{
  "id": 3588816,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL WOLFE, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wolfe",
  "decision_date": "1988-11-23",
  "docket_number": "No. 3\u201488\u20140124",
  "first_page": "299",
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:43:30.106689+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL WOLFE, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE HEIPLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Michael Wolfe, was charged with the aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a five-year-old girl (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 16(c)(1)). The trial court subsequently ruled that the child was not competent to testify. The court further found that the State could introduce hearsay statements allegedly made by the girl to her father only if the State could corroborate the statements.\nThe State appeals, arguing first that the trial court erred in finding the complainant incompetent to testify.\nThe record of the February 8, 1988, competency hearing shows that the complainant knew that she was five years old and that her birthday was in November, but did not know the day of her birth. She could not recall whether she had had a party on her last birthday, nor could she remember what she had done at Christmas. She knew she lived in Illinois, but she did not know the name of the town. She knew the name of her school, but she could not recall how long she had attended it. While she expressed initial confusion as to what it means to tell the truth, she later gave correct examples of truthfulness and lying.\nThe competency of a minor to testify must be judged on whether she is sufficiently mature to (1) receive correct impressions from her senses; (2) recollect those impressions; (3) understand questions and narrate answers intelligently; and (4) appreciate the moral duty to tell the truth. (People v. Sanchez (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 488, 434 N.E.2d 395.) The trial court\u2019s ruling on the competency of a witness to testify will be overturned only if there is a manifest abuse of discretion or if a legal principle was manifestly misapprehended. (People v. Ballinger (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 620, 225 N.E.2d 10.) Based on the record before us, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s finding the minor incompetent to testify was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe State\u2019s second argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in excluding the complainant\u2019s father\u2019s testimony concerning statements the complainant made.\nAt the hearing on this matter, the father testified that the defendant\u2019s wife, Colleen, regularly baby-sat for the complainant. In particular, on Friday, October 2, 1987, Colleen baby-sat for the complainant. Thereafter, the complainant behaved normally until Sunday night, October 4, when she told her father that she had something to tell him, but that she did not want to get a spanking. According to her father, she then told him that on several occasions the defendant had had her play with his \u201cburger.\u201d She indicated that a \u201cburger\u201d was a penis. Although the complainant could not set a specific time for the alleged incidents, the father concluded from subsequent discussions with her and other people that there was a good possibility that they had last occurred on October 2,1987.\nThe trial court ruled that admission of the father\u2019s testimony was subject to the requirements of section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 10). Section 115 \u2014 10 states in pertinent part that in a prosecution for a sexual act perpetrated upon a child under the age of 13, testimony of an out-of-court statement made by the child regarding any act which is an element of the offense is admissible if the child testifies at the proceeding or if there is corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 10.) Since the trial court had found the complainant incompetent to testify and the State had no evidence to corroborate the father\u2019s hearsay testimony, the effect was to exclude the evidence. Although the State argued in the trial court that the testimony in question was admissible as a spontaneous declaration, the trial court apparently believed that admission of a spontaneous declaration was also governed by section 115 \u2014 10\u2019s corroborating evidence requirement.\nIn People v. Damen (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 464, 193 N.E.2d 25, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that spontaneous declarations and corroborative statements are distinct exceptions to the rule against hearsay evidence. The appellate court in In re R.D. (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 612, 476 N.E.2d 62, held that section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure codifies the corroborative statement exception. We find no indication that in section 115 \u2014 10 the legislature also intended to restrict the admission of spontaneous declarations. Further, we find no other requirement of corroboration for admission of a spontaneous declaration. Accordingly, if the complainant\u2019s statements qualify as spontaneous declarations, they may be admitted into evidence without corroboration.\nThe record shows that at least two days passed between the complainant\u2019s last contact with the defendant and her statements to her father that the defendant had molested her. Elapsed time alone does not control the admissibility of a statement as a spontaneous declaration; the critical factor is the opportunity to fabricate, in view of whether the surrounding circumstances created the opportunity for reflection and invention. (People v. Bitler (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 477, 497 N.E.2d 137.) The trial court made no finding on this issue and it is unclear from the record whether there was an opportunity to fabricate. We therefore remand the cause with instructions for the trial court to determine in light of Bitler whether the complainant\u2019s statements are admissible as spontaneous declarations.\nThe judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with our findings.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.\nBARRY and WOMBACHER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE HEIPLE"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James T. Teros, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (Walter P. Hehner, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.",
      "Dean L. Sutton, of Lytton & Lytton, of East Moline, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL WOLFE, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201488\u20140124\nOpinion filed November 23, 1988.\nJames T. Teros, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (Walter P. Hehner, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nDean L. Sutton, of Lytton & Lytton, of East Moline, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0299-01",
  "first_page_order": 321,
  "last_page_order": 324
}