{
  "id": 3588371,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD A. WEAKLEY, JR., Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Weakley",
  "decision_date": "1988-11-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 3-88-0147",
  "first_page": "274",
  "last_page": "276",
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    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:43:30.106689+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD A. WEAKLEY, JR., Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE HEIPLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals from dismissal of the defendant\u2019s charge of driving while his license was revoked (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6 \u2014 303(a)). We affirm.\nInitially, we note that the defendant, Richard A. Weakley, Jr., has filed no appellee\u2019s brief. However, we address the case under the authority of First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493.\nThis case presents the sole question of whether section 6 \u2014 303(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) is a basis to charge the Iowa resident-defendant for driving in Illinois when his Iowa driver\u2019s license was revoked by Iowa.\nIn relevant part, section 6 \u2014 303(a) currently provides as follows:\n\u201c(a) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when such person\u2019s driver\u2019s license *** is revoked or suspended as provided by this Code or any other law, except as may be specifically allowed *** pursuant to this Code, shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6 \u2014 303(a).\nThe 1979 edition of the relevant part of section 6 \u2014 303(a) provided as follows:\n\u201c(a) Any person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when his driver\u2019s license *** is revoked or suspended as provided by this Act or any other Act, except as may be allowed *** under this Act, shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6 \u2014 303(a).\nIn People v. Brown (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 609, 455 N.E.2d 287, we interpreted the 1979 statute under facts similar to those in the instant case. There, Iowa resident Brown was charged under section 6 \u2014 303(a) for driving in Illinois while his Iowa driver\u2019s license was revoked by Iowa. We affirmed dismissal of the charge.\nIn the instant case, the trial court dismissed the section 6 \u2014 303(a) charge, referring to our decision in Brown. The State argues on appeal that Brown is no longer valid in light of subsequent amendment of section 6 \u2014 303(a). We disagree and find that Brown is dispositive.\nBrown interpreted section 6 \u2014 303(a)\u2019s phrase \u201cthis Act or any other Act\u201d to refer only to acts adopted by the Illinois General Assembly, not to legislation of other States. It relied upon the fact that section 6 \u2014 303(a) did not, as it easily could have, expressly regulate nonresident drivers whose licenses had been revoked or suspended by their home States. It found support for its interpretation in section 6 \u2014 303(b) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95^2, par. 6 \u2014 303(b)). The Brown court noted that section 6 \u2014 303(b) provided for extension of a defendant\u2019s period of suspension of revocation upon the Secretary of State\u2019s receipt of a report of a conviction under section 6 \u2014 303(a). According to the Brown court, section 6 \u2014 303(b) clearly referred to, and only to, licenses issued and later suspended or revoked by the Secretary of State of Illinois.\nIn determining legislative intent, we presume that the legislature acted with knowledge of judicial decisions concerning prior and existing law. (Cottage-63rd Street Currency Exchange v. Callahan (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 586, 432 N.E.2d 1258.) Furthermore, we strictly construe penal statutes against the State and in favor of the defendant. Brown, 118 Ill. App. 3d at 611.\nAlthough the legislature has amended section 6 \u2014 303 following our decision in Brown, it has in no way responded to the primary points of the Brown decision. Its substitution of \u201cthis Code or any other law\u201d for the phrase \u201cthis Act or any other Act\u201d does not reveal the intent to broaden section 6 \u2014 303(a) to include foreign State, revocations or suspensions. The amendment made no response to Brown\u2019s call for an explicit statement to reveal an intent to include drivers under foreign State revocations or suspensions. It also made no apparent response to Brown\u2019s comment that section 6 \u2014 303(b) supported a conclusion that section 6 \u2014 303(a) referred only to Illinois suspensions or revocations.\nPresuming that the current section 6 \u2014 303(a) was written with the legislature\u2019s knowledge of Brown, and strictly construing the statute against the State, we find that the defendant\u2019s charge was properly dismissed.\nBased upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Hancock County.\nAffirmed.\nSTOUDER, P.J., and WOMBACHER, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE HEIPLE"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Samuel Naylor VI, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carthage (Gary F. Gnidovec, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.",
      "Richard A. Weakley, Jr., of Dallas City, appellee pro se."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD A. WEAKLEY, JR., Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3-88-0147\nOpinion filed November 15, 1988.\nSamuel Naylor VI, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carthage (Gary F. Gnidovec, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nRichard A. Weakley, Jr., of Dallas City, appellee pro se."
  },
  "file_name": "0274-01",
  "first_page_order": 296,
  "last_page_order": 298
}