four years and was therefore unaware what time the local taverns closed.\nIn this case, the State\u2019s theory of defendant\u2019s motive for the murder was the victim\u2019s relationship with defendant\u2019s ex-wife, who had become pregnant while defendant was imprisoned, in addition to defendant\u2019s greed. Therefore, the evidence concerning defendant having been in the penitentiary is relevant both to motive and to show defendant\u2019s intent to kill the victim by demonstrating defendant\u2019s seriousness and willingness to carry out his threats.\nThe prosecutor\u2019s closing argument does refer to the evidence, including defendant\u2019s having been in the penitentiary. On the other hand, defense counsel also referred to defendant\u2019s incarceration in closing argument. In light of all the evidence, the context of the language utilized by the prosecutor, the relation of the argument to the evidence, and the effect of the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument on defendant\u2019s rights, it cannot be said defendant was denied a fair trial. See People v. Smith (1972), 6 Ill. App. 3d 259, 285 N.E.2d 460.\nIn any event, by failing to object to the evidence and argument at trial and by failing to include these alleged errors in a post-trial motion filed by a new, substitute counsel, defendant has waived the consideration of these alleged errors on appeal. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) The only reason we have reviewed the question to the extent we have here is not because we consider it to be plain error, but, rather, because the first issue raised in this appeal by the defendant questioned the effectiveness of trial counsel and the failure to object to improper evidence might be some evidence that counsel was ineffective.\nHaving found no basis to support the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, the judgment of the circuit court of Morgan County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLUND and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SPITZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Judith L. Libby, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Tim P. Olsen, State\u2019s Attorney, of Jacksonville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Cullom, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRUCE ARMSTRONG, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201488\u20140191\nOpinion filed October 26, 1988.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Judith L. Libby, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nTim P. Olsen, State\u2019s Attorney, of Jacksonville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Cullom, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0874-01", "first_page_order": 896, "last_page_order": 902 }