{ "id": 3588949, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PRESTON ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Adams", "decision_date": "1988-11-10", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201486\u20143131", "first_page": "197", "last_page": "203", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 197" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "658 F.2d 1225", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 474397 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/658/1225-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 N.E.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 992", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3119902 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1003" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/0992-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 U.S. 123", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767670 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" }, { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3604747 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" }, { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 969", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "973" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156641 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "352" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126872 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "94" }, { "page": "87" }, { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0080-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 605, "char_count": 13899, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.526715375941739e-08, "percentile": 0.4473461580192513 }, "sha256": "533fba0cf9acba5090645e7c6ec4fb7a348648f9a14eca6876715f019b5b80a9", "simhash": "1:aa6f1144d26d0bb8", "word_count": 2323 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:43:30.106689+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PRESTON ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Preston Adams, along with codefendants Lindsay Cannon and Andre Johnson were jointly indicted on charges of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Prior to trial, Preston Adams moved for severance. This motion was denied. Following a jury trial, Preston Adams and codefendant Andre Johnson were found guilty of conspiracy to commit murder and not guilty of murder. Codefendant Cannon was found guilty of both murder and conspiracy to commit murder.\nOn appeal, the defendant Preston Adams argues: (1) that the trial court erred in failing to sever the trial; and (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to give a tendered jury instruction on withdrawal.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s evidence essentially consisted of signed court-reported statements made by Adams, Cannon and Johnson, who were all members of a street gang called the Disciples. Adams\u2019 statement established the following.\nOn October 6, 1984, Adams met Cannon and Johnson at the house of a man named Archie Adams. They talked about going to a residential building at 2051 West Lake Street. Preston Adams characterized 2051 West Lake Street as the \u201cVice Lords building\u201d and stated that they were going there to \u201cget some Vice Lords who had shot at them earlier\u201d that day.\nThat evening, Adams, Cannon and Johnson went to 2051 West Lake Street. Adams carried a .38 caliber revolver, Cannon carried a .22 caliber rifle, and Johnson carried an umbrella. When they got inside the building, Adams and Johnson separated from Lindsay Cannon. After looking around and not finding \u201cthe guys who had shot at us earlier,\u201d Adams and Johnson left the building. Once outside the building, they got into an argument because Johnson wanted the gun to go back inside the building. As Johnson raised the umbrella to attack Adams, Lindsay Cannon, who had just come out of the building, came in between them and kept them apart. Seconds later, someone yelled, \u201cVice Lords\u201d and started shooting at the three of them. Adams and Cannon \u201cboth turned around and returned fire.\u201d Adams fired five shots with the .38 caliber gun which he carried. After returning fire, all of them ran to another building.\nThe court-reported statements of Cannon and Johnson gave the same account of the events of October 6, 1984, except for one discrepancy. Adams stated that they went to 2051 West Lake Street to \u201cget some Vice Lords who had shot at them earlier\u201d that day. Later in his statement, Adams stated that they were looking for \u201cthe guys who had shot at us\u201d earlier. In his court-reported statement, Cannon stated that they went to 2051 West Lake Street to \u201cget even with some boys that shot at [Adams] during the day.\u201d Johnson also stated that a member of the Vice Lords shot at Adams earlier that day.\nUndisputed testimony at trial established that one of the shots fired by Cannon\u2019s gun fatally wounded Edward Barrow, who was on his way to visit his mother in the 2051 West Lake Street building. Barrow was not a member of any gangs.\nAdams was the only defendant to testify at trial. On direct examination, Adams stated that not all of his court-reported statement was true. Adams testified that on October 6, 1984, he was standing outside his girlfriend\u2019s apartment when Cannon and Johnson approached him. Johnson told him they were going to 2051 West Lake Street because someone owed him money. Cannon was \u201chunching on me and everything\u201d and when Adams saw the .22 caliber rifle which Cannon was carrying, Adams got the impression that if he did not go with them something might happen to him.\nAdams also denied on direct examination that he possessed or fired a .38 caliber revolver at 2051 West Lake Street. However, on cross-examination, he admitted that he fired five shots with the .38 caliber revolver at the 2051 West Lake Street building.\nAdams also alleged that it was the codefendants who told him to make the inculpatory statements in his confession and he followed their orders because he feared for his life or the lives of his family. However, on cross-examination, Adams testified that he was never threatened verbally or physically by either Cannon or Johnson regarding testimony at trial.\nAdams\u2019 first contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to sever the trial. Adams\u2019 primary basis for this contention is that his defense is antagonistic to that of the codefendants. Adams\u2019 defense was that he did not voluntarily participate in the conspiracy.\nA defendant does not have an automatic right to be tried separately from his codefendants simply because they were all charged in the same indictment for crimes arising from the same circumstances. (People v. Bean (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 80, 92, 485 N.E.2d 349, 354.) However, when codefendants\u2019 defenses are so antagonistic to each other that one of the codefendants cannot receive a fair trial jointly with the others, severance is required. (People v. Daugherty (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 533, 542, 468 N.E.2d 969, 973.) The decision whether to grant a motion to sever is discretionary with the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Bean, 109 Ill. 2d at 93, 485 N.E.2d at 355.\nWe fail to see how the defenses of Cannon and Johnson were so antagonistic that Adams was deprived of a fair trial. The court-reported statements of Adams and codefendants Cannon and Johnson were essentially the same. Each statement stated that on October 6, 1984, Adams, Cannon and Johnson met at Archie Adams\u2019 house and discussed going to 2051 West Lake Street to \u201cget\u201d or \u201cget even\u201d with members of the Vice Lords who had shot at one of them earlier that day. All three statements further indicated that before going to 2051 West Lake Street, Cannon armed himself with a .22 caliber rifle, Adams armed himself with a .38 caliber revolver and Johnson carried an umbrella.\nAt trial, Adams\u2019 defense was that he was not voluntarily present at 2051 West Lake Street. He testified that not all of his court-reported statement was true. According to Adams\u2019 testimony at trial, Cannon and Johnson approached him outside of his girlfriend\u2019s house and forced him to accompany them. Adams also claimed that he did not have a .38 caliber revolver; however, on cross-examination, he admitted that he did use a .38 caliber revolver to fire five shots at 2051 West Lake Street.\nTo be considered antagonistic defenses, there must be a true conflict such that each defendant condemns the other but professes his own innocence. (People v. Fort (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 14, 21, 497 N.E.2d 416, 421.) Actual hostility is required. (People v. Bean (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 80, 93, 485 N.E.2d 349, 355.) Neither Cannon nor Johnson testified. The statements they gave do not profess their innocence and place the blame on the defendant. The fact that Adams\u2019 defense of involuntary participation was, as Adams described it in his appellate brief, clouded by statements of Cannon and Johnson (appellant\u2019s brief at 11) does not constitute actual hostility. This is not a case where Cannon and Johnson could only convince the jury of their innocence by convincing them to convict Preston Adams.\nWe are also not persuaded by Adams\u2019 characterization of the joint trial as akin to the unacceptable situation in Bean, where the trial became \u201cmore of a contest between the defendants than between the State and an individual defendant.\u201d (Bean, 109 Ill. 2d at 94, 485 N.E.2d at 355.) In Bean, defendant Bean and codefendant Robert Byron were tried together for a variety of crimes connected with a death. Defendant moved for severance, which was denied. In his opening statement, counsel for Byron repeatedly referred to defendant. Counsel stated: \u201c \u2018Bob Byron is going to take the witness stand. He is going to testify. Because an innocent man can\u2019t wait to tell his story. And a guilty man will never take the stand.\u2019 \u201d (109 Ill. 2d at 87, 485 N.E.2d at 352.) Counsel\u2019s attacks continued during cross-examination and closing argument as well.\nIn the instant case, Adams points out that Johnson\u2019s counsel cross-examined Adams for 75 pages while the State cross-examined for only 39 pages (appellant\u2019s brief at 13). This does not convince us that Adams was placed in the untenable position of defending himself against both the State and the codefendants. (Fort, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 21, 497 N.E.2d at 421.) Nor does Adams cite instances where the attorneys for Cannon and Johnson repeatedly tried to destroy Adams\u2019 case.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to sever the trial on the grounds of antagonistic defenses.\nRegarding the denial of severance, Adams also argues that \u201cwhen one or more of the codefendants have made prior statements implicating the defendant the failure of the codefendants to testify extremely prejudices the defendant by denying the defendant the right of cross-examination.\u201d Appellant\u2019s brief at 9, citing Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620.\nAs stated above, the general rule is that defendants jointly indicted are to be jointly tried unless fairness to one of the defendants requires a separate trial to avoid prejudice. Bean, 109 Ill. 2d at 92, 485 N.E.2d at 355.\nAdams essentially argues that he was prejudiced because the codefendants did not testify and he could not cross-examine their statements. This conclusion that this was prejudicial is based on the defendant\u2019s contention that he testified at trial in a manner that contradicted the statements.\nThis contention is without merit. All three statements essentially state that Adams and codefendants Cannon and Johnson met at Archie Adams\u2019 house, where they discussed going to 2051 West Lake Street to \u201cget\u201d or \u201cget even with\u201d members of the Vice Lords who shot at one of them earlier that day. The statements also state that Cannon had a .22 caliber rifle which he shot, Adams had a .38 caliber revolver which he shot, and Johnson carried an umbrella.\nAt trial, Adams admitted that he went to 2051 West Lake Street and fired five times with a .38 caliber revolver at 2051 West Lake Street. This testimony does not contradict the statements; rather, it gives an explanation for his action. Adams is not trying to avoid his confession. He does not deny his participation, but consistent with his defense, Adams testified that although he went to 2051 West Lake Street, he did not go voluntarily. The statements of codefendants Cannon and Johnson which are the same as Adams\u2019 statement do not speak to Adams\u2019 assertion that he did not go voluntarily. Nor do the statements of the codefendants implicate Adams and exonerate themselves. They do not implicate Adams any more than Adams implicates himself at trial. Adams fails to explain how he is prejudiced when he testifies to essentially the same facts as to those that were in the statements.\nAdams argues that there is prejudice because he squarely places the blame on Cannon and Johnson. This may be prejudicial to Cannon and Johnson but does not address the prejudice to Adams.\nThere is one aspect of Adams\u2019 testimony which differs from his statement as well as the statement of the codefendants. At trial, the defendant stated that contrary to his statement, he did not meet the others at Archie Adams\u2019 house but that Cannon and Johnson approached Adams outside of his girlfriend\u2019s house. We believe that this is a minor discrepancy and does not establish Adams\u2019 contention that his trial testimony contradicted the court reporter\u2019s statements.\nTherefore, we believe that because there was no prejudice, the trial court did not err in severing the trial on confrontational grounds.\nThe defendant\u2019s final contention is that the trial court erred in refusing to give tendered Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.03 (2d ed. 1981) where there was some evidence that Adams withdrew from the conspiracy.\nThe defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. The defendant cites no case nor are we aware of any case which states that withdrawal is an affirmative defense to the crime of conspiracy. The traditional rule is that since the crime of conspiracy is complete with the agreement and an overt act, no subsequent action can exonerate the conspirator of that crime. (2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law \u00a76.5(f), at 110 (1986); see also People v. Harvey (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 992, 1003, 420 N.E.2d 645, 653 (concerning a conviction of solicitation to commit murder (\u201c[o]nce the evidence establishes that the essential elements of the offense have occurred, it follows that there can be no withdrawal from a completed offense\u201d)); United States v. Read (7th Cir. 1981), 658 F.2d 1225, 1233 (\u201c[withdrawal is not *** a complete defense to the crime of conspiracy\u201d).) In the instant case, there is evidence of an agreement: the defendant and his codefendants discussed going to 2051 West Lake Street to \u201cget\u201d or \u201cget even\u201d with a member of the Vice Lords. There is also evidence of an overt act: the defendant and his codefendants armed themselves and went to 2051 West Lake Street to find a member of the Vice Lords. Because there was evidence establishing the essential elements of conspiracy, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to give tendered jury instruction No. 5.03.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLINN and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert E. Pincham, Jr., and Michael B. Lehman, both of Robert E. Pincham, Jr., Ltd. & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Patricia Y. Brown, and Joseph G. Laspisa, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PRESTON ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201486\u20143131\nOpinion filed November 10, 1988.\nRobert E. Pincham, Jr., and Michael B. Lehman, both of Robert E. Pincham, Jr., Ltd. & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Patricia Y. Brown, and Joseph G. Laspisa, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0197-01", "first_page_order": 219, "last_page_order": 225 }